COMPLAINT FORM
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AND DISABILITY
MAIL THIS FORM TO THE CLERK, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, P.O.
BOX 193939, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94119-3939/tdc. MARK THE
ENVELOPE "JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT COMPLAINT" OR "JUDICIAL DISABILITY
COMPLAINT". DO NOT PUT THE NAME OF THE JUDGE OR MAGISTRATE ON
THE ENVELOPE.
SEE RULE 2(e) FOR THE NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED FOR FILING.
1. Complainant's name: Paul Andrew, Mitchell
Address: c/o 2509 North Campbell Avenue, #1776
Tucson [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE
Daytime telephone: (520) 323-3921
(leave message on voice mail)
2. Judge or magistrate complained about:
Name: William D. Browning
United States District Judge
Court: United States District Court
Tucson, Arizona state
3. Does this complaint concern the behavior of the judge or
magistrate in a particular lawsuit or lawsuits?
( X ) Yes ( ) No
If "yes" give the following information about each lawsuit
(use the reverse side if there is more than one):
Court: United States District Court
Docket Number: 95-484-TUC
Are (were) you a party or lawyer in the lawsuit?
( ) Party ( X ) Counsel ( ) Neither
If party, give the name, address, and telephone number of
your Counsel:
n/a
Judicial Complaint Against William D. Browning: Page 1 of 6
Docket numbers of any appeals to the Ninth Circuit:
Notice of appeal was filed before trial, but Mr.
Browning refused to stay the trial, and ruled that
Notice of Appeal could not be processed until after
sentencing. Defendant Sheila Wallen objected timely.
4. Have you filed any lawsuits against the judge or magistrate?
( ) Yes ( X ) No (Client has, however.)
If yes, give the following information about each lawsuit
(use the reverse side if there is more than one):
Court: District Court of the United States
Judicial District of Arizona
Present status of suit:
My client, Sheila Terese Wallen, served Formal Notice
and Demand upon Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, to prepare and present to the
Chief Justice of the United States a certificate of
necessity that the Chief Justice designate and assign
temporarily a competent and qualified judge from the
Court of International Trade to perform judicial duties
in the District Court of the United States, pursuant to
authorities in 28 U.S.C. 293, 296, 297, 461(b), and
Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920). Her action cannot
proceed without a competent and qualified judge to sit
on the District Court of the United States.
Name, address, and telephone number of your Counsel:
n/a
Court to which any appeal has been taken:
(see above)
Docket number of appeal:
none
Present status of appeal:
none
5. On separate sheets of paper, no larger than the paper this
form is printed on, describe the conduct or the evidence of
disability that is the subject of this complaint. See rule
2(b) and 2(d). Do not use more than 5 pages (5 sides).
Most complaints do not require that much.
see attached
Judicial Complaint Against William D. Browning: Page 2 of 6
6. You should either:
(1) check the first box below and sign this form in
the presence of a notary public; or
(2) check the second box and sign the form. You do
not need a notary public if you check the second
box.
( ) I swear (affirm) that --
(X) I declare under penalty of perjury --
I have read rules 1 and 2 of the Rules of the
Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit Governing
Complaints of Judicial Misconduct or Disability,
and the statement made in this complaint are true
and correct to the best of my knowledge.
/s/ Paul Mitchell
________________________________________________
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness, and
Counselor at Law
All Rights Reserved Without Prejudice
Executed on: September 16, 1996
copies: Judge Alex Kozinski, Ninth Circuit
U.S. Marshals, Tucson, Arizona
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Tucson, Arizona
Attorney General, State of Arizona
Governor Fife Symington, State of Arizona
Sheila Terese Wallen, Arivaca, Arizona state
Judicial Complaint Against William D. Browning: Page 3 of 6
Attachment to Complaint of Judicial Misconduct
1. Mr. Browning agreed -- before trial, on record, and before a
gallery of witnesses -- to guarantee all of Sheila Wallen's
fundamental Rights during said trial. He then refused to
allow Her to enjoy the assistance of Her Counsel of Choice,
by ordering Mr. Paul Andrew Mitchell to the back seat of the
gallery, where Mr. Mitchell was forced to stay during the
entire course of the trial and was prevented by U.S.
Marshals from communicating with Miss Wallen. Mr. Mitchell
was allowed to speak with Miss Wallen only during recess
periods. Mr. Browning had been previously briefed, in
detail, as to the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938), which held that
a criminal defendant is entitled to the assistance of
Counsel at every step in the proceedings, and if the trial
court fails to ensure that this assistance is available at
every step in the proceedings, then the trial court ousts
itself of jurisdiction. Mr. Browning did not care about
this Supreme Court precedent; Mr. Browning does not believe
that U.S. Supreme Court decisions have any legal
significance. Denial of effective assistance of Counsel is
a criminal deprivation of a fundamental Right under color of
law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 242, and perjury of oath, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. 1621. In My opinion, this matter is
serious enough to be brought to the attention of a qualified
federal grand jury, one whose members are chosen randomly
from a pool that includes State Citizens too, not just
federal citizens.
2. When presented with an Affidavit of Circumstances
Surrounding the Arrest of Sheila Wallen, and also with a
comprehensive Motion to Stay Proceedings pending final
resolution of Sheila Wallen's challenge to the
constitutionality of the Jury Selection and Service Act,
complete with a very detailed Sworn Statement of facts
supporting said Motion, Mr. Browning received these
pleadings at approximately 3:00 p.m. on Wednesday afternoon,
July 17, 1996; Mr. Browning then ruled on these pleadings,
wrote his Order on the same day, placed his Order in U.S.
Mail, and it was delivered to Sheila Wallen's post office 70
miles away in Arivaca, Arizona, by 11:00 a.m. the following
morning, Thursday, July 18, 1996. It was impossible for Mr.
Browning to have read all of these pleadings in such an
extremely short period of time. Furthermore, Mr. Browning's
Order ruled that Wallen's Affidavit was hearsay, and that
there was nothing in the Stay Motion and accompanying Sworn
Statement of any legal significance, despite the fact that
the latter pleadings contained numerous authorities and
rulings by the United States Supreme Court. For example,
see U.S. v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 399-400 (1973), to wit:
nobody should be punished unnecessarily for relying upon the
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Refusing to file a
proper and correctly executed Affidavit violates Federal
Rules of Evidence, Rule 201(d), Mandatory Judicial Notice,
Judicial Complaint Against William D. Browning: Page 4 of 6
and constitutes obstruction of justice in violation of 18
U.S.C. 1506. Miss Wallen's Affidavit contained proof that
the alleged officers of the United States proceeded
criminally to trespass upon Wallen's private property
without a valid warrant to search and seize said property,
and to arrest Her without a valid warrant for Her arrest.
This Affidavit also contained material evidence which proves
the lack of jurisdiction of the United States District Court
over which Mr. Browning presided, since a warrant was
absolutely necessary to execute the search, seizure & arrest
in the first instance; without said warrants, Browning's
court was denied jurisdiction over the subject matter. See
Rule C of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and
Maritime Claims. This Affidavit also contains evidence of
threats, duress, extortion, and coercion by said alleged
agents of the United States, all in violation of 18 U.S.C.
872 (extortion), making Mr. Browning an accessory to all of
these crimes after the fact, in violation 18 U.S.C. 3. This
matter should be brought before a competent and qualified
federal grand jury.
3. As of 5:00 p.m. on Friday, August 30, 1996, Mr. Browning had
failed to answer Wallen's Final Notice and Demand for Proof
of Power, Standing, and Jurisdiction in the Particulars.
His failure to do so is competent evidence that neither he,
nor the court over which he was presiding, had any criminal
jurisdiction whatsoever to proceed over the case before him.
Specifically, Miss Wallen demanded: (1) proof that the
alleged U.S. Attorneys who were prosecuting Her had powers
of attorney to represent the Plaintiff "UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA"; (2) proof of the statutory, regulatory, and
constitutional authority which grants legal standing to the
"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" to bring a criminal action before
a "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT"; and (3) proof of the
statutory, regulatory, and constitutional authority which
grants jurisdiction to a "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT" as
opposed to a "DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES" to hear a
criminal case against a Union State Citizen when the alleged
crime was committed inside the state zone and outside the
federal zone. It is a principle of law that, once
challenged, the one asserting jurisdiction must prove that
jurisdiction exists as a matter of law. The proponent of a
rule carries the burden of proving its application in the
instant case. See 5 U.S.C. 556(d). For judicial support of
this principle, see in particular the following cases:
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 533; Griffin vs Matthews, 310
F.Supp. 341, 423 F.2d 272; McNutt vs. G.M., 56 S.Ct. 789,
80 L.Ed 1135; Basso vs. U.P.L., 495 F.2d 906; Thomson vs
Gaskiel, 62 S.Ct. 673, 83 L.Ed 111; Albrecht vs. U.S., 273
U.S. 1; Louisville R.R. vs Motley, 211 U.S. 149, 29 S.Ct.
42. Proceeding without jurisdiction, particularly after a
formal notice and demand for proof of jurisdiction have been
completely ignored, is a criminal denial of due process of
law, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and 18 U.S.C. 242.
This matter should be brought before a competent and
qualified federal grand jury.
Judicial Complaint Against William D. Browning: Page 5 of 6
4. Mr. Browning also "DENIED" two pleadings by Miss Wallen
filed in the form of a Notice and Demand for Mandatory
Judicial Notice, pursuant to Rule 201(d) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. A federal judge has absolutely no
discretion in the matter of mandatory judicial notice. The
rule itself is very clear on this point: "when MANDATORY."
Refusing to file material evidence, and proper and correctly
executed demands for mandatory judicial notice of said
evidence, violates Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 201(d),
Mandatory Judicial Notice, and constitutes obstruction of
justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1506. Miss Wallen was
forced to refuse Mr. Browning's DENIAL Order for fraud. The
proper method for excluding said evidence is for the
opposing party to move the court to strike the evidence;
this was not done by the opposing party, or by any of their
officers, agents, or employees. Claiming to have "DENIED"
Miss Wallen's Notices and Demands for Mandatory Judicial
Notice, absent a proper Motion to Strike by the opposing
party, is proof that Mr. Browning engaged in the practice of
law, a high misdemeanor in violation of 28 U.S.C. 454. This
matter should be brought before a competent and qualified
federal grand jury.
5. Criminal conduct by a United States District Judge, while
presiding over any case, whether it be civil or criminal, is
conduct which is prejudicial to the effective and
expeditious administration of the business of the federal
courts. "No higher duty rests upon this court than to exert
its full authority to prevent all violation of the
principles of the Constitution." Harlan dissenting in
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), emphasis added. A
competent and qualified federal grand jury should be given
the opportunity to investigate probable criminal conduct by
William D. Browning in this case, and in others of which I
am aware.
Judicial Complaint Against William D. Browning: Page 6 of 6
c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776
Tucson [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE
July 25, 1996
Mr. William D. Browning
44 East Broadway
Tucson [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE
Re: U.S.A. v. Wallen, Case No. 95-484-WDB
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE AND DEMAND
Dear Mr. Browning:
I am Citizen of Arizona state, a Counselor at Law, and a
part-time student of comparative economic history. I recently
had a lawful contract obligation to attend a court trial over
which you presided. That obligation arose from a contract for
consideration paid in lawful money, i.e. silver dollars. During
that trial, the question of your authority was raised, and you
answered that your authority was the Constitution and laws of the
United States.
It is My understanding that the Constitution for the United
States of America, as lawfully amended, contains a provision
which prevents federal officers from impairing the obligation of
contracts. This provision is in the Constitution as published in
federal depository libraries, and in the official law books upon
which district courts rely for conclusive evidence of the Law.
This Constitution clearly forbids titles of nobility. See
Article I, Section 10, Clause 1. It is My contention, based on
diligent research, that any license is construed by American
courts to be a title of nobility, which is forbidden by this
provision. However, no penalties were mentioned by this
provision and it is for this reason, I believe, that no penalties
currently attach to the exercise of licenses issued by the state
and federal governments. It was the lack of penalties which
motivated Congress to cure this oversight with a proposal to
amend the Constitution with penalties for exercising titles of
nobility.
My research has also uncovered a constitutional amendment,
ratified by the Union states in the year 1819, which penalizes
the exercise of titles of nobility with a forfeiture of
citizenship and with a disqualification from ever serving in any
public office in America (see attached). This Amendment is the
main reason why I am not now a licensed bar member, and have no
intention of ever becoming a licensed bar member, because I do
not want to forfeit My Arizona state Citizenship, and I would
like to serve in public office some day.
Constructive Notice and Demand: Page 1 of 4
This Amendment supersedes any state "practice of law"
statutes, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, to the extent that
those statutes require the exercise of any titles of nobility.
Moreover, with or without this Amendment, it is My opinion that
membership in a bar association would require that I violate not
only My personal code of conduct, but also numerous provisions in
the Constitution for the United States of America, as lawfully
amended, including but not limited to the Sixth and Tenth
Amendments, and other laws of the United States, including but
not limited to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
Such membership prevents me from diligently protecting the
fundamental Rights of My clients. My first loyalty is to My
Creator, to Myself, My Family, the Citizenship of My state, and
then to My clients and their fundamental Right to maintain that
very same loyalty. Bar membership reverses these priorities and
flatly violates this loyalty, because it requires loyalty to the
court, to the bar, to public policy contrary to the Constitution,
and lastly to My clients, in that order. These priorities
violate the doctrine of separation of powers and, more
importantly, My clients' fundamental Rights.
Accordingly, I have the following important questions for
you, sir: Was the original Thirteenth Amendment a provision in
the Constitution which you took an oath to support, or was it
not? Under rules of equity, I assert My fundamental Right to
know what provisions are in the Constitution which you took an
oath to support. This is matter of your contract with Me.
If you have ever exercised a title of nobility in America,
e.g. esquire, lawyer, attorney, Honor, then the original
Thirteenth Amendment is a constitutional authority which has
disqualified you from ever serving in the office of federal
judge, is it not? Judges occupy public offices, do they not?
I am asking this question specifically because of your
decisions to bar me from assisting My client, Sheila Terese
Wallen, at all times during Her recent criminal trial on charges
of illegal marijuana possession with intent to distribute same.
In fact, you ordered me to the back row of the gallery, with U.S.
Marshals standing between Me and My client, preventing any
communication with My client.
If you have, in fact, taken an oath to support the
Constitution, and the administrative record does appear to
support this fact, does that Constitution not also contain a
provision which bars you from impairing the obligation of
contracts? See Contracts Clause. I had a lawful contract with
Sheila Terese Wallen, and you impaired that contract.
My contract with Sheila was predicated upon My belief that
your oath of office placed you in a valid contract with Me. By
what specific lawful authority do you claim any Right to impair
the obligations of My contract with Sheila Terese Wallen? If you
are upholding the U.S. Constitution, then My contract with Her is
valid and enforceable, under rules of equity, and you are
forbidden from doing anything to impair that contract.
Constructive Notice and Demand: Page 2 of 4
I will look forward to your timely response to this letter.
If I do not hear from you in writing within ten (10) working days
from the date of this letter, I will proceed on the basis of the
conclusive presumption that the original Thirteenth Amendment was
not in the Constitution which you took an oath to support.
I will stipulate that your oath predates the publication of
recent research proving that the original Thirteenth Amendment
has been well hidden from public knowledge (i.e. fraud).
Nevertheless, the original Thirteenth Amendment was lawfully
ratified, pursuant to Article V. This ratification has been
proven conclusively.
Therefore, you are now in the wrong contract with the
American People, because the Constitution which you took an oath
to support does not contain the original Thirteenth Amendment, as
evidenced by the Constitution as it was published in federal
depository libraries, and as it was published in the official law
books upon which district courts relied for conclusive evidence
of the Law, on the day you took your original oath of office.
Furthermore, you are disqualified from serving as a federal
judge for these and other reasons, because you have exercised one
or more titles of nobility or honor (e.g. "Honor", "Esquire")
since ratification of that Amendment. The original Thirteenth
Amendment does not contain any provisions for curing such a
disability or regaining your Citizenship. Your only defense now
is that you, too, were victimized by fraudulent concealment of
this Amendment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1001.
Whether or not the original Thirteenth Amendment was a
provision in the Constitution which you took an oath to support,
the Contracts Clause has been in the organic U.S. Constitution
since its original ratification. You, sir, simply cannot impair
the Right of Contract, pursuant to an explicit prohibition which
is in that Constitution.
One last point: when exactly did the decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court become "hearsay," without any legal significance?
You ruled as such on July 17, 1996, in Sheila's case. I really
would like to know, for reasons which should be obvious to anyone
who claims to be a federal judge with expertise in federal law.
Are these decisions which you heard Supreme Court Justices say?
Does that make them "hearsay", in your opinion? If not, then
what does? Before I take any remedial action on this point, I
must have your explanation for what now appears to be gross
judicial misconduct on your part.
If you wish to rebut the presumptions which I have presented
to you in this letter, then please do so. I would welcome them,
sincerely. For the record, I am presenting these facts and laws
to you, pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 1986.
Thank you very much for your careful consideration, and I
will look forward to your timely response to this CONSTRUCTIVE
NOTICE AND DEMAND, before 10 days transpire.
Constructive Notice and Demand: Page 3 of 4
Respectfully yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state and federal witness
all rights reserved without prejudice
copies: Clerk of Court
Sheila Terese, Wallen, Sui Juris
Judge Alex Kozinski, Ninth Circuit
Joelyn Marlowe, Esquire
U.S. Marshal's office
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Constructive Notice and Demand: Page 4 of 4
MEMO
TO: Cathy A. Catterson
Clerk of Court
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 193939
San Francisco, California state
FROM: Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Counselor at Law
DATE: March 14, 1997
SUBJECT: Complaint of Judicial Misconduct No. #96-80337
against William D. Browning, USDC, Tucson
Please incorporate this letter, My attached letter to USDC Judge
William D. Browning dated July 25, 1996, and My Notice of Intent
to File a Criminal Complaint dated September 20, 1996, into the
docket file which has been assigned judicial misconduct complaint
number #96-80337 against Judge Browning.
Because I have heard absolutely nothing from the Ninth Circuit,
or from any other government personnel in this matter, I
respectfully request some action on this complaint, which is now
six months old.
As I have already written in a previous letter to you, inquiring
about the unexplained delay(s) in processing My judicial
complaint against John M. Roll, the Chief Judge is required to
give such complaints his expeditious attention. I do not think
you could find anyone in America to preside on a jury who would
conclude that one-half year is expeditious. Do you?
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Counselor at Law and federal witness
c/o 2509 N. Campbell Avenue, #1776
Tucson, Arizona state
email: pmitch@primenet.com (586/Eudora Pro 3.0:
preferred, to conserve all resources)
phone: (520) 320-1514 (private line:
please get permission to disclose)
fax machine: (520) 320-1256 (dedicated hard copy:
available 24-hours per day or night)
fax modem: (520) 320-1513 (dedicated email line:
please call phone to switch software)
web site: http://www.supremelaw.com
copy: Procter Hug, Chief Judge
p.s. Please have someone tell Judge Browning to stop picking his
nose during court proceedings.
# # #
c/o 2509 N. Campbell, #1776
Tucson [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE
September 20, 1996
NOTICE OF INTENT
TO FILE A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
AGAINST WILLIAM D. BROWNING
Clerk of Court
United States District Court
55 East Broadway
Tucson, Arizona state
Subject: Criminal Complaint against
Mr. William D. Browning
Dear Clerk:
This is My formal Notice of Intent to File a Criminal
Complaint against Mr. William D. Browning, currently employed by
the United States federal government, for criminal misconduct
described in the attached Judicial Complaint form which has
already been transmitted to the Clerk of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (see attached).
Please notify the appropriate person(s) of this formal
Notice of Intent.
NOTICE TO AGENTS IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPALS.
NOTICE TO PRINCIPALS IS NOTICE TO AGENTS.
Thank you very much for your consideration.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness
and Counselor at Law
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
copies: Governor Fife Symington, Tucson, Arizona
Attorney General, State of Arizona, Tucson
Attorney General, United States, Washington, D.C.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Tucson, Arizona
Judicial Conduct Commission, State of Arizona, Phoenix
Clerk, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, San Francisco
Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, Washington, D.C.
Speaker, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
President, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
# # #
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U.S.A. v. Wallen