Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris
c/o Forwarding Agent at:
350 – 30th Street,
Suite 444
Oakland 94609-3426
CALIFORNIA, USA
In Propria Persona
All Rights Reserved
without Prejudice
District Court of the United States
Eastern Judicial District of California
Paul Andrew
Mitchell, ) No. CIV. S-01-1480 WBS DAD PS
)
Plaintiff,
) NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR
)
TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT OF A
v. ) JUDGE OF THE COURT OF
)
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al., ) TO PRESIDE OVER THIS
)
DISTRICT COURT OF THE
Defendants.
) UNITED STATES:
______________________________) 461(b)
Greetings to You:
Judge Alex Kozinski
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
P.O. Box 91510
Pasadena 91109-1510
CALIFORNIA,
USA
Formal
NOTICE AND DEMAND are hereby respectfully made of You, Judge Kozinski, by Me,
Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, Citizen of California State, expressly not
a citizen of the United States ("federal citizen"), and Plaintiff in
the above entitled matter (hereinafter "Plaintiff"), to present to
the Chief Justice of the United States a certificate of necessity that the
Chief Justice designate and assign temporarily a competent and qualified judge
from the Court of International Trade to perform judicial duties in this
honorable District Court of the United States (“DCUS”). See 28 U.S.C. 293, 296, 297, 461(b); also Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245
(1920) (never overturned).
The
authority in Evans is particularly poignant. It is apparent to Plaintiff, because of exhaustive research which
He has completed during the past 5 years, that all sitting United States
District Judges in America are appointed to serve in either an Article I or in an Article IV capacity at the
present time. In this capacity, said
Judges do not enjoy the explicit immunity which is found in Article III,
Section 1 ("3:1")
of the Constitution for the United States of America, as lawfully amended
(hereinafter "U.S. Constitution"),
to wit:
The Judges, both of the
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,
and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
[U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 1]
[emphasis added]
Plaintiff
submits that one of the major reasons why said Judges do not enjoy the explicit
immunity at 3:1 is the
doctrine of territorial heterogeneity.
Confer in The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue,
Eleventh Edition, available from the Supreme Law Library at Internet Domain supremelaw.org/fedzone11/; see also U.S. v. Lopez, 131 L.Ed.2d
626 (1995):
Each of these [schools] now
has an invisible federal zone [sic] extending 1,000 feet beyond
the (often irregular) boundaries of the school property.
[emphasis added]
Here, in his concurring opinion in that case, Justice Kennedy utilized
this term as a household word, without any citations or footnotes, only three
(3) years after The Federal Zone was
first published. The doctrine of
territorial heterogeneity is summarized as follows in the Conclusions of The
Federal Zone, to wit:
In exercising its exclusive
authority over the federal zone, Congress is not subject to the same
constitutional limitations that exist inside the 50 States. For this reason, the areas that are inside
and outside the federal zone are heterogeneous with respect to each other. This difference results in a principle of
territorial heterogeneity: the areas within
the federal zone are subject to one set of rules; the areas without (or outside) the federal zone are
subject to a different set of rules.
The Constitution rules outside the zone and inside the 50 States. The Congress rules inside the zone and
outside the 50 States. The 50 States
are, therefore, in one general class, because all constitutional
restraints upon Congress are in force throughout the 50 States, without
prejudice to any one State. The areas
within the federal zone are in a different general class, because these
same constitutional restraints simply do not limit Congress inside that zone.
[The Federal Zone,
electronic 11th Edition, Conclusions]
In
the pivotal case of Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), which is
discussed at several places in the book The
Federal Zone supra, the U.S. Supreme Court fabricated a doctrine
whereby the Constitution of the "United States", as
such, does not extend beyond the limits of the States which are united by
and under it. This doctrine of
territorial heterogeneity is now commonly identified as the "Downes
Doctrine."
This
doctrine has been reinforced by subsequent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court,
notably, the case of Hooven & Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), in which the high
Court ruled that the guarantees of the Constitution extend to the federal zone
only as Congress has made those guarantees applicable. In Hooven supra, the
high Court also acknowledged that the term “United States” has three
(3) entirely different legal meanings.
The United States District
Courts (“USDC”) are currently
established by Congress as territorial (federal zone) courts, with
constitutional authority emanating from Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2,
to wit:
The Congress shall have
Power to dispose of and make all needed Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory
or other Property belonging to the United States; ....
[U.S. Constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 3, Cl. 2]
[emphasis added]
Plaintiff wishes to
litigate the instant case in an Article
III Court of competent jurisdiction.
In particular, Plaintiff wishes to invoke the judicial Power of the
United States, among several reasons, in order to obtain all relief
itemized in Plaintiff’s Initial
COMPLAINT as filed in the instant case.
See Article III, Section 1.
In
order for this case to proceed forward, and it is Plaintiff's fundamental Right
under the Seventh Amendment
that it do so, this honorable Court must be seated with a competent and
qualified Judge who is not subject to any undue executive or legislative
influence whatsoever.
This
means, among other things, that an Article
III judge must be designated and temporarily appointed to preside
over all proceedings in the instant case, who is not a "taxpayer" and
whose integrity and independence from all other governments and all other
government branches are unassailable and beyond question.
Plaintiff
hereby objects strenuously to the existence of any contract, either
verbal or written, either expressed or implied in fact, between any currently
seated United States District Judge and the "Internal Revenue Service" [sic]
or any other controlling interests, on grounds of conflicts of
interest. A completed Form W-4
Employee’s Withholding Allowance Certificate is an expressed, written contract.
Plaintiff
is guaranteed the fundamental right to an independent and unbiased
judiciary. See Evans v. Gore supra. The existence of a contract between the
presiding Judge and any other branch of the federal government, or any of its agencies,
assigns, or instrumentalities, is evidence of a conflict of interest and proof
of a dependent and biased judiciary.
See Lord v. Kelley, 240 F.Supp. 167, 169 (1965) and compare with Evans
v. Gore supra, to measure how far American society has degenerated
under the Downes Doctrine.
This
honorable Court will please take formal judicial notice of the holding and
the dicta in Evans, which case proves that American courts have an obligation
to rule on matters which properly come before them.
Plaintiff's NOTICE AND
DEMAND, as made herein, now comes properly before You, Sir.
For
the edification of Judge Kozinski, of this honorable Court, and of all
interested Parties, Plaintiff attaches a true and correct copy of a recent Press
Release entitled “Private
Attorney General Cracks Title 28 of the United States Code,” dated November
26, 2001 A.D., and incorporates same by reference as Attachment “A”, as if set forth fully herein.
Wherefore, Plaintiff hereby makes this formal Demand upon
You, Judge Alex Kozinski of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit:
(1) to prepare and present to the Chief Justice of
the United States a Certificate of Necessity that the Chief Justice designate
and assign temporarily a competent and qualified judge from the Article III Court of International
Trade to perform judicial duties in this honorable District
Court of the United States;
(2) to file said
Certificate in the official Court record of the instant case; and,
(3) to serve said
Certificate on all interested parties.
See PROOF OF SERVICE infra.
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, Plaintiff in the
above entitled action, hereby verify under penalty of perjury, under the laws
of the United States of America, without the “United States”
(federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and
correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and
belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
Dated: November 28, 2001 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
___________________________________________
Printed:
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A.,
M.S., Sui Juris
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby certify,
under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America,
without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18
years of age, a Citizen of ONE
OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the
following document(s):
NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT
OF A JUDGE OF THE COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
TO PRESIDE OVER THIS DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
28 U.S.C. 293, 296, 297, 461(b)
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in
first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to
the following:
Clerk of Court
District Court of the United States
501 “I” Street, Suite 4-200
Sacramento 95814-2322
CALIFORNIA, USA
Courtesy copies to:
Ropers, Majeski, Kohn & Bentley DeForest & Koscelnik
(failed to exhibit oaths) (failed to exhibit oath)
1001 Marshall Street 3000 Koppers Building
Redwood City 94063 436 Seventh Avenue
CALIFORNIA, USA Pittsburgh 15219
PENNSYLVANIA, USA
Murphy Austin Adams Schoenfeld LLP Pillsbury Winthrop LLP
(failed to exhibit oaths) (failed to exhibit oaths)
P.O. Box 1319 400 Capitol Mall, Suite 1700
Sacramento 95814-1319 Sacramento 95814-4419
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Dated: November
28, 2001 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul
Andrew Mitchell
__________________________________________________
Printed: Paul
Andrew Mitchell, Plaintiff In Propria Persona
(not “Pro Se” [sic])
Press Release:
“Private
Attorney General Cracks
Title 28 of the United States
Code”
November 26, 2001 A.D.
Private Attorney General Cracks
Title 28 of the United States Code
by
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Counselor at Law, Federal Witness
and Private Attorney General
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE November 26, 2001 A.D.
Sacramento. Paul Andrew Mitchell, the Private Attorney
General at the Supreme Law Firm and Webmaster of the Supreme Law Library on the
Internet, today announced major developments in his ongoing project to decode Title
28 ‑‑ the set of American laws that govern the federal court
system.
In a brief but direct application of this knowledge,
written for a trainee in federal litigation, Mitchell demonstrated how the
federal courts lacked original jurisdiction in the anti-trust case against the
Microsoft Corporation.
That case was allegedly brought by the “United States of
America” (or “USA”), but attorneys for the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
have no powers of attorney to represent the “USA”, as such. Willful misrepresentation is a violation of the
McDade Act at 28 U.S.C. 530B, which requires DOJ attorneys to obey State Bar
disciplinary guidelines:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/530B.html
The
federal government recently reversed its policy in the case against the
Microsoft Corporation, and is now pushing equitable settlements across the
board.
The
term “USA” is mentioned only once in Title 28 ‑‑ at section 1746 ‑‑
and there it is clearly distinguished from the “United States” ‑‑
the proper legal term that is used for the federal government throughout Title
28:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/1746.html
Mitchell’s findings have consequences that reach far beyond
the anti-trust case against Microsoft.
It is now painfully apparent that DOJ are pretending to represent
the “USA” in all civil and criminal cases, intentionally to avoid
exercising the judicial power of the United States.
Under Article III in the U.S. Constitution, this power must
be exercised in constitutional courts that guarantee cherished
fundamental Rights, like the Right to due process of law as guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment. Article III courts
must be convened to hear Controversies to which the United States is a Party
(singular).
To make matters worse, the U.S. Supreme Court has also
erred by ruling that the term “Party” as used in Article III means “Plaintiff”
but not “Defendant”. See Williams v.
United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933).
In Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, the term “Party” embraces both
plaintiffs and defendants.
By substituting the “USA” as Plaintiffs (plural), DOJ have
perpetrated a fraud by switching to legislative courts where fundamental
Rights are not guarantees, but merely privileges granted (or denied) at the
discretion of arbitrary judges, sitting on legislative tribunals. Mitchell describes these courts as operating
in legislative mode as opposed to constitutional mode.
Glaring proof of this fraud can be seen at section 132 of
Title 28. In this section, Congress
attempted to broadcast into all 50 States a territorial tribunal ‑‑
the United States District Court (“USDC”).
Congress did this under another pretense, namely, that those States
could be treated as if they were all federal Territories:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/132.html
More
than a century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court invented a false doctrine by which
the U.S. Constitution did not extend into U.S. Territories and
Possessions. Mitchell later refuted
this doctrine, after discovering two Acts of Congress that expressly extended
the U.S. Constitution into the District of Columbia in 1871 A.D., and
then into all federal Territories in 1873 A.D. See 16 Stat. 419, 426, Sec. 34;
and 18 Stat. 325, 333, Sec. 1891, respectively.
In the year 1992 A.D., Paul Mitchell authored a
popular classic book entitled The Federal
Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue. The Federal Zone is now in its
eleventh edition.
In that book, he proved that federal municipal law governs
U.S. Territories like Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands, but federal
municipal law does not extend into any of the 50 States of the
Union. The income tax statutes in the
Internal Revenue Code are federal municipal law.
Because they are not yet States of the Union, Congress is
the state legislature for all Territories, Possessions, and Enclaves like
military bases ‑‑ an area now collectively called the federal
zone. In the year 1995 A.D.,
Justice Kennedy used the term “federal zone” as a household word in his
concurring opinion in U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).
Section 132 of Title 28 is even more deceptive for
creating the false notion that the Article III District Court of the United
States (“DCUS”) was abolished, but nothing could be further from the
truth. A careful reading of section 132
reveals that the DCUS is not even mentioned in that statute.
The DCUS was never expressly abolished by any Act of
Congress, and it is still mentioned in numerous other places throughout
Title 28. Congress knows how to abolish
a court when it wants to do so. The
Ninth Circuit has also ruled that repeals by implication are not favored. Thus, for the DCUS to be abolished, a clear
Act of Congress would be required to effect that result. Whatever Congress creates, Congress must
destroy.
Another stunning application of this knowledge came
recently, when a federal criminal defendant appealed to the Ninth Circuit to
review interlocutory orders issued by the USDC. An interlocutory order is one that occurs before
final judgment is reached at sentencing after a jury verdict.
In response to Mitchell’s pleadings, the Ninth Circuit
cited a case which ruled that final judgment in a criminal case means the sentence. That citation was U.S. v. Powell, 24
F.3d. 28, 31 (9th Cir. 1994).
Then, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the defendant’s appeal for lack of
appellate jurisdiction.
Under Mitchell’s expert guidance, the defendant proved that
the Ninth Circuit has no appellate jurisdiction to review interlocutory
orders issued by the legislative USDC.
However, the Ninth Circuit does have appellate jurisdiction to review
interlocutory orders issued by the constitutional DCUS. The proof is found at 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1):
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/1292.html
Mitchell
then persuaded the defendant to request a published opinion holding that
statutes granting appellate jurisdiction must be strictly construed
also. It is already well decided that
statutes granting original jurisdiction must be strictly construed. Such a holding is a logical extension of
existing federal case law.
Clearly,
these findings expose the USDC in all 50 States as a summary tribunal
that compels criminal defendants to endure lengthy trials, conviction and
sentencing before any U.S. Court of Appeals can take jurisdiction under
the Final Judgments Act at 28 U.S.C. 1291:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/1291.html
In
closely related developments, the main culprit has now been identified as the
Act of June 25, 1948, in which Congress radically re-organized the entire
federal court system. This is the Act
of Congress that broadcasted the USDC from the federal Territories into all 50
States of the Union. This Act has now
been formally challenged for being deliberately vague, and therefore
unconstitutional.
By attempting to re-define the DCUS retroactively, this Act
also violates the ex post facto prohibition at Article I, Section 9,
Clause 3, in the U.S. Constitution.
This prohibition strictly bars Congress from enacting laws that
have any retroactive effect.
Without a clear amending statute, Congress cannot later re-define the
term “District Court of the United States” in statutes that predate June 25,
1948 A.D.
For example, the Sherman Antitrust Act was first enacted in
the year 1890 A.D., and that Act granted original jurisdiction to the
DCUS. Subsequently, the Act of June 25,
1948, did not change or otherwise amend that grant of original jurisdiction to
the DCUS. Therefore, cases enforcing
the Sherman Antitrust Act must be brought by the “United States” (not
the “USA”) in an Article III federal court proceeding in constitutional
mode. Identical results obtain from
many other federal laws, like the Securities and Exchange Acts.
Other
sections of Title 28 have already been challenged properly in court for
violating the U.S. Constitution. In
1996 A.D., in the case of a subpoena issued by a federal grand jury,
Mitchell was allowed to prove that the federal Jury Selection and Service Act
is also unconstitutional. That Act
expressly discriminates against Citizens of the 50 States ‑‑ the only
class of Citizens contemplated when Article III was being drafted, circa 1787 A.D. For definitive authority on this crucial
point, see Pannill v. Roanoke, 252 F. 910, 914.
There are now two (2) classes of citizens under American
laws that have never been repealed ‑‑ State Citizens and federal
citizens ‑‑ but only State Citizens are qualified to be federal
lawmakers. See the Qualifications
Clauses in the U.S. Constitution; the
“United States” in those provisions means “States united”.
Moreover, those Citizens who are qualified to make
federal laws cannot vote or serve on any juries, State or federal. And, those who can vote and serve on
juries are not qualified to make federal laws.
This
seriously twisted situation is due, in part, to the Act of June 25, 1948, and
related Congressional efforts to foist a legislative democracy upon all
50 States. These efforts violate the Guarantee
Clause in the U.S. Constitution. The
federal government is required by that Clause to guarantee a Republican
Form of Government to the 50 States of the Union.
Paul Andrew Mitchell can be reached at email address:
He
is currently available for speaking engagements on this, and related topics in
American constitutional law, the focus of his extensive judicial activism.
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