Donald E. Wishart, Sui Juris
Citizen of California State,
Federal Witness and Victim
c/o 5150 Graves Avenue, Suite 12-C
San Jose [ZIP code exempt]
CALIFORNIA, USA
In Propria Persona and
by Special Appearance Only
All Rights Reserved
without Prejudice
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic],
) Case Number CR-00-20227-JF
)
Plaintiff [sic], ) GENERAL
SUPPLEMENT
) TO ALL MOTIONS:
v. )
DONALD E. WISHART [sic], )
)
Defendant [sic]. )
)
________________________________)
COMES NOW Donald E. Wishart, Sui Juris, Citizen of California State and Defendant in the above entitled matter (“Defendant”), to submit this, His GENERAL SUPPLEMENT TO ALL MOTIONS, pursuant to the Petition Clause, which MOTIONS were previously filed and properly served.
In what follows infra, Defendant respectfully requests leave to utilize single-spaced paragraphs, in order to conserve paper, copying costs, and postage.
Please be advised that there is currently a fatal flaw in the federal Jury Selection and Service Act (“JSSA”) at 28 U.S.C. 1865(b)(1), for the following, well documented reasons:
1.
Any federal grand
jury or trial jury selected in compliance with the JSSA cannot be a
legal body, even if every juror is otherwise qualified by statute:
a.
due to class
discrimination against State Citizens, i.e.
Citizens of ONE OF
the United States of America, who are not also federal citizens by Right
of Election [sic]; confer at Federal citizenship in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth
Edition; see 1866 Civil Rights
Act; 42 USCS 1983; Wadleigh v. Newhall, 136 F. 941 (CC
Cal, 1905): only federal citizens have
standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. 1983;
b.
such
discrimination, against an entire class of Citizens, violates the fundamental
guarantees of equal protection as enumerated at Article 7 in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, and at Article 26 in
the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the latter enacted with specific
Reservations; treaty provisions are
supreme Law, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause (“6:2”) in the
Constitution for the United States of America, as lawfully amended
(hereinafter “U.S.
Constitution”); copies of these two
Treaties are incorporated by reference, as if set forth fully herein, to copies
published at Internet URL:
http://www.supremelaw.org/ref/treaty/index.htm
c. the ruling in Pannill v. Roanoke, 252
F. 910, 914, is definitive, and dispositive:
federal citizens were not even
contemplated when the U.S. Constitution
was drafted; therefore, before 1866, there was only one class
of citizens; after 1866, there were two classes of citizens,
the second of which is a municipal
franchise domiciled in the District of Columbia (“D.C.”) and subject to
federal municipal jurisdiction; see Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885);
d. numerous court citations are available to prove this class discrimination in the JSSA, at 28 U.S.C. 1865(b)(1); see Topic “A” in the OPENING BRIEF, U.S.A. v. Gilbertson and all related pleadings (whether filed or not); copies of this OPENING BRIEF and draft APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO FILE ENLARGED BRIEF are incorporated by reference, as if set forth fully herein, to copies published at Internet URL’s:
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/gilberts/opening.htm
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/gilberts/replysup.htm
e. such discrimination means that those qualified to make federal laws, cannot now vote or serve on federal juries; and, those eligible to vote and serve on federal juries, cannot now make federal laws; see Qualifications Clauses for seminal authorities (1:2:2, 1:3:3, and 2:1:5); confer also at Reductio ad absurdum in Black’s supra; the term “United States” in these provisions means “States united” [sic]; see People v. Pablo De La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311, 337 (1870); no taxation without representation.
Accordingly, even though all “jurors” on a panel of federal citizens, claiming to be a lawfully convened federal grand jury, may be qualified to serve, the entire panel is not a legal body due to this class discrimination against the very People who are qualified to make federal Laws in America. See the Qualifications Clauses, in chief, at 1:2:2, 1:3:3 and 2:1:5 (“Article : Section : Clause”).
In addition to this serious,
unconstitutional flaw which has now been thoroughly documented in the JSSA and
elsewhere (e.g. voter registration affidavits), Defendant hereby
provides formal NOTICE of the following additional reasons for demanding a
certified copy of the panel’s record of proceedings in the instant case, and
for requesting an opportunity to make a written appearance before a lawfully
convened federal grand jury which does not exhibit class
discrimination:
2. Messrs. ROBERT S. MUELLER III, THOMAS S. DiLEONARDO, and GREGORY S. GORDON, alleging to be employed currently by the U.S. Department of Justice and currently prosecuting the instant case, do not have valid Powers of Attorney to represent the Plaintiffs UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic]:
a. Plaintiffs are identified by the plural,
collective noun which is synonymous with, and refers exclusively to, the Union of several States which are united
by, and under, the U.S. Constitution;
see Preamble,
in chief (i.e. “We the People … do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of
America.” [bold emphasis added]);
b. Plaintiffs and Defendant are both identified
by a nomme de guerre or “name of war”
in the French language (i.e. ALL
CAPITAL LETTERS) when a state of war does not exist as a matter of fact,
and can not exist as a matter of Law;
warring against the several States is defined as treason in the U.S. Constitution; see Article III, Section 3, Clause 1 (“3:3:1”); one of the penalties for treason is
death; there are no provisions in the U.S. Constitution
authorizing perpetual martial law; the Law of Nations is emphatically NOT the supreme Law of
this Land; see also “The Lawless
Law of Nations,” by author Sterling Edmunds;
c. the several Attorneys General, representing the 50 States of the Union, have not made proper appearances, nor has any one of them brought this action, in the first instance;
d. accordingly, by failing to make any proper appearances, Plaintiffs have failed to prosecute the instant case.
3. Plaintiffs UNITED STATES OF AMERICA do not
have standing to prosecute criminal
cases in this United States District Court (hereinafter “USDC”):
a.
see citations in
re: standing in People v. United
States, NOTICE
OF INTENT TO PETITION FOR LEAVE TO INSTITUTE QUO WARRANTO PROCEEDINGS, DCUS, Billings, #CV-96-163-BLG; a copy of said NOTICE is incorporated by reference,
as if set forth fully herein, to the copy published at Internet URL:
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/garfield/qwnotint.htm
b.
Congress has failed
to grant standing to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA to sue as Plaintiffs in
federal courts, although Congress has granted standing to the “United
States” to sue, and be sued, in federal courts; see, in particular, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345, 1346.
4. The USDC does
not have any original jurisdiction to
prosecute criminal cases and has no statutory or constitutional authority to
convene a federal grand jury to issue criminal indictments:
a. 18 U.S.C. 3231
grants original jurisdiction to the District Courts of the United States (“DCUS”), not to the USDC; see dispositive case of Mookini et al. v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201, 205
(1938); confer at Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius in Black’s supra:
what was omitted, or excluded, was intended
to be omitted or excluded; the USDC was
expressly omitted from 18 U.S.C. 3231; omission of USDC was
intentional;
b.
statutes granting
original jurisdiction to the federal courts must be strictly construed;
see Mookini supra and
numerous other cites (available upon request);
c.
USDC is a legislative court, not a constitutional court, with authority issuing
from Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 (“4:3:2”); see Balzac v. Porto Rico [sic],
258 U.S. 298, 312 (1924); numerous other cites, notably those developed at Topic “E”
of the OPENING
BRIEF in U.S.A. v. Gilbertson supra; recently, federal
magistrates have erred by claiming authority under Article I of
the U.S.
Constitution;
d.
Defendant enjoys
the fundamental Right to defend Himself in a federal constitutional court where Due Process guarantees are in effect and
enforceable, not in a legislative
court; see Fifth
Amendment, in chief (i.e. no
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law);
e.
Defendant also
enjoys the fundamental Right to know precisely -- without vagueness,
ambivalence or duplicity -- the nature
and cause of the instant accusation(s);
see Sixth
Amendment, in chief;
f.
Defendant also
enjoys the fundamental Right to prosecute His own VERIFIED
CRIMINAL CROSS-COMPLAINT(s) in a federal constitutional court, not in a legislative
court; see Petition Clause in the First
Amendment, in chief, and the Arising Under Clause (“3:2:1”);
g.
court pleadings,
and requests to appear before a lawful grand jury, are petitions to
Government for redress of grievances, afforded First
Amendment protections and not allowing dubious intrusions of any kind; see Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516; City of Long Beach v. Bozek,
31 Cal.3d 527, 535;
h.
under Article III,
Section 2, Clause 2 (“3:2:2”),
the U.S. Supreme Court has original jurisdiction of the instant case, to
wit: “In all Cases … in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall
have original Jurisdiction.” All 50
States are Proper Parties to the instant case;
i.
if “UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA” refers to some other legal entity(s), Defendant is now at a total loss even to guess what it (or they) might
be, and hereby alleges major
fraud, if that is, in fact, the case;
see 18
U.S.C. 1031;
j.
without lawful powers of attorney to represent the UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA [sic], the persons alleging to be U.S. Attorneys prosecuting the instant
case are liable to charges of willful misrepresentation, in violation of the
McDade Act at 28
U.S.C. 530B; see also § 6086.7 in the
California Business and Professions Code;
k.
all pleadings filed to date by said persons alleging to be U.S.
Attorneys representing the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, were filed without lawful
power(s) of attorney and should be stricken for this very reason.
5. In all criminal cases, Defendant is guaranteed
federal courts of competent jurisdiction,
per the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (a United States Treaty); this guarantee is fundamental; see also Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, Article 8; and the Supremacy Clause (“6:2”) in pari materia with the Arising Under
Clause (“3:2:1”)
and 28
U.S.C. 1331 (a federal question is a matter arising under the Constitution,
Laws and Treaties of the United
States):
a.
the USDC is not competent to prosecute this
case; to illustrate, the following dialectic is right on point:
“Q: Does the Constitution give people any right to
proceed or be proceeded against, in the first instance, in an inferior federal constitutional court rather than a
federal legislative court?
“A: As to criminal defendants charged with
offenses committed in one of the states, surely.” [!!!]
Source: "The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic,"
by Henry M. Hart, Jr., in 66 Harvard Law Review 1365-1366 (1953) [bold
emphasis added];
b. the Act of June 25, 1948, unlawfully
extended the USDC,
a legislative court [sic], into judicial districts already established within each State of the
Union;
c. the
Act of June 25, 1948, expressly intended to continue
the judicial jurisdiction of the DCUS; legislative intent is always decisive; Section 2(b) of the Act June 25, 1948,
provided, in part, that the provisions of this title [i.e. Title 28, U.S.C.] as
set out in § 1 of the Act of June
25, 1948, with respect to the organization of the court, shall be construed
as a continuation of existing law;
the Act of June 25, 1948, contains the following corresponding language,
to wit:
The
provisions of title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, of the United States
Code, set out in
section 1 of this Act, with respect to the organization of each of the several
courts therein provided for ... shall be construed as continuations of
existing law. ... No loss of
rights, interruption of jurisdiction, or prejudice to matters pending in any of
such courts on the effective date of this Act shall result from its enactment.
[bold
emphasis added]
d.
by virtue of the
constitutional prohibition against ex
post facto Laws, the Act of June 25, 1948, was barred from re-defining terms in
all prior statutes granting original jurisdiction to the DCUS; see Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 (“1:9:3”); also Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad
Company, 240 U.S. 1 (1916), as a case in point (brought in the DCUS, Southern District
of New York); in other words, Congress cannot retroactively alter
the meaning of the term “district
court of the United States” as that term is found in statutes pre-dating
June 25, 1948; term has a well
established historic significance,
per Mookini supra;
e. Quoting: “In essence a
legislative court is merely an administrative agency with an elegant name. While Congress surely has the power to
transfer portions of the business of the federal judiciary to legislative
courts, a wholesale transfer of that
business would work a fundamental change in the status of our independent
judiciary and would seem vulnerable to constitutional attack.” Kenneth L. Karst, Encyclopedia of the
American Constitution, New York, MacMillan Publishing Company (1986),
volume 3, page 1144, discussion of topic LEGISLATIVE COURT [bold emphasis added]; see also Bibliography, Note 1962,
"Legislative and Constitutional Courts: What Lurks Ahead for
Bifurcation," Yale Law Journal, 71:979-1012;
f. therefore, DCUS continues to exist within the federal court system, notwithstanding absence of any U.S. Supreme Court authority(s) to issue civil or criminal rules for the DCUS; in this regard, see 28 U.S.C. 2072(a) and (b), in chief;
g. Defendant has the procedural
Right to petition the DCUS,
or the U.S. Supreme Court, for a WARRANT OF REMOVAL, transferring the instant
case into the proper federal court with competent, original jurisdiction.
6. The man alleging to preside on this Court ("JF") has an adverse conflict of interest for volunteering to allow his judicial compensation (read “pay”) to be diminished by federal income taxes; see 28 U.S.C. 455, in chief:
a. Article III, Section 1 (“3:1”)
immunizes all federal judges from diminution of their judicial pay; this provision has never been amended, or
repealed;
b. this immunity was expressly upheld by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920);
c.
Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist has admitted publicly that all federal judges currently pay taxes on their pay; a published Press Release
memorializing this admission is incorporated by reference, as if set forth
fully herein, to the copy published at Internet URL:
http://www.supremelaw.org/press/rels/lawless.htm
d.
taxation of
judicial pay is proof of undue influence by Trust #62 domiciled in Puerto Rico,
dba Internal Revenue Service [sic]; see Lord v. Kelley, 240 F.Supp. 167,
169 (1965) admitting undue influence, and “The Cooper File” in
re: Trust #62, and Performance Management and Recognition System (“PMRS”); Anti-Kickback Act of 1986, 41 U.S.C. 51 et
seq.; “The Cooper File” is
incorporated by reference, as if set forth fully herein, to the copy published
at Internet URL:
http://www.supremelaw.org/library/cooper.html
e.
Downes Doctrine is specious
for creating a colorable excuse for taxing judicial pay; see Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244
(1901), paraphrasing: “the Constitution of the United States, as such, does not
extend beyond the limits of the States which are united by and under it”;
f.
Downes Doctrine is contravened by Acts of 1871
and 1873, expressly extending the U.S. Constitution into D.C. and into all federal Territories, respectively, to settle any lingering doubts
about its applicability therein; see
cites in FIRST
SUPPLEMENT TO NOTICE OF INTENT TO PETITION SUPREME COURT FOR PEREMPTORY WRIT OF
MANDAMUS in U.S.A. v. Gilbertson, which is incorporated by reference,
as if set forth fully herein, to the copy published at Internet URL:
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/gilberts/intentm3.filed.htm
g.
therefore, the
DCUS is currently vacant
because it lacks qualified judicial officers, in all judicial districts, e.g. Northern
Judicial District of California;
California State is decidedly not a “United States District” [sic] nor a “federal area” or enclave or
territory or possession (i.e. none of
the above), notwithstanding the Buck Act;
h. Defendant has the procedural Right to demand
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to prepare a certificate of necessity,
certifying said vacancy, and to forward same to the Chief Justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court who, in turn, has authority to designate, and assign temporarily
to the DCUS, a judge of
the Court of International Trade, which court is an Article III
court by law, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 251(a) and 293.
7. Man alleging to preside on this USDC has
failed to perfect the Oath of Office required by Article VI, Section 3 (“6:3”):
a. judicial
immunity cannot be invoked without original jurisdiction and without a valid Oath of Office; without original jurisdiction, this USDC has
only enough authority to dismiss the instant case, for failing to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted (USDC cannot
issue any relief whatsoever);
b. lacking
the requisite Oath
of Office, the man alleging to preside on the instant case, and all accomplices,
are personally liable to Defendant for impersonating federal officers, and for
all related federal offenses, e.g. 18 U.S.C. 912,
also 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 241, 1961 et seq.;
c. Defendant
reserves a fundamental Right to litigate all operative provisions of the U.S. Constitution,
in equity (read “as a matter of contract with the American People”),
notwithstanding current absence of rules for the DCUS; see 28 U.S.C. 2072(a)
and (b); federal government employees and agents are now fraudulently attempting
to enforce non-existent provisions in the U.S. Constitution;
d. Congress
has failed to enact legislation clarifying a procedure to compel disclosure of
a federal judge’s Oath of Office; litigants, whether civil or criminal, are
entitled to actual notice that a valid Oath of Office
has been executed by the man or woman claiming to preside as federal judge, or
federal magistrate judge, in any given case.
8. In all criminal cases, Defendant also enjoys
the fundamental guarantee of qualified
judicial officers, per the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights at Article 2,
Section 3(b) and Article
9, Section 3; see also Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, Article 8; and
Supremacy Clause (“6:2”) in pari materia with the Arising Under
Clause (“3:2:1”)
in the U.S.
Constitution, and with 28 U.S.C. 1331
(a federal question is a matter arising under the Constitution,
Laws and Treaties):
a.
man alleging to
preside on the instant case is necessarily disqualified for lacking a
valid Oath of
Office, and for exhibiting
adverse conflicts of interest, chiefly the undue
executive influence resulting from taxing judicial pay;
b. Separation of Powers Doctrine is violated
when undue executive influence is
discovered upon Court, resulting in judicial partiality, bias and dependence; the Framers of the U.S. Constitution
intended Article
III to authorize an impartial, unbiased and independent
judiciary;
c. a
gold-fringed American flag has been defined by former President and Supreme
Allied Commander during World War II, Dwight D. Eisenhower, as the banner of
the Commander-in-Chief, providing further proof of undue executive influence (President is Commander-in-Chief
and head of the Executive Branch).
9.
Defendant has been
victimized by a property conversion
racket, most likely orchestrated by rogue agents and/or imposters within
the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and their accomplices (whether witting,
or unwitting):
a.
if Mr. LeRoy
Michael Schweitzer’s early “warrants” were deliberately cleared, most likely by cooperating banks, to give only the appearance
of overall authenticity to unsuspecting users of his later “warrants”, then this
is fraud and entrapment, both of which demand immediate dismissal of the
pertinent charges;
b.
if Mr. LeRoy
Michael Schweitzer’s “lien” process was, in fact, unlawful, then an
identical charge can and should be brought against the administrative
process which the IRS routinely uses to record Notices of Federal Tax Lien in
the offices of County Recorders throughout the nation;
c.
specifically, the
IRS administrative process begins with a Notice of Deficiency, then a Notice of
Federal Tax Lien which is recorded by County Recorders as a public record; then, with the full cooperation of County
Recorders, IRS then mutates these “Notices” into non-judicial liens and
uses them to exercise collection powers not granted by the IRC or the
corresponding regulations;
d.
if the process
which the IRS uses to record Notices of Federal Tax Lien is, in fact, lawful,
then LeRoy Michael’s Schweitzer’s lien process was, in fact, lawful, and
the pertinent charges should be dismissed forthwith, if nothing else;
e.
if IRS can -- extra-judicially -- rebut any
taxpayer’s affidavit, signed under penalty of perjury, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(2)
and FRCP Rule 56(e), without being bound by FRCP Rule 56(g), thus proceeding extra-judicially
to create -– finally and ultimately -– a lien which can be used to seize
Personal property and real property, then Schweitzer CAN DO THE
SAME, notwithstanding protestations to the contrary by U.S. Attorneys,
United States Courts, and U.S. banks; OR,
the only other alternative is that Schweitzer cannot and IRS also
cannot;
f.
after being
tendered, Schweitzer’s “warrants” were converted and assembled by
various DOJ offices, e.g. downtown
Los Angeles, California, where electronic and hard-copy dossiers were collated
with records of tangible, valuable assets owned by warrant users; asset groups were then targeted for
forfeiture by DOJ;
g.
DOJ continues to
use the PROMIS software (Prosecutors Management Information
System) evidently stolen from the Inslaw Corporation, to collate said
dossiers;
h.
typically, bank
fraud and/or mail fraud charges were then brought against users of Schweitzer’s
“warrants,” forcing valuable assets into forfeiture, and imposing fines and
penalties for violations exactly like those alleged in the instant
indictment; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 287, 1341, in
chief;
i.
systematic repetition
of such fines, penalties and forfeitures amounts to premeditated entrapment and a property conversion racket, in direct violation of the Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), at 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.;
j.
Defendant was
entrapped, and thus victimized, by the very same racket; see petitioner’s OFFER TO
PROVE RACKETEEERING, which is incorporated by reference, as if set forth
fully herein, to the copy published at Internet URL:
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/swan/rebuttal.htm#racketeering
k.
under federal banking
laws, Schweitzer’s “warrants” should have been refused and returned to their
“maker” within 72 hours, particularly when they were endorsed “without
recourse” as to the payee(s); instead,
the warrants were unlawfully converted into the possession of FBI and then DOJ;
l.
arguendo, if the IRS non-judicial process is legal under
the U.C.C., then
Schweitzer’s process is also legal, and his warrants do have monetary value,
under the same system as is used by the Federal Reserve Banks; even such a reputable publication as the National
Geographic magazine has admitted that our banking “system” creates money OUT
OF NOTHING; this can only be
done in a system of FIAT money, having no substantive, honest basis;
m.
again, if the
government smiles on our banking system for making money out of nothing, then
the principle of equal protection of the law mandates that
Schweitzer be allowed to perfect a lien and use same as the basis and substance
for “creating” accounts at the Comptroller of the Currency;
n.
then, when
Schweitzer’s warrants are stolen and converted by agencies of the federal
government, such as FBI and DOJ, a true crime of conversion HAS BEEN COMMITTED
against Defendant, which crime Defendant herewith alleges;
o.
Defendant’s status
as a “payee” was no different from one who assigns his pay check to his
landlord; upon discovering insufficient
funds, for example, the landlord’s recourse is to the pay check’s maker,
and not the tenant, unless mens rea and conspiracy to defraud can
be proven beyond a shadow of a doubt;
p.
given the
fundamental guarantees as found in the Fifth
Amendment, as a teacher and mentor Schweitzer either knew, or should have known, the risks of
inferring guilt from silence and tendering warrants founded on this
inference; he also failed to warn
Defendant and other prospective users of those risks; to this extent, Schweitzer must bear some responsibility for the
consequences of his advice;
q.
Defendant reserves
His right to subpoena LeRoy Schweitzer:
“to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor”, as
guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment.
10.
The income tax
statutes in the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) are municipal
laws deliberately written to be vague as to their territorial application,
specific liabilities, known legal duties and their enforceability (if any):
a.
term “Internal”
means “Municipal”; the municipal nature of the IRC’s income tax provisions is res judicata under ruling in plaintiffs’ favor in Knox v. U.S. et al., USDC, W.D. Texas, #SA-89-CA-1308; see winning brief, published as Appendix “A” in The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue, and edited for
spelling and grammar by Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., after John Knox’s
passing; Appendix “A” is incorporated by
reference, as if set forth fully herein, to the copy published at URL:
http://www.supremelaw.org/fedzone11/htm/append-a.htm
b.
the term “State” at
IRC § 3121(e)
is restricted to the named
territories and possessions of D.C., Guam, Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and
Puerto Rico; experts in the offices of the Legislative Counsel and Congressional
Research Service advised U.S. Representative Barbara Kennelly of same; identical
constructions are found in other pertinent IRC sections, and many other federal
laws;
c.
Defendant expressly
reserves His fundamental Right to subpoena said legal experts: “to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor”, as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment; letter from Rep.
Kennelly to John Randall is incorporated by reference, as if set forth fully
herein, to the copy published at Internet URL:
http://www.supremelaw.org/press/rels/kennell3.gif
d.
Congress is prohibited from re-defining terms which
are found in the U.S. Constitution; see
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), prohibiting Congress from
defining the term “income” (holding predicated on ratification of the so-called
16th
amendment, later proven to be a fraud);
also U.S. v. Ballard, 535 F.2d 400, 404 (8th Cir.
1976) (holding that “income” is not defined anywhere
in the IRC);
e.
the terms “State”
and “United States” figure prominently throughout
the U.S. Constitution, the IRC and Title 27, U.S.C., and
Congress often re-defines both terms to exclude the 50 States of the Union, in direct violation of
the Eisner Prohibition supra;
f.
President Andrew
Johnson’s 3-man commission, convened after President Abraham Lincoln’s assassination,
issued a set of municipal codes with a nation-wide
scope; a federal judge lectured the
D.C. Historical Society, on December 5, 1898, that Congress has no authority whatsoever to extend its municipal
laws into the several States of the Union, in violation of the Tenth
Amendment; to do so invades the
province of the 50 States, expressly reserved to them, and to their People, by
the Tenth
Amendment; this federal judge’s
admission is a “smoking gun”;
g.
there are no
statutes creating specific liabilities for taxes imposed by IRC subtitle A, except
for federal government employees [sic] and withholding agents;
Defendant is neither; see IRC § 7701(a)(16);
h.
federal income
taxes are completely voluntary for
Citizens of ONE
OF the 50 States; compare also the
“Withholding Exemption
Certificate” at IRC § 3402(n): absent liability statutes, there can be no liability and no
requirement to file Form 1040 or other reporting forms, e.g. 720, etc., for
any given calendar year, unless one volunteers to assess oneself and to make
oneself liable;
i.
28 U.S.C. 1746(2)
governs the perjury jurat on IRS Form 1040 and other reporting forms (i.e. jurat format is inside the “United States” [sic]);
IRS has published no form(s) for said Withholding Exemption
Certificate, although many private and State governmental organizations
have done so, e.g. California Franchise Tax Board (“FTB”), and John
Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland;
j.
the regulations at
26 CFR 1.1-1(b) are overly broad, for creating liabilities not specifically authorized by the corresponding
statute, i.e. IRC § 1, thus
violating the Separation of Powers Doctrine:
the Executive Branch cannot make
Law by regulations published in the Federal Register;
k.
valid regulations only
implement the underlying statutory authority(s); they cannot re-define or expand the reach of Congressional
intent, because the Secretary of the Treasury cannot “make” law, but can only
implement the law as enacted by Congress;
l.
all legislative
powers are reserved to the Congress;
see Article I, Section 1 (“1:1”), i.e. “All legislative Powers herein
granted” are vested in the Congress of the United States (not anywhere else);
m.
further vagueness
occurs at IRC § 7851(a)(6)(A),
in regards to the meaning of the term “this title” [sic]; the consistent
federal legislative practice is to use this term to refer to a Title of the
United States Code, e.g. compare
statutes in Title 28
(the laws which govern the federal courts!);
term there means Title 28;
n.
Title 26, U.S.C., has
never been enacted into positive law; see House Speaker “Tip”
O’Neill’s admission in this regard; IRC
§ 7851
also falls within subtitle
F (Procedure and Administration) i.e.
§§ 6000 thru 8000 roughly; neither
congressional committees, nor the Secretary of the Treasury, can make law by
promulgating regulations; the President
must sign all bills, before they become Law;
o.
the high Court has
defined the criterion to prove vagueness
in a statute: “men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application,” Connally v. General
Construction Company, 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) [bold emphasis added];
p.
the term “this
title” is not defined in the IRC; by
asking ten (10) people of common intelligence to explain IRC § 7851(a)(6)(A),
their answers will vary, and have varied, in fact; this section, therefore, fails the high Court’s vagueness test,
as do numerous other IRC sections (some of which require the equivalent of 5
Ph.D.-level degrees to decipher and comprehend);
q.
thus, IRC § 7851(a)(6)(A)
is null and void for vagueness, and
no provisions of subtitle
F have ever taken effect, inclusive also of section 7851;
r.
Defendant is
charged with violating 26 U.S.C. §§ 7203 and 7212(a),
both in subtitle F
(§§ 6000 thru 8000 roughly) and not currently in effect as positive law, as
such; any doubt of this kind must
be resolved in favor of those upon whom the “tax” is sought to be laid; see Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v.
McLain, 192 U.S. 397, 416 (1904);
confer also at “Obligation, perfect or imperfect” and “Positive law” in Black’s
Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition;
s.
moreover, the U.S.
House of Representatives has now voted to “sunset the Code” by a majority vote in
favor of the Date Certain Tax Code Replacement Act, H.R. 4199, approved on
April 13, 2000 A.D.; the
Congressional findings as stated in said House Resolution must be considered in
the instant case, because those findings speak directly to the overly and intentionally
complex nature of the tax code;
t.
accordingly, during
calendar years 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998 A.D.,
Defendant had no legal duty to make an income tax return to the District Director
of the IRS for the Internal Revenue District of Central California, at San
Jose, in the Northern District of California;
u.
during calendar
years 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998 A.D.,
Defendant had no legal duty to make an income tax return to the Director, IRS
Center at Fresno, California;
v.
during calendar
years 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998 A.D.,
Defendant had no legal duty to make an income tax return to any other proper
officer [sic] of the United
States; California is not a “federal
area” [sic] under the Buck Act (see
term “California area” [sic] in the
instant indictment at page 1, line 22);
w.
during said
calendar years, Defendant received no “gross income” from sources inside the “United States” [sic] and Defendant was not specifically
liable to the United States, nor to any other party(s), for payment of any
federal income taxes upon gross receipts He may have received from sources outside the United States [sic] during those years;
x.
meaning of “United
States” is controlled by general definitions at IRC §§ 7701(a)(9)
and (10), which also fall within subtitle F (IRC §§
6000 thru 8000 roughly) and have never
been enacted into positive law;
y.
50 States are outside the “United States” [sic]; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1746(1) and
(2); “United States” is therein
distinguished from the “United States of America” [sic], the latter of
which is UNDERSTOOD to mean the 50 States;
Defendant demands to know if this is the entity which is prosecuting the
instant case;
z.
as a Citizen of
California State, who was expressly not a federal citizen,
Defendant was not liable to the United States for any taxes imposed upon His worldwide income; see Treasury Decision
2313;
aa.
using the list of taxable sources listed at 26 CFR 1.861.8(f), there
are no facts in evidence that Defendant was engaged in any of these activities,
regardless of their legal situs, i.e. inside or outside the “United States” as that
term is defined supra.
11. In the
IRS Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”), Handbook of Delegation Orders, at page
1229-80 (dated 4-3-91), Delegation of Personnel-Related Matters, Chart 2, the
Deputy Commissioner was allegedly delegated authority to do the following:
· Approve monetary awards and exceptions to
monetary award scales up to and including $10,000 for any one individual or
group, and incur necessary expenses for the recognition of contributions
· Approve monetary awards and exceptions to
monetary award scales of $5,000-$10,000 (excluding PMRS Cash Awards) for any
one individual or group
· As Chairperson, Executive Resources Board,
to review and concur in recommendations for all awards for executives
· Recommend to Treasury, monetary awards of
$10,001-25,000 ($5,001 or more for Performance Management and Recognition
System (PMRS) Cash Awards) for any one individual or group
· Recommend an additional monetary award of
$10,000 (total $35,000) to the President through Treasury. [!!]
a. Defendant is prepared to call witnesses who
are willing to testify, under oath, that these PMRS awards are cash
payments specifically reserved for the President of the United States, for
federal judges, and for U.S. Attorneys, upon obtaining grand jury indictments
against "illegal tax protesters" [sic] and other political
“enemies” of same;
b. on this point, Defendant wishes to emphasize
that, under the First
Amendment in the U.S. Constitution, protest has never been
illegal in America; compare also U.C.C. 1-207 and UCCA
1207 (i.e. phrases “under protest” and “without prejudice” are
equivalent and synonymous); the term
"illegal protester" is, therefore, an oxymoron which cannot survive a
challenge on any constitutional grounds; otherwise, it sanctions a “suspect” class which suffers
demonstrable discrimination and prejudice prohibited by law;
c. accordingly, to be consistent with the U.S. Constitution
and also with the rules of grammatical construction for the English language,
the term "illegal tax protester" as found in various Acts of
Congress, and in regulations currently utilized by the “Internal Revenue
Service”, must be interpreted to mean that the "tax" is
"illegal", not the "protest" and not the “protester”; Defendant admits to protesting an illegal
tax; even if it had been properly
ratified, the so-called 16th
amendment gave no new taxing authority to the United States (federal
government);
d. upon request, Defendant can supply numerous
Supreme Court authorities for the proposition that Congressional statutes must
be construed in harmony with the fundamental Law; see First
Amendment, in chief; also U.C.C. 1-207, UCCA
1207;
e. thus, it now appears that there are
substantial cash incentives for U.S. Attorneys to lie, tamper with juries, and
obstruct evidence in seeking and obtaining indictments requested by the IRS,
all in violation of applicable federal laws and of principles
established in the U.S.
Constitution; for example, see 18 U.S.C. 1001
and 1031
(i.e. Major fraud against the United States);
f. historically, the Internal Revenue Manual
(“IRM”) has had no authority in law whatsoever; Lurhing v. Glotzbach, 304 F.2d 360
(4th Cir. 1962); Einhorn v. DeWitt,
618 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Goldstein, 342 F.Supp. 661 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Boulez v. C.I.R., 810 F.2d 209 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); and, United States v.
Will, 671 F.2d 963, 967 (6th Cir. 1982), for example;
g. recently, however, and as a direct result of
the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Internal
Revenue Service employees are now required to comply with the provisions
of the IRM; section 1203 of said Act
now identifies specific acts constituting grounds for termination of employment
with the Internal Revenue Service;
h. in the instant case, some of said acts are
alleged to have occurred, and have already been brought to the attention of
various courts and governmental bodies;
but, said acts have remained unprosecuted, not the least of which is
Defendant’s allegation of grand jury tampering, in which this Court will be a
willing participant -- by willfully depriving Defendant of a certified record
of proceedings; this Court is
authorized to disclose proceedings: see
Schmidt v. U.S., 115 F.2d 394 (6th Cir.); U.S. v. A.M.A., 26 F.Supp. 429
(D.C.), Atwell v. U.S., 162 F. 97 (4th Cir.).
12. Moreover, in order to make sure that panels are not proceeding ultra vires, NOTICE AND DEMAND are hereby made of this Court to recognize and obey the court holding that "… the indiscriminate summoning of witnesses in a spirit of meddlesome inquiry, on the mere chance that some crime may be discovered, is forbidden under the rules of the common law." See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L.Ed. 652, 26 S.Ct. 370. Please also take formal NOTICE of the following pertinent holdings:
The most valuable function of the grand jury is not only to examine into the commission of crimes, but to stand between the prosecutor and the accused; that is, to protect the citizen against unfounded accusations, whether they come from the government or are prompted by partisan passion or private enmity.
[38 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 26, page 971]
[bold emphasis added]
When the investigation is one required to be ordered by the court, under restrictions on the powers of the grand jury, the general rule that the investigation may not be a mere "fishing expedition" or a blanket inquiry for speculative purposes is applicable. It has been so held in respect of an investigation where it appears that a system of crime exists among public officials. McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498, 106 ALR 1373.
[38 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 28, page 973]
[bold emphasis added]
While the phrase "ultra vires" has been used to designate, not only acts beyond the express and implied powers of a corporation, but also acts contrary to public policy or contrary to some express statute prohibiting them, the latter class of acts is now termed illegal, and the "ultra vires" confined to the former class.
[Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition]
[emphasis added]
The United States government is a foreign corporation with respect to a state. [citing In re Merriam's Estate, 36 N.E. 505, 141 N.Y. 479, affirmed U.S. v. Perkins, 16 S.Ct. 1073, 163 U.S. 625, 41 L.Ed 287]
[19 C.J.S. 883, emphasis added]
An
act of Congress creating a private corporation is the act of Congress as the
local Legislature of the District of Columbia;
Congress cannot, under the federal constitution, as the Congress of the
United States of America, create a private corporation; Daly et
al. v. The National Life Insurance Company of the United States of America,
Indiana Supreme Court (November term, 1878).
REMEDIES
REQUESTED
For all the reasons stated herein, and elsewhere throughout the record now before this honorable Court, the instant indictment must be dismissed with prejudice as to the Plaintiffs, alleging falsely to have standing to bring the instant criminal prosecution.
Furthermore, this Court must order the production of a certified copy of the panel’s record of proceedings. Failing to do so implicates this Court with named and unnamed co-conspirators, who are now, and who have been, proceeding with unclean hands, as a criminal enterprise. The panel’s record of proceedings must be produced, in order to exonerate this Court from complicity with this conspiracy.
To do otherwise is plain error.
Further, demand has been previously made for verification of legal authority(s), if any, to acquire over 12,000 documents admittedly in possession of IRS-CID. A restatement of said demand is herewith made, i.e. for itemization and certification of ALL documents, and corresponding authority(s) to collect each and every one of same, with specificity and particularity.
This Court simply lacks lawful jurisdiction to proceed any further, without issuing ALL remedies already requested by Defendant.
I, Donald E. Wishart, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help Me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1). See Supremacy Clause in pari materia with all provisions of Title 28, U.S.C. (Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the United States are supreme Law of the Land).
Dated: October 20, 2000 A.D.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Donald E. Wishart
Donald E. Wishart, Sui Juris
Citizen of California State,
Federal Witness and Victim
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
I, Donald E. Wishart, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18 years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the following document(s):
GENERAL
SUPPLEMENT TO ALL MOTIONS:
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to the following:
Office of the U.S. Attorney Office of the U.S. Attorney
280 South First St., Suite 371 312 North Spring Street
San Jose [ZIP code exempt] Los Angeles [ZIP code exempt]
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Department of Justice, Tax Div. Department of Justice, Tax Div.
West. Criminal Enforcement Sec. West. Criminal Enforcement Sec.
600 “E” St., N.W., Room 5712 600 “E” St., N.W., Room 5712
Washington [ZIP code exempt] Washington [ZIP code exempt]
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Federal Public Defender’s Ofc. Internal Revenue Service
160 W. Santa Clara St., Ste. 575 55 South Market Street
San Jose [ZIP code exempt] San Jose [ZIP code exempt]
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Paul Camacho Don Hallenbeck
Internal Revenue Service Internal Revenue Service
55 South Market Street 55 South Market Street
San Jose [ZIP code exempt] San Jose [ZIP code exempt]
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Mel Steiner Colbert Tang
Internal Revenue Service Internal Revenue Service
55 South Market Street 55 South Market Street
San Jose [ZIP code exempt] San Jose [ZIP code exempt]
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Brian
Watson Ken
Whitmore
Internal Revenue Service Internal Revenue Service
55 South Market Street 55 South Market Street
San Jose [ZIP code exempt] San Jose [ZIP code exempt]
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Dan Sutherland Solicitor General
Internal Revenue Service U.S. Dept. of Justice
55 South Market Street 10th & Constitution, N.W.
San Jose [ZIP code exempt] Washington [ZIP code exempt]
CALIFORNIA, USA DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Bay View
Federal Bank Chief
Counsel
Attention: Legal Department Internal Revenue Service
2121 South El Camino Real 1111 Constitution Ave., N.W.
San Mateo [ZIP code exempt] Washington [ZIP code exempt]
CALIFORNIA,
USA DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA, USA
Jeremy Fogel Patricia V. Trumbull
c/o Clerk of Court c/o Clerk of Court
280 South First St., Rm. 2112 280 South First St., Rm. 2112
San Jose [ZIP code exempt] San Jose [ZIP code exempt]
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Department of Justice, Tax Div.
Western Criminal Enforcement Sec.
600 “E” St., N.W., Room 5712
Washington [ZIP code exempt]
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Executed on October 20, 2000 A.D.
/s/ Donald E. Wishart
Donald E. Wishart, Sui Juris
Citizen of California State,
Federal Witness and Victim
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice