MEMO
TO: Michelle Knight
FROM: Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Private Attorney General
DATE: March 8, 2001 A.D.
SUBJECT: Document by Anthony Hargis entitled
“Law Suit to Void Social Security Number”
I am writing to respond to the document you sent entitled “Law Suit to Void Social Security Number”. I find a number of legal and theoretical errors in this document, which should be corrected before any lawsuit commences.
#1: The way to understand the phrase “U.S. Individual Income Tax Return” is to separate the term “U.S. Individual” from the rest of the phrase. This phrase does not refer to “Individual Income”; it refers to “U.S. Individuals”! Compare this term with the comparable definition of “United States person” in the Internal Revenue Code. Since the income tax provisions of the Internal Revenue code are municipal law, the term “U.S.” here means “federal zone”. Thus, a “U.S. Individual” is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and a “U.S. Individual Income Tax Return” is an Income Tax Return for U.S. Individuals.
#2: The term “individual” is clearly defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, and it is not problematic, in and of itself, contrary to assertions in the document. The term “individual” as such does not refer to a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. Read that definition for yourself, and you will see what I mean. It is the qualifier “U.S.” which is problematic, because the Hooven case held that “United States” has three different meanings in American law. On this point, please note that the term “United States” has now been removed from Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition! That should tell you a lot. The term “United States” is perhaps THE single most important term used in the U.S. Constitution, and the latest edition of the official law dictionary throughout America has blatantly REMOVED the definition of this crucial term.
#3: It is not entirely “obvious” that we are not aliens. If we are talking about Paris, then Americans are certainly aliens with respect to France. Moreover, and less obviously, we are also aliens with respect to the municipal laws of every other State, including also the District of Columbia. Frank Brushaber was identified as a nonresident alien by Treasury Decision 2313, and he was a Citizen of New York and resident of Brooklyn. That Treasury Decision has never been amended or repealed.
#4: On the other hand, the document is correct to ask if we are all U.S. citizens (read “federal citizens”). Our research database has amassed quite enough cases now to prove, beyond any doubt, that there are two classes of citizens in America, and that one may join only one of those 2 classes without necessarily joining the other. In this sense, these 2 classes are independent of each other. This ability to choose between these two classes was termed our “Right of Election” by the Maine Supreme Court, just after the Dred Scott decision; in current language, that “Right” is more commonly called our “freedom of choice”. The term “U.S. citizen” can only mean one of those two classes; otherwise, it is ambiguous and all laws and regulations which utilize that term are null and void for vagueness. You will note that the Internal Revenue Code consistently uses the term “citizen of the United States” (lower-case “c”), as do many other federal laws.
#5: The 1866 Civil Rights Act is federal municipal law. The pertinent cases have held that federal citizenship, as created by that Act, is a federal municipal franchise. My book “The Federal Zone” goes into federal municipal law in great detail. Think of this status as a corporation: Congress reaps the profits from exercising this franchise. This view is the best one, because it is by far the simplest one. The simplest solution is always the best solution. Confer at “Occam’s Razor” in any good dictionary of the English language.
#6: The so-called 14th amendment never “constitutionalized” the 1866 Civil Rights Act, nor was it even declaratory of any existing laws, because that “amendment” was never properly ratified. See Dyett v. Turner, Utah Supreme Court (1968), in which that court recited unrebutted historical facts proving that it was not ratified. They did it again in State v. Phillips, in 1975. Those historical facts are governed by the Full Faith and Credit Clause, because they are, in many cases, the Acts of State Legislatures which voted for or against that proposed amendment. Since the 1866 Civil Rights Act is merely an Act of Congress, which was never raised to “constitutional” status, Congress can easily alter, amend, or repeal that Act. Thus, the document errs again by stating that a certain passage from this Act is “beyond the power of Congress or courts to alter”. Not so!
#7: The document errs again by stating that the 1866 Civil Rights Act “… gave to [freed black slaves] only Article iv, section two ‘privileges and immunities’.” This is not correct either. The Privileges and Immunities Clause at Article IV, Section 2 is part of the organic U.S. Constitution, and its wording clearly refers only to State Citizens -- the only class of Citizens which existed when the U.S. Constitution was first ratified. See Pannill v. Roanoke for an excellent definitive, and dispositive ruling on this point (paraphrasing: federal citizens were not even contemplated when the organic Constitution was first being drafted). Another good authority on this point is Ex parte Knowles, decided in 1855 by the California Supreme Court, which held that there was no such thing as a “citizen of the United States” as of that date! Keeping the pertinent history straight will build a better legal foundation, for many purposes.
#8: It is obvious that the so-called 14th amendment is referring to a second class of citizens, because it contains its own “privileges and immunities” clause (in addition to several other reasons, like the notorious section 1). There would never have been any need for a second such “privileges and immunities” clause, if the freed black slaves had been admitted to State Citizenship after the Dred Scott decision. They were not. Had they been admitted to State Citizenship after the Dred Scott case, they would automatically have been protected by Article IV, Section 2 (the organic Privileges and Immunities Clause), without any need for a second privileges and immunities clause in an entirely new “amendment”. By the way, another way to prove that the so-called 14th amendment was “bad law” is the sheer amount of litigation it has generated; much of that litigation was the result of all the confusion it caused. See, for example, the Slaughter House Cases!
#9: Congress could easily have proposed an amendment different from the 14th, using language similar to the 15th Amendment, e.g. “The status of Citizen of the United States [sic] shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State, on account of race.” Congress did not. (In point of historical fact, Congress circa 1868 was dominated by maniacal “Radical Republicans.” Witness the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson, for vetoing the Reconstruction Acts.) Notice that I here use the exact terminology as found in the Qualifications Clauses (i.e. the Constitutional qualifications for Representative, Senator and President). Copies of the U.S. Constitution are demonstrably erroneous if they utilize a lower-case “c” in the Qualifications Clauses (1:2:2, 1:3:3, and 2:1:5 -– the only federal elected offices).
#10: What Congress did do, however, was to create a municipal franchise which gave the freed black slaves a terrible choice: either consent to becoming a subject of the District of Columbia, or go back to Africa. Congress also committed a massive fraud upon all subsequent generations, by using a lower-case “c” in “citizen of the United States”, to confuse everyone into equating this term with the comparable term in the Qualifications Clauses. In those Clauses, the term “United States” means “States United” and “Citizen of the United States” means “Citizen of ONE OF the States United”. See People v. De La Guerra, for authority. Similarly, the original Northwest Ordinance clarifies the matter considerably by using “one of” in this context. On the other hand, in the 1866 Civil Rights Act the term “citizen of the United States” means “citizen of the federal zone” (lower-case “c”). Remember, Congress cannot re-define any terms found in the U.S. Constitution: “Congress … cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised.” Eisner v. Macomber. This is obviously a very B-I-G holding, which remains on the books today.
#11: Clearly, all of resulting confusion would have been avoided entirely if Congress had utilized the term “federal citizen” instead of the term “citizen of the United States” [sic]. Confer at “Federal citizenship” in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition. The very existence of this legal definition is extremely condemning of the Congress circa 1866 and ever since then (not to mention the courts), in this well documented conspiracy to render all Americans “subject” to federal municipal law. Are you subject to Nebraska State laws? If not, why not? Was this the “conspiracy” to which JFK alluded in his legendary comments to an eastern university just before he died? I now think so.
#12: The inferences which the document draws from these subtle errors are necessarily incorrect. A blatant example is the statement that “one kind of citizen has no standing relative to the Bill of Rights while the other does,” citing Jones v. Temmer. American courts are certainly not infallible, and their pattern of errors is becoming more obvious with time. The writer needs to know when the courts have erred; this is one of those cases. Similarly, another blatant example is the statement that “if we want standing relative to the Bill of Rights, we must have white-citizen status.” I realize that there may be several court cases which have attempted to materialize such doctrines, and I realize that many so-called “patriots” are doing everything they can to perpetuate inferior status for minority races like the black race, but it does not take much to prove these doctrines wrong -- both legally wrong and morally wrong. Even if it were difficult to prove these doctrines wrong, they are still wrong. Here’s the proof (you decide if this proof is easy, or difficult to understand):
#13: Much confusion can be avoided by resting on fundamentals:
First, the cases prove that the 1866 Civil Rights Act was, and still is, federal municipal law, and federal citizenship is a federal municipal franchise. A clear and unambiguous case is Roa v. Collector, which ruled that citizenship, strictly speaking, is a term of municipal law! Thus, the term “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” is best translated to mean “subject to the municipal jurisdiction of Congress” (read “federal zone”, a term which was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Lopez). This view is as powerful as it is simple: federal citizens from the federal zone; State Citizens from the state zone!
Second, the historical record proves that the so-called 14th amendment was never ratified. Thus, it is not authority for anything, least of all the notions that all Americans are federal citizens, or that federal citizens are necessarily Citizens of any State in which they might reside. Since federal citizenship is a municipal franchise, it cannot be a “national” status, e.g. citizen of the nation (like an umbrella arching from coast to coast). Congress has absolutely no authority whatsoever to legislate such a status into existence, any more than it can create a “national” corporation. On this point, the Indiana Supreme Court has already ruled that Congress can only create a corporation in its capacity as the legislature for the federal zone; to do otherwise invades the province of the 50 States, reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment (i.e. to create their own corporations).
Third, racial discrimination by American governments is now outlawed by two human rights treaties: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both of which are rendered supreme Law by the Supremacy Clause. These two treaties enjoy a status that is comparable to the Bill of Rights, although treaty amendments do not require the consent of three-fourths of the several States. Thus, American courts are truly compelled to remain “color blind” in all civil and criminal adjudications; Congress is truly compelled to remain “color blind” in all laws it may enact. Legal “apartheid” can no longer be sustained by any valid legal argument. Accordingly, American courts are thereby barred from elevating the white race to any “superior” status of any kind, or from relegating any minority races to “inferior” status of any kind, notwithstanding the failed ratification of the so-called 14th amendment. Why? Answer: Because the human rights treaties are supreme Law, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. Like it or not, racial discrimination violates the supreme Law in America, and courts cannot sustain racial discrimination in any decisions they might make.
Fourth, the Bill of Rights can and must be applied to all federal municipal laws, because Congress expressly extended the U.S. Constitution into D.C. in 1871, and then again into all federal Territories in 1873. (The only areas thus far omitted from these extension statutes are the federal enclaves inside the 50 States, but a very convincing argument can be made that they are necessarily political subdivisions of D.C.) The original Social Security Act of 1935 is also federal municipal law. I understand that a doctrine has developed under the holding in Downes v. Bidwell circa 1901, that the U.S. Constitution did not apply to federal municipal law; this doctrine was reinforced by the holding in Hooven & Allison v. Evatt -- paraphrasing: the guarantees of the Constitution extend to the federal zone, only as Congress makes those guarantees applicable. Well, Congress has already extended the entire U.S. Constitution into D.C. in 1871 and into all federal Territories in 1873, by enacting laws which the federal government has simply ignored at its own great peril; so, the so-called “Downes Doctrine” is specious at best, and evidence of a massive criminal conspiracy among lawmakers and judges, at worst. See 18 U.S.C. 241, for the correct legal meaning of “conspiracy” as I have used it in this context (lower-case “c”).
As a general rule, it is a basic violation of the Principle of Equal Protection to treat each class of citizens differently. There are some important exceptions to this general rule: federal citizens who inhabit the federal zone have no voting Representatives or Senators in the Congress. THEY CAN’T! This result is necessitated by the fact that Congress has exclusive jurisdiction inside the federal zone, and this means that there is no State government there (and, hence, no State Citizens there either!)
Similarly, the Guarantee Clause does not require the federal government to guarantee a Republican Form of government to the federal zone; Congress is free to create a different form there, and this is exactly what Congress has done. Justice Harlan, in Downes v. Bidwell, called it a legislative democracy. An interesting amendment would be one which also requires the federal government to guarantee a Republican Form to itself. But the need for such an amendment appears to be over the heads of many college graduates (because the U.S. Constitution is simply not taught very well in American public schools, if it is even taught at all).
#14: Finally, the document errs by implying that a lawsuit is required to void a Social Security Number. This is not correct. Actual or constructive fraud can be the basis for canceling any instrument, e.g. the original SS-5 application for an SSN. Moreover, and more importantly, obtaining an SSN does not mean that we abandon our standing relative to the Bill of Rights, or that we waive all protections under the Bill of Rights. The U.S. Supreme Court has issued several rulings which set a very high standard for waivers of fundamental Rights. See, for example, Brady v. U.S.: waivers of fundamental Rights must be knowingly intelligent acts, done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Applying for an SSN obviously does not meet this extremely high standard for waivers of fundamental Rights. Moreover, the cases have held that waivers of fundamental Rights shall not ever be presumed.
Thus, it is not entirely clear what a lawsuit based on erroneous theories and assumptions is going to accomplish, particularly when the rescission of a Social Security Number can be done without a lawsuit. If the document is proposing a lawsuit whose real agenda is to re‑institute apartheid in America, and not to clarify the municipal nature of the original Social Security Act, then please count me out.
The document goes on to make other claims, which I choose not to discuss here. If you need clarification or elaboration of any of the points I have made above, please don’t hesitate to ask.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Private Attorney General