Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness,
Counselor at Law, and Relator
c/o 2509 N. Campbell Avenue, #1776
Tucson [zip code exempt]
ARIZONA STATE

Under Protest, Necessity, and
by Special Visitation






               DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                  JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF MONTANA

                        BILLINGS DIVISION


People of the United States ) Case No. CV-96-163-BLG
of America, ex relatione    )
Paul Andrew Mitchell,       ) NOTICE OF MOTION AND
                            ) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION;
               Petitioners, ) NOTICE OF CHALLENGE AND
                            ) CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONALITY
          vs.               ) OF FEDERAL REMOVAL STATUTES:
                            ) 28 U.S.C. 1441 thru 1451;
United States et al.,       ) Sixth Amendment:
                            ) Nature and Cause Clause;
               Respondent.  ) human rights treaties (2)
____________________________)


COME NOW  the People of the United States of America (hereinafter

"Petitioners"), ex  relatione Paul  Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.,

Citizen of  Arizona state,  federal witness, and Counselor at Law

(hereinafter "Relator"),  to request  formal  reconsideration  by

this honorable  Court  of  the  ORDER  of  Chief  Judge  Jack  D.

Shanstrom, dated  and filed in the instant case on April 8, 1997.

Petitioners submit  that  the  multitude  of  issues  which  have

already arisen  in  the  instant  case  are  likely  to  generate

controversy, at times intense, concerning the correct sequence in

which this  Court  should  address  said  issues.    Accordingly,

Petitioners have  herein chosen to address issues in the order in

which they have arisen in the ORDER of April 8, 1997.


           Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes:
                          Page 1 of 14


     At the  very top  of said  ORDER is  found the  nomenclature

"UNITED  STATES   DISTRICT  COURT"  [sic]  (hereinafter  "USDC").

Petitioners submit  that this nomenclature refers specifically to

an  Article IV territorial  tribunal, and  not to the Article III

judicial forum  which Petitioners have specifically petitioned in

the instant  case.   See caption supra.  Petitioners are entitled

to relief  that is  issued from courts of competent jurisdiction;

likewise, Petitioners  are not entitled to any relief from courts

which do  not have  competent jurisdiction.    See  International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;  Universal Declaration of

Human Rights;  due process clause in the Fifth Amendment.

     Petitioners also  submit, for  the careful  consideration of

this honorable  Court, all  pleadings  previously  filed  in  the

instant case,  as sufficient  and meritorious grounds for keeping

this all  important distinction  foremost in  the  minds  of  all

interested parties,  of all  qualified judges  who may preside in

the instant  case, and  of all  representatives of the interested

parties.  See Reservations enacted with human rights treaties.

     In particular,  the authorities in American Insurance Co. v.

356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511 (1828), 7 L.Ed 242, and Balzac v.

Porto Rico  [sic], 42 S.Ct. 343, 258 U.S. 298 at 312, 66 L.Ed 627

(1921), should  provide more  than enough proof to this honorable

Court that  the USDC  has  territorial  jurisdiction  within  the

federal zone,  and the  DCUS has  territorial jurisdiction within

the state zone.  Montana state is within the state zone.

     Numerous other  court authorities have already been cited in

the instant  case, and  the Respondents  have failed to rebut, or

even to respond in any way.  Petitioners now argue that the total

silence by  Respondents on  this  point  now  activates  estoppel

against Respondents.  See Carmine v. Bowen, 64 A. 932 (1906).


           Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes:
                          Page 2 of 14


     Accordingly, it  is apparent to Petitioners that any ORDER's

which may  be issued  from the  USDC in the instant case are null

and void  ab initio and ultra vires, solely by virtue of the fact

that the District Court of the United States (hereinafter "DCUS")

was petitioned in the instant case, and not the USDC.

     More to  the point, one of the original reasons for invoking

federal judicial power(s) in the instant case is the existence of

an outstanding  Freedom of  Information Act  ("FOIA") request for

the official  credentials of  all six  hundred thirty-three (633)

alleged federal  agents who  rotated in  and out  of the standoff

with the  so-called Montana  Freemen in  Garfield county, Montana

state (hereinafter  "Freeman Standoff").   Said  FOIA request has

not been  answered to  date with  the credentials  of any of said

agents.   Petitioners have,  therefore, already  exhausted  their

administrative remedies in the matter of said FOIA request.

     The court of original jurisdiction to enjoin the withholding

of documents  properly requested, and to compel the production of

documents improperly  withheld,  is  the  DCUS.    See  5  U.S.C.

552(a)(4)(B).   The court  of original  jurisdiction to  litigate

FOIA requests  is res  judicata.   See the ORDER of United States

District Judge John M. Roll, dated May 21, 1996, In re Grand Jury

Subpoena Served  on New  Life Health Center Company, Case No. GJ-

95-1-6 (JMR), USDC, Tucson, Arizona state, to wit:

     ... [T]his [USDC] is not the proper forum to bring a request
     under the Freedom of Information Act.
                                                 [emphasis added]


           Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes:
                          Page 3 of 14


     And  so,  it  is  with  no  small  degree  of  concern  that

Petitioners read  Judge Shanstrom's ORDER of April 8, 1997, which

alleges that  "petitioner's [sic]  contentions lack  merit and do

not provide any basis for reconsideration of the October Order."

     On a  technical  point,  Petitioners  wish  to  remind  this

honorable Court  that Paul  Andrew Mitchell is the Relator in the

instant case.   The  stated Petitioners  are the  People  of  the

United States of America.  For this reason alone, said ORDER errs

by referring to the Relator as the "petitioner" who submitted the

"contentions" in question.

     More importantly,  however, to  suggest that the contentions

of Petitioners  lack merit  and do  not  provide  any  basis  for

reconsideration,  is  to  promote  the  absurd  proposition  that

identifying the  court of competent jurisdiction for any judicial

proceeding is  a matter of no consequence.  Confer at Reductio ad

absurdum in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, to wit:

     Reductio ad  absurdum.   Latin.   In logic,  the  method  of
     disproving an argument by showing that it leads to an absurd
     consequence.


     Further on  in the  USDC's ORDER  of April 8, 1997, the USDC

discusses Petitioners'  NOTICE OF INTENT TO PETITION FOR LEAVE TO

INSTITUTE QUO  WARRANTO PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE "INTERNAL REVENUE

SERVICE" [sic].   That  court found  that said  NOTICE OF  INTENT

contemplates a  new future lawsuit [sic] which cannot be filed in

this action  and does  not warrant review by the USDC until filed

as a separate action.

     Petitioners object  to this finding.  Without the benefit of

discovering the  true identity(s)  of  all  633  alleged  federal

agents who  rotated in  and out  of the  Freeman Standoff,  it is

quite possible,  and also highly likely, that one or more of said

agents were  actually employed  by the  Internal Revenue Service.

The organizational  situs of  the Internal  Revenue Service would

then become  a salient  issue, in the instant case, and should be

litigated in this action and not in a separate action.


           Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes:
                          Page 4 of 14


     Petitioners also  object to  this finding  because they have

already paid  two (2) separate filing fees.  The requirement that

Petitioners must  now  pay  a  third  filing  fee,  in  order  to

institute a  separate "new  future lawsuit,"  as  that  term  was

utilized in the USDC's ORDER of April 8, 1997, raises the specter

of barratry,  which is  the offense  of frequently  exciting  and

stirring up  quarrels and  suits, either  at  law  or  otherwise.

Confer at  "Barratry" in  Black's Law  Dictionary, Sixth Edition.

Petitioners submit  that the  added expense of a third filing fee

constitutes barratry.

     On the  second page  of the  USDC's ORDER  of April 8, 1997,

said ORDER  again finds  that  Petitioners'  document  requesting

removal lacks  merit and  remains  denied  by  the  USDC.    This

finding, again,  raises the  all important  question of  original

jurisdiction.   The USDC  cannot deny  any motion  which  is  not

properly before  it.   Petitioners have not submitted any motions

whatsoever to  the USDC in the instant case.  For a federal judge

to issue  orders from  a court  which has  never been  moved  nor

otherwise petitioned,  is to  practice law  in violation  of  the

prohibition against  same at  28 U.S.C.  454:  Practice of law by

justices and judges, to wit:

     Any justice  or judge  appointed under  the authority of the
     United States  who engages  in the practice of law is guilty
     of a high misdemeanor.


           Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes:
                          Page 5 of 14


     The USDC's ORDER of April 8, 1997, also goes on to hold that

the removal  statutes do  not afford  a petitioner/plaintiff  the

power to remove a case to federal court.  Petitioners applaud the

efforts to  which the  USDC has  evidently gone  to  explore  the

removal statutes  which are  found at  28  U.S.C.  1441  et  seq.

Nevertheless, by  way of  demonstrating newly  found evidence  of

confusion  and   duplicity  in  the  federal  laws  in  question,

Petitioners submit  the  following  specific  citations  for  the

careful consideration of this honorable Court:

     28 U.S.C. 1441(a)    "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1441(d)    "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1442(a)    "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1443       "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1444       "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1445(a)    "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1445(b)    "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1445(c)    "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1445(d)    "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1446(a)    "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1446(c)(1) "United States district court" [sic]
     28 U.S.C. 1446(c)(2) "United States district court" [sic]
     28 U.S.C. 1446(c)(4) "United States district court" [sic]
     28 U.S.C. 1446(c)(5) "United States district court" [sic]
     28 U.S.C. 1448       "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1449       "district court of the United States"
     28 U.S.C. 1450       "district court of the United States"


     Petitioners hereby  challenge all  federal removal statutes,

as a  group, for  being void  for vagueness  in violation  of the

Sixth Amendment nature and cause clause.  See 28 U.S.C. 1441 thru

1452;  See Balzac and American Insurance supra.


           Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes:
                          Page 6 of 14


     Said statutes also evidence negligence and fraud on the part

of Congress.  Said fraud is demonstrated by an unlawful intent to

extend the  territorial and  subject matter  jurisdictions of the

USDC into  the several  states of  the Union, over which the DCUS

has original  jurisdiction with  respect to  said  territory  and

subject matters.   The  removal statutes  evidence the  fraud, in

violation of the Tenth Amendment.

     Recent research  has also  proven that the federal judiciary

has also  sabotaged  the  U.S. Constitution  and  corrupted  laws

governing the  conduct of the federal courts.  This has been done

in part  by creating  the false  impression  that  the  USDC  has

territorial and  subject matter  jurisdiction within  the several

states of  the Union,  particularly over  criminal  prosecutions,

when it does not.

     The truth is that the USDC is designed to adjudicate matters

that arise  within the  federal zone, and the DCUS is designed to

adjudicate matters that arise within the state zone.

     This honorable Court will please take formal judicial notice

of the fact that the USDC is named on the ORDER of April 8, 1997,

by  Chief   United  States  District  Judge  Jack  D.  Shanstrom,

allegedly ordering the instant case remanded back to State Court.

This is  a fraud  upon Petitioners, and upon all American People,

who enjoy  the fundamental  guarantee  of  due  process  of  law.

Sedition by  syntax is  not due  process of  law.   See Title 28,

United States  Code,  in toto;   see also  Act of  June 25, 1948:

"... [P]rovisions  of this  title [28 U.S.C.] ... with respect to

the  organization   of  the   court,  shall  be  construed  as  a

continuation of existing law ..."  [emphasis added].


           Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes:
                          Page 7 of 14


     The USDC's  ORDER of  April 8, 1997, also attempts to remand

the instant  case back to the Montana Sixteenth Judicial District

Court, Garfield  County, and attempts to order the Clerk of Court

to return  the file  in cause number #2721 back to said Sixteenth

Judicial District  Court.   If this remand is allowed to proceed,

Petitioners will  have been  denied due  process of law, in clear

violation of the Fifth Amendment.

     Petitioners began  the instant case in the Montana Sixteenth

Judicial District  Court in  Garfield County  (hereinafter "State

Court").   The instant  case was  ordered  removed  into  federal

court.   Petitioners paid a second filing fee to the Clerk of the

DCUS, under  protest, due  to the fact that the Clerk of the DCUS

refused a tender of lawful money (gold) in payment for said fee.

     Now, Judge  Shanstrom is  attempting to remand the case back

to State  Court, before  the fate  of the  credentials of all 633

alleged federal  agents has been determined, and before all other

federal questions have been properly adjudicated.

     Once again,  it is painfully evident to Petitioners that the

State Court has absolutely no jurisdiction whatsoever to litigate

the original FOIA request for said credentials.

     Accordingly, Judge Shanstrom's ORDER has the unnecessary and

unlawful result  of forcing  Petitioners into  a vicious  circle,

from which there is no exit.


           Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes:
                          Page 8 of 14


     For  this   reason,  among   all  others   mentioned  above,

Petitioners strenuously  object to  the USDC's  ORDER of April 8,

1997, and  hereby petition  this honorable  DCUS for  an ORDER to

Chief  United   States  District   Judge  Jack  D.  Shanstrom  to

reconsider his  alleged ORDER  of April  8, 1997, in light of all

the substantive  and meritorious  issues  which  have  been  well

documented in  the instant  Motion and  in previous  pleadings --

most notably the American Insurance opinion of Chief Justice John

Marshall supra,  arguably the  greatest  Chief  Justice  ever  to

preside on the Supreme Court of the United States.  To repeat:

     ... [P]rovisions  of this  title as  set out in section 1 of
     said Act  June 25, 1948, with respect to the organization of
     the court,  shall be construed as a continuation of existing
     law ...."
                  [Historical and Statutory Notes, 28 U.S.C. 132]
                          [West Publishing Company, 1996 Edition]


     In closing, Petitioners respectfully request formal Judicial

Notice of  the essay  entitled "Karma and the Federal Courts," by

Relator Paul  Andrew Mitchell, which essay is attached hereto and

incorporated by reference as if set forth fully herein.


                        REMEDY REQUESTED

     All premises  having been  carefully considered, Petitioners

hereby petition  this honorable  District  Court  of  the  United

States for an ORDER compelling Chief United States District Judge

Jack D.  Shanstrom to  reconsider his ORDER, dated April 8, 1997,

and filed  erroneously in  the instant case under a caption which

exhibits the  legal nomenclature  "UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT",

in apparent contradiction to, and outside the lawful jurisdiction

of, the  judicial powers  of this  District Court  of the  United

States which have been invoked in the instant case.

     Petitioners respectfully  request that  Judge Shanstrom give

close and deliberate attention to the distinction, now thoroughly

documented, between  the Article III District Court of the United

States, and  the Article IV  United  States District Court,  with

particular application of this distinction to the instant case.


           Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes:
                          Page 9 of 14


Dated:  April 14, 1997


Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell

Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness,
(expressly not a citizen of the United States),
Counselor at Law, and Relator on behalf of
the People of the United States of America

All Rights Reserved without Prejudice


           Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes:
                          Page 10 of 14


                        PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Paul  Andrew, Mitchell,  B.A., M.S., Citizen of Arizona state,

federal witness,  and Counselor  at Law, do hereby certify, under

penalty of  perjury, under  the laws  of  the  United  States  of

America, without the "United States", that I am at least 18 years

of age,  a Citizen  of one  of the  United States of America, and

that I personally served the following document(s):

                      NOTICE OF MOTION AND
                   MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION;
              NOTICE OF CHALLENGE AND CHALLENGE TO
         CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL REMOVAL STATUTES:
           28 U.S.C. 1441 thru 1451;  Sixth Amendment:
       Nature and Cause Clause;  human rights treaties (2)

by placing  one true and correct copy of same in first class U.S.

Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to:


Attorney General                   William H. Rehnquist, C.J.
Department of Justice              Supreme Court of the U.S.
10th and Constitution, N.W.        1 First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C.                   Washington, D.C.

Solicitor General                  Warren Christopher
Department of Justice              U.S. Secretary of State
10th and Constitution, N.W.        Department of State
Washington, D.C.                   Washington, D.C.

James M. Burns                     LeRoy Michael; Schweitzer
United States District Court       c/o Yellowstone County Jail
316 North 26th Street              3165 King Avenue, East
Billings, Montana state            Billings, Montana state

Office of the U.S. Attorneys       Judge J. Clifford Wallace
United States District Court       Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Federal Building                   c/o P.O. Box 193939
Billings, Montana state            San Francisco, California

Chief Judge                        Judge Alex Kozinski
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals     Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
c/o P.O. Box 193939                125 South Grand Avenue, #200
San Francisco, California state    Pasadena, California state


Executed on April 14, 1997:


/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell

Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness,
Counselor at Law, and Relator


           Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes:
                          Page 11 of 14


For Immediate Release                            November 2, 1996


                 "Karma and the Federal Courts"

                               by

                      Paul Andrew Mitchell
                       All Rights Reserved
                         (November 1996)


     The law  of karma  is this:  what goes around, comes around.
When you  begin with freedom, freedom comes back to dwell in your
house.

     And so,  we have  come to this point in decoding Title 28 of
the United  States Codes:   there  are  two  classes  of  federal
"District Courts" in the federal court system.

     One class  is for  the federal zone;  the other class is for
the state zone.

     Using  a  very  powerful  rule  of  statutory  construction,
"inclusio unius  est exclusio  alterius," we show that the phrase
"District Court  of the  United States"  refers to federal courts
for the  state zone;   and  the phrase  "United  States  District
Court" refers to federal courts for the federal zone.

     We have  this on  the authority  of the Supreme Court of the
United States,  most notably  in the  cases of American Insurance
Company v. 356 Bales of Cotton, and Balzac v. Porto Rico [sic].

     Now, here's  the rub:  Since federal courts are creatures of
statutes only,  they can  only cognize  subject matters which are
assigned to them expressly by statutes.

     When it  comes to  criminal  jurisdiction,  the  controlling
statute is 18 U.S.C. 3231.

     This statute  grants original  jurisdiction to  the District
Courts of  the United  States (DCUS),  but does  not mention  the
United States District Courts (USDC)!

     How about them apples?

     Remember this carefully:

     Inclusio  unius  est exclusio  alterius  (in Latin  ).
     Inclusion of one is  exclusion of others (in English).

     Since the  USDC  is  not  mentioned,  its  omission  can  be
inferred as  intentional. (Read  that again,  then confirm  it in
Black's Law Dictionary, any edition).

     So,  from  the  historian's  point  of  view,  Congress  has
permitted the limited territorial and subject matter jurisdiction
of the  USDC to be extended, unlawfully, into the state zone, and
into subject  matters over  which said  court has no jurisdiction
whatsoever.


           Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes:
                          Page 12 of 14


     This deception was maintained as long as nobody noticed, but
now it  is  obvious,  and  quite  difficult  to  change,  without
bringing down  the whole  house of  cards (which is happening, by
the way.   The  Liege firemen  are  literally  hosing  their  own
corrupt court buildings, so we're not alone in this department of
judicial tyranny.)

     By the  way, the famous Belgian Firemen from Liege have been
invited, via  the Internet,  to discharge the Belgian debt to the
United States  by moving  their talents  state-side.  They should
return home  debt free,  in about  ten years  or so, depending on
available supplies of soap and water.

     Imagine a  sheet of  Saran Wrap,  which has  been yanked too
far, by pulling it beyond the strict territorial boundaries which
surround the federal zone.

     This is  the United States District Court (USDC), in all its
limited Honors and tarnished glory.

     Further proof of this bad karma can be found by comparing 18
U.S.C. 1964(a)  and 1964(c).  Both statutes  grant  authority  to
issue remedies  to restrain racketeering activities prohibited by
18 U.S.C.  1962.   Section 1964(a)  grants civil  jurisdiction to
issue injunctive  relief to  the DCUS;   Section  1964(c)  grants
civil jurisdiction  to issue injunctive relief to the USDC.  Both
refer  to   the  exact   same  subject   matter,   namely,   RICO
(Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) activities.

     So, when these two statutes are otherwise identical, why did
Congress need to enact two separate statutes?

     The answer  is simple:   one  authority was  needed for  the
DCUS, and  the other  was needed  for the  USDC.  Simple, really,
when the  sedition by  syntax  is  explained  in  language  which
penetrates the deception.

     Now, if  this is truly the case, and nobody has been able to
prove us  wrong about  this matter,  the United  States  (federal
government) is  in a  heap of  trouble here,  because it has been
prosecuting people  in the wrong courts ever since the Civil War;
furthermore,  those   courts  have   no   criminal   jurisdiction
whatsoever, because  such an authority is completely lacking from
Titles 18  and 28,  both of which have been enacted into positive
law, unlike  Title 26,  which has  not been enacted into positive
law.  See Title 1 for details.

     What do we do with this earth-shaking discovery?  Well, when
any federal case is filed, the criminal defendant should submit a
Freedom of  Information Act  (FOIA) request immediately, for such
things as  any regulations  which  have  been  published  in  the
Federal Register,  pursuant to  the Federal  Register Act, for 18
U.S.C. 3231.


           Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes:
                          Page 13 of 14


     It won't  hurt to  send submit similar FOIA requests for the
credentials of  all federal employees who have "touched" the case
in any way.

     Since we  already know  that there are no regulations for 18
U.S.C. 3231,  and that  federal employees  will usually refuse to
produce their  credentials, your  FOIA requests  will be met with
silence, whereupon  you will file a FOIA appeal.  Once the appeal
deadline has run, you are in court.

     But which court?  Guess ...

     ... the  answer is  the District Court of the United States.
What an  amazing discovery,  yes?  A United States District Judge
in Arizona,  in late Spring of 1996, ruled that the United States
District Court  (USDC) is  not the  proper forum  to  litigate  a
request under  the FOIA.   That can only be because FOIA requests
must be  litigated in  the District  Court of  the United  States
(DCUS).

     Now we  have the United States checkmated.  The proper forum
for FOIA  is now  res judicata.   If the DCUS is the proper forum
for FOIA,  and if the USDC is NOT the proper forum for FOIA, then
the USDC  is not  the proper  forum for prosecuting violations of
Title 18  either, because  the USDC  does not show up in 5 U.S.C.
552 or in 18 U.S.C. 3231!

     Read that last paragraph again, and again, until you get it.
It's okay  to admit  that you  must read  it several  times; this
writer once  read a  paragraph  from  Hooven and Allison v. Evatt
some 20 different times, until the meaning was finally clear.

     Inclusio unius  est exclusio  alterius.    The  omission  by
Congress  of  the  USDC  from  18  U.S.C.  3231  must  have  been
intentional;   the maxim certainly allows us to infer that it was
intentional.   Use of  this maxim allows for us to exploit one of
the most  powerful techniques  in American  jurisprudence.  It is
called "collateral  attack"  --  a broadside, rather than a head-
on, collision.

     Knowledge is power, and power is freedom ...

     ... freedom.  Freedom!  FREEDOM!!!

     Love it.


Common Law Copyright
Paul Andrew Mitchell
Counselor at Law, federal witness
and Citizen of Arizona state

All Rights Reserved Without Prejudice

November 2, 1996


           Reconsider and Challenge Removal Statutes:
                          Page 14 of 14


                             #  #  #


Return to the Table of Contents for

People v. United States et al.