For the sole purpose of establishing a benchmark of clarity,
the term "State" means any one of the 50 States of the
Union, the District of Columbia, the territories and
possessions belonging to the Congress, and the federal
enclaves lawfully ceded to the Congress by any of the 50
States of the Union.
Now, compare this benchmark with the various definitions of the
word "State" that are found in Black's Law Dictionary and in the
Internal Revenue Code. Black's is a good place to start, because
it clearly defines two different kinds of "states". The first
kind defines a member of the Union, i.e., one of the 50 States
which are united by and under the Constitution:
The section of territory occupied by one of the United
States***. One of the component commonwealths or states of
the United States of America.
[emphasis added]
The second kind defines a federal state, which is entirely
different from a member of the Union:
Any state of the United States**, the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or
possession subject to the legislative authority of the
United States. Uniform Probate Code, Section 1-201(40).
[emphasis added]
Notice carefully that a member of the Union is not defined as
being "subject to the legislative authority of the United
States". Also, be aware that there are also several different
definitions of "State" in the IRC, depending on the context. One
of the most important of these is found in a chapter specifically
dedicated to providing definitions, that is, Chapter 79 (not
exactly the front of the book). In this chapter of definitions,
we find the following:
When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly
expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent
thereof-- ...
(10) State. -- The term "State" shall be construed to
include the District of Columbia, where such
construction is necessary to carry out provisions of
this title.
[IRC 7701(a)(10)]
[emphasis added]
Already, it is obvious that this definition leaves much to be
debated because it is ambiguous and it is not nearly as clear as
our "established benchmark of clarity" (which will be engraved in
marble a week from Tuesday). Does the definition restrict the
term "State" to mean only the District of Columbia? Or does it
expand the term "State" to mean the District of Columbia in
addition to the 50 States of the Union? And how do we decide?
Even some harsh critics of federal income taxes, like Otto Skinner, have argued that ambiguities like this are best resolved by interpreting the word "include" in an expansive sense, rather than a restrictive sense. To support his argument, Skinner cites the definitions of "includes" and "including" that are actually found in the Internal Revenue Code:
Includes and Including. -- The terms "includes" and
"including" when used in a definition contained in this
title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise
within the meaning of the term defined.
[IRC 7701(c)]
[emphasis added]
Skinner reasons that the Internal Revenue Code provides for
an expanded definition of the term "includes" when used in other
definitions contained in that Code. Using his logic, then, the
definition of "State" at IRC Sec. 7701(a)(10) must be interpreted
to mean the District of Columbia, in addition to other things.
But what other things? Are the 50 States to be included also?
What about the territories and possessions? And what about the
federal enclaves ceded to Congress by the 50 States? If the
definition itself does not specify any of these things, then
where, pray tell, are these other things "distinctly expressed"
in the Code? If these other things are distinctly expressed
elsewhere in the Code, is their expression in the Code manifestly
compatible with the intent of that Code? Should we include also
a state of confusion to our understanding of the statute?
Quite apart from the meaning of "includes" and "including", defining the term "include" in an expansive sense leads to an absurd result that is manifestly incompatible with the Constitution. If the expansion results in defining the term "State" to mean the District of Columbia in addition to the 50 States of the Union, then these 50 States must be situated within the federal zone. Remember, the federal zone is the area of land over which the Congress has unrestricted, exclusive legislative jurisdiction. But, the Congress does not have unrestricted, exclusive legislative jurisdiction over any of the 50 States. It is bound by the chains of the Constitution in this other zone, to paraphrase Thomas Jefferson. Specifically, Congress is required to apportion direct taxes which it levies within the 50 States. This is a key limitation on the power of Congress. It has never been explicitly repealed (as Prohibition was repealed).
Unlike the Brushaber case, other federal cases can be cited to support the conclusions that taxes on income are direct taxes, and that the 16th Amendment actually removed this apportionment rule from direct taxes laid on "income". Sorry, but the Supreme Court is not always consistent in this area, and the Appellate Courts are even less consistent. These other cases are highly significant, if only because they provide essential evidence of other attempts by federal courts to isolate the exact effects of a ratified 16th Amendment. The following ruling by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals is unique, among all the relevant federal cases, for its clarity and conciseness on this question:
The constitutional limitation upon direct taxation was
modified by the Sixteenth Amendment insofar as taxation of
income was concerned, but the amendment was restricted to
income, leaving in effect the limitation upon direct
taxation of principal.
[Richardson vs United States, 294 F.2d 593, 596 (1961)]
[emphasis added]
The constitutional limitation upon direct taxes is apportionment.
It is not difficult to find Supreme Court decisions which arrived
at the very same conclusion about the 16th Amendment, long before
the Richardson case:
... [I]t does not extend the taxing power to new or excepted
subjects, but merely removed all occasion, which otherwise
might exist, for an apportionment among the states of taxes
laid on income, whether it be derived from one source or
another.
[Peck & Co. vs Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1918)]
[emphasis added]
And, in what is arguably one of the most significant Supreme
Court decisions to define the precise meaning of "income", the
Eisner Court simply paraphrased the Peck decision when it
attributed the exact same effect to the 16th Amendment, namely,
income taxes had become direct taxes relieved of apportionment:
As repeatedly held, this did not extend the taxing power to
new subjects, but merely removed the necessity which
otherwise might exist for an apportionment among the States
of taxes laid on income. ...
A proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very clear
language, requires also that this Amendment shall not be
extended by loose construction, so as to repeal or modify,
except as applied to income, those provisions of the
Constitution that require an apportionment according to
population for direct taxes upon property, real and
personal.
[Eisner vs Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 205-206 (1919)]
[emphasis added]
Contrary to statements about it in the Brushaber decision,
the earlier Pollock case, without any doubt, defined income taxes
as direct taxes. It also overturned an Act of Congress precisely
because that Act levied a direct tax without apportionment:
First. We adhere to the opinion already announced, that,
taxes on real estate being indisputably direct taxes, taxes
on the rents or income of real estate are equally direct
taxes.
Second. We are of the opinion that taxes on personal
property, or on the income of personal property, are
likewise direct taxes.
[Pollock vs Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.]
[158 U.S. 601 (1895), emphasis added]
Another Supreme Court decision is worthy of note, not only
because it appears to attribute the exact same effect to the 16th
Amendment, but also because it fails to clarify which meaning of
the term "United States" is being used:
No doubt is suggested (the former requirement of
apportionment having been removed by constitutional
amendment) as to the power of Congress thus to impose taxes
upon incomes produced within the borders of the United
States [?] or arising from sources located therein, even
though the income accrues to a non-resident alien.
[Shaffer vs Carter, 252 U.S. 37]
[emphasis and question mark added]
In the Shaffer decision, it is obvious that Justice Pitney
again attributed the same effect to the 16th Amendment. However,
if he defined "United States" to mean the federal zone, then he
must have believed that Congress also had to apportion direct
taxes within that zone before the 16th Amendment was "declared"
ratified. Such a belief contradicts the exclusive legislative
authority which Congress exercises over the federal zone:
In exercising this power [to make all needful rules and
regulations respecting territory or other property belonging
to the United States**], Congress is not subject to the same
constitutional limitations, as when it is legislating for
the United States***.
[Hooven & Allison Co. vs Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)]
[emphasis added]
On the other hand, if Justice Pitney defined "United States"
to mean the several States of the Union, he as much admits that
the Constitution needed amending to authorize an unapportioned
direct tax on income produced or arising from sources within the
borders of those States. Unfortunately for us, Justice Pitney
did not clearly specify which meaning he was using, and we are
stuck trying to make sense of Supreme Court decisions which
contradict each other. For example, compare the rulings in Peck,
Eisner, Pollock and Shaffer (as quoted above) with the rulings in
Brushaber and Stanton vs Baltic Mining Co., and also with the
ruling In re Becraft (a recent Appellate case). To illustrate,
the Stanton court ruled as follows:
... [T]he Sixteenth Amendment conferred no new power of
taxation but simply prohibited the previous complete and
plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from
the beginning from being taken out of the category of
indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged ....
[Stanton vs Baltic Mining Company, 240 U.S. 103 (1916)]
[emphasis added]
Now, contrast the Stanton decision with a relatively recent
decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco.
In re Becraft is classic because that Court sanctioned a seasoned
defense attorney $2,500 for raising issues which the Court called
"patently absurd and frivolous", sending a strong message to any
licensed attorney who gets too close to breaking the "Code".
First, the Court reduced attorney Lowell Becraft's position to
"one elemental proposition", namely, that the 16th Amendment does
not authorize a direct non-apportioned income tax on resident
United States** citizens and thus such citizens are not subject
to the federal income tax laws. Then the 9th Circuit dispatched
Becraft's entire argument with exemplary double-talk, as follows:
For over 75 years, the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts have both implicitly and explicitly recognized the
Sixteenth Amendment's authorization of a non-apportioned
direct income tax on United States** citizens residing in
the United States*** and thus the validity of the federal
income tax laws as applied to such citizens. See, e.g.,
Brushaber .... [M]uch of Becraft's reply is also devoted to
a discussion of the limitations of federal jurisdiction to
United States** territories and the District of Columbia and
thus the inapplicability of the federal income tax laws to a
resident of one of the states*** [from footnote 2].
[In re Becraft, 885 F.2d 547, 548 (1989), emphasis added]
Here, the 9th Circuit credits the 16th Amendment with authorizing
a non-apportioned direct tax, completely contrary to Brushaber.
Then the term "United States" is used two different ways in the
same sentence; we know this to be true because a footnote refers
to "one of the [50] states". The Court also uses the term
"resident" to mean something different from the statutory meaning
of "resident" and "nonresident", thus exposing another key facet
of their fraud (see Chapter 3). Be sure to recognize what's
missing here, namely, any mention whatsoever of State Citizens.
For the lay person, doing this type of comparison is a daunting if not impossible task, and demonstrates yet another reason why federal tax law should be nullified for vagueness, if nothing else. If Appellate and Supreme Court judges cannot be clear and consistent on something as fundamental as a constitutional amendment, then nobody can. And their titles are Justice. Are you in the State of Confusion yet?
When it comes to federal income taxes, we are thus forced to admit the existence of separate groups of Supreme Court decisions that flatly contradict each other. One group puts income taxes into the class of indirect taxes; another group puts them into the class of direct taxes. One group argues that a ratified 16th Amendment did not change or repeal any other clause of the Constitution; another group argues that it relieved income taxes from the apportionment rule. Even experts disagree. To illustrate the range of disagreement on such fundamental constitutional issues, consider once again the conclusion of legal scholar Vern Holland, quoted in a previous chapter:
[T]he Sixteenth Amendment did not amend the Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court by unanimous decisions
determined that the amendment did not grant any new powers
of taxation; that a direct tax cannot be relieved from the
constitutional mandate of apportionment; and the only
effect of the amendment was to overturn the theory advanced
in the Pollock case which held that a tax on income, was in
legal effect, a tax on the sources of the income.
[The Law That Always Was, page 220, emphasis added]
Now consider an opposing view of another competent scholar.
After much research and much litigation, author and attorney
Jeffrey A. Dickstein offers the following concise clarification:
A tax imposed on all of a person's annual gross receipts is
a direct tax on personal property that must be apportioned.
A tax imposed on the "income" derived from those gross
receipts is also a direct tax on property, but as a result
of the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress no longer has to enact
legislation calling for the apportionment of a tax on that
income.
[Judicial Tyranny and Your Income Tax, pages 60-61]
Recall now that 17,000 State-certified documents have been
assembled to prove that the 16th Amendment was never ratified.
As a consistent group, the Pollock, Peck, Eisner and Richardson
decisions leave absolutely no doubt about the consequences of the
failed ratification: the necessity still exists for an
apportionment among the 50 States of all direct taxes, and income
taxes are direct taxes. Using common sense as our guide, an
expansive definition of "include" results in defining the term
"State" to mean the District of Columbia in addition to the 50
States. This expansive definition puts the 50 States inside the
federal zone, where Congress has no restrictions on its exclusive
legislative jurisdiction. But, just a few sentences back, we
proved that the rule of apportionment still restrains Congress
inside the 50 States. This is an absurd result: it is not
possible for the restriction to exist, and not exist, at the same
time, in the same place, for the same group of people, for the
same laws, within the same jurisdiction. Congress cannot have
its cake and eat it too, as much as it would like to! Absurd
results are manifestly incompatible with the intent of the IRC
(or so I am told).
Other problems arise from Skinner's reasoning. First of all, like so much of the IRC, the definitions of "includes" and "including" are outright deceptions in their own right. A grammatical approach can be used to demonstrate that these definitions are thinly disguised tautologies. Note, in particular, where the Code states that these terms "shall not be deemed to exclude other things". This is a double negative. Two negatives make a positive. This phrase, then, is equivalent to saying that the terms "shall be deemed to include other things". Continuing with this line of reasoning, the definition of "includes" includes "include", resulting in an obvious tautology. (I just couldn't resist.) Forgive them, for they know not what they do.
The definitions of "includes" and "including" can now be rewritten so as to "include other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined". So, what things are otherwise within the meaning of the term "State", if those things are not distinctly expressed in the original definition? You may be dying to put the 50 States of the Union among those things that are "otherwise within the meaning of the term", but you are using common sense. The Internal Revenue Code was not written with common sense in mind; it was written with deception in mind. The rules of statutory construction apply a completely different standard. Author Ralph Whittington has this to say about the special definitions that are exploited by lawyers and lawmakers:
The Legislature means what it says. If the definition
section states that whenever the term "white" is used
(within that particular section or the entire code), the
term includes "black," it means that "white" is "black" and
you are not allowed to make additions or deletions at your
convenience. You must follow the directions of the
Legislature, NO MORE -- NO LESS.
[Omnibus, Addendum II, p. 2]
Unfortunately for Otto Skinner and others who try valiantly
to argue the expansive meaning of "includes" and "including",
Treasury Decision No. 3980, Vol. 29, January-December 1927, and
some 80 court cases have adopted the restrictive meaning of these
terms:
The supreme Court of the State ... also considered that the
word "including" was used as a word of enlargement, the
learned court being of the opinion that such was its
ordinary sense. With this we cannot concur. It is its
exceptional sense, as the dictionaries and cases indicate.
[Montello Salt Co. vs State of Utah, 221 U.S. 452 (1911)]
[emphasis added]
An historical approach yields similar results. Without
tracing the myriad of income tax statutes which Congress has
enacted over the years, it is instructive to examine the
terminology found in a revenue statute from the Civil War era.
The definition of "State" is almost identical to the one quoted
from the current IRC at the start of this chapter. On June 30,
1864, Congress enacted legislation which contained the following
definition:
The word "State," when used in this Title, shall be
construed to include the Territories and the District of
Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out
its provisions.
[Title 35, Internal Revenue, Chapter 1, page 601]
[Revised Statutes of the United States**]
[43rd Congress, 1st Session, 1873-74]
Aside from adding "the Territories", the two definitions are
nearly identical. The Territories at this point in time were
Washington, Utah, Dakota, Nebraska, Colorado, New Mexico, and the
Indian Territory.
One of the most fruitful and conclusive methods for establishing the meaning of the term "State" in the IRC is to trace the history of changes to the United States Codes which occurred when Alaska and Hawaii were admitted to the Union. Because other authors have already done an exhaustive job on this history, there is no point in re-inventing their wheels here. It is instructive to illustrate these Code changes as they occurred in the IRC definition of "State" found at the start of this chapter. The first Code amendment became effective on January 3, 1959, when Alaska was admitted to the Union:
Amended 1954 Code Sec. 7701(a)(10) by striking out
"Territories", and by substituting "Territory of Hawaii".
[IRC 7701(a)(10)]
The second Code amendment became effective on August 21, 1959,
when Hawaii was admitted to the Union:
Amended 1954 Code Sec. 7701(a)(10) by striking out "the
Territory of Hawaii and" immediately after the word
"include".
[IRC 7701(a)(10)]
Applying these code changes in reverse order, we can reconstruct
the IRC definitions of "State" by using any word processor and
simple "textual substitution" as follows:
Time 1: Alaska is a U.S.** Territory
Hawaii is a U.S.** Territory
7701(a)(10): The term "State" shall be construed to include the
Territories and the District of Columbia, where
such construction is necessary to carry out
provisions of this title.
Alaska joins the Union. Strike out "Territories" and substitute
"Territory of Hawaii":
Time 2: Alaska is a State of the Union
Hawaii is a U.S.** Territory
7701(a)(10): The term "State" shall be construed to include the
Territory of Hawaii and the District of Columbia,
where such construction is necessary to carry out
provisions of this title.
Hawaii joins the Union. Strike out "the Territory of Hawaii and"
immediately after the word "include":
Time 3: Alaska is a State of the Union
Hawaii is a State of the Union
7701(a)(10): The term "State" shall be construed to include the
District of Columbia, where such construction is
necessary to carry out provisions of this title.
Author Lori Jacques has therefore concluded that the term
"State" now includes only the District of Columbia, because the
former Territories of Alaska and Hawaii have been admitted to the
Union, Puerto Rico has been granted the status of a Commonwealth,
and the Philippine Islands have been granted their independence
(see United States Citizen versus National of the United States,
page 9, paragraph 5). It is easy to see how author Lori Jacques
could have overlooked the following reference to Puerto Rico,
found in the IRC itself:
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. -- Where not otherwise
distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the
intent thereof, references in this title to possessions of
the United States** shall be treated as also referring to
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
[IRC 7701(d)]
In order to conform to the requirements of the Social
Security scheme, a completely different definition of "State" is
found in the those sections of the IRC that deal with Social
Security. This definition was also amended on separate occasions
when Alaska and Hawaii were admitted to the Union. The first
Code amendment became effective on January 3, 1959, when Alaska
was admitted:
Amended 1954 Code Sec. 3121(e)(1), as it appears in the
amendment note for P.L. 86-778, by striking out "Alaska,"
where it appeared following "includes".
[IRC 3121(e)(1)]
The second Code amendment became effective on August 21, 1959,
when Hawaii was admitted:
Amended 1954 Code Sec. 3121(e)(1), as it appears in the
amendment note for P.L. 86-778, by striking out "Hawaii,"
where it appeared following "includes".
[IRC 3121(e)(1)]
Applying these code changes in reverse order, we can reconstruct
the definitions of "State" in this Section of the IRC as follows:
Time 1: Alaska is a U.S.** Territory
Hawaii is a U.S.** Territory
3121(e)(1): The term "State" includes Alaska, Hawaii, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands.
Alaska joins the Union. Strike out "Alaska," where it appeared
following "includes":
Time 2: Alaska is a State of the Union
Hawaii is a U.S.** Territory
3121(e)(1): The term "State" includes Hawaii, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
Hawaii joins the Union. Strike out "Hawaii," where it appeared
following "includes":
Time 3: Alaska is a State of the Union
Hawaii is a State of the Union
3121(e)(1): The term "State" includes the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
Puerto Rico becomes a Commonwealth. For services performed after
1960, Guam and American Samoa are added to the definition:
Time 4: Puerto Rico becomes a Commonwealth
Guam and American Samoa join Social Security
3121(e)(1): The term "State" includes the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.
Notice carefully how Alaska and Hawaii only fit these definitions
of "State" before they joined the Union. It is most revealing
that these Territories became States when they were admitted to
the Union, and yet the United States Codes had to be changed
because Alaska and Hawaii were defined in those Codes as "States"
before admission to the Union, but not afterwards. This apparent
anomaly is perfectly clear, once the legal and deliberately
misleading definition of "State" is understood. The precise
history of changes to the Internal Revenue Code is detailed in
Appendix B of this book. The changes made to the United States
Codes when Alaska joined the Union were assembled in the Alaska
Omnibus Act. The changes made to the federal Codes when Hawaii
joined the Union were assembled in the Hawaii Omnibus Act. The
following table summarizes the sections of the IRC that were
affected by these two Acts:
IRC Section Alaska Hawaii
changed: joins: joins:
----------- ------ ------
2202 X X
3121(e)(1) X X
3306(j) X X
4221(d)(4) X X
4233(b) X X
4262(c)(1) X X
4502(5) X X
4774 X X
7621(b) X (-- Note
7653(d) X X
7701(a)(9) X X
7701(a)(10) X X
Section 7621(b) sticks out like a sore thumb when the
changes are arrayed in this fashion. The Alaska Omnibus Act
modified this section of the IRC, but the Hawaii Omnibus Act did
not. Let's take a close look at this section and see if it
reveals any important clues:
Sec. 7621. Internal Revenue Districts.
(a) Establishment and Alteration. -- The President shall
establish convenient internal revenue districts for the
purpose of administering the internal revenue laws. The
President may from time to time alter such districts.
[IRC 7621(a)]
Now witness the chronology of amendments to IRC Section 7621(b),
entitled "Boundaries", as follows:
Time 1: Alaska is a U.S.** Territory.
{1/3/59 Hawaii is a U.S.** Territory. ("{" means "before")
7621(b): Boundaries. -- For the purpose mentioned in
subsection (a), the President may subdivide any
State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or
may unite two or more States or Territories into
one district.
Time 2: Alaska is a State of the Union.
1/3/59 Hawaii is a U.S.** Territory.
7621(b): Boundaries. -- For the purpose mentioned in
subsection (a), the President may subdivide any
State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or
may unite into one District two or more States or
a Territory and one or more States.
Time 3: Alaska is a State of the Union.
2/1/77 Hawaii is a State of the Union.
7621(b): Boundaries. -- For the purpose mentioned in
subsection (a), the President may subdivide any
State or the District of Columbia, or may unite
into one district two or more States.
The reason why the Hawaii Omnibus Act did not change section
7621(b) is not apparent from reading the statute, nor has time
permitted the research necessary to determine why this section
was changed in 1977 and not in 1959. After Alaska joined the
Union, Hawaii was technically the only remaining Territory. This
may explain why the term "Territories" was changed to "Territory"
at Time 2 above. However, this is a relatively minor matter,
when compared to the constitutional issue that is involved here.
There is an absolute constitutional restriction against
subdividing or joining any of the 50 States, or any parts
thereof, without the consent of Congress and of the Legislatures
of the States affected. This restriction is very much like the
restriction against direct taxes within the 50 States without
apportionment:
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union;
but no new State shall be formed or erected within the
Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by
the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States,
without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States
concerned as well as of the Congress.
[Constitution for the United States of America]
[Article 4, Section 3, Clause 1]
[emphasis added]
This point about new States caught the keen eye of author
and scholar Eustace Mullins. In his controversial and heart-
breaking book entitled A Writ for Martyrs, Mullins establishes
the all-important link between the Internal Revenue Service and
the Federal Reserve System, and does so by charging that Internal
Revenue Districts are "new states" which have been established
within the jurisdiction of legal States of the Union, as follows:
The income tax amendment and the Federal Reserve Act were
passed in the same year, 1913, because they function as an
essential team, and were planned to do so. The Federal
Reserve districts and the Internal Revenue Districts are
"new states," which have been established within the
jurisdiction of legal states of the Union.
[see Appendix "I", emphasis added]
Remember, the federal zone is the area of land over which
the Congress exercises an unrestricted, exclusive legislative
jurisdiction. The Congress does not have unrestricted, exclusive
legislative jurisdiction over any of the 50 States. It is bound
by the chains of the Constitution. This point is so very
important, it bears repeating throughout the remaining chapters
of this book. As in the apportionment rule for direct taxes and
the uniformity rule for indirect taxes, Congress cannot join or
divide any of the 50 States without the explicit approval of the
Legislatures of the State(s) involved. This means that Congress
cannot unilaterally delegate such a power to the President.
Congress cannot lawfully exercise (nor delegate) a power which it
simply does not have.
How, then, is it possible for section 7621(b) of the Internal Revenue Code to give this power to the President? The answer is simple: the territorial scope of the Internal Revenue Code is the federal zone. The IRC only applies to the land that is internal to that zone. If the territorial scope of the IRC were the 50 States of the Union, then section 7621(b) would, all by itself, render the entire statute unconstitutional for violating clause 4:3:1 of the Constitution (see above). Numerous other constitutional violations would also occur if the territorial scope of the IRC were the 50 States. A clear and unambiguous definition of "State" must be known before status and jurisdiction can be decided with certainty. After seeing and verifying all of the evidence discussed above, the editors of a bulletin published by the Monetary Realist Society wrote the following long comment about the obvious problems it raises:
A serious reader could come to the conclusion that Missouri,
for example, is not one of the United States referred to in
the code. This conclusion is encouraged by finding that the
code refers to Hawaii and Alaska as states of the United
States before their admission to the union! Is the IRS
telling us that the only states over which it has
jurisdiction are Guam, Washington D.C., Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, etc.? Well, why not write and find out?
Don't expect an answer, though. Your editor has asked this
question and sought to have both of his Senators and one
Congresswoman prod the IRS for a reply when none was
forthcoming. Nothing.
And isn't that strange? It would be so simple for the
service to reply, "Of course Missouri is one of the United
States referred to in the code" if that were, indeed, the
case. What can one conclude from the government's refusal
to deal with this simple question except that the government
cannot admit the truth about United States citizenship? I
admit that the question sounds silly. Everybody knows that
Missouri is one of the United States, right? Sure, like
everybody knows what a dollar is! But the IRS deals with
"silly" questions every day, often at great length. After
all, the code occupies many feet of shelf space, and covers
almost any conceivable situation. It just doesn't seem to
be able to cope with the simplest questions!
["Some Thoughts on the Income Tax"]
[The Bulletin of the Monetary Realist Society]
[March 1993, Number 152, page 2]
Although this book was originally intended to focus on the
Internal Revenue Code, the other 49 U.S. Codes contain a wealth
of additional proof that the term "State" does not always refer
to one of the 50 States of the Union. Just to illustrate, the
following statutory definition of the term "State" was found in
Title 8, the Immigration and Nationality Act, as late as 1987:
(36) The term "State" includes (except as used in section
310(a) of title III [8 USCS Section 1421(a)]) the District
of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands of
the United States.
[8 USC 1101(a)(36), circa 1987, emphasis added]
The "exception" cited in this statute tells the whole story here.
In section 1421, Congress needed to refer to courts of the 50
States, because their constitutions and laws granted to those
courts the requisite jurisdiction to naturalize. For this
reason, Congress made an explicit exception to the standard,
federal definition of "State" quoted above. The following is the
paragraph in section 1421 which contained the exceptional uses of
the term "State" (i.e. Union State, not federal state):
1421. Jurisdiction to naturalize
(a) Exclusive jurisdiction to naturalize persons as
citizens of the United States** is hereby conferred upon the
following specified courts: District courts of the United
States now existing, or which may hereafter be established
by Congress in any State ... also all courts of record in
any State or Territory now existing, or which may hereafter
be created, having a seal, a clerk, and jurisdiction in
actions at law or equity, or law and equity, in which the
amount in controversy is unlimited.
[8 USC 1421(a), circa 1987, emphasis added]
In a section entitled "State Courts", the interpretive notes and
decisions for this statute contain clear proof that the phrase
"in any State" refers to any State of the Union (e.g. New York):
Under 8 USCS Section 1421, jurisdiction to naturalize was
conferred upon New York State Supreme Court by virtue of its
being court of record and having jurisdiction in actions at
law and equity. Re Reilly (1973) 73 Misc 2d 1073, 344 NYS2d
531.
[8 USCS 1421, Interpretive Notes and Decisions]
[Section II. State Courts, emphasis added]
Subsequently, Congress removed the reference to this exception in
the amended definition of "State", as follows:
(36) The term "State" includes the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands of the United
States.
[8 USC 1101(a)(36), circa 1992]
Two final definitions prove, without any doubt, that the IRC
can also define the terms "State" and "United States" to mean the
50 States as well as the other federal states. The very existence
of multiple definitions provides convincing proof that the IRC is
intentionally vague, particularly in the section dedicated to
general definitions (IRC 7701(a)). The following definition is
taken from Subtitle D, Miscellaneous Excise Taxes, Subchapter A,
Tax on Petroleum (which we all pay taxes at the pump to use):
(A) In General. -- The term "United States" means the 50
States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, any possession of the United States, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. [!!]
[IRC 4612(a)(4)(A)]
[emphasis added]
Notice that this definition uses the term "means". Why is
this definition so clear, in stark contrast to other IRC
definitions of the "United States"? Author Ralph Whittington
provides the simple, if not obvious, answer:
The preceding is a true Import Tax, as allowed by the
Constitution; it contains all the indicia of being Uniform,
and therefore passes the Constitutionality test and can
operate within the 50 Sovereign States. The language of
this Revenue Act is simple, specific and definitive, and it
would be impossible to attach the "Void for Vagueness
Doctrine" to it.
[The Omnibus, page 83, emphasis added]
The following definition of "State" is required only for
those Code sections that deal with the sharing of tax return
information between the federal government and the 50 States of
the Union. In this case, the 50 States need to be included in
the definition. So, the lawmakers can do it when they need to
(and not do it, in order to put the rest of us into a state of
confusion):
(5) State -- The term "State" means -- [!!]
(A) any of the 50 States, the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin
Islands, the Canal Zone, Guam, American Samoa, and
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
[IRC 6103(b)(5), emphasis added]
It is noteworthy [!!] that these sections of the IRC also utilize
the term "means" instead of the terms "includes" and "including",
and instead of the phrase "shall be construed to include". It is
certainly not impossible to be clear. If it were impossible to
be clear, then just laws would not be possible at all, and the
Constitution could never have come into existence anywhere on
this planet. Authors like The Informer (as he calls himself)
consider the very existence of multiple definitions of "State"
and "United States" to be highly significant proof of fluctuating
statutory intent, even though a definition of "intent" is nowhere
to be found in the statute itself. Together with evidence from
the Omnibus Acts, these fluctuating definitions also expose
perhaps the greatest fiscal fraud that has ever been perpetrated
upon any people at any time in the history of the world.
Having researched all facets of the law in depth for more than ten full years, The Informer summarizes what we have learned thus far with a precision that was unique for its time:
The term "States" in 26 USC 7701(a)(9) is referring to the
federal states of Guam, Virgin Islands, Etc., and NOT the 50
States of the Union. Congress cannot write a municipal law
to apply to the individual nonresident alien inhabiting the
States of the Union. Yes, the IRS can go into the States of
the Union by Treasury Decision Order, to seek out those
"taxpayers" who are subject to the tax, be they a class of
individuals that are United States** citizens, or resident
aliens. They also can go after nonresident aliens that are
under the regulatory corporate jurisdiction of the United
States**, when they are effectively connected with a trade
or business with the United States** or have made income
from a source within the United States** ....
[Which One Are You?, page 98, emphasis added]
Nevertheless, despite a clarity that was rare, author Lori
Jacques has found good reasons to dispute even this statement.
In a private communication, she explained that the Office of the
Federal Register has issued a statement indicating that Treasury
Department Orders 150-10 and 150-37 (regarding taxation) were not
published in the Federal Register. Evidently, there are still no
published orders from the Secretary of the Treasury giving the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue the requisite authority to
enforce the Internal Revenue Code within the 50 States of the
Union. Furthermore, under Title 3, Section 103, the President of
the United States, by means of Presidential Executive Order, has
not delegated authority to enforce the IRC within the 50 States
of the Union. Treasury Department Order No. 150-10 can be found
in Commerce Clearinghouse Publication 6585 (an unofficial
publication). Section 5 reads as follows:
U.S. Territories and Insular Possessions. The Commissioner
shall, to the extent of authority otherwise vested in him,
provide for the administration of the United States internal
revenue laws in the U.S. Territories and insular possessions
and other authorized areas of the world.
Thus, the available evidence indicates that the only
authority delegated to the Internal Revenue Service is to enforce
tax treaties with foreign territories, U.S. territories and
possessions, and Puerto Rico. To be consistent with the law,
Treasury Department Orders, particularly TDO's 150-10 and 150-37,
needed to be published in the Federal Register. Thus, given the
absence of published authority delegations within the 50 States,
the obvious conclusion is that the various Treasury Department
orders found in Internal Revenue Manual 1229 have absolutely no
legal bearing, force or effect on sovereign Citizens of the 50
States. Awesome, yes? Our hats are off, once again, to Lori
Jacques for her superb legal research.
The astute reader will notice another basic disagreement between authors Lori Jacques and The Informer. Lori Jacques concludes that the term "State" now includes only the District of Columbia, a conclusion that is supported by IRC Sec. 7701(a)(10). The Informer, on the other hand, concludes that the term "States" refers to the federal states of Guam, Virgin Islands, etc. These two conclusions are obviously incompatible, because singular and plural must, by law, refer to the same things.
It is important to realize that both conclusions were reached by people who have invested a great deal of earnest time and energy studying the relevant law, regulations, and court decisions. If these honest Americans can come to such diametrically opposed conclusions, after competent and sincere efforts to find the truth, this is all the more reason why the law should be declared null and void for vagueness. Actually, this is all the more reason why we should all be pounding nails into its coffin, by every lawful method available to boycott this octopus. The First Amendment guarantees our fundamental right to boycott arbitrary government, by our words and by our deeds.
Moreover, the "void for vagueness" doctrine is deeply rooted in our right to due process (under the Fifth Amendment) and our right to know the nature and cause of any accusation (under the Sixth Amendment). The latter right goes far beyond the contents of any criminal indictment. The right to know the nature and cause of any accusation starts with the statute which a defendant is accused of violating. A statute must be sufficiently specific and unambiguous in all its terms, in order to define and give adequate notice of the kind of conduct which it forbids. If it fails to indicate with reasonable certainty just what conduct the legislature prohibits, a statute is necessarily void for uncertainty, or "void for vagueness" as the doctrine is called. Any prosecution which is based upon a vague statute must fail together with the statute itself. A vague criminal statute is unconstitutional for violating the 5th and 6th Amendments. The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed unequivocally:
That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense
must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are
subject to it what conduct on their part will render them
liable to its penalties, is a well-recognized requirement,
consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the
settled rules of law. And a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law.
[Connally et al. vs General Construction Co.]
[269 U.S 385, 391 (1926), emphasis added]
The Informer's conclusions appear to require definitions of
"includes" and "including" which are expansive, not restrictive.
The matter could be easily decided if the IRC would instead
exhibit sound principles of statutory construction, state clearly
and directly that "includes" and "including" are meant to be used
in the expansive sense, and itemize those specific persons,
places, and/or things that are "otherwise within the meaning of
the terms defined". If the terms "includes" and "including" must
be used in the restrictive sense, the IRC should state, clearly
and directly, that the expressions "includes only" and "including
only" must be used.
Alternatively, the IRC could exhibit sound principles of statutory construction by stating clearly and directly that "includes" and "including" are always meant to be used in the restrictive sense. Better yet, abandon the word "include" entirely, together with all of its grammatical variations, and use instead the word "means" (which does not suffer from a long history of semantic confusion). It would also help a lot if the 50 States were consistently capitalized and the federal states were not. These, again, are excellent grounds for deciding that the IRC is vague and therefore null and void. Of course, if the real intent is to expand the federal zone in order to subjugate the 50 states under the dominion of Federal States (defined along something like ZIP code boundaries) and to replace the sovereign Republics with a monolithic socialist dictatorship, carved up into arbitrary administrative "districts", that is another problem altogether.
The absurd results which obtain from expanding the term "State" to mean the 50 States, however, are problems which will not go away, no matter how much we clarify the definitions of "includes" and "including" in the IRC. There are 49 other U.S. Codes which have the same problem. Moreover, the mountain of material evidence impugning the ratification of the so-called 16th Amendment should leave no doubt in anybody's mind that Congress must still apportion all direct taxes levied inside the sovereign borders of the 50 States. Likewise, Congress is not empowered to delegate unilateral authority to the President to subdivide or to join any of the 50 States. There are many other constitutional violations which result from expanding the term "State" to mean the 50 States of the Union. In this context, the mandates and prohibitions found in the Bill of Rights are immediately obvious, particularly as they apply to State Citizens.
Clarifying the definitions of "includes" and "including" in the IRC is one thing; clarifying the exact extent of sovereign jurisdiction is quite another. Congress is just not sovereign within the borders of the 50 States. Sorry, all you Senators and Representatives. When you took office, you did not take an oath to uphold and defend the Ten Commandments. You did not take an oath to uphold and defend the Uniform Commercial Code. You did not take an oath to uphold and defend the Communist Manifesto. You did take an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution for the United States of America.
It should be obvious, at this point, that capable authors like Lori Jacques and The Informer do agree that the 50 States do not belong in the standard definition of "State" because they are in a class that is different from the class of federal states. Within the borders of the 50 States, the "geographical" extent of exclusive federal jurisdiction is confined to the federal enclaves; this extent does not encompass the 50 States themselves. We cannot blame the average American for failing to appreciate this subtlety. The confusion that results from the vagueness we observe is inherent in the statute and evidently intentional, which raises some very serious questions concerning the real intent of that statute in the first place. Could money have anything to do with it? The question answers itself.