William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris
c/o General Delivery
Gadsden, Alabama state
(non-domestic zip code exempt)
In Propria Persona
All Rights Reserved Without Prejudice
DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NORTHERN JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
MIDDLE DIVISION
STATE OF ALABAMA [sic] ) Case No. CV97-H-22-M
)
Plaintiff [sic] ) 16th Cir. Case #CC-95-1083-DWS
)
v ) NOTICE OF REFUSAL FOR CAUSE
) OF ORDER REMANDING THIS ACTION
WILLIAM MICHAEL KEMP [sic], ) TO THE CIRCUIT COURT
) FOR ETOWAH COUNTY
Defendant [sic] ) Rule 201(d), 301, and 302,
) Federal Rules of Evidence
) Rule 9(b) FRCP
)
)
)
)
______________________________)
COMES NOW William Michael Kemp, Sui Juris (hereinafter
"Petitioner"), to provide formal Notice to all interested
party(s), and to demand mandatory judicial notice by this
honorable Court, pursuant to Rules 201(d), 301, and 302 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, of this, Petitioner's formal Refusal,
pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of
the alleged ORDER of the honorable James H. Hancock, Chief Judge,
United States District Court (hereinafter "Chief Judge"), issued
and filed erroneously in the instant case on January 8, 1997.
Petitioner refuses said ORDER for fraud, as is demonstrated with
particularity in the following, to wit:
Notice of Refusal for Cause: Page 1 of 10
1. Because Petitioner seeks, as is His Right, to invoke
Constitutional (Article III) judicial authority in protection of
His Rights guaranteed under the Constitution for the United
States of America, as lawfully amended ("U.S. Constitution"), and
declares that these Rights have been violated by a "Drug Task
Force" of Etowah County Alabama, which operates with a large
proportion of federal funding;
Petitioner declares that not only have His essential Rights
been violated, but also federal funds have been used to
accomplish the violation; further, these violations are the
standard practice of said "Drug Task Force."
Petitioner filed His PETITION FOR WARRANT OF REMOVAL in the
District Court of the United States ("DCUS"), Northern Judicial
District of Alabama, Middle Division, as is evident on the face
of the document. Petitioner has a receipt from a Postal Money
Order, serial number 64697148821, issued on January 6, 1997 at
United States Post Office "359530." This shows receipt by the
Clerk, District Court of the United States [sic], of the sum of
one hundred fifty dollars and no cents ($$150.00) in lawful
money, from Petitioner, whose ship-to location is in care of 2108
Lookout Street located in Gadsden, Alabama state.
2. The Chief Judge's ORDER is plainly issued from the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama, Middle Division. As mentioned supra, Petitioner's
VERIFIED PETITION was presented to the District Court of the
United States. The former is an Article IV territorial tribunal,
with territorial and subject matter jurisdiction tightly
constrained by Acts of Congress; the latter is an Article III
judicial power Court, with general jurisdiction to hear all
matters arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the
United States. Petitioner finds the Chief Judge's ORDER of Remand
to be ultra vires (without effect) on the instant case.
Jurisdiction of court may be challenged at any stage
of the proceeding, and also may be challenged after
conviction and execution of judgment by way of writ of
habeas corpus.
[U.S. v. Anderson, 60 F.Supp. 649 (D.C.Wash. 1945)]
Notice of Refusal for Cause: Page 2 of 10
3. NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOIA REQUEST
Petitioner hereby places all interested party(s) on formal
Notice of Petitioner's intent to submit a proper request under
the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") for all financial records
of the federally funded Drug Task Force of Etowah county, Alabama
state. The DCUS is the federal court of original jurisdiction to
compel production of documents requested under the FOIA, and to
enjoin the improper withholding of said documents, upon
exhaustion of requester's administrative remedies. See 5 U.S.C.
552(a)(4)(B).
4. Petitioner argues that the only competent and qualified
candidates for temporary assignment to preside on a three-judge
panel in this honorable District Court of the United States
("DCUS") are those who now preside upon the United States Court
of International Trade, which is expressly an Article III forum,
by Act of Congress. See 28 U.S.C. 251(a), to wit:
The court is a court established under article III
of the Constitution of the United States.
5. Petitioner requires a competent and qualified panel of
three federal judges to preside on this DCUS, because Citizens of
Alabama state are not presently being counted in decisions to
apportion congressional districts: they cannot register to vote;
and they also cannot serve on federal grand or petit juries,
unless they are willing to sign fraudulent voter registration
affidavits and thereby create the presumption that they have
opted into Federal citizenship. Confer at "Federal citizenship"
in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition. Petitioner hereby
explicitly exercises His fundamental Right of Election to refuse
Federal citizenship, because the "United States" [sic] has become
a criminal enterprise, as evidenced by the War on Drugs [sic] and
its municipal instrumentality, the "Drug Task Force" [sic] of
Etowah county, Alabama state. See Alabama voter registration
forms; Right of Election; jus soli; jus sanguinis.
6. The authority in Evans [See Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245
(1920), never overturned] is particularly poignant. It is
apparent to Petitioner, because of irrefutable historical
research, that all sitting Judges of the United States District
Court in America are appointed to serve in either an Article I or
in an Article IV capacity at the present time. In this capacity,
said Judges do not enjoy the explicit immunity which is found in
Article III, Section 1 ("3:1") of the Constitution for the United
States of America, as lawfully amended, to wit:
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour [sic], and
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office.
[U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 1]
Notice of Refusal for Cause: Page 3 of 10
7. Petitioner submits that one of the major reasons why
said Judges do not enjoy the explicit immunity at 3:1 is the
doctrine of territorial heterogeneity. Confer in The Federal
Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue, Fourth Edition,
previously available on the Internet via the Alta Vista search
engine; see also U.S. v. Lopez, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995):
Each of these [schools] now has an invisible
federal zone [sic] extending 1,000 feet beyond the (often
irregular) boundaries of the school property.
[Kennedy concurring]
Here, the U.S. Supreme Court utilized the term "federal zone" as
a common noun, without any citations or footnotes. The doctrine
of territorial heterogeneity, as such, is summarized as follows
in the "Conclusions" of The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of
Internal Revenue, to wit:
In exercising its exclusive authority over the
federal zone, Congress is not subject to the same
constitutional limitations that exist inside the 50
States. For this reason, the areas that are inside and
outside the federal zone are heterogeneous with respect
to each other. This difference results in a principle of
territorial heterogeneity: the areas within the federal
zone are subject to one set of rules; the areas without
(or outside) the federal zone are subject to a different
set of rules. The Constitution rules outside the zone
and inside the 50 States. The Congress rules inside the
zone and outside the 50 States. The 50 States are,
therefore, in one general class, because all
constitutional restraints upon Congress are in force
throughout the 50 States, without prejudice to any one
State. The areas within the federal zone are in a
different general class, because these same
constitutional restraints simply do not limit Congress
inside that zone.
[The Federal Zone, electronic Fifth Edition,
Conclusions]
8. In the pivotal case of Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244
(1901), which is discussed at several places in the book The
Federal Zone supra, the U.S. Supreme Court established a doctrine
whereby the Constitution of the "United States", as such, does
not extend beyond the limits of the states which are united by
and under it. This doctrine of territorial heterogeneity is now
commonly identified as the "Downes Doctrine."
9. This doctrine has been reinforced by subsequent
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, notably, the case of Hooven
& Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), in which the high Court
ruled that the guarantees of the Constitution extend to the
federal zone only as Congress has made those guarantees
applicable. The United States District Courts ("USDC") are
currently established by Congress as territorial (federal zone)
courts, with constitutional authority emanating from Article IV,
Section 3, Clause 2, to wit:
Notice of Refusal for Cause: Page 4 of 10
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needed Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States; ....[U.S. Constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 3, Cl. 2]
10. There is a distinct and definite difference between a
"United States District Court" and a "District Court of the
United States". The words "District Court of the United States"
commonly describe constitutional courts created under Article III
of the Constitution, not the legislative courts which have long
been the courts of the Territories. See International
Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342
U.S. 237 at 241 (1952), 72 S.Ct. 235, 96 L.Ed. 275, 13 Alaska
536.
11. The term "District Court of the United States" commonly
describes Article III courts or "courts of the United States",
and not legislative courts of the territories. See American
Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511 (1828), 7 L.Ed
242; International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union v.
Wirtz, 170 F.2d 183 (9th Cir., 1948), cert. den. 336 U.S. 919, 93
L.Ed. 1082, 69 S.Ct. 641, reh. den. 336 U.S. 971, 93 L.Ed 1121,
69 S.Ct. 936.
12. Though the judicial system set up in a territory of the
United States is a part of federal jurisdiction, the phrase
"court of the United States" when used in a federal statute is
generally construed as not referring to "territorial courts."
See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 at 312 (1921), 42 S.Ct.
343, 66 L.Ed. 627. In Balzac, the High Court stated:
The United States District Court is not a true United
States court established under Article III of the
Constitution to administer the judicial power of the
United States therein conveyed. It is created by virtue
of the sovereign congressional faculty, granted under
Article IV, Section 3, of that instrument, of making all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory
belonging to the United States. The resemblance of its
jurisdiction to that of true United States courts in
offering an opportunity to nonresidents of resorting to a
tribunal not subject to local influence, does not change
its character as a mere territorial court.
13. The distinction within the dual nature of the federal
court system is also noted in Title 18 U.S.C. 3241, which states
that the United States District Court for the Canal Zone shall
have jurisdiction "concurrently with the district courts of the
United States, of offenses against the laws of the United States
committed upon the high seas."
Notice of Refusal for Cause: Page 5 of 10
14. This honorable Court is directed to one of the great
masters of U.S. Constitution, Chief Justice John Marshall,
writing in the year 1828. Here, Justice Marshall makes a very
clear distinction between judicial courts, authorized by Article
III, and legislative (territorial) courts, authorized by Article
IV. Marshall even utilizes some of the exact wording of Article
IV to differentiate those courts from Article III "judicial
power" courts, as follows:
These [territorial] courts then, are not
Constitutional courts, in which the judicial power
conferred by the Constitution on the general government
can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it.
They are legislative courts, created in virtue of the
general rights of sovereignty which exists in the
government, or in virtue of that clause which enables
Congress to make all needful rules and regulations,
respecting the territory belonging to the United States.
The jurisdiction with which they are invested, is not a
part of that judicial power which is defined in the 3d
article of the Constitution, but is conferred by
Congress, in the execution of those general powers which
that body possesses over the territories of the United
States. Although admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised
in the States in those courts only which are established
in pursuance of the 3d article of the Constitution, the
same limitation does not extend to the territories. In
legislating for them, Congress exercises the combined
powers of the general and of the State government.
[American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton], [1
Pet. 511 (1828)]
Other supporting authorities now follow, to wit:
Constitutional provision against diminution of
compensation of federal judges was designed to secure
independence of judiciary.
[O'Donoghue v. U.S., 289 U.S. 516 (1933)], [headnote
2. Judges]
The term "District Courts of the United States," as
used in Criminal Appeals Rules, without an addition
expressing a wider connotation, had its historic
significance and described courts created under article 3
of Constitution, and did not include territorial courts.
[Mookini et al. v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201], [headnote 2.
Courts]
Where statute authorized Supreme Court to prescribe
Criminal Appeals Rules in District Courts of the United
States including named territorial courts, omission in
rules when drafted of reference to District Court of
Hawaii, and certain other of the named courts, indicated
that Criminal Appeals Rules were not to apply to those
[latter] courts.
[Mookini et al. v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201], [headnote 4.
Courts]
Notice of Refusal for Cause: Page 6 of 10
15. The following paragraph from Mookini is extraordinary
for several reasons: (1) it refers to the "historic and proper
sense" of the term "District Courts of the United States", (2)
it makes a key distinction between such courts and application of
their rules to territorial courts; (3) the application of the
maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius is obvious here,
namely, the omission of territorial courts clearly shows that
they were intended to be omitted:
Not only did the promulgating order use the term
District Courts of the United States in its historic and
proper sense, but the omission of provisions for the
application of the rules to the territorial courts and
other courts mentioned in the authorizing act clearly
shows the limitation that was intended.
[Mookini et al. v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201]
The words "district court of the United States"
commonly describe constitutional courts created under
Article III of the Constitution, not the legislative
courts which have long been the courts of the
Territories.
[Int'l Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union et al.
v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237 (1952)]
The phrase "court of the United States", without
more, means solely courts created by Congress under
Article III of the Constitution and not territorial
courts.
[Int'l Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union et al.
v. Wirtz, 170 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1948), headnote 1]
United States District Courts have only such
jurisdiction as is conferred by an Act of Congress under
the Constitution. U.S.C.A. Const. art. 3, sec. 2; 28
U.S.C.A. 1344]
[Hubbard v. Ammerman, 465 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir., 1972),
headnote 2. Courts]
The United States district courts are not courts of
general jurisdiction. They have no jurisdiction except
as prescribed by Congress pursuant to Article III of the
Constitution. [many cites omitted]
[Graves v. Snead, 541 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1976)]
Notice of Refusal for Cause: Page 7 of 10
Jurisdiction of court may be challenged at any stage
of the proceeding, and also may be challenged after
conviction and execution of judgment by way of writ of
habeas corpus.
[U.S. v. Anderson, 60 F.Supp. 649 (D.C.Wash. 1945)]
The United States District Court has only such
jurisdiction as Congress confers.
[Eastern Metals Corp. v. Martin], [191 F.Supp 245
(D.C.N.Y. 1960)]
16. Lastly, Petitioner hereby notoriously objects,
permanently for the record, to the evident practice of the Clerk
of Court of using a rubber stamp with the nomenclature "U.S.
District Court," when this honorable Court is the District Court
of the United States [sic] as a matter of law.
17. RELATED CASES AND INCORPORATION OF RELATED PLEADINGS
Pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Petitioner
hereby provides formal Notice to all interested party(s), and
demands mandatory judicial notice, pursuant to Rules 201(d), 301
and 302 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, of the following
related cases, in which the below mentioned pleadings have
already been served on all party(s) to those cases (if not
actually filed, or lodged, in said cases) respectively:
(1) Looker v. United States et al, DCUS West Virginia,
Northern Judicial District, Case Numbers #5:96-CR-40, #1:96-CR-
41, #1:96-CR-42, and #1:96-CR-43, REBUTTAL TO RESPONSE OF UNITED
STATES TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS UNTIL FINAL
REVIEW OF CHALLENGE TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF JURY SELECTION
AND SERVICE ACT: 28 U.S.C. 1861 et seq., which is incorporated
by reference as if set forth fully herein;
(2) People of the United States of America ex relatione
Paul Andrew Mitchell v. United States et al., DCUS Montana,
Billings Division, Case Number #CV-96-163-BLG; see attached copy
of NOTICE OF REFUSAL FOR CAUSE [cites omitted] which is
incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein;
(3) In re: Paul Andrew Mitchell Freedom of Information Act
Request, USDC Montana, Helena Division, Case Number #MCV-96-50-H-
CCL; see attached copy of NOTICE OF REFUSAL FOR CAUSE [cites
omitted] which is also incorporated by reference as if set forth
fully herein.
For the convenience of this honorable Court, Petitioner
attaches said pleadings hereto as Exhibits. Due to logistical
problems, Petitioner hereby informs this honorable Court that
said Exhibits are expected to arrive under separate cover,
transmitted to the Clerk of Court via Priority U.S. Mail by
Petitioner's Counsel of choice, Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Notice of Refusal for Cause: Page 8 of 10
SUMMARY
Petitioner is entitled to a response to His Petition from a
competent and qualified District Court of the United States
[sic], said Court to consider Petitioner's proper petition for
warrant of removal. Chief Judge Hancock is a judge of the United
States District Court, said Court having been demonstrated to
differ from the District Court of the United States. Further, he
is not qualified to sit on a proper District Court of the United
States, because his judicial compensation is currently being
diminished by federal income taxes, in violation of Article III,
Section 1, of the U.S. Constitution, and in violation of the
pivotal holding in Evans v. Gore, which requires competent and
qualified federal judges, whose compensation(s) are not currently
being diminished by federal income taxes, for the District Court
of the United States. See Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920)
(never overturned).
VERIFICATION
I, William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris, hereby declare, under
penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of
America, without the "United States", and under knowledge of the
law forbidding false witness before God and men, attest and
affirm that I have read the foregoing and know the contents
thereof, and that the same is true of My own knowledge, except
those matters herein alleged on information and belief, and as to
those matters, I believe them to be true, so help Me God,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
Dated: January 14, 1997
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Mike Kemp
______________________________________________
William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris
Citizen of Alabama state
(expressly not a federal citizen)
Notice of Refusal for Cause: Page 9 of 10
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under
penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of
America, without the "United States", that I am at least eighteen
years of age, a Citizen of one of the United States of America,
and that I personally served the following document(s):
NOTICE OF REFUSAL FOR CAUSE
OF ORDER REMANDING THIS ACTION
TO THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR ETOWAH COUNTY
Rules 201(d), 301, and 302 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first
class United States mail, with postage prepaid and properly
addressed to the following:
Clerk of Court Solicitor General
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals Department of Justice
c/o P.O. Box 301555 10th and Constitution, N.W.
Montgomery, Alabama state Washington, D.C.
James E. Hedgspeth, Jr. Clerk of Court
Etowah County Offices District Court of the U.S. [sic]
c/o 800 Forrest Avenue c/o 1729 Fifth Avenue North
Gadsden, Alabama state Birmingham, Alabama state
Clerk of Court Attorney General
Circuit Court of Etowah County Department of Justice
c/o 800 Forrest Avenue 10th and Constitution, N.W.
Gadsden, Alabama state Washington, D.C.
Executed on January 14, 1997
/s/ Mike Kemp
_________________________________________________
William Michael, Kemp, Sui Juris
Citizen of Alabama state
(expressly not a federal citizen)
all Rights reserved without prejudice
Notice of Refusal for Cause: Page 10 of 10
# # #
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Alabama v. Kemp