Chapter 5: What State Are You In?

Answer: Mostly liquid, some solid, and occasional gas!

This answer is only partially facetious. In something as important as a Congressional statute, one would think that key terms like "State" would be defined so clearly as to leave no doubt about their meaning. Alas, this is not the case in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) brought to you by Congress. The term "State" has been deliberately defined so as to confuse the casual reader into believing that it means one of the 50 States of the Union, even though it doesn't say "50 States" in so many words. For the sake of comparison, we begin by crafting a definition which is deliberately designed to create absolutely no doubt or ambiguity about its meaning:
     For the sole purpose of establishing a benchmark of clarity,
     the term  "State" means  any one  of the  50 States  of  the
     Union,  the   District  of  Columbia,  the  territories  and
     possessions belonging  to  the  Congress,  and  the  federal
     enclaves lawfully  ceded to  the Congress  by any  of the 50
     States of the Union.

Now, compare this benchmark with the various definitions of the word "State" that are found in Black's Law Dictionary and in the Internal Revenue Code. Black's is a good place to start, because it clearly defines two different kinds of "states". The first kind defines a member of the Union, i.e., one of the 50 States which are united by and under the Constitution:
     The section  of territory  occupied by  one  of  the  United
     States***.   One of the component commonwealths or states of
     the United States of America.
                                                 [emphasis added]

The second kind defines a federal state, which is entirely different from a member of the Union:
     Any state  of the United States**, the District of Columbia,
     the Commonwealth  of  Puerto  Rico,  and  any  territory  or
     possession subject  to  the  legislative  authority  of  the
     United States.  Uniform Probate Code, Section 1-201(40).

                                                 [emphasis added]

Notice carefully that a member of the Union is not defined as being "subject to the legislative authority of the United States". Also, be aware that there are also several different definitions of "State" in the IRC, depending on the context. One of the most important of these is found in a chapter specifically dedicated to providing definitions, that is, Chapter 79 (not exactly the front of the book). In this chapter of definitions, we find the following:

     When used  in this  title, where  not  otherwise  distinctly
     expressed  or   manifestly  incompatible   with  the  intent
     thereof-- ...

     (10) State. --  The  term  "State"  shall  be  construed  to
          include  the   District   of   Columbia,   where   such
          construction is  necessary to  carry out  provisions of
          this title.
                                                [IRC 7701(a)(10)]
                                                 [emphasis added]

Already, it is obvious that this definition leaves much to be debated because it is ambiguous and it is not nearly as clear as our "established benchmark of clarity" (which will be engraved in marble a week from Tuesday). Does the definition restrict the term "State" to mean only the District of Columbia? Or does it expand the term "State" to mean the District of Columbia in addition to the 50 States of the Union? And how do we decide?

Even some harsh critics of federal income taxes, like Otto Skinner, have argued that ambiguities like this are best resolved by interpreting the word "include" in an expansive sense, rather than a restrictive sense. To support his argument, Skinner cites the definitions of "includes" and "including" that are actually found in the Internal Revenue Code:

     Includes  and   Including.  --   The  terms  "includes"  and
     "including" when  used in  a definition  contained  in  this
     title shall  not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise
     within the meaning of the term defined.
                                                    [IRC 7701(c)]
                                                 [emphasis added]

Skinner reasons that the Internal Revenue Code provides for an expanded definition of the term "includes" when used in other definitions contained in that Code. Using his logic, then, the definition of "State" at IRC Sec. 7701(a)(10) must be interpreted to mean the District of Columbia, in addition to other things. But what other things? Are the 50 States to be included also? What about the territories and possessions? And what about the federal enclaves ceded to Congress by the 50 States? If the definition itself does not specify any of these things, then where, pray tell, are these other things "distinctly expressed" in the Code? If these other things are distinctly expressed elsewhere in the Code, is their expression in the Code manifestly compatible with the intent of that Code? Should we include also a state of confusion to our understanding of the statute?

Quite apart from the meaning of "includes" and "including", defining the term "include" in an expansive sense leads to an absurd result that is manifestly incompatible with the Constitution. If the expansion results in defining the term "State" to mean the District of Columbia in addition to the 50 States of the Union, then these 50 States must be situated within the federal zone. Remember, the federal zone is the area of land over which the Congress has unrestricted, exclusive legislative jurisdiction. But, the Congress does not have unrestricted, exclusive legislative jurisdiction over any of the 50 States. It is bound by the chains of the Constitution in this other zone, to paraphrase Thomas Jefferson. Specifically, Congress is required to apportion direct taxes which it levies within the 50 States. This is a key limitation on the power of Congress. It has never been explicitly repealed (as Prohibition was repealed).

Unlike the Brushaber case, other federal cases can be cited to support the conclusions that taxes on income are direct taxes, and that the 16th Amendment actually removed this apportionment rule from direct taxes laid on "income". Sorry, but the Supreme Court is not always consistent in this area, and the Appellate Courts are even less consistent. These other cases are highly significant, if only because they provide essential evidence of other attempts by federal courts to isolate the exact effects of a ratified 16th Amendment. The following ruling by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals is unique, among all the relevant federal cases, for its clarity and conciseness on this question:


     The  constitutional  limitation  upon  direct  taxation  was
     modified by  the Sixteenth  Amendment insofar as taxation of
     income was  concerned, but  the amendment  was restricted to
     income,  leaving   in  effect  the  limitation  upon  direct
     taxation of principal.

          [Richardson vs United States, 294 F.2d 593, 596 (1961)]
                                                 [emphasis added]

The constitutional limitation upon direct taxes is apportionment. It is not difficult to find Supreme Court decisions which arrived at the very same conclusion about the 16th Amendment, long before the Richardson case:
     ... [I]t does not extend the taxing power to new or excepted
     subjects, but  merely removed  all occasion, which otherwise
     might exist,  for an apportionment among the states of taxes
     laid on  income, whether  it be  derived from  one source or
     another.
                        [Peck & Co. vs Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1918)]
                                                 [emphasis added]

And, in what is arguably one of the most significant Supreme Court decisions to define the precise meaning of "income", the Eisner Court simply paraphrased the Peck decision when it attributed the exact same effect to the 16th Amendment, namely, income taxes had become direct taxes relieved of apportionment:
     As repeatedly  held, this did not extend the taxing power to
     new  subjects,   but  merely  removed  the  necessity  which
     otherwise might  exist for an apportionment among the States
     of taxes laid on income. ...

     A proper  regard for  its genesis, as well as its very clear
     language, requires  also that  this Amendment  shall not  be
     extended by  loose construction,  so as to repeal or modify,
     except  as  applied  to  income,  those  provisions  of  the
     Constitution that  require  an  apportionment  according  to
     population  for   direct  taxes   upon  property,  real  and
     personal.

               [Eisner vs Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 205-206 (1919)]
                                                 [emphasis added]

Contrary to statements about it in the Brushaber decision, the earlier Pollock case, without any doubt, defined income taxes as direct taxes. It also overturned an Act of Congress precisely because that Act levied a direct tax without apportionment:
     First.   We adhere  to the  opinion already announced, that,
     taxes on  real estate being indisputably direct taxes, taxes
     on the  rents or  income of  real estate  are equally direct
     taxes.

     Second.   We are  of the  opinion  that  taxes  on  personal
     property,  or  on  the  income  of  personal  property,  are
     likewise direct taxes.

                           [Pollock vs Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.]
                            [158 U.S. 601 (1895), emphasis added]

Another Supreme Court decision is worthy of note, not only because it appears to attribute the exact same effect to the 16th Amendment, but also because it fails to clarify which meaning of the term "United States" is being used:
     No  doubt   is  suggested   (the   former   requirement   of
     apportionment  having   been   removed   by   constitutional
     amendment) as  to the power of Congress thus to impose taxes
     upon incomes  produced within  the  borders  of  the  United
     States [?]  or arising  from sources  located therein,  even
     though the income accrues to a non-resident alien.

                                 [Shaffer vs Carter, 252 U.S. 37]
                               [emphasis and question mark added]

In the Shaffer decision, it is obvious that Justice Pitney again attributed the same effect to the 16th Amendment. However, if he defined "United States" to mean the federal zone, then he must have believed that Congress also had to apportion direct taxes within that zone before the 16th Amendment was "declared" ratified. Such a belief contradicts the exclusive legislative authority which Congress exercises over the federal zone:
     In exercising  this power  [to make  all needful  rules  and
     regulations respecting territory or other property belonging
     to the United States**], Congress is not subject to the same
     constitutional limitations,  as when  it is  legislating for
     the United States***.

             [Hooven & Allison Co. vs Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)]
                                                 [emphasis added]

On the other hand, if Justice Pitney defined "United States" to mean the several States of the Union, he as much admits that the Constitution needed amending to authorize an unapportioned direct tax on income produced or arising from sources within the borders of those States. Unfortunately for us, Justice Pitney did not clearly specify which meaning he was using, and we are stuck trying to make sense of Supreme Court decisions which contradict each other. For example, compare the rulings in Peck, Eisner, Pollock and Shaffer (as quoted above) with the rulings in Brushaber and Stanton vs Baltic Mining Co., and also with the ruling In re Becraft (a recent Appellate case). To illustrate, the Stanton court ruled as follows:
     ... [T]he  Sixteenth Amendment  conferred no  new  power  of
     taxation but  simply prohibited  the previous  complete  and
     plenary power  of income taxation possessed by Congress from
     the beginning  from being  taken  out  of  the  category  of
     indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged ....

          [Stanton vs Baltic Mining Company, 240 U.S. 103 (1916)]
                                                 [emphasis added]

Now, contrast the Stanton decision with a relatively recent decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco. In re Becraft is classic because that Court sanctioned a seasoned defense attorney $2,500 for raising issues which the Court called "patently absurd and frivolous", sending a strong message to any licensed attorney who gets too close to breaking the "Code". First, the Court reduced attorney Lowell Becraft's position to "one elemental proposition", namely, that the 16th Amendment does not authorize a direct non-apportioned income tax on resident United States** citizens and thus such citizens are not subject to the federal income tax laws. Then the 9th Circuit dispatched Becraft's entire argument with exemplary double-talk, as follows:
     For over  75 years,  the Supreme Court and the lower federal
     courts have  both implicitly  and explicitly  recognized the
     Sixteenth Amendment's  authorization  of  a  non-apportioned
     direct income  tax on  United States**  citizens residing in
     the United  States*** and  thus the  validity of the federal
     income tax  laws as  applied to  such citizens.   See, e.g.,
     Brushaber ....  [M]uch of Becraft's reply is also devoted to
     a discussion  of the  limitations of federal jurisdiction to
     United States** territories and the District of Columbia and
     thus the inapplicability of the federal income tax laws to a
     resident of one of the states*** [from footnote 2].

        [In re Becraft, 885 F.2d 547, 548 (1989), emphasis added]

Here, the 9th Circuit credits the 16th Amendment with authorizing a non-apportioned direct tax, completely contrary to Brushaber. Then the term "United States" is used two different ways in the same sentence; we know this to be true because a footnote refers to "one of the [50] states". The Court also uses the term "resident" to mean something different from the statutory meaning of "resident" and "nonresident", thus exposing another key facet of their fraud (see Chapter 3). Be sure to recognize what's missing here, namely, any mention whatsoever of State Citizens.

For the lay person, doing this type of comparison is a daunting if not impossible task, and demonstrates yet another reason why federal tax law should be nullified for vagueness, if nothing else. If Appellate and Supreme Court judges cannot be clear and consistent on something as fundamental as a constitutional amendment, then nobody can. And their titles are Justice. Are you in the State of Confusion yet?

When it comes to federal income taxes, we are thus forced to admit the existence of separate groups of Supreme Court decisions that flatly contradict each other. One group puts income taxes into the class of indirect taxes; another group puts them into the class of direct taxes. One group argues that a ratified 16th Amendment did not change or repeal any other clause of the Constitution; another group argues that it relieved income taxes from the apportionment rule. Even experts disagree. To illustrate the range of disagreement on such fundamental constitutional issues, consider once again the conclusion of legal scholar Vern Holland, quoted in a previous chapter:

     [T]he Sixteenth  Amendment did  not amend  the Constitution.
     The United  States  Supreme  Court  by  unanimous  decisions
     determined that  the amendment  did not grant any new powers
     of taxation;   that a direct tax cannot be relieved from the
     constitutional mandate  of  apportionment;    and  the  only
     effect of  the amendment was to overturn the theory advanced
     in the  Pollock case which held that a tax on income, was in
     legal effect, a tax on the sources of the income.

                  [The Law That Always Was, page 220, emphasis added]

Now consider an opposing view of another competent scholar. After much research and much litigation, author and attorney Jeffrey A. Dickstein offers the following concise clarification:
     A tax  imposed on all of a person's annual gross receipts is
     a direct  tax on personal property that must be apportioned.
     A tax  imposed on  the "income"  derived  from  those  gross
     receipts is  also a  direct tax on property, but as a result
     of the  Sixteenth Amendment, Congress no longer has to enact
     legislation calling  for the  apportionment of a tax on that
     income.
               [Judicial Tyranny and Your Income Tax, pages 60-61]

Recall now that 17,000 State-certified documents have been assembled to prove that the 16th Amendment was never ratified. As a consistent group, the Pollock, Peck, Eisner and Richardson decisions leave absolutely no doubt about the consequences of the failed ratification: the necessity still exists for an apportionment among the 50 States of all direct taxes, and income taxes are direct taxes. Using common sense as our guide, an expansive definition of "include" results in defining the term "State" to mean the District of Columbia in addition to the 50 States. This expansive definition puts the 50 States inside the federal zone, where Congress has no restrictions on its exclusive legislative jurisdiction. But, just a few sentences back, we proved that the rule of apportionment still restrains Congress inside the 50 States. This is an absurd result: it is not possible for the restriction to exist, and not exist, at the same time, in the same place, for the same group of people, for the same laws, within the same jurisdiction. Congress cannot have its cake and eat it too, as much as it would like to! Absurd results are manifestly incompatible with the intent of the IRC (or so I am told).

Other problems arise from Skinner's reasoning. First of all, like so much of the IRC, the definitions of "includes" and "including" are outright deceptions in their own right. A grammatical approach can be used to demonstrate that these definitions are thinly disguised tautologies. Note, in particular, where the Code states that these terms "shall not be deemed to exclude other things". This is a double negative. Two negatives make a positive. This phrase, then, is equivalent to saying that the terms "shall be deemed to include other things". Continuing with this line of reasoning, the definition of "includes" includes "include", resulting in an obvious tautology. (I just couldn't resist.) Forgive them, for they know not what they do.

The definitions of "includes" and "including" can now be rewritten so as to "include other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined". So, what things are otherwise within the meaning of the term "State", if those things are not distinctly expressed in the original definition? You may be dying to put the 50 States of the Union among those things that are "otherwise within the meaning of the term", but you are using common sense. The Internal Revenue Code was not written with common sense in mind; it was written with deception in mind. The rules of statutory construction apply a completely different standard. Author Ralph Whittington has this to say about the special definitions that are exploited by lawyers and lawmakers:

     The Legislature  means what  it says.    If  the  definition
     section states  that  whenever  the  term  "white"  is  used
     (within that  particular section  or the  entire code),  the
     term includes  "black," it means that "white" is "black" and
     you are  not allowed  to make additions or deletions at your
     convenience.  You   must  follow   the  directions   of  the
     Legislature, NO MORE -- NO LESS.

                                     [Omnibus, Addendum II, p. 2]

Unfortunately for Otto Skinner and others who try valiantly to argue the expansive meaning of "includes" and "including", Treasury Decision No. 3980, Vol. 29, January-December 1927, and some 80 court cases have adopted the restrictive meaning of these terms:
     The supreme  Court of the State ... also considered that the
     word "including"  was used  as a  word of  enlargement,  the
     learned court  being  of  the  opinion  that  such  was  its
     ordinary sense.   With  this we  cannot concur.   It  is its
     exceptional sense, as the dictionaries and cases indicate.

        [Montello Salt Co. vs State of Utah, 221 U.S. 452 (1911)]
                                                 [emphasis added]

An historical approach yields similar results. Without tracing the myriad of income tax statutes which Congress has enacted over the years, it is instructive to examine the terminology found in a revenue statute from the Civil War era. The definition of "State" is almost identical to the one quoted from the current IRC at the start of this chapter. On June 30, 1864, Congress enacted legislation which contained the following definition:
     The  word  "State,"  when  used  in  this  Title,  shall  be
     construed to  include the  Territories and  the District  of
     Columbia, where  such construction is necessary to carry out
     its provisions.

                [Title 35, Internal Revenue, Chapter 1, page 601]
                        [Revised Statutes of the United States**]
                            [43rd Congress, 1st Session, 1873-74]

Aside from adding "the Territories", the two definitions are nearly identical. The Territories at this point in time were Washington, Utah, Dakota, Nebraska, Colorado, New Mexico, and the Indian Territory.

One of the most fruitful and conclusive methods for establishing the meaning of the term "State" in the IRC is to trace the history of changes to the United States Codes which occurred when Alaska and Hawaii were admitted to the Union. Because other authors have already done an exhaustive job on this history, there is no point in re-inventing their wheels here. It is instructive to illustrate these Code changes as they occurred in the IRC definition of "State" found at the start of this chapter. The first Code amendment became effective on January 3, 1959, when Alaska was admitted to the Union:

     Amended  1954   Code  Sec.   7701(a)(10)  by   striking  out
     "Territories", and by substituting "Territory of Hawaii".

                                                [IRC 7701(a)(10)]

The second Code amendment became effective on August 21, 1959, when Hawaii was admitted to the Union:

     Amended 1954  Code Sec.  7701(a)(10) by  striking  out  "the
     Territory  of   Hawaii  and"   immediately  after  the  word
     "include".

                                                [IRC 7701(a)(10)]

Applying these code changes in reverse order, we can reconstruct the IRC definitions of "State" by using any word processor and simple "textual substitution" as follows:

     Time 1:   Alaska is a U.S.** Territory
               Hawaii is a U.S.** Territory

7701(a)(10):   The term "State" shall be construed to include the
               Territories and  the District  of Columbia,  where
               such  construction   is  necessary  to  carry  out
               provisions of this title.


Alaska joins  the Union.  Strike out "Territories" and substitute
"Territory of Hawaii":


     Time 2:   Alaska is a State of the Union
               Hawaii is a U.S.** Territory

7701(a)(10):   The term "State" shall be construed to include the
               Territory of  Hawaii and the District of Columbia,
               where such  construction is necessary to carry out
               provisions of this title.

Hawaii joins the Union.  Strike out "the Territory of Hawaii and"
immediately after the word "include":


     Time 3:   Alaska is a State of the Union
               Hawaii is a State of the Union

7701(a)(10):   The term "State" shall be construed to include the
               District of  Columbia, where  such construction is
               necessary to carry out provisions of this title.

Author Lori Jacques has therefore concluded that the term "State" now includes only the District of Columbia, because the former Territories of Alaska and Hawaii have been admitted to the Union, Puerto Rico has been granted the status of a Commonwealth, and the Philippine Islands have been granted their independence (see United States Citizen versus National of the United States, page 9, paragraph 5). It is easy to see how author Lori Jacques could have overlooked the following reference to Puerto Rico, found in the IRC itself:
     Commonwealth  of   Puerto  Rico.   --  Where  not  otherwise
     distinctly expressed  or manifestly  incompatible  with  the
     intent thereof,  references in  this title to possessions of
     the United  States** shall  be treated  as also referring to
     the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
                                                    [IRC 7701(d)]

In order to conform to the requirements of the Social Security scheme, a completely different definition of "State" is found in the those sections of the IRC that deal with Social Security. This definition was also amended on separate occasions when Alaska and Hawaii were admitted to the Union. The first Code amendment became effective on January 3, 1959, when Alaska was admitted:

     Amended 1954  Code Sec.  3121(e)(1), as  it appears  in  the
     amendment note  for P.L.  86-778, by  striking out "Alaska,"
     where it appeared following "includes".
                                                 [IRC 3121(e)(1)]

The second Code amendment became effective on August 21, 1959, when Hawaii was admitted:

     Amended 1954  Code Sec.  3121(e)(1), as  it appears  in  the
     amendment note  for P.L.  86-778, by  striking out "Hawaii,"
     where it appeared following "includes".
                                                 [IRC 3121(e)(1)]

Applying these code changes in reverse order, we can reconstruct the definitions of "State" in this Section of the IRC as follows:
     Time 1:   Alaska is a U.S.** Territory
               Hawaii is a U.S.** Territory

 3121(e)(1):   The term  "State"  includes  Alaska,  Hawaii,  the
               District of  Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
               Islands.


Alaska joins  the Union.   Strike out "Alaska," where it appeared
following "includes":


     Time 2:   Alaska is a State of the Union
               Hawaii is a U.S.** Territory

 3121(e)(1):   The term  "State" includes Hawaii, the District of
               Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.


Hawaii joins  the Union.   Strike out "Hawaii," where it appeared
following "includes":


     Time 3:   Alaska is a State of the Union
               Hawaii is a State of the Union

 3121(e)(1):   The  term   "State"  includes   the  District   of
               Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.


Puerto Rico becomes a Commonwealth.  For services performed after
1960, Guam and American Samoa are added to the definition:


     Time 4:   Puerto Rico becomes a Commonwealth
               Guam and American Samoa join Social Security

 3121(e)(1):   The  term   "State"  includes   the  District   of
               Columbia, the  Commonwealth of  Puerto  Rico,  the
               Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.

Notice carefully how Alaska and Hawaii only fit these definitions of "State" before they joined the Union. It is most revealing that these Territories became States when they were admitted to the Union, and yet the United States Codes had to be changed because Alaska and Hawaii were defined in those Codes as "States" before admission to the Union, but not afterwards. This apparent anomaly is perfectly clear, once the legal and deliberately misleading definition of "State" is understood. The precise history of changes to the Internal Revenue Code is detailed in Appendix B of this book. The changes made to the United States Codes when Alaska joined the Union were assembled in the Alaska Omnibus Act. The changes made to the federal Codes when Hawaii joined the Union were assembled in the Hawaii Omnibus Act. The following table summarizes the sections of the IRC that were affected by these two Acts:

          IRC Section         Alaska         Hawaii
          changed:            joins:         joins:
          -----------         ------         ------

          2202                  X              X
          3121(e)(1)            X              X
          3306(j)               X              X
          4221(d)(4)            X              X
          4233(b)               X              X
          4262(c)(1)            X              X
          4502(5)               X              X
          4774                  X              X
          7621(b)               X                  (-- Note
          7653(d)               X              X
          7701(a)(9)            X              X
          7701(a)(10)           X              X


Section 7621(b) sticks out like a sore thumb when the changes are arrayed in this fashion. The Alaska Omnibus Act modified this section of the IRC, but the Hawaii Omnibus Act did not. Let's take a close look at this section and see if it reveals any important clues:
     Sec. 7621.  Internal Revenue Districts.

     (a)  Establishment and  Alteration. --  The President  shall
     establish convenient  internal  revenue  districts  for  the
     purpose of  administering the  internal revenue  laws.   The
     President may from time to time alter such districts.

                                                    [IRC 7621(a)]

Now witness the chronology of amendments to IRC Section 7621(b), entitled "Boundaries", as follows:

     Time 1:   Alaska is a U.S.** Territory.
     {1/3/59   Hawaii is a U.S.** Territory. ("{" means "before")

     7621(b):  Boundaries.  --   For  the  purpose  mentioned  in
               subsection (a),  the President  may subdivide  any
               State, Territory,  or the District of Columbia, or
               may unite  two or  more States or Territories into
               one district.


     Time 2:   Alaska is a State of the Union.
     1/3/59    Hawaii is a U.S.** Territory.

     7621(b):  Boundaries.  --   For  the  purpose  mentioned  in
               subsection (a),  the President  may subdivide  any
               State, Territory,  or the District of Columbia, or
               may unite  into one District two or more States or
               a Territory and one or more States.


     Time 3:   Alaska is a State of the Union.
     2/1/77    Hawaii is a State of the Union.

     7621(b):  Boundaries.  --   For  the  purpose  mentioned  in
               subsection (a),  the President  may subdivide  any
               State or  the District  of Columbia,  or may unite
               into one district two or more States.

The reason why the Hawaii Omnibus Act did not change section 7621(b) is not apparent from reading the statute, nor has time permitted the research necessary to determine why this section was changed in 1977 and not in 1959. After Alaska joined the Union, Hawaii was technically the only remaining Territory. This may explain why the term "Territories" was changed to "Territory" at Time 2 above. However, this is a relatively minor matter, when compared to the constitutional issue that is involved here. There is an absolute constitutional restriction against subdividing or joining any of the 50 States, or any parts thereof, without the consent of Congress and of the Legislatures of the States affected. This restriction is very much like the restriction against direct taxes within the 50 States without apportionment:
     New States  may be admitted by the Congress into this Union;
     but no  new State  shall be  formed or  erected  within  the
     Jurisdiction of any other State;  nor any State be formed by
     the Junction  of two  or more  States, or  Parts of  States,
     without the  Consent  of  the  Legislatures  of  the  States
     concerned as well as of the Congress.

                  [Constitution for the United States of America]
                                 [Article 4, Section 3, Clause 1]
                                                 [emphasis added]

This point about new States caught the keen eye of author and scholar Eustace Mullins. In his controversial and heart- breaking book entitled A Writ for Martyrs, Mullins establishes the all-important link between the Internal Revenue Service and the Federal Reserve System, and does so by charging that Internal Revenue Districts are "new states" which have been established within the jurisdiction of legal States of the Union, as follows:
     The income  tax amendment  and the  Federal Reserve Act were
     passed in  the same  year, 1913, because they function as an
     essential team,  and were  planned to  do so.   The  Federal
     Reserve districts  and the  Internal Revenue  Districts  are
     "new  states,"   which  have  been  established  within  the
     jurisdiction of legal states of the Union.

                               [see Appendix "I", emphasis added]

Remember, the federal zone is the area of land over which the Congress exercises an unrestricted, exclusive legislative jurisdiction. The Congress does not have unrestricted, exclusive legislative jurisdiction over any of the 50 States. It is bound by the chains of the Constitution. This point is so very important, it bears repeating throughout the remaining chapters of this book. As in the apportionment rule for direct taxes and the uniformity rule for indirect taxes, Congress cannot join or divide any of the 50 States without the explicit approval of the Legislatures of the State(s) involved. This means that Congress cannot unilaterally delegate such a power to the President. Congress cannot lawfully exercise (nor delegate) a power which it simply does not have.

How, then, is it possible for section 7621(b) of the Internal Revenue Code to give this power to the President? The answer is simple: the territorial scope of the Internal Revenue Code is the federal zone. The IRC only applies to the land that is internal to that zone. If the territorial scope of the IRC were the 50 States of the Union, then section 7621(b) would, all by itself, render the entire statute unconstitutional for violating clause 4:3:1 of the Constitution (see above). Numerous other constitutional violations would also occur if the territorial scope of the IRC were the 50 States. A clear and unambiguous definition of "State" must be known before status and jurisdiction can be decided with certainty. After seeing and verifying all of the evidence discussed above, the editors of a bulletin published by the Monetary Realist Society wrote the following long comment about the obvious problems it raises:

     A serious reader could come to the conclusion that Missouri,
     for example,  is not one of the United States referred to in
     the code.  This conclusion is encouraged by finding that the
     code refers  to Hawaii  and Alaska  as states  of the United
     States before  their admission  to the  union!   Is the  IRS
     telling  us   that  the   only  states  over  which  it  has
     jurisdiction are  Guam, Washington  D.C., Puerto  Rico,  the
     Virgin Islands,  etc.?   Well, why  not write  and find out?
     Don't expect  an answer, though.  Your editor has asked this
     question and  sought to  have both  of his  Senators and one
     Congresswoman prod  the  IRS  for  a  reply  when  none  was
     forthcoming.  Nothing.

     And isn't  that strange?   It  would be  so simple  for  the
     service to  reply, "Of  course Missouri is one of the United
     States referred  to in  the code"  if that were, indeed, the
     case.   What can  one conclude from the government's refusal
     to deal with this simple question except that the government
     cannot admit  the truth  about United States citizenship?  I
     admit that  the question sounds silly.  Everybody knows that
     Missouri is  one of  the United  States, right?   Sure, like
     everybody knows  what a  dollar is!   But the IRS deals with
     "silly" questions  every day,  often at great length.  After
     all, the  code occupies many feet of shelf space, and covers
     almost any  conceivable situation.   It just doesn't seem to
     be able to cope with the simplest questions!

                              ["Some Thoughts on the Income Tax"]
                   [The Bulletin of the Monetary Realist Society]
                                 [March 1993, Number 152, page 2]

Although this book was originally intended to focus on the Internal Revenue Code, the other 49 U.S. Codes contain a wealth of additional proof that the term "State" does not always refer to one of the 50 States of the Union. Just to illustrate, the following statutory definition of the term "State" was found in Title 8, the Immigration and Nationality Act, as late as 1987:
     (36) The term  "State" includes  (except as  used in section
     310(a) of  title III  [8 USCS Section 1421(a)]) the District
     of Columbia,  Puerto Rico,  Guam, and  the Virgin Islands of
     the United States.

                  [8 USC 1101(a)(36), circa 1987, emphasis added]

The "exception" cited in this statute tells the whole story here. In section 1421, Congress needed to refer to courts of the 50 States, because their constitutions and laws granted to those courts the requisite jurisdiction to naturalize. For this reason, Congress made an explicit exception to the standard, federal definition of "State" quoted above. The following is the paragraph in section 1421 which contained the exceptional uses of the term "State" (i.e. Union State, not federal state):
     1421.  Jurisdiction to naturalize

     (a)  Exclusive  jurisdiction   to  naturalize   persons   as
     citizens of the United States** is hereby conferred upon the
     following specified  courts:   District courts of the United
     States now  existing, or  which may hereafter be established
     by Congress  in any  State ...  also all courts of record in
     any State  or Territory now existing, or which may hereafter
     be created,  having a  seal, a  clerk, and  jurisdiction  in
     actions at  law or  equity, or  law and equity, in which the
     amount in controversy is unlimited.

                      [8 USC 1421(a), circa 1987, emphasis added]

In a section entitled "State Courts", the interpretive notes and decisions for this statute contain clear proof that the phrase "in any State" refers to any State of the Union (e.g. New York):
     Under 8  USCS Section  1421, jurisdiction  to naturalize was
     conferred upon New York State Supreme Court by virtue of its
     being court  of record and having jurisdiction in actions at
     law and equity.  Re Reilly (1973) 73 Misc 2d 1073, 344 NYS2d
     531.
                  [8 USCS 1421, Interpretive Notes and Decisions]
                       [Section II. State Courts, emphasis added]

Subsequently, Congress removed the reference to this exception in the amended definition of "State", as follows:
     (36) The term  "State" includes  the District  of  Columbia,
     Puerto Rico,  Guam, and  the Virgin  Islands of  the  United
     States.
                                  [8 USC 1101(a)(36), circa 1992]

Two final definitions prove, without any doubt, that the IRC can also define the terms "State" and "United States" to mean the 50 States as well as the other federal states. The very existence of multiple definitions provides convincing proof that the IRC is intentionally vague, particularly in the section dedicated to general definitions (IRC 7701(a)). The following definition is taken from Subtitle D, Miscellaneous Excise Taxes, Subchapter A, Tax on Petroleum (which we all pay taxes at the pump to use):
     (A)  In General.  -- The  term "United  States" means the 50
          States, the  District of  Columbia, the Commonwealth of
          Puerto Rico,  any possession  of the United States, the
          Commonwealth of  the Northern  Mariana Islands, and the
          Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.            [!!]

                                              [IRC 4612(a)(4)(A)]
                                                 [emphasis added]

Notice that this definition uses the term "means". Why is this definition so clear, in stark contrast to other IRC definitions of the "United States"? Author Ralph Whittington provides the simple, if not obvious, answer:
     The preceding  is a  true Import  Tax,  as  allowed  by  the
     Constitution;  it contains all the indicia of being Uniform,
     and therefore  passes the  Constitutionality  test  and  can
     operate within  the 50  Sovereign States.   The  language of
     this Revenue  Act is simple, specific and definitive, and it
     would be  impossible  to  attach  the  "Void  for  Vagueness
     Doctrine" to it.
                           [The Omnibus, page 83, emphasis added]

The following definition of "State" is required only for those Code sections that deal with the sharing of tax return information between the federal government and the 50 States of the Union. In this case, the 50 States need to be included in the definition. So, the lawmakers can do it when they need to (and not do it, in order to put the rest of us into a state of confusion):
     (5)  State  --  The term "State" means --               [!!]

          (A)  any of  the 50  States, the  District of Columbia,
               the  Commonwealth   of  Puerto  Rico,  the  Virgin
               Islands, the Canal Zone, Guam, American Samoa, and
               the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.

                                 [IRC 6103(b)(5), emphasis added]

It is noteworthy [!!] that these sections of the IRC also utilize the term "means" instead of the terms "includes" and "including", and instead of the phrase "shall be construed to include". It is certainly not impossible to be clear. If it were impossible to be clear, then just laws would not be possible at all, and the Constitution could never have come into existence anywhere on this planet. Authors like The Informer (as he calls himself) consider the very existence of multiple definitions of "State" and "United States" to be highly significant proof of fluctuating statutory intent, even though a definition of "intent" is nowhere to be found in the statute itself. Together with evidence from the Omnibus Acts, these fluctuating definitions also expose perhaps the greatest fiscal fraud that has ever been perpetrated upon any people at any time in the history of the world.

Having researched all facets of the law in depth for more than ten full years, The Informer summarizes what we have learned thus far with a precision that was unique for its time:

     The term  "States" in  26 USC 7701(a)(9) is referring to the
     federal states of Guam, Virgin Islands, Etc., and NOT the 50
     States of  the Union.  Congress cannot write a municipal law
     to apply  to the individual nonresident alien inhabiting the
     States of the Union.  Yes, the IRS can go into the States of
     the Union  by Treasury  Decision Order,  to seek  out  those
     "taxpayers" who  are subject  to the tax, be they a class of
     individuals that  are United  States** citizens, or resident
     aliens.   They also can go after nonresident aliens that are
     under the  regulatory corporate  jurisdiction of  the United
     States**, when  they are  effectively connected with a trade
     or business  with the  United States**  or have  made income
     from a source within the United States** ....

                    [Which One Are You?, page 98, emphasis added]

Nevertheless, despite a clarity that was rare, author Lori Jacques has found good reasons to dispute even this statement. In a private communication, she explained that the Office of the Federal Register has issued a statement indicating that Treasury Department Orders 150-10 and 150-37 (regarding taxation) were not published in the Federal Register. Evidently, there are still no published orders from the Secretary of the Treasury giving the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the requisite authority to enforce the Internal Revenue Code within the 50 States of the Union. Furthermore, under Title 3, Section 103, the President of the United States, by means of Presidential Executive Order, has not delegated authority to enforce the IRC within the 50 States of the Union. Treasury Department Order No. 150-10 can be found in Commerce Clearinghouse Publication 6585 (an unofficial publication). Section 5 reads as follows:
     U.S. Territories  and Insular Possessions.  The Commissioner
     shall, to  the extent  of authority otherwise vested in him,
     provide for the administration of the United States internal
     revenue laws in the U.S. Territories and insular possessions
     and other authorized areas of the world.

Thus, the available evidence indicates that the only authority delegated to the Internal Revenue Service is to enforce tax treaties with foreign territories, U.S. territories and possessions, and Puerto Rico. To be consistent with the law, Treasury Department Orders, particularly TDO's 150-10 and 150-37, needed to be published in the Federal Register. Thus, given the absence of published authority delegations within the 50 States, the obvious conclusion is that the various Treasury Department orders found in Internal Revenue Manual 1229 have absolutely no legal bearing, force or effect on sovereign Citizens of the 50 States. Awesome, yes? Our hats are off, once again, to Lori Jacques for her superb legal research.

The astute reader will notice another basic disagreement between authors Lori Jacques and The Informer. Lori Jacques concludes that the term "State" now includes only the District of Columbia, a conclusion that is supported by IRC Sec. 7701(a)(10). The Informer, on the other hand, concludes that the term "States" refers to the federal states of Guam, Virgin Islands, etc. These two conclusions are obviously incompatible, because singular and plural must, by law, refer to the same things.

It is important to realize that both conclusions were reached by people who have invested a great deal of earnest time and energy studying the relevant law, regulations, and court decisions. If these honest Americans can come to such diametrically opposed conclusions, after competent and sincere efforts to find the truth, this is all the more reason why the law should be declared null and void for vagueness. Actually, this is all the more reason why we should all be pounding nails into its coffin, by every lawful method available to boycott this octopus. The First Amendment guarantees our fundamental right to boycott arbitrary government, by our words and by our deeds.

Moreover, the "void for vagueness" doctrine is deeply rooted in our right to due process (under the Fifth Amendment) and our right to know the nature and cause of any accusation (under the Sixth Amendment). The latter right goes far beyond the contents of any criminal indictment. The right to know the nature and cause of any accusation starts with the statute which a defendant is accused of violating. A statute must be sufficiently specific and unambiguous in all its terms, in order to define and give adequate notice of the kind of conduct which it forbids. If it fails to indicate with reasonable certainty just what conduct the legislature prohibits, a statute is necessarily void for uncertainty, or "void for vagueness" as the doctrine is called. Any prosecution which is based upon a vague statute must fail together with the statute itself. A vague criminal statute is unconstitutional for violating the 5th and 6th Amendments. The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed unequivocally:

     That the  terms of  a penal  statute creating  a new offense
     must be  sufficiently  explicit  to  inform  those  who  are
     subject to  it what  conduct on  their part will render them
     liable to  its penalties,  is a well-recognized requirement,
     consonant alike  with ordinary  notions of fair play and the
     settled rules of law.  And a statute which either forbids or
     requires the  doing of  an act in terms so vague that men of
     common intelligence  must necessarily  guess at  its meaning
     and  differ  as  to  its  application,  violates  the  first
     essential of due process of law.

                    [Connally et al. vs General Construction Co.]
                        [269 U.S 385, 391 (1926), emphasis added]

The Informer's conclusions appear to require definitions of "includes" and "including" which are expansive, not restrictive. The matter could be easily decided if the IRC would instead exhibit sound principles of statutory construction, state clearly and directly that "includes" and "including" are meant to be used in the expansive sense, and itemize those specific persons, places, and/or things that are "otherwise within the meaning of the terms defined". If the terms "includes" and "including" must be used in the restrictive sense, the IRC should state, clearly and directly, that the expressions "includes only" and "including only" must be used.

Alternatively, the IRC could exhibit sound principles of statutory construction by stating clearly and directly that "includes" and "including" are always meant to be used in the restrictive sense. Better yet, abandon the word "include" entirely, together with all of its grammatical variations, and use instead the word "means" (which does not suffer from a long history of semantic confusion). It would also help a lot if the 50 States were consistently capitalized and the federal states were not. These, again, are excellent grounds for deciding that the IRC is vague and therefore null and void. Of course, if the real intent is to expand the federal zone in order to subjugate the 50 states under the dominion of Federal States (defined along something like ZIP code boundaries) and to replace the sovereign Republics with a monolithic socialist dictatorship, carved up into arbitrary administrative "districts", that is another problem altogether.

The absurd results which obtain from expanding the term "State" to mean the 50 States, however, are problems which will not go away, no matter how much we clarify the definitions of "includes" and "including" in the IRC. There are 49 other U.S. Codes which have the same problem. Moreover, the mountain of material evidence impugning the ratification of the so-called 16th Amendment should leave no doubt in anybody's mind that Congress must still apportion all direct taxes levied inside the sovereign borders of the 50 States. Likewise, Congress is not empowered to delegate unilateral authority to the President to subdivide or to join any of the 50 States. There are many other constitutional violations which result from expanding the term "State" to mean the 50 States of the Union. In this context, the mandates and prohibitions found in the Bill of Rights are immediately obvious, particularly as they apply to State Citizens.

Clarifying the definitions of "includes" and "including" in the IRC is one thing; clarifying the exact extent of sovereign jurisdiction is quite another. Congress is just not sovereign within the borders of the 50 States. Sorry, all you Senators and Representatives. When you took office, you did not take an oath to uphold and defend the Ten Commandments. You did not take an oath to uphold and defend the Uniform Commercial Code. You did not take an oath to uphold and defend the Communist Manifesto. You did take an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution for the United States of America.

It should be obvious, at this point, that capable authors like Lori Jacques and The Informer do agree that the 50 States do not belong in the standard definition of "State" because they are in a class that is different from the class of federal states. Within the borders of the 50 States, the "geographical" extent of exclusive federal jurisdiction is confined to the federal enclaves; this extent does not encompass the 50 States themselves. We cannot blame the average American for failing to appreciate this subtlety. The confusion that results from the vagueness we observe is inherent in the statute and evidently intentional, which raises some very serious questions concerning the real intent of that statute in the first place. Could money have anything to do with it? The question answers itself.

[ Next | Prev | Contents ]