Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Private Attorney General
c/o Forwarding Agent
501 West Broadway #A-332
San Diego 92101
CALIFORNIA, USA
All Rights Reserved
without Prejudice
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic], ) Appeal Docket No. 07-2017
) Civil No. 04-CV-0885 BB/WDS
Plaintiff/Appellee, )
v. )
)
John S. Williamson et al., )
)
Defendants/Appellants. )
---------------------------------)
)
United States ) NOTICE OF INTERVENTION:
ex relatione )
Paul Andrew Mitchell, ) 3:2:1 (in judicial mode);
) 18 U.S.C. 1964(a);
Movant. ) 28 U.S.C. §§ 530B, 2403(a);
) 31 U.S.C. 1321(a)(62);
) FRAP Rule 44; and,
) FRCP 24(a), (c) in pari materia
_________________________________) (United States not yet a party).
COMES NOW the United States (hereinafter “Movant”) ex rel. Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, Private Attorney General, Criminal Investigator and Federal Witness (hereinafter “Relator”) to notify this honorable Court of Appeals of Movant’s intervention of right, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2403(a), and to provide timely Notice to all interested Parties of same.
Intervention by the United States ex rel. is now effective pursuant to Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”) in pari materia with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 24(c) (United States not yet a party); and Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 (“3:2:1”) in the Constitution for the United States of America (hereinafter “U.S. Constitution”).
In particular, see 28 U.S.C. 1865(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. 2072(b); the Internal Revenue Code; and the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869 et seq. with emphasis on the legislative intent as expressed by Congress in the Miscellaneous Provisions of the Act of June 25, 1948 supra.
OF
CERTAIN ACTS OF CONGRESS
Pursuant to the duties imposed upon it by virtue of FRAP Rule 44, the Office of the Clerk of this Court will please certify to the Office of the U.S. Attorney General that the constitutionality of certain Acts of Congress affecting the public interest is herein drawn in question. See REMEDY MANDATED BY LAW infra (Page 8 of 16).
Likewise, the Clerk of this Court will please certify Movant’s intervention for presentation of all evidence admissible in the above entitled case, and for argument(s) on the question of the constitutionality of:
(1) the Jury Selection and Service Act at 28 U.S.C. 1865(b)(1);
(2) the Abrogation Clause in the Rules Enabling Act at 28 U.S.C. 2072(b);
(3) all income tax provisions in subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code; and,
(4) the entire Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869 et seq., presently codified at Title 28 of the United States Code (“U.S.C.”), including also all Miscellaneous Provisions.
Subject to all applicable provisions of Law, the United States ex rel. hereby expressly reserves all rights of a Party, and shall be subject to all liabilities of a Party as to court costs, to the extent necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and laws relating to the question of the constitutionality of said Acts of Congress.
See 1 U.S.C. 101 defining “Act of Congress”.
See also Article II, Articles of Confederation (“United States, in Congress Assembled”); 28 U.S.C. 530B (willful misrepresentation); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933) (United States as Plaintiff); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); 18 U.S.C. 3231 (Article III constitutional courts have original jurisdiction of federal offenses); 3:2:1 (“Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;”).
The “United States” and the “United States of America” are not one and the same. Congress is expressly prohibited from re-defining any terms found in the U.S. Constitution. See Preamble (“Constitution for the United States of America”); Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 (“2:1:1”) (“President of the United States of America”); Article VII (“Independence of the United States of America”); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), quoting in pertinent part:
Congress ... cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations that power can be lawfully exercised.
The U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) does not enjoy general power(s) of attorney to represent the United States of America. Compare 28 U.S.C. 547(1), (2) (Duties). Willful misrepresentation by officers employed by that Department is actionable under the McDade Act, 28 U.S.C. 530B (Ethical standards for attorneys for the Government). The 50 States of the Union are already quite adequately represented legally by their respective State Attorneys General.
Moreover, the named Plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic] has already incorporated twice in the State of Delaware, and one of those two foreign corporations was originally established as a “RELIGIOUS NONPROFIT” entity, in direct violation of the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment. The United States ex rel. hereby invokes the Full Faith and Credit Clause in the U.S. Constitution specifically to demand mandatory judicial notice of all official records of the Delaware Secretary of State for both of said foreign corporations.
Whenever the United States proceeds as Party Plaintiff, an Article III constitutional court, exercising the judicial Power of the United States, is a prerequisite under 3:2:1 (“The judicial Power shall extend ... to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party”). See 28 U.S.C. 1345 (United States as Plaintiff). The term “shall” is always mandatory and imperative in these contexts.
Whenever the United States proceeds as a Party Defendant, the sovereign must grant permission to be sued. See 28 U.S.C. 1346 (United States as Defendant). In this mode, a legislative court is permitted. See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 577 (1933):
... [C]ontroversies to which the United States may by statute be made a party defendant, at least as a general rule, lie wholly outside the scope of the judicial power vested by article 3 in the constitutional courts. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 645, 646 S., 12 S.Ct. 488.
A private Citizen may move a federal court on behalf of the United States ex relatione. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); Rotella v. Wood et al., 528 U.S. 549 (2000): object is to turn victims into prosecutors and to eliminate rackets.
The Sherman Act (1890), the federal statutes at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964(a) and 3231, and IRC 7402(a), (b), (c) and (f), confer original jurisdiction upon the several district courts of the United States (“DCUS”). These courts are Article III constitutional courts proceeding in judicial mode. See Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 36 Stat. 1167 (1911), 62 Stat. 909 (1948); and Article III.
See also Mookini v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201, 205 (1938) (term DCUS in its historic and proper sense); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) (RICO statutes bring to bear the pressure of private attorneys general on a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate); and General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co., 260 U.S. 261 (1922) (antitrust injunctions brought by the United States in the public interest).
The United States District Courts (“USDC”) are legislative tribunals typically proceeding in legislative mode. See American Insurance v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511, 7 L.Ed. 242 (1828) (C.J. Marshall’s seminal ruling); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) (The USDC is not a true United States court established under Article III); and 28 U.S.C. §§ 88, 111, 132, 152, 171, 251, 458, 461, 1367, and 1:8:9 (Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court).
Legislative tribunals are not now required to exercise the Article III guarantees required of constitutional courts, however. See American Insurance v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511, 7 L.Ed. 242 (1828) (C.J. Marshall’s seminal ruling); Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. 235, 242‑243 (1850); Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. 434, 447 (1871); Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. 648, 655 (1873); Good v. Martin, 95 U.S. 90, 98 (1877); Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1878); The City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453, 460 (1879); Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 274 U.S. 145 (1927); Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928); Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U.S. 438 (1929); Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930); Claiborne‑Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U.S. 382 (1932); O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); and Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). This U.S. Court of Appeals is an Article III federal court. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 279 U.S. 716 (1929): all Circuit Courts of Appeals are constitutional courts!
All guarantees of the U.S.
Constitution were expressly extended into the District of Columbia in 1871, and into all federal Territories in 1873. See 16 Stat. 419, 426, Sec. 34; 18 Stat. 325, 333,
Sec. 1891, respectively. A third such
“Extension Statute” was enacted by Congress at 48 U.S.C. 1561 with certain
questionable qualifications. See Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 559 (1989).
Also, compare Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 380 (1901) (paraphrasing the Harvard Law Review: the Constitution of the United States, as such, does not extend beyond the limits of the States which are united by and under it); and Hooven & Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945) (the guaranties [sic] of the Constitution extend into the federal zone only as Congress makes those guaranties applicable).
INCORPORATION OF
EVIDENTIARY DOCUMENTS
Movant hereby requires mandatory judicial Notice by this honorable
Circuit Court, pursuant to Rule 201(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (“FREv”), of the following separately certified documents,
and Movant provides formal Notice to all interested
Parties of same:
(1)
PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI in:
Mitchell
v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al. (S.Ct. #03-5070)
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/cert.htm#drama
Mandatory
judicial notice is also requested of the fifteen (15) individual documents
itemized in the latter pleading under the heading “Navigating this Petition and
its Appendices” (see Internet URLs).
Special
emphasis is herein placed upon Relator’s OPENING
BRIEF to the Ninth Circuit, as listed above,
particularly everywhere the Rules
Enabling Act, and the distinction between constitutional courts and
legislative
tribunals, are discussed in detail.
(2)
APPELLANT’S
REPLY TO PROOF BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:
Simons v. C-BASS et al. (Sixth Circuit #05-2460)
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/simons/reply.htm
(3)
APPELLANT’S
OPENING BRIEF in:
USA v. Gilbertson (Eighth Circuit #97-2099-MNST)
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/gilberts/opening.htm (4) Press Release entitled “Private Attorney General Cracks Title 28 of the United States Code” (see Attachment “A”)
http://www.supremelaw.org/press/rels/cracking.title.28.htm
All of said documents itemized above are
hereby incorporated by reference, as if set forth fully here.
If this Circuit Court, its Clerks, or
Counsel to any Proper Party in this case should desire to obtain printed hard
copies of any document itemized above, upon receipt of a written request
transmitted via U.S. Mail, Relator will happily
oblige by expediting a printed hard copy to the mailing location provided in
each written request.
REMEDY MANDATED BY LAW
All premises having been duly considered, Relator respectfully requests the Clerk of this honorable
Court, on behalf of the United States:
(1)
to certify to
the Office of the U.S. Attorney General that the constitutionality of the
following Acts of Congress has now been properly drawn into question, to wit:
(a)
the federal
Jury Selection and Service Act at 28 U.S.C. 1865(b)(1), for expressly
discriminating in favor of federal citizens and against Citizens of the United
States of America, in violation of the federal policy at 28 U.S.C. 1861, in
violation of Article III, Section 2, Clause 3, and in violation of the Seventh
Amendment;
(b)
the Rules
Enabling Act at 28 U.S.C. 2072(b), for violating Article I, Section 1, the
Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the ex
post facto Clause in the U.S. Constitution;
(c)
all income
tax provisions in subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code, for deliberate
vagueness in violation of the Ninth Amendment and of the Nature and Cause
Clause in the Sixth Amendment; and,
(d) the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869 et
seq., also known as Title 28 of the United States Code, for vagueness, for
violating the ex post facto Clause, for violating the Separation of
Powers, and for violating the general principle that statutes granting original
jurisdiction to federal courts must be strictly construed; and,
(2) to certify Movant’s intervention for presentation of all evidence admissible in the above entitled case, and for argument(s) on the question of the constitutionality of said Acts of Congress.
RETROACTIVE IMPLICATIONS
OF THIS INTERVENTION
The United States argues that Appellants have been systematically deprived of their fundamental Rights to due process of Law, as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, as long as said unconstitutional statutes have been allowed to remain on the books. Seventh Amendment.
NOTICE OF INTERVENTION BY STATUTORY
RIGHT
Movant hereby notoriously exercises its statutory right to intervene, pursuant to the federal statute at 28 U.S.C. 2403(a), to wit:
In any action, suit or proceeding in a court of the United
States to which the United States or any agency, officer or employee thereof is
not a party, wherein the constitutionality
of any Act of Congress affecting the public interest is drawn in question, the court shall certify such fact to the Attorney
General, and shall permit the United States to intervene for
presentation of evidence, if evidence is otherwise admissible
in the case, and for argument on the question of constitutionality. The United States shall, subject to the applicable
provisions of law, have all the rights of a party and be
subject to all liabilities of a party as to court costs to the extent necessary
for a proper presentation of the
facts and law relating to the question of constitutionality.
[bold and underline emphases added]
Thank you for your professional consideration.
VERIFICATION
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1). See Supremacy Clause (Constitution, Laws and Treaties are all the supreme Law of the Land).
Dated: February 5, 2007 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
______________________________________________
Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Private Attorney General
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18 years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the following document(s):
NOTICE
OF INTERVENTION:
3:2:1 (in judicial mode);
18 U.S.C. 1964(a);
28 U.S.C. §§ 530B, 2403(a);
31 U.S.C. 1321(a)(62);
FRAP Rule 44; and,
FRCP
24(a), (c) in pari materia
(United States not a party)
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to the following:
Clerk of Court (5x)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
1823 Stout Street
Denver 80257
COLORADO, USA
Mr. and Mrs. John S. Williamson
1277 Historic Route 66 East
Tijeras 87059
NEW MEXICO, USA
Mr. John Gregory Williamson
c/o Mr. and Mrs. John S. Williamson supra
Mr. David Andrew Williamson
c/o Mr. and Mrs. John S. Williamson supra
Mr. Garrett James Williamson
824 Adams Street, N.E.
Albuquerque 87110
NEW MEXICO, USA
Ms. Deborah Kruhm
P.O. Box
23899
Santa Fe 87502
NEW MEXICO, USA
Ms. Gretchen M. Wolfinger
U.S. Department of Justice
Appellate Section
P.O. Box 502
Washington 20044
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Courtesy copies:
Office of the U.S. Attorney
P.O. Box 607
Albuquerque 87103
NEW MEXICO, USA
U.S. Department of Justice
Tax Division
717 North Harwood, Suite 400
Dallas 75201
TEXAS, USA
Dr. Harriet Smith Windsor
Secretary of State
State of Delaware
401 Federal Street
Dover 19901
DELAWARE, USA
[See USPS Publication #221 for addressing instructions.]
Dated: February 5, 2007 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
______________________________________________
Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Private Attorney General
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
Attachment “A”:
PRESS RELEASE
“Private Attorney General Cracks
Title 28 of the United States Code”
November 26, 2001 A.D.
Private Attorney General Cracks
Title 28 of the United States Code
by
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Counselor at Law, Federal Witness
and Private Attorney General
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE November 26, 2001 A.D.
Sacramento. Paul Andrew Mitchell, the Private Attorney General at the Supreme Law Firm and Webmaster of the Supreme Law Library on the Internet, today announced major developments in his ongoing project to decode Title 28 -- the set of American laws that govern the federal court system.
In a brief but direct application of this knowledge, written for a trainee in federal litigation, Mitchell demonstrated how the federal courts lacked original jurisdiction in the anti-trust case against the Microsoft Corporation.
That case was allegedly brought by the “United States of America” (or “USA”), but attorneys for the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) have no powers of attorney to represent the “USA”, as such. Willful misrepresentation is a violation of the McDade Act at 28 U.S.C. 530B, which requires DOJ attorneys to obey State Bar disciplinary guidelines:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/530B.html
The federal government recently reversed its policy in the case against the Microsoft Corporation, and is now pushing equitable settlements across the board.
The term “USA” is mentioned only once in Title 28 –- at section 1746 -- and there it is clearly distinguished from the “United States” -- the proper legal term that is used for the federal government throughout Title 28:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/1746.html
Mitchell’s findings have consequences that reach far beyond the anti-trust case against Microsoft. It is now painfully apparent that DOJ are pretending to represent the “USA” in all civil and criminal cases, intentionally to avoid exercising the judicial power of the United States.
Under Article III in the U.S. Constitution, this power must be exercised in constitutional courts that guarantee cherished fundamental Rights, like the Right to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Article III courts must be convened to hear Controversies to which the United States is a Party (singular).
To make matters worse, the U.S. Supreme Court has also erred by ruling that the term “Party” as used in Article III means “Plaintiff” but not “Defendant”. See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933). In Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, the term “Party” embraces both plaintiffs and defendants.
By substituting the “USA” as Plaintiffs (plural), DOJ have perpetrated a fraud by switching to legislative courts where fundamental Rights are not guarantees, but merely privileges granted (or denied) at the discretion of arbitrary judges, sitting on legislative tribunals. Mitchell describes these courts as operating in legislative mode as opposed to constitutional mode.
Glaring proof of this fraud can be seen at section 132 of Title 28. In this section, Congress attempted to broadcast into all 50 States a territorial tribunal -- the United States District Court (“USDC”). Congress did this under another pretense, namely, that those States could be treated as if they were all federal Territories:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/132.html
More than a century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court invented a false doctrine by which the U.S. Constitution did not extend into U.S. Territories and Possessions. Mitchell later refuted this doctrine, after discovering two Acts of Congress that expressly extended the U.S. Constitution into the District of Columbia in 1871 A.D., and then into all federal Territories in 1873 A.D. See 16 Stat. 419, 426, Sec. 34; and 18 Stat. 325, 333, Sec. 1891, respectively.
In the year 1992 A.D., Paul Mitchell authored a popular classic book entitled The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue. The Federal Zone is now in its eleventh edition.
In that book, he proved that federal municipal law governs U.S. Territories like Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands, but federal municipal law does not extend into any of the 50 States of the Union. The income tax statutes in the Internal Revenue Code are federal municipal law.
Because they are not yet States of the Union, Congress is the state legislature for all Territories, Possessions, and Enclaves like military bases -- an area now collectively called the federal zone. In the year 1995 A.D., Justice Kennedy used the term “federal zone” as a household word in his concurring opinion in U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).
Section 132 of Title 28 is even more deceptive for creating the false notion that the Article III District Court of the United States (“DCUS”) was abolished, but nothing could be further from the truth. A careful reading of section 132 reveals that the DCUS is not even mentioned in that statute.
The DCUS was never expressly abolished by any Act of Congress, and it is still mentioned in numerous other places throughout Title 28. Congress knows how to abolish a court when it wants to do so. The Ninth Circuit has also ruled that repeals by implication are not favored. Thus, for the DCUS to be abolished, a clear Act of Congress would be required to effect that result. Whatever Congress creates, Congress must destroy.
Another stunning application of this knowledge came recently, when a federal criminal defendant appealed to the Ninth Circuit to review interlocutory orders issued by the USDC. An interlocutory order is one that occurs before final judgment is reached at sentencing after a jury verdict.
In response to Mitchell’s pleadings, the Ninth Circuit cited a case which ruled that final judgment in a criminal case means the sentence. That citation was U.S. v. Powell, 24 F.3d. 28, 31 (9th Cir. 1994). Then, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the defendant’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Under Mitchell’s expert guidance, the defendant proved that the Ninth Circuit has no appellate jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders issued by the legislative USDC. However, the Ninth Circuit does have appellate jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders issued by the constitutional DCUS. The proof is found at 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1):
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/1292.html
Mitchell then persuaded the defendant to request a published opinion holding that statutes granting appellate jurisdiction must be strictly construed also. It is already well decided that statutes granting original jurisdiction must be strictly construed. Such a holding is a logical extension of existing federal case law.
Clearly, these findings expose the USDC in all 50 States as a summary tribunal that compels criminal defendants to endure lengthy trials, conviction and sentencing before any U.S. Court of Appeals can take jurisdiction under the Final Judgments Act at 28 U.S.C. 1291:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/1291.html
In closely related developments, the main culprit has now been identified as the Act of June 25, 1948, in which Congress radically re-organized the entire federal court system. This is the Act of Congress that broadcasted the USDC from the federal Territories into all 50 States of the Union. This Act has now been formally challenged for being deliberately vague, and therefore unconstitutional.
By attempting to re-define the DCUS retroactively, this Act also violates the ex post facto prohibition at Article I, Section 9, Clause 3, in the U.S. Constitution. This prohibition strictly bars Congress from enacting laws that have any retroactive effect. Without a clear amending statute, Congress cannot later re-define the term “District Court of the United States” in statutes that predate June 25, 1948 A.D.
For example, the Sherman Antitrust Act was first enacted in the year 1890 A.D., and that Act granted original jurisdiction to the DCUS. Subsequently, the Act of June 25, 1948, did not change or otherwise amend that grant of original jurisdiction to the DCUS. Therefore, cases enforcing the Sherman Antitrust Act must be brought by the “United States” (not the “USA”) in an Article III federal court proceeding in constitutional mode. Identical results obtain from many other federal laws, like the Securities and Exchange Acts.
Other sections of Title 28 have already been challenged properly in court for violating the U.S. Constitution. In 1996 A.D., in the case of a subpoena issued by a federal grand jury, Mitchell was allowed to prove that the federal Jury Selection and Service Act is also unconstitutional. That Act expressly discriminates against Citizens of the 50 States -- the only class of Citizens contemplated when Article III was being drafted, circa 1787 A.D. For definitive authority on this crucial point, see Pannill v. Roanoke, 252 F. 910, 914.
There are now two (2) classes of citizens under American laws that have never been repealed -- State Citizens and federal citizens -- but only State Citizens are qualified to be federal lawmakers. See the Qualifications Clauses in the U.S. Constitution; the “United States” in those provisions means “States united”.
Moreover, those Citizens who are qualified to make federal laws cannot vote or serve on any juries, State or federal. And, those who can vote and serve on juries are not qualified to make federal laws.
This seriously twisted situation is due, in part, to the Act of June 25, 1948, and related Congressional efforts to foist a legislative democracy upon all 50 States. These efforts violate the Guarantee Clause in the U.S. Constitution. The federal government is required by that Clause to guarantee a Republican Form of Government to the 50 States of the Union.
Paul Andrew Mitchell can be reached at email address:
He is currently available for speaking engagements on this, and related topics in American constitutional law, the focus of his extensive judicial activism.
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