MEMORANDUM OF LAW

TO: John Schmeeckle

FROM: Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

Private Attorney General

DATE: February 10, 2003 A.D.

SUBJECT: voluntary payroll withholding

Dear Mr. Schmeeckle:

Per your written request, it is my honor to provide you with this MEMORANDUM OF LAW concerning voluntary payroll withholding.

If we were starting from scratch, as was the case 13 years ago (1990), this MEMORANDUM would need to cover a great deal of new ground, and do so using a large number of pages.

Fortunately, because so much research has already been completed, documented, and confirmed, we already have an excellent foundation on which to build, using certified documents readily available on the Internet. See the Supreme Law Library, for example.

Thus, I will assume here that you, and others at your company who may also read this MEMORANDUM, are already familiar with the following Internet resources:

Cornell University’s version of the United States Code:

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/ [title/section]

“The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue”:

http://www.supremelaw.org/fedzone11/index.htm

“31 Questions and Answers about the Internal Revenue Service”:

http://www.supremelaw.org/sls/31answers.htm (“31Q&A”)

ALERT entitled “Social Security and Tax Withholding

Are Voluntary within the 50 States”:

http://www.supremelaw.org/rsrc/alert.htm

Press Release entitled “U.S. Secretary of the Treasury

Falls Silent in Face of SUBPOENA for Tax Liability Statutes”:

http://www.supremelaw.org/press/rels/subpoena.htm

Essay entitled “Let’s Dismantle IRS:

This Racket is Busted” (and all links at the end):

http://www.supremelaw.org/press/rels/dismantle.irs.htm

Press Release entitled “Congresswoman Suspected

of Income Tax Evasion”:

http://www.supremelaw.org/press/rels/irc3121.htm

The latter Press Release is particularly important and relevant to your request, because it efficiently settles 2 nagging questions that persist in these discussions: (1) it clearly defines the territorial scope of the term “State” as used in the Internal Revenue Code, and (2) it proves the proper legal construction of the term “includes”.

Please take careful note of the letter dated January 24, 1996, from Connecticut Congresswoman Barbara Kennelly to Mr. John Randall. Apparently, Rep. Kennelly did not know the answer to Mr. Randall’s question, so she referred his question to “legal experts” employed by the offices of the Legislative Counsel and the Congressional Research Service. Without doing any analysis of her own, she simply reiterated their advice in her written reply to Mr. Randall (see attached). Quoting her reply in pertinent part:

The term state in 26 U.S. Code 3121(e) specifically includes only the named U.S. territories and possessions of the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam and American Samoa.

Please also take careful note of the fact that I have described these legal experts as being “employed” by two offices of the federal government, situated in Washington, D.C. These are the kind of “employees” to whom the withholding statutes refer, because it is these “employees” from whose “wages” payroll withholding is mandatory, pursuant to the Public Salary Tax Act, and not voluntary.

At IRC section 3401(a), the term “wages” is somewhat vaguely defined to mean all remuneration for services performed by an employee for his employer. This deliberate vagueness forces us to examine the statutory definition of the term “employee” at IRC 3401(c).

For purposes of the Public Salary Tax Act, the statutory definition which controls the enforcement of payroll withholding is IRC section 3401(c). This statute is worth repeating here, once again:

For purposes of this chapter, the term “employee” includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing. The term “employee” also includes an officer of a corporation.

If you are not one of these, then the Public Salary Tax Act does not concern you, and neither you nor your company are required to withhold any federal income taxes from your periodic paychecks.

Another point worth stressing, and repeating, is that section 3401(c) also uses the term “State” (“elected official of ... a State”). Because of the complex frauds that are imbedded and distributed throughout the IRC, you may have mistakenly understood that section to mean a State of the Union. But, go back and re‑read the letter from Rep. Kennelly on this point, as discussed above. Here “State” does not mean a State of the Union!

Even though an IRC section may use the term “State”, this does not mean that the term “State” therein refers to one of the 50 States of the Union, like California or Florida. It turns out that many different definitions of “State” and “United States” are sprinkled around the IRC, so it is imperative for the reader to know exactly which of these definitions governs any particular section of the IRC.

The main problem with these conflicting and mutually incompatible definitions of “State” and “United States” is that the U.S. Supreme Court has already told Congress that it can not re‑define any terms used in the U.S. Constitution. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, as discussed in 31Q&A. Of course, both of these terms figure quite prominently throughout the U.S. Constitution. See the Guarantee Clause at Article IV, Section 4, for an excellent example which clearly distinguishes the “United States” from the 50 States of the Union (“United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union”).

If the book “The Federal Zone” did anything of singular significance, it succeeded in developing a defensible methodology for proving conclusively that any given federal statute is federal municipal law. Clearly, any municipal law which is deliberately written to appear as if it has nationwide application must be deliberately vague, and therefore unconstitutional for violating our fundamental Right to know the Nature and Cause of any accusation. This fundamental Right is guaranteed to us by the Sixth Amendment in the Bill of Rights.

So, here we have identified the central core of the fraud that is federal income taxation: even if they were not deliberately vague, the taxes imposed by subtitle A are implemented by IRC sections that are federal municipal laws. This means that they are enforceable only in limited geographic areas where Congress has exclusive legislative jurisdiction (read “not States of the Union”). Think of these areas as the blue zone on the American flag; the stars are the 50 States; and, the stripes refer to the original 13 colonies, founded mostly by immigrants fleeing government and religious oppression in Europe.

Accordingly, insofar as the Internal Revenue Code was written and enacted to convey or otherwise foster the notion that its provisions are mandatory upon all inhabitants of the 50 States of the Union, that Code is demonstrably vague, fraudulent and unconstitutional for this one reason. “Fraud” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Ed., to mean a failure to disclose what should have been disclosed. Clearly, Congress should disclose whenever any one of its statutes is only enforceable within the federal zone and not within the 50 States.

As if these problems were not serious enough, we have now confirmed that the Internal Revenue Service is not an official department or bureau within the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Without going into any of the many complex details required to address this question thoroughly, let it suffice to say that the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has already confirmed, in court litigation, that DOJ has no powers of attorney to represent IRS personnel in any court proceedings that concern the misconduct of IRS personnel. This can only be true if IRS is not an executive agency of the United States government.

IRS is a trust domiciled in Puerto Rico; as such, they are expressly excluded from the statutory definition of federal “agency” as that term is defined at 5 U.S.C. 551(1)(C). See 31 U.S.C. 1321(a)(62).

Accordingly, whenever IRS utilizes United States Mail to convey the false and fraudulent notion that they are an official bureau or department inside the U.S. Department of the Treasury, it is a plain violation of the penal statute at 31 U.S.C. 333 (impersonating the Department of the Treasury). See return address on their envelopes.

Also, impersonating a federal officer is a felony violation of 18 U.S.C. 912. Failure to report a federal felony is also a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 4. Finally, deliberate use of U.S. Mail for fraudulent purposes is mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341.

Making matters much worse for all IRS personnel, and for anyone else who would aid and abet the massive fiscal fraud which they continue to perpetrate against the American People, some of the crimes enumerated above also constitute predicate acts to racketeering, which violates the federal criminal statutes at 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq. (“RICO”). “RICO” is the standard abbreviation for the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. See 18 U.S.C. 1962, in chief.

In particular, Congress has already defined “pattern of racketeering activity” to mean only two (2) predicate acts during any given ten‑year period. Mail fraud is one such predicate act. A partial list of RICO predicate acts is found at 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(A) and (B). The full list embraces many State laws not enumerated at 1961. And, the civil RICO remedies at 18 U.S.C. 1964 authorize triple damages (3x) to be awarded to victims of such criminal rackets.

State courts like the Superior Court of California have original jurisdiction to issue civil RICO remedies, pursuant to the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Tafflin v. Levitt. The Ninth Circuit has agreed in the case of Lou v. Belzberg. See 18 U.S.C. 1964(a). Because the Article III District Court of the United States is legally vacant at the present time, you are advised to seek civil RICO remedies from the Superior Court of California, pursuant to these standing decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court and by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Mr. Schmeeckle, I hope this MEMORANDUM has been responsive to your specific request. If I can provide you with any additional insights into these matters, please don’t hesitate to inquire further.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell

Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

Private Attorney General

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