For, notwithstanding  the alleged  defect in  the service on
him of  the summons,  if he  made a  general  appearance  in  the
justice court,  he will  be bound  by that  appearance as  having
waived the  informality of the summons.  Pleas based upon lack of
jurisdiction of the person are in their nature pleas in abatement
and find  no special  favor in  the law.   They amount to no more
than the  declaration of  the defendant  that he  has had  actual
notice, is  actually in  court  in  a  proper  action,  but,  for
informality in  the service of process, is not legally before the
court.   It is  purely a  dilatory plea,  and when  the defendant
seeks to  avail himself of it, he must, for very obvious reasons,
stand upon  his naked  legal right  and seek nothing further from
the court  than the  enforcement of  that right.   He will not be
heard to  ask the court of anything further than the adjudication
upon his  plea, and  if he  does ask  anything further,  then, by
logic  of   the  fact,   he  must  necessarily  have  waived  the
irregularity of the summons before the court.  Here is one reason
for the  well-settled rule  that if  a defendant wishes to insist
upon  the  objection  that  he  is  not  in  court  for  want  of
jurisdiction over  his person,  he must specially appear for that
purpose only,  and must  keep out for all purposes except to make
that objection.   Another  reason equally  valid, is that if such
defendant shall  ask for  any relief other than that addressed to
his plea,  he is seeking to gain an unconscionable advantage over
his adversary,  whereby, if  the determination of the court be in
his favor  he must  avail himself  of it, while, if it be against
him, he  may fall back upon his plea of lack of jurisdiction over
the person.   So  it is  well settled  that if a defendant, under
such circumstances, raises any other question, or asks for relief
which  can only be granted upon the hypothesis that the court has
jurisdiction of  his person,  his appearance  is general,  though
termed special, and he thereby submits to the jurisdiction of the
court as  completely as  if he  had been  regularly  served  with
summons. (citations  omitted)   In the present case the defendant
made his  motion to  quash service  of summons.    In  this,  his
appearance was  undoubtedly special, as he limited it solely to a
request for  specific relief.    But  he  also  demurred  to  the
jurisdiction of  the court  over his  person and over the subject
matter of  the action.   In  this case  plainly a demurrer to the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction over his person could not lie.
If in  any conceivable  case it  could lie,  such a demurrer also
would be  treated as  a special  appearance.   But here  he  went
further and  demurred to  the jurisdiction  of the court over the
subject-matter of  the action,  a request  for relief  which  the
court could  not grant  him, saving  upon the  theory that he was
regularly before the court.  It was relief, moreover, independent
and apart  from his  plea to the jurisdiction of the person, and,
if successful,  would have  worked a dismissal of the action upon
an entirely  distinct legal  ground.   That in  so  demurring  he
waived the  question  of  the  jurisdiction  of  his  person  and
submitted himself  to the jurisdiction of the court is abundantly
settled. ( Code of Civ. Proc., sec. 1014; Zobel v Zobel, 151 Cal.
98 [90 Pac. 191]

             [Olcese v. Justice Court, 156 Cal. 82, 87-88 (1909)]

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Olcese v. Justice Court