Chapter 13:
Amendment 16 Post Mortem
The
documented failure of the 16th Amendment to be ratified is a cause for
motivating all of us to isolate the precise effects of this failed
ratification. In previous chapters, a
careful analysis of the relevant case law revealed two competing groups of
decisions. One group puts income taxes
in the category of direct taxes.
Another group puts them in the category of indirect taxes. One group argues that the 16th Amendment did amend the Constitution by
authorizing an unapportioned direct tax, but only on income, leaving the
apportionment rule intact for all other direct taxes. Another group argues that the 16th Amendment did not really amend the Constitution; it merely clarified the taxing power of Congress by overturning
the "principle" on which the Pollock case was decided. By distilling the cores of these two
competing groups, we are thereby justified in deciding that a ratified 16th
Amendment produced one or both of the following two effects:
1. Inside the 50 States, it removed the apportionment restriction from taxes laid on income, but it left this restriction in place for all other direct taxes.
2.
It overturned the principle advanced
in the Pollock case which held that a tax on income is, in legal effect,
a tax on the source of that income.
Federal
courts did not hesitate to identify the effects of a ratified 16th
Amendment. Now that the evidence
against its ratification is so overwhelming and incontrovertible, the federal
courts are evidently unwilling to identify the effects of the failed
ratification. These courts have opted
to call it a "political" question, even though it wasn't a
"political" question in years immediately after Philander C. Knox
declared it ratified.
It is difficult to believe that the
federal courts are now incapable of exercising the logic required to isolate
the legal effects of the failed ratification.
Quite simply, if a ratified 16th Amendment had effect X, then a failed
ratification proves that X did not happen.
What is X? Their
"political" unwillingness to exercise basic logic means that the
federal courts have abdicated their main responsibility -- to uphold and defend the U.S.
Constitution -- and that we must now do it for them instead (see Appendix W concerning "Direct Taxation and the
1990 Census"). At a minimum, the
value of X is one or both of the two effects itemized above.
Some people
continue to argue, even now, that the 16th Amendment doesn't even matter at
all. Soon after The Federal Zone
began to circulate among readers throughout America, the flow of complimentary
letters grew to become a steady phenomenon.
As of this writing, no substantive criticisms have been received of its
two major theses, i.e., territorial
heterogeneity and void for vagueness.
Occasional criticisms did occur, but most of them were minor, lacking in
substance, or lacking authority in law.
The following is exemplary of the most serious of these criticisms:
I fail to understand the harping on
the invalid ratification of the 16th Amendment. It really doesn't matter whether the amendment was ratified or
not --
Brushaber ruled "no new powers, no new subjects",
and further went on to tell us that Congress always had the power to tax
what the 16th Amendment said could be taxed.
[private communication, June 1, 1992]
It does matter whether the amendment was
ratified or not, for several reasons.
One obvious reason is that the Federal Register contains at least
one official statement that the 16th Amendment is the federal government's
general authority to tax the incomes of individuals and corporations (see Chapter 1 and Appendix J). If the amendment failed, then it cannot be the government's general
authority to tax the incomes of individuals and corporations. There may be some other authority, but that authority is definitely not the 16th
Amendment. The official statement in
the Federal Register is further evidence of fraud and misrepresentation,
even if its author was totally
innocent.
Another
reason is that, contrary to Brushaber, other decisions of the Supreme
Court, as well as lower federal courts, have ruled that taxes on incomes are direct
taxes, and the 16th Amendment authorized an unapportioned direct tax on
incomes. Author Jeffrey Dickstein has
done a very thorough job of demonstrating how the Brushaber ruling
stands in stark contrast to the Pollock case before it, and to the Eisner
case after it. The Brushaber
decision is an anomaly for this reason, and for this reason alone. It ruled that income taxes are indirect excise taxes (which necessarily must be
uniform across the States of the Union).
However, the Brushaber court failed even to mention "The
Insular Cases" and the doctrine of territorial heterogeneity that issued
therefrom (see Appendix W).
If the 16th
Amendment authorized an unapportioned direct tax on incomes, per Eisner,
Peck, Shaffer and Richardson, then such a tax is not
required to be either uniform or apportioned.
Therefore, this group of decisions did interpret the 16th Amendment
differently from Brushaber; they
conclude that it did amend the Constitution and that it did
create a new power, namely, the power to impose an unapportioned direct
tax. Contrary to the private
communication quoted above, Congress has not always had the power to
impose an unapportioned direct tax on the States of the Union. In view of the evidence which now proves
that the 16th Amendment was never ratified, it is correct to say that Congress
has never had the power to impose an unapportioned direct tax on the
States of the Union. The Pollock
decision now becomes a major hurdle standing in the government's way, because
the Pollock Court clearly found that all taxes on income are direct taxes, and all direct
taxes levied inside the 50 States must
be apportioned. The Pollock
decision is most relevant to any direct tax which Congress might levy against
the incomes and property of State Citizens, as distinct from citizens
of the United States**. (Each has
citizens of its own.)
Put
in the simplest of language, a ratified 16th Amendment either changed the
Constitution, or it did not change the Constitution. If it changed the Constitution, one change that did occur was to
authorize an unapportioned direct tax on the incomes of State Citizens. If it did not change the Constitution, the
apportionment restriction has always been operative within the 50 States, even
now. Either way, the failed
ratification proves that Congress must still apportion all direct taxes which it levies upon the incomes and property of Citizens
of the 50 States.
Corporations,
on the other hand, are statutory creations, whether they are domestic or
foreign. As such, they enjoy the
privilege of limited liability.
Congress is free to levy taxes on the exercise of this privilege and to
call them indirect excises. Within the
50 States, such an excise must be uniform for it to be constitutional; within the federal zone, such an excise need
not be uniform. In the context of
statutory privileges, the apportionment rule is completely irrelevant. Therefore, the status of "United
States** citizens" is also a statutory privilege the exercise of
which can be taxed with indirect excises, regardless of where that privilege might be exercised. The subject of such
indirect taxes is the exercise of a statutory privilege; the measure
of such taxes is the amount of income derived from exercising that privilege.
Justice White
did all of us a great disservice by writing a ruling that is tortuously
convoluted, in grammar and in logic. If
he had taken The Insular Cases explicitly into account, and if he had
distinguished Frank Brushaber's situs
from the situs of Brushaber's
defendant, the principle of territorial heterogeneity would have clarified the
decision enormously. Specifically,
according to the doctrine established by Downes v. Bidwell in 1901,
Congress is not required to apportion direct taxes within the federal zone, nor
is Congress required to levy uniform excise taxes within the federal zone. However, within the 50 States of the Union,
all direct taxes must still be apportioned, and all indirect excise taxes must
still be uniform. Now that we know the
16th Amendment never became law, these restrictions still apply to any tax
which Congress levies inside the 50 States.
Quite naturally, a problem arises when one party is inside the federal
zone, and the other party is outside the federal zone. That was the case in Brushaber.
The Downes
doctrine defined the "exclusive" authorities of 1:8:17 and 4:3:2 in
the U.S. Constitution to mean that Congress was not subject to the uniformity
restriction on excise taxes levied inside the federal zone. By necessary implication, Congress is not
subject to the apportionment restriction on direct taxes levied inside the
federal zone. It is important to
realize that the Union Pacific Railroad Company was a domestic
corporation, incorporated by Congress, inside the federal zone. A tax on such a corporation was a tax levied
within the federal zone, where the apportionment and uniformity
restrictions simply did not exist.
Instead of
making this important territorial distinction, Justice White launched into an
exercise of questionable logic, attributing statements to the Pollock
court which the Pollock court did not make, adding words to the 16th
Amendment that were not there, hoping his logic would persuade the rest of us
that the Pollock principle was now overturned. According to White, the principle established in Pollock
was that a tax on income was a tax on the source
of that income. In this context, White
is distinguishing income from source, in the same way that interest is
distinguished from principal. This same
distinction was made by a federal Circuit court in the Richardson case
as late as the year 1961. In light of
the overriding importance of the Downes doctrine, it is difficult and
also unnecessary to elevate the importance of this distinction any higher; it is also important to keep it in proper
perspective. Within the federal zone,
Congress can tax interest and principal (income and source) without any
regard for apportionment or uniformity.
Therefore, within the federal zone, the distinction is academic.
Whatever the
merits of this distinction between income and source, White was wrong to ignore
the key Pollock holding that income taxes are direct taxes. The Pollock
decision investigated the relevant history of direct taxes in depth. White was also
wrong to ignore the clear legislative history of the 16th Amendment, the stated
purpose of which was to eliminate the
apportionment restriction which caused the Pollock court to overturn
an income tax Act in the first place.
That Act was found to be unconstitutional precisely because it levied a
direct tax on incomes without apportionment.
Finally, White was wrong to launch into his lengthy discussion of the
16th Amendment without even mentioning The Insular Cases, when these cases were relatively recent authority
for the proposition that Congress did not need an amendment to impose taxes
without apportionment or uniformity inside the federal zone. This may be hindsight, but hindsight is
always 20/20.
The relevance
of the 16th Amendment to the tax on Frank Brushaber's dividend is another
matter. Two schools of thought have
emerged, with opposing views of that relevance. One school relies heavily on the key precedents established by Pollock. Specifically, the original investment is the
"source" of Brushaber's income.
A tax on the source is a direct tax.
Pollock found that a tax on income is a tax on the source. Therefore, a tax on income is a direct
tax. Without a ratified 16th
Amendment, such a tax must be apportioned whenever it is levied inside the 50
States. With a ratified 16th
Amendment, such a tax need not be apportioned whenever it is levied inside the
50 States. This school argues that
Brushaber's dividend was taxable because the 16th Amendment removed the
apportionment requirement on such a tax.
But, is the tax really levied "inside the 50 States", if the activity which produced the income was
actually inside the federal zone? The
importance of the Pollock principle now comes to the fore.
The competing
school argues that a ratified 16th Amendment was not strictly necessary for
Congress to impose a direct tax on Brushaber's dividend without
apportionment. Granted, he was a State Citizen
who lived and worked within one of the States of the Union. For this reason, the government found that
he was a "nonresident alien" under their own rules. If White's ruling did anything else, it held
that Brushaber's dividend was also taxable without apportionment and without
uniformity because its "source" was inside the federal zone, and that
"source" was a taxable activity (profit generation by a domestic
corporation). In this context, it does
make sense to jettison the Pollock "principle" and to
distinguish interest from principal, dividend from original stock
investment. Having done so, Justice
White could argue that the "source" of Brushaber's dividend was
domestic corporate activity and not
Brushaber's original investment.
Unfortunately for all of us, however, Brushaber did not challenge the
constitutionality of the income tax as applied to his dividend, so this
question was not properly before the Supreme Court; Brushaber did challenge the constitutionality of the income tax
as applied to his defendant.
Unfortunately
for Mr. Brushaber, he thought that the defendant was a foreign
corporation. The government was correct
to point out that the defendant was actually a domestic corporation, chartered
by Congress. As such, this
corporation's profits could be taxed by Congress without apportionment or
uniformity, and without an amendment authorizing such a tax. For the same reasons, Brushaber's share of those same profits could also
be taxed without constitutional restrictions, and without an amendment
authorizing such a tax, even though he was outside the federal zone and inside
a State of the Union. In this context,
it is revealing that the Internal Revenue Code imposes a uniform "flat
tax" when such income is received by nonresident aliens, giving it the appearance of a uniform indirect
tax. However, this
"uniformity" is not the consequence of a constitutional
requirement; it is the consequence of
decisions by Congress acting in its capacity as a majority-ruled legislative
democracy.
Moreover,
under the authority of the Downes doctrine, Congress is empowered to
define domestic corporate profits as "profits before dividends are
paid", and to penalize all domestic corporations which attempt to avoid
federal taxes by defining their profits as "profits after dividends
are paid." Within the federal
zone, Congress has the power to assert a superior claim to all profits
of domestic corporations, and to define those profits any way it chooses. By "superior claim" we mean that
Congress comes before stockholders inside the federal zone, even if the
stockholders are outside the federal zone, and even if the money they used to
purchase their stock came from a source that was outside the federal zone. A ratified 16th Amendment would have had no
effect whatsoever on the power of Congress to levy a tax without any
restrictions on any of the assets of domestic corporations. A ratified 16th Amendment would have
empowered Congress to tax, without apportionment, dividends paid to State Citizens
by foreign corporations when both
were inside the 50 States, but a ratified 16th Amendment was not strictly
necessary for Congress to tax dividends paid to them by domestic corporations.
Neither was a ratified 16th Amendment necessary for Congress to tax
dividends paid by either type of corporation to citizens of other nations like
France, since the latter citizens enjoy none of the protections guaranteed by
the Constitution for the United
States of America. In this context, it
is important to make a careful distinction between dividends and corporate
profits.
It is clear
that the second of these two competing schools of thought has now
prevailed. Even though there are
serious logical and obvious grammatical problems with Justice White's ruling,
in retrospect he was right to question the Pollock principle. The situs
principle is easier to understand, if only because it dovetails so squarely
with the overriding principles of territorial jurisdiction and territorial
heterogeneity. Moreover, it is entirely
possible for the Pollock principle to yield to the situs principle, even though the 16th Amendment was never actually
ratified. Remember that Justice White
ruled in Brushaber that the only
effect of the 16th Amendment was to overturn the Pollock principle. If the amendment failed, it could thereby be
argued that the Pollock principle has never been overturned. Nevertheless, subsequent case law has
confirmed the superiority of the situs
principle: the source of income is the situs of the income-producing
activity. Sources are either inside or
outside the federal zone.
Finally, like
"income", the term "source" is not in the
Constitution either, because the amendment failed to be ratified. Recall the Eisner prohibition,
whereby Congress was told it did not have the power to define
"income" by any definition it might adopt (see Appendix
J). Congress was also told it did
not have the power to define any other term in the U.S. Constitution by any
definition it might adopt. That
prohibition was predicated on a ratified 16th Amendment, the text of which
introduced the term "income" to the Constitution for the first
time. Although the issue did not arise as such and there is no court precedent per se, the exact same logic applies to
the term "source". The failed
ratification means that Congress is now free to legislate any definition it might adopt for the terms "income" and "source", as long as the
statutes containing those terms do not otherwise violate the Constitution as lawfully
amended. The source of income is the situs of the income-producing
activity. See Chapter
7.
On a more
general level, the exact same logic can extend the Eisner prohibition per force to render unconstitutional any
and all federal statutes which redefine the term "State" to mean
anything other than a member of the
Union, because this term is used throughout the U.S. Constitution. In the regulations at 31 CFR 51.2 and 52.2,
for example, not only are there separate definitions for the terms
"State" and a "state";
but also, the Union member is spelled with a small "s" and a de facto entity is spelled with a
CAPITAL "S" to denote a "State within a state".
Moreover, the case law which surrounds
the Buck Act in Title 4 has recognized the legal possibility of such a State
within a state. Evidently, the
population of federal citizens inhabiting the 50 States of the Union are
legally regarded as a separate, inferior class endowed with the privileges of a
legislative democracy, as distinct from the fundamental Rights of all State
Citizens who inhabit those very same States.
This logical reduction of the Downes Doctrine is absurd, because it
violates the fundamental principles of equal protection of the law, and the
Guarantee Clause. No new
"State" shall be erected, ever, without the consent of the States
affected. California is a Republic and
not a democracy.
The explicit
recognition of territorial jurisdiction, and of the status of the parties with respect to that territorial
jurisdiction, provides much additional clarification to the Brushaber ruling. Such a clarification was definitely needed
because the almost incomprehensible grammar of the Brushaber ruling is
actually responsible for much of the confusion and controversy that continue to
persist in this field, even today. As
Alan Stang puts it, Justice White turned himself into a pretzel, and lots of
other people got twisted up in the process.
A clear understanding of status and jurisdiction, and a proper
application of the principle of territorial heterogeneity, together provide an
elegant and sophisticated means to eliminate much, if not all, of that
confusion and controversy, once and for all.
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Reader's Notes: