Re: Bad Karma Paul Mitchell?


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Posted by Two Cities on April 03, 1998 at 18:15:14:

In Reply to: Bad Karma Paul Mitchell? posted by Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S. on April 02, 1998 at 21:32:03:

: : : : I response was posted on an email service I subscribe to after your article on karma and the courts was distributed there. Can you make a rebuttle to the issue?

: : : : Mitchell is so far behind times it is a shame. We discovered this over three years ago and it don't mean a blame thing. Foia or privacy cannot be heard in ANY district court. Its all administrative and so are districts courts administrative agencies of Congress. So when you approach either district court the matter is res judicata for the other agency has had its court hearing. Now for the remedy that the administrative agency can't give you, the only place to get judicial review of an administrative agency is founfd in Title 5 United Stated Code Service at section 706 NOTE 6. Read it and see for yourself. Now you can see how far Mitchell is off base. HE ASSUMED it was the "other "district court, huh? Not so when reading the forementioned Title.

: : : : Big Al

: : :
: : : Dear Al et al.,

: : : No, bad karma federal judiciary!!

: : : I respectfully disagree. Many pertinent
: : : court authorities have held that statutes
: : : granting original jurisdiction to federal
: : : courts must be STRICTLY construed. Confer
: : : at "Federal Courts" in C.J.S., for example.

: : : Title 1, U.S.C. controls the construction
: : : of singular versus plural; i.e., they refer
: : : to one and the same entities, always, without
: : : exception. The American Insurance and
: : : Balzac v. Porto Rico holdings clearly
: : : distinguish the USDC from the DCUS. And,
: : : the federal statute at 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B)
: : : expressly mentions the DCUS, NOT the USDC!!

: : : Such was the essence of John M. Roll's ORDER
: : : In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on New Life
: : : Health Center Company, to wit:

: : : This [USDC] is not the proper forum to
: : : bring a request under the Freedom of
: : : Information Act.

: : : See exact wording in Gilbertson's OPENING BRIEF.

: : : For this reason, the matter is res judicata.
: : : Confer also at:

: : : Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.

: : : in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition.
: : : The inference can be made that, what was omitted,
: : : was intended to be omitted. Congress, therefore,
: : : INTENDED to omit the USDC from said statute.

: : : Likewise, compare 18 U.S.C. 1964(a) and 1964(c).

: : : Your use of ad hominem argumentation is
: : : properly ignored -- for being frivolous.

: : :
: : : Respectfully submitted,

: : : /s/ Paul Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

: : : Counselor at Law, Federal Witness
: : : and Private Attorney General

: : Yes Virginia, there is a sandy claws.....
: : Thanks Paul. We've been wondering exactly where that cite was at regarding the difference between the venues of the different courts, and had lost track of the 1 USC reference somewhere in the shuffle of tall piles of poorly indexed misfilings on our office floor, or wherever.
: : One additional point to Big Al AKA New kid on the Block: Do the statutes mean exactly what they say, or is that up to some judge having a (pardon the expresion please) 'brain fart' to decide? Check out the info on Law 101 at www.taxgate.com and see what ol' Thurston Bell has turned up.
: : It looks like you'll find that, even though your favorite Congress-critter may be an idiot, legislative counsel and the lawyers that prepare the statutes are pretty sharp cookies. Ergo, the statutes say what they mean, and mean what they say; no more, no less.
: : One citation or one statute does not the law make, just like one verse from the Bible is a lousy basis on which to establish a doctrine, but many violate that most basic of principles, in both cases. So sad.

:
: Dear Friends,

: Here are the pertinent cites which I could find
: on the subject of strict construction of
: federal jurisdictional statutes:

: "The general policy of the Judiciary Act of
: 1887 and 1888, as has been recognized repeatedly,
: was to contract [reduce] the jurisdiction of the
: federal courts, and accordingly all doubts as to
: jurisdiction must be resolved against it."

: 25 C.J. 4 [emphasis added]

: "Jurisdiction of inferior federal courts, see
: supra Sec. 4(1), based on diversity of citizenship
: is entirely statutory, and the rule stated supra
: that statutes conferring jurisdiction on the
: federal courts are to be strictly construed
: applies to the statute conferring diversity
: jurisdiction."

: 36 C.J.S. 55

: cites:

: Thomson v. Gaskill, Neb.,
: 62 S.Ct. 673, 315 U.S. 442, 86 L.Ed. 951

: City of Indianapolis v. Chase Nat. Bank of
: City of New York, Ind.,
: 62 S.Ct. 15, 314 U.S. 63, 86 L.Ed. 47,
: reh. den. 62 S.Ct. 355, 356, three cases
: 314 U.S. 714, 86 L.Ed. 569

: Trust Co. of Chicago v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
: C.A.Ill., 183 F.2d 640

: Seidman v. Hamilton, D.C.Pa.,
: 173 F.Supp. 641

: Garfield Local 13-566 Oil, Chemical and Atomic
: Workers Intern. Union, AFL-CIO v. Heyden Newport
: Chemical Corp., D.C.N.J.,
: 172 F.Supp. 230

: Harris v. American Legion, D.C.Ind.,
: 162 F.Supp 700

: Detres v. Lions Bldg. Corp., D.C.Ill.,
: 136 F.Supp 699, reversed on other grounds,
: C.A., 234 F.2d 596

: Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubinstein, D.C.N.Y.,
: 133 F.Supp. 496

: Asbury v. New York Life Insurance Co., D.C.Ky.,
: 45 F.Supp. 513

: Scarborough v. Mountain States Telephone
: & Telegraph Co., D.C.Tex., 45 F.Supp. 176

: Continental Min. & Mill. Co. v. Migliaccio,
: D.C.Utah, 16 F.R.D. 217

: "... [J]urisdiction must be based on a clear
: statutory mandate." 36 C.J.S. 5

: cites:

: Carroll v. U.S., App.D.C.,
: 77 S.Ct. 1332, 354 U.S. 394, 1 L.Ed.2d 1442

: "A strict construction of statutes conferring
: jurisdiction on federal courts and prescribing
: jurisdictional requirements is called for by
: the policy of the statutes and due regard for
: the rightful independence of state governments;
: and, accordingly, all doubts as to jurisdiction
: must be resolved against it."

: 36 C.J.S. 5

: cites:

: Aetna Ins. Co. v. Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co.,
: C.A.Kan., 229 F.2d 584

: Tsang v. Kansas, C.A.Cal.,
: 173 F.2d 204, cert. den. 69 S.Ct. 1515,
: 337 U.S. 939, 93 L.Ed. 1744

: Kresberg v. International Paper Co., C.C.A.N.Y.,
: 149 F.2d 911, cert. den. 66 S.Ct. 146,
: 326 U.S. 764, 90 L.Ed. 460

: Downing v. Howard, D.C.Del.,
: 68 F.Supp 6, aff'd C.C.A.,
: 162 F.2d 654, cert. den. 68 S.Ct. 155,
: 332 U.S. 818, 92 L.Ed. 395

: Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp.
: v. Third Nat. Bank of Nashville,
: D.C.Tenn., 60 F.Supp. 110, reversed
: on other grounds, C.C.A., 153 F.2d 678,
: cert. den. 67 S.Ct. 49, 329 U.S. 718,
: 91 L.Ed. 622, and 67 S.Ct. 50,
: 329 U.S. 718, 91 L.Ed. 623

: U.S. v. Forness, D.C.N.Y.,
: 37 F.Supp. 337

: "Jurisdictional statutes are construed narrowly."

: cites:

: Mozingo v. Consolidated Const. Co.,
: D.C.Va., 171 F.Supp. 396

: Central Mexico Light & Power Co.
: v. Munch, C.C.A.N.Y.,
: 116 F.2d 85

: Humphrey v. U.S. Fidelity &
: Guaranty Co., D.C.Or.,
: 38 F.Supp. 224

: 25 C.J. p. 691, note 55

: "Presumption against jurisdiction
: see Federal Civil Procedure, Sec. 449."

: "Policy generally is to disclaim
: jurisdiction in doubtful cases."

: The Emma Giles, D.C.Md., 15 F.Supp 502

: "A grant of jurisdiction must appear
: by clear and unambiguous provision."

: 36 C.J.S. 5

: cite:

: Sweet v. B.F. Goodrich Co., D.C.Ohio,
: 68 F.Supp. 782

: "...[A]ll doubts as to jurisdiction must
: be resolved against it."

: 25 C.J. 4, p. 691, n. 55

: cites:

: St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. Davis,
: 132 Fed 629, 632

: Joy v. St. Louis,
: 122 Fed. 524, aff'd 201 U.S. 332,
: 26 S.Ct. 478, 50 L.Ed. 776

:
: Resectfully submitted,

: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

: Counselor at Law, Federal Witness
: and Private Attorney General

My meager wooden nickel on other issues of jurisdiction.

county vs. County vs. COUNTY

Actual borders are assigned to counties. There descriptors are township, range, section, east, west, north and south to mention a few. The legal descriptions make sure that they read like places on the earth.
Counties (I'm guessing, haven't seen one) give Legal descriptions with Township, Range, Section etc. and it is doubtful whether these descriptions actually reference places, but rather points of beginning. Points are of course mathematical abstractions with no extension in physical space.
COUNTIES give LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS WITH TWP, RGE, SEC, POB ETC. and are the locus for the collection of PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES NEVER SPECIFIED WITH A UNIT OF ACCOUNT. THE PRESENTMENT IS ENTIRELY MADE UP OF NUMBERS and the word dollar is absent. Does a legal definition exist for the sign "S"?
COUNTIES ARE ENTIRELY ROMAN, AND DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ANY KNOWLEDGE OF LOWER CASE LETTERS, ALTHOUGH THEY DO RECOGNIZE THE ARABIC NUMBERS.

I'm beginning to think that the county treasurer which oversees a lawful realm of property taxation contracts with the County Treasurer for the collections concerning artificial entities, and the County Treasurer with knowledge of who the Legal Owner is in the County, further contracts with the COUNTY TREASURER for collections of PRESENTMENTS delivered to TENANTS IN FIEF, RETURNING IMAGINARY COMMERCIAL CREDIT WITH 'PAYMENT'.
The legal hooks arise via the common mechanism of property transfers utilizing Real (REAL) Estate (ESTATE) Agents and Title Companies and Mortgage lenders and brokers. Their general system will ensure that the man/woman is artfully translated into either one or two separate fictions along the way. The process seems to exist to avoid this trap, and it is in plain sight within at least the RCW. The obfuscation is quite old, at least 95 years judging by an old deed (the county transcription).
A correctly executed property transfer of land conveying a place on the earth requires attention to miniscule detail, and the shedding of several decades (if not centuries) of language destruction. Every single word is a potential land mine.

The degree of legal fiction that attaches to an individual seems to be closely related to being able to attach an address to the individual's name, thereby rooting the individual to a fixed or permanent location. These entities are address fixated when compelled to communicate.

The COUNTY will only COMMUNICATE with BACKWARDS SPELLED AND COMMATIZED YOU. Any other required communication the COUNTY kicks back up to the next level, the County which communicates with your correct name but insists on the existence of an non c/o address. My guess is they would have to kick it back up another level, to county, to be able to communicate directly with the individual. That is of course undesirable from their viewpoint since such an imposition would rapidly crumble status quo.

These separate corporate personas that get attached to most people through the course of daily living do not appear to be inextricably melded, ie. with awareness of the separate nature Two Cities is easily distinguishable from Cities, Two and CITIES, TWO etc. If other individuals serving in corporate capacities on directorships of corporations in this land can differentiate their hats, so can we. Sometimes it might just be convenient to purchase CITY WATER and for the purposes of that billing statement become a person as long as the liability is limited.




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