Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
c/o MBE PMB #332
501 W. Broadway, Suite “A”
San Diego 92101
CALIFORNIA, USA
tel: (619) 234-5252 (msg)
fax: (619) 234-5272
In Propria Persona
All Rights Reserved
without Prejudice
United States Court of Appeals
Ninth Circuit
Paul Andrew
Mitchell, ) Appeal No. 02-15269
and
) 372(c) No. 02-89005
Plaintiff/Appellant, )
v.
)
)
AOL Time Warner, Inc. et
al., )
)
Defendants/Appellees.)
-------------------------------)
)
United States ) MOTION FOR INTERVENTION
OF RIGHT
ex relatione )
AND APPLICATION FOR WRIT
Paul Andrew Mitchell, ) IN THE NATURE OF QUO
WARRANTO:
)
Intervenor.
) 3:2:1 (in judicial
mode);
) 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072(b),
2403(a);
) FRAP Rule 44; and,
) FRCP 24(a), (c) in pari materia
_______________________________)
(United States not a party).
COMES NOW the United States (hereinafter “Intervenor”) ex relatione Paul Andrew Mitchell, Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America and Private Attorney General (hereinafter “Relator”) to exercise its statutory right to intervene in the instant appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2403(a), to apply for a Writ of Quo Warranto in the instant appeal and all other relief which this Court deems just and proper, and to provide timely Notice to all interested parties of same, pursuant to Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”) in pari materia with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 24(c) (United States not yet a party); and Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 (“3:2:1”) in the Constitution for the United States of America, as lawfully amended (hereinafter “U.S. Constitution”). See 28 U.S.C. 2072(b) and the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869 et seq. in full.
OF
CERTAIN ACTS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
Pursuant to the duties imposed upon it by virtue of FRAP Rule 44, the Office of the Clerk of this Court (“Circuit Clerk”) will now please certify to the Office of the United States Attorney General that the constitutionality of certain Acts of Congress affecting the public interest is herein drawn in question.
Likewise, the Circuit Clerk will now please certify Intervenor’s intervention for presentation of all evidence admissible in the instant appeal, and for argument(s) on the question of the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. 2072(b), and of the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869 et seq. presently codified at Title 28 of the United States Code (“U.S.C.”)
Subject to all applicable provisions of Law, the United States hereby expressly reserves all rights of a party and shall be subject to all liabilities of a party as to court costs, to the extent necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and laws relating to the question of the constitutionality of said Acts of Congress.
See Article II, Articles of Confederation (“United States, in Congress Assembled”); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933) (United States as plaintiff); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (a private Citizen may appear on behalf of the United States ex rel.); 3:2:1 (“Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party”). Find “U.S. ex rel.” etc. on the Internet.
The “United States” and the “United States of America” are not one and the same. Congress is expressly prohibited from re‑defining any terms found in the U.S. Constitution. See Preamble (“Constitution for the United States of America”); Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 (“2:1:1”) (“President of the United States of America”); Article VII (“Independence of the United States of America”); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920):
Congress ... cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone that power can be lawfully exercised.
The U.S. Department of Justice does not enjoy general power(s) of attorney to represent the United States of America. Compare 28 U.S.C. 547(1), (2) (Duties). Willful misrepresentation by officers employed by that Department is actionable under the McDade Act, 28 U.S.C. 530B (Ethical standards for attorneys for the Government).
Whenever the United States proceeds as party plaintiff, an Article III constitutional court, exercising the judicial Power of the United States, is a prerequisite under 3:2:1 (“The judicial Power shall extend ... to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party”). See 28 U.S.C. 1345 (United States as plaintiff).
Whenever the United States proceeds as a party defendant, the sovereign must grant permission to be sued. See 28 U.S.C. 1346 (United States as defendant). In this mode, a legislative court is permitted. See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 577 (1933):
... [C]ontroversies to which the United States may by statute be made a party defendant, at least as a general rule, lie wholly outside the scope of the judicial power vested by article 3 in the constitutional courts. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 645‑646.
A private Citizen may move a federal court on behalf of the United States ex relatione. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), as cited above.
The Lanham Act at 60 Stat. 440 confers original jurisdiction on the several district courts of the United States (“DCUS”). These courts are Article III constitutional courts proceeding in judicial mode. Compare 15 U.S.C. 1121(a) (uncodified).
See also Mookini v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201, 205 (1938) (term DCUS in its historic and proper sense); and Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley‑Duff & Associates, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) (RICO statutes bring to bear the pressure of private attorneys general on a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate).
The United States District Courts (“USDC”) are legislative courts typically proceeding in legislative mode. See American Insurance v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511, 7 L.Ed. 242 (1828) (C.J. Marshall’s seminal ruling); and Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) (The USDC is not a true United States court established under Article III.) See 28 U.S.C. §§ 88, 91, 132, 152, 171, 251, 458, 461, 1367.
Legislative courts are not required to exercise the Article III guarantees required of constitutional courts. See Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 274 U.S. 145 (1927); Swift v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928); Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U.S. 438 (1929); Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930); Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U.S. 382 (1932); O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); 49 Stat. 1921.
All guarantees of the U.S. Constitution were expressly extended into the District of Columbia in 1871, and into all federal Territories in 1873. See 16 Stat. 419, 426, Sec. 34; 18 Stat. 325, 333, Sec. 1891, respectively. Compare Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 380 (1901) (paraphrasing the Harvard Law Review: the Constitution of the United States, as such, does not extend beyond the limits of the States which are united by and under it); and Hooven & Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945) (the guaranties [sic] of the Constitution extend into the federal zone only as Congress has made those guaranties applicable).
The United States hereby notoriously exercises its statutory right to intervene, pursuant to the federal statute at 28 U.S.C. 2403(a).
Intervenor now formally incorporates Attachments “A”, “B” and “C” by reference infra, as if set forth fully here.
OF
JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT, 28 U.S.C. 372(c)
Intervenor
also formally incorporates by reference Circuit Clerk’s entire docket number No. 02-89005, as if set forth fully here, and all
documents and other certified evidence contained therein. Said docket number was first assigned when
Appellant filed a timely, proper and lawful COMPLAINT
OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT against Mr. Drozd, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 372(c). Strictly speaking, said COMPLAINT was
filed well within the period allowed by the USDC’s Local Rules (“L.R.”) for
objections to findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Appellant’s MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF USDC’S ORDER.
APPLICATION
FOR WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO
Pursuant to all authorities now cited in Appellant’s recently filed PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENTS, particularly Legerton v. Chambers, 163 P. 678, 32 Cal.App. 601 (1917) and Thompson v. Holt, 52 Ala. 491, the United States now stipulates that a Presidential Commission is the highest and best evidence of a judge’s right to office until, on quo warranto or a proceeding of that nature, that claim is annulled by judicial determination.
Accordingly, in deference to applicable California State laws, the United States hereby moves this honorable Court for a lawful Writ in the nature of Quo Warranto, properly issued by the Circuit Clerk upon Messrs. William B. Shubb and Dale A. Drozd, to demonstrate by what lawful authorities (if any) each claims to preside on the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Judicial District of California (“DCUS”) in Sacramento, California, and by what lawful authorities (if any) each claims to exercise the judicial Power of the United States under Article III in the instant case.
All premises having been duly considered, the United States ex rel. Paul Andrew Mitchell, Private Attorney General, hereby exercises its statutory right to intervene in the instant case and moves this honorable Court for a Writ in the nature of Quo Warranto to issue upon Messrs. William B. Shubb and Dale A. Drozd, to demonstrate by what lawful authorities each claims to preside on the DCUS in Sacramento, California, and by what lawful authorities each claims to exercise the judicial Power of the United States on behalf of Intervenor under Article III in the Constitution for the United States of America, as lawfully amended.
Intervenor also moves this honorable Court for a routine ORDER to the Circuit Clerk, commanding that Office formally to certify to the United States Attorney General Appellant’s formal challenge to the constitutionality of certain Acts of Congress, specifically the Abrogation Clause in the Rules Enabling Act at 28 U.S.C. 2072(b) and the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869 et seq.
Intervenor also moves this Court for a routine ORDER to the Circuit Clerk, commanding that Office formally to certify Intervenor’s intervention for presentation of all evidence admissible in the instant appeal, and for argument(s) on the questions of the constitutionality of the Abrogation Clause in the Rules Enabling Act at 28 U.S.C. 2072(b), and of the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869 et seq. presently codified at Title 28 of the United States Code (“U.S.C.”)
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, Relator and Appellant
in the above entitled action, hereby verify under penalty of perjury, under the
laws of the United States of America, without the “United States”
(federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and
correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and
belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
Dated: December
19, 2002 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul
Andrew Mitchell
__________________________________________________________
Printed: Paul
Andrew Mitchell, Relator/Appellant In Propria Persona
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby certify,
under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America,
without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18
years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the
following document(s):
MOTION FOR
INTERVENTION OF RIGHT AND
APPLICATION FOR
WRIT IN THE NATURE OF QUO WARRANTO:
3:2:1
(in judicial mode); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072(b),
2403(a);
FRAP Rule 44; and,
FRCP 24(a), (c) in pari materia
(United States not a party).
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in
first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to
the following:
Judge Alex Kozinski (supervising) Clerk of Court (51x)
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Attention: Cathy Catterson
P.O. Box 91510 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Pasadena 91109-1510 P.O. Box 193939
CALIFORNIA, USA San Francisco 94119-3939
CALIFORNIA, USA
Ropers, Majeski, Kohn & Bentley DeForest & Koscelnik
(failed to exhibit oaths) (failed to exhibit oath)
1001 Marshall Street 3000 Koppers Building
Redwood City 94063 436 Seventh Avenue
CALIFORNIA, USA Pittsburgh 15219
PENNSYLVANIA, USA
Murphy Austin Adams Schoenfeld LLP Pillsbury Winthrop LLP
(failed to exhibit oaths) (failed to exhibit oaths)
P.O. Box 1319 400 Capitol Mall, Suite 1700
Sacramento 95812-1319 Sacramento 95814-4419
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Curiale Dellaverson Hirschfeld Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart Oliver
Kraemer & Sloan, LLP & Hedges, LLP
(failed to exhibit oaths) (failed to exhibit oaths)
727 Sansome Street 201 Sansome Street, 6th Floor
San Francisco 94111 San Francisco 94104
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Office of the General Counsel Paul
Southworth
(failed to exhibit oaths) 2018 N. New
Hampshire Ave.
University of California Los Angeles 90027
1111 Franklin Street, 8th Floor CALIFORNIA, USA
Oakland 94607-5200
CALIFORNIA, USA
Karl Kleinpaste Ram Samudrala
P.O. Box 1551 UW Micro Box 357242
Beaver Falls 15010 Seattle 98195-7242
PENNSYLVANIA, USA WASHINGTON STATE, USA
Laskin & Guenard Rivkin Radler, LLP
(failed to exhibit oath) (failed to exhibit oaths)
1810 South Street 1330 N. Dutton Ave., #200
Sacramento 95814 Santa Rosa 95401-4646
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Harvey Siskind Jacobs LLP Office of Solicitor General
(failed to exhibit oaths) 950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
3 Embarcadero Center, Ste. 1060 Room 5614
San Francisco 94111 Washington 20530-0001
CALIFORNIA, USA DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Register of Copyrights Steinhart & Falconer LLP
Library of Congress (failed to exhibit oaths)
101 Independence Avenue, S.E. 333 Market Street, 32nd Floor
Washington 20559-6000 San Francisco 94105-2150
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Matheny Sears Linkert & Long LLP Latham & Watkins
(failed to exhibit oaths) (failed to exhibit oaths)
P.O. Box 13711 633 West Fifth St., Ste. 4000
Sacramento 95853-4711 Los Angeles 90071-2007
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
[Please see USPS Publication #221 for “addressing”
instructions.]
Dated: December
19, 2002 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul
Andrew Mitchell
__________________________________________________________
Printed: Paul
Andrew Mitchell, Relator/Appellant In Propria Persona
FINAL NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR
PROOF OF APPOINTMENT
AND DESIGNATION
September 1, 2001 A.D.
FINAL NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR
PROOF OF APPOINTMENT AND DESIGNATION
TO: Mr. Jack L. Wagner, Clerk of Court
District Court of the United States
501 “I” Street, Suite 4-200
Sacramento 95814-2322
CALIFORNIA, USA
Mr. Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Director
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building
One Columbus Circle, N.E.
Washington 20544
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Mr. James. S. Carroll, III, Assistant Director
Executive Office for United States Attorneys
Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Unit
600 “E” Street, N.W., Room 7300
Washington 20530
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Hon. Mary M. Schroeder, Chief Judge
c/o Cathy A. Catterson, Clerk of Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
P.O. Box 193939
San Francisco 94119-3939
CALIFORNIA, USA
FROM: Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Plaintiff/Appellant
Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al.
Ninth Circuit docket #02-15269 and 372(c) #02-89005
DATE: September 1, 2002 A.D.
Ladies and Gentlemen:
To date, neither the office of the Clerk of the federal district court in Sacramento, California, nor the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts in Washington, D.C., nor the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., nor the State Bar of California, nor the Clerk of the California Supreme Court, has been able to produce any of the credentials which Mr. Dale A. Drozd (hereinafter “Mr. Drozd”) must have, in order for him to occupy the office of United States magistrate judge in Sacramento, California State.
I refer all of you specifically to the form letter I received from Mr. James S. Carroll, III, dated April 24, 2002, in which he appeared to err by alleging that My request sought public records which may be obtained from the clerk of the court. This appeared to be an error, because the U.S. Department of Justice (in the Executive Branch) is the legal custodian of all Presidential Commissions appointing federal judges to the bench, not any office in the Judicial Branch.
Thus, the clerk of court is not the legal custodian of any such Presidential Commissions. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2104(a)(1)(A) and 2902(c).
On April 26, 2002 A.D., Mr. Drozd signed and filed another specious “order” in which he formally acknowledged My allegations that, in his case, no jurisdiction, no license, no oath, no certificate, and no commission have been produced by any personnel employed by any of the above federal offices to which this NOTICE AND DEMAND are now addressed.
And, in that specious “order” of April 26, 2002, Mr. Drozd offered absolutely no rebuttal(s) or denial(s) whatsoever that no (civil) jurisdiction existed, no license (to practice law) existed, no oath (of office) existed, no certificate (of oath) existed, and no (presidential) commission existed. I never consented to civil jurisdiction by any United States magistrate judges.
I refer you now to the cases which have held that a Presidential Commission is required for all judges of the Supreme Court, Circuit Courts, and District Courts. For Mr. Drozd to exercise any lawful authorities of a district judge, such as denying My MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT, the Law requires that he be commissioned by the President, and have a life-time appointment. Neither is the case, based on the official record before the Ninth Circuit at the present time. See the Appointments Clause in the U.S. Constitution (“2:2:2”).
So, I believe that
sufficient evidence has already been certified that Mr. Drozd is not now, and
never was, a district judge.
The question remains, therefore, whether or not Mr. Drozd is now, or ever was, a United States magistrate judge. Please note well the federal statute at 28 U.S.C. 631(a) requires that judges of each United States District Court shall appoint all United States magistrate judges; the statute at 28 U.S.C. 631(b)(1) requires each such magistrate judge to have been ‑‑ for at least five (5) years ‑‑ a member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a State.
Provided that they are qualified and duly appointed, a federal judge may then, and only then, designate such magistrate judges to conduct hearings and to submit to a judge proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to the federal statute at 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B).
My demand for his certificate of oath, properly indorsed upon his license to practice law, was My earnest and good faith attempt to determine whether or not Mr. Drozd was ever qualified to be appointed to the office of United States magistrate judge, in the first instance. Evidently, Mr. Drozd was not so qualified.
Section 6067 of the California Business and Professions Code mandates that a certificate of oath shall be indorsed upon a license to practice law in the State of California. When no such certificate was produced by Mr. Drozd, nor by the State Bar of California, nor by the Clerk of the California Supreme Court, I was thereby entitled to conclude that Mr. Drozd was never qualified to be appointed to the office of United States magistrate judge, in the first instance.
To date, I have not requested any evidence that Mr. Drozd has been duly appointed or designated under 28 U.S.C. 631(a) or 636(b)(1)(B), respectively, because the matter of his qualifications came first. If he was never qualified, then no appointment or designation by any federal judge could have been valid, or lawful, in the first instance.
Nevertheless, before I satisfy the legal requirements imposed upon me by the federal criminal statute at 18 U.S.C. 4 (misprision of felony), and before I formally charge Mr. Drozd with impersonating a federal officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 912 (a felony), I wish to confirm, once and for all, whether or not certain documentary evidence exists.
Documentary evidence may indicate that a federal judge did attempt to appoint Mr. Drozd to the office of United States magistrate judge, and/or that a federal judge did attempt to designate Mr. Drozd to conduct hearings and submit findings of fact and conclusions of law in My case, now pending before the Ninth Circuit. I would regard such documentary evidence as a factor mitigating the charge I now intend to file against Mr. Drozd, for impersonating a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. 912, and I do intend to supplement My Complaint of Judicial Misconduct with said evidence (if available).
Accordingly, I hereby demand the timely exhibition and certification of any and all documentary evidence that a federal judge did attempt to appoint Mr. Dale A. Drozd to the office of United States magistrate judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 631(a) (or any other lawful authority).
I also demand the timely exhibition and certification of any and all documentary evidence that a federal judge did attempt, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B) (or any other lawful authority), to designate Mr. Dale A. Drozd to conduct hearings and submit findings of fact and conclusions of law in My case, now pending before the Ninth Circuit.
I am giving each of you a reasonable deadline of thirty (30) calendar days hence, which deadline is 5:00 p.m. on September 30, 2002 A.D., to produce the documentary evidence itemized above. Beyond that deadline, your silence will constitute fraud, pursuant to the court holding in U.S. v. Tweel, and it will also activate estoppel, pursuant to the court holding in Carmine v. Bowen (cites on the Internet).
Please be advised that I intend to file your answer(s), if any, in the Ninth Circuit docket assigned to My Complaint of Judicial Misconduct against Mr. Drozd, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 372(c). That docket number is #02‑89005. I also intend to testify to your silence, in the event that no answers are forthcoming from all of you, or any one of you.
Thank you for your timely professional consideration.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Private Attorney General, Plaintiff and Appellant
Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al.
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/index.htm
copies: Judge Alex Kozinski (supervising)
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 91510
Pasadena 91109-1510
CALIFORNIA, USA
Hon. Jan Scully, District Attorney
Office of the District Attorney
County of Sacramento
901 “G” Street
Sacramento 95814
CALIFORNIA, USA
U.S. Mail care of:
Dr. John C. Alden, M.D., Eyewitness
350 – 30th Street, Suite 444
Oakland 94609-3426
CALIFORNIA, USA
NOTICE OF DEFAULT
BY AFFIDAVIT
October 6, 2002 A.D.
NOTICE OF DEFAULT
BY AFFIDAVIT
TO: Mr. William B. Shubb
c/o Clerk of Court
501 “I” Street, Suite 4-200
Sacramento 95814-2322
CALIFORNIA, USA
FROM: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Plaintiff/Appellant
Mitchell
v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al.
Case No. #CIV S 01-1480 WBS DAD PS
Ninth Circuit Appeal #02-15269 and
372(c) Complaint No. #02-89005
DATE: October 6, 2002 A.D.
SUBJECT: FINAL NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR CREDENTIALS REQUIRED BY LAW,
June 11, 2002 A.D.
Greetings Mr. Shubb:
On June 11, 2002 A.D., I transmitted to you, via first class U.S. Mail, My FINAL NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR CREDENTIALS REQUIRED BY LAW, specifically demanding that you produce a certified copy of your presidential commission, and that you do so no later than 5:00 p.m. on Monday, June 24, 2002 A.D.
As of that reasonable deadline, I have not received said certified copy, from you or from any one or anything else.
Accordingly, you are now in default.
I hereby incorporate by reference true and correct copies of the attached form letter dated April 24, 2002, from James S. Carroll III, with My refusal for cause, as if both were set forth fully herein.
I also incorporate by reference true and correct copies of My lawful and proper FOIA request, dated January 15, 2002 A.D., and of My lawful and proper FOIA appeal, dated February 4, 2002 A.D., both of which are also attached, as if set forth fully herein.
The attached documents constitute material evidence that, as the legal custodian of the requisite presidential commissions, the U.S. Department of Justice does not have in their custody any presidential commission(s) appointing Mr. William B. Shubb to the office of United States District Judge.
CONCLUSIONS
Now, I therefore proceed on the basis of the above mentioned evidence that no such presidential commission exists for Mr. William B. Shubb, and that any oath of office executed by Mr. William B. Shubb is necessarily counterfeit and fraudulent on its face.
Accordingly, this evidence also forms the basis of My reasonable and objective conclusions that:
(1) Mr. William B. Shubb was not lawfully appointed to occupy the office of United States District Judge;
(2) Mr. William B. Shubb was not lawfully appointed to preside on the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California;
(3) Mr. William B. Shubb was never lawfully appointed to preside on the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Judicial District of California; and,
(4) Mr. William B. Shubb possessed no lawful authority to appoint U.S. magistrate judges, or to refer civil matters to the latter for findings of facts and conclusions of law.
The Undersigned hereby verifies, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
Dated: October 6, 2002 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
_____________________________________________
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Sui Juris
Author, Damaged Party and Plaintiff/Appellant
U.S. Mail:
c/o Dr. John C. Alden, M.D.
350 – 30th Street, Suite 444
Oakland 94609-3426
CALIFORNIA, USA
copy: Mr. Jack L. Wagner, Clerk of Court
District Court of the United States
501 “I” Street, Suite 4-200
Sacramento 95814-2322
CALIFORNIA, USA
Mr. Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Director
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
Thurgood Marshall Federal Judiciary Building
One Columbus Circle, N.E.
Washington 20544
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Mr. James. S. Carroll, III, Assistant Director
Executive Office for United States Attorneys
Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Unit
600 “E” Street, N.W., Room 7300
Washington 20530
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Hon. Mary M. Schroeder, Chief Judge
c/o Cathy A. Catterson, Clerk of Court
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
P.O. Box 193939
San Francisco 94119-3939
CALIFORNIA, USA
MEMO to Jon Mummolo,
November 9, 2002 A.D.
MEMO
TO: Jon Mummolo
Washington Square News
FROM: Paul Andrew Mitchell
DATE: November 9, 2002 A.D.
SUBJECT: answers to your 2 questions
Greetings Jon,
I appreciate this opportunity to respond to your excellent questions.
Let me begin by laying a summary legal and historical foundation, so that you will be in a much better position to apply the pertinent laws to the relevant facts of my case against AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al.
A correct historical perspective will divide this case into 3 distinct periods of time:
(1) the period prior to enactment of the Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996 (“ACPA”);
(2) the period between enactments of the ACPA and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998(“DMCA”); and,
(3) the period after enactment of the DMCA.
This approach is necessary, because the U.S. Constitution prohibits ex post facto legislation, even in civil matters, and most definitely in criminal matters. See Article I, Section 9, Clause 3.
For your information, we have used the ex post facto Clause to prove that, in 1946 A.D. the Lanham Act conferred original jurisdiction on the constitutional Article III District Court of the United States, and not on the legislative Article IV United States District Court. This tough jurisdictional question necessitated a lot of additional pleadings on my part. I mention this because my case is not simply a copyright infringement case; it is also a trademark infringement case under the Lanham Act; and much more (see COUNT’s ONE thru FIVE).
The ACPA was enacted in July of 1996, in part to stem the flood of copyright complaints and requests for prompt remedial legislation that reached the Congress in response to the release of Netscape Navigator.
You may recall that Microsoft Corporation had delayed their entry into Internet software market, because Bill Gates had not fully appreciated the technological significance of the Internet until after Netscape took off and became the darling of Wall Street.
The ACPA is significant because of its clear legislative intent. See:
http://www.supremelaw.org/copyrite/statutes/anticounterfeiting.htm
Prior to these statutory amendments, the applicable laws were the Copyright Act of 1976 and the Lanham Act, but criminal copyright infringement was not also deemed a racketeering (“RICO”) predicate act until July of 1996. It was still a serious federal offense, however, for violating 17 U.S.C. 506 and 18 U.S.C. 2319 (see COUNT ONE):
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/506.html
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/2319.html
Because the 1976 Copyright Act was written at a time when the Internet did not exist, there were no provisions in that Act for immunizing Internet Service Providers (“ISP’s”) from the criminal conduct of their subscribers. ISP’s did not even exist at that time either!
Our investigation began quite informally in December of 1995, as Netscape began to proliferate. Later our investigation escalated with formal notices to AOL and a few other violators in the Fall of 1997. So, some of the evidence we acquired is dated prior to the ACPA, and most of it is dated after the ACPA was enacted in 1996.
It remains to be seen what the federal courts will do to apply the facts of my case, as they existed prior to July of 1996, to the laws that existed at that time.
Most importantly, strictly applying the 1976 Copyright Act, a 3-year civil statute of limitations is in force prior to August 1, 1998, because I did not file my case until August 1, 2001 A.D.
On the other hand, there are also laws which govern the legal concepts of “accrual” and “tolling”. The statute of limitations is “tolled” (or suspended), for reasons such as fraudulent concealment, which have already been thoroughly documented in my OPENING BRIEF:
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/opening.htm
Just to illustrate, fraudulent concealment is one of the reasons why the courts have allowed the statute of limitations to be tolled in copyright infringement cases. Clearly, the act of obstructing discovery of computer activity logs and the identities of subscribers suspected of infringing my exclusive copyrights is tantamount to fraudulent concealment, tolling the statute of limitations.
Thus, I believe the sheer weight of the facts and applicable laws prior to August 1, 1998, weighs strongly in favor of admitting evidence of Copyright and Lanham Act violations prior to that date. As you will see below, it was never my legal obligation to police the Internet all by myself. California law imposes no such obligation.
And, the sheer preponderance of facts and applicable laws also weighs strongly in favor of holding the responsible parties specifically liable for all those copyright and trademark infringements, even if some do happen to have started more than 3 years before August 1, 2001 (the date I filed the suit). See discussion of continuing wrongs in my OPENING BRIEF to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (abbreviated “Ninth Circuit”).
This is a most interesting phase in our evidence against all named Defendants. First of all, in the ACPA Congress elevated criminal copyright infringement to the level of a RICO predicate act. See the list of predicate acts itemized at 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(B).
“Pattern of racketeering activity” had already been defined by Congress to mean and include only two (2) predicate acts during any given ten (10) year period. Obviously, we are dealing with literally thousands, if not millions, of such discrete acts, now that criminal copyright infringement has been added to that list.
Moreover, the legislative intent of the RICO laws is that they should be liberally construed, not strictly construed. This legislative intent was never codified in Title 18 of the United States Code, however; one must find the original Statutes at Large, to confirm this liberal construction rule. I have now confirmed this difference.
So, even though the DMCA had not yet been enacted, and can not be enforced retroactively, the period between July 1996 and October 1998 is rather crucial in light of the comprehensive copyright enforcement which I performed during the Summer of 1998, using the generous computer facilities provided to me by the main librarians at Southwest Texas State University (“SWT”). They were a Godsend, indeed!
You will note, from the Background Facts in the Initial COMPLAINT, that I used a systematic email methodology to disseminate a NOTICE AND DEMAND that all responsible ISP’s produce a certified copy of my authorization (if any) to promote a stolen and modified electronic copy of “The Federal Zone” on their Internet server computers.
Then, following closely on the heels of this NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR AUTHORIZATION, I also posted on the Internet the following PUBLIC NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE:
Formal DEMAND is hereby made of you to delete ALL extant copies of component electronic files in "The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue," all editions, and ALL hypertext links to extant copies, whether such links are now valid or not, and ALL pointers to same which now exist in the index databases of all Internet search engines, and to do so on all computers now in your possession or control, and all computers to which you have any write access whatsoever.
The stated deadline for their specific performance was July 31, 1998 A.D. This turns out to be a pivotal date in the context of this case.
Of course, I had never authorized anyone to steal and then modify any electronic versions of the book, or any components thereof.
Every single ISP who received these NOTICES AND DEMANDS then failed to produce any certified authorization(s). Some of them simply removed the offending files; some of them did not remove the offending files. Some of them were presented with evidence of wholesale counterfeits; others were presented only with evidence of hyperlinks to stolen copies and/or modified counterfeits. A New York federal court has already decided that hyperlinks to stolen intellectual property are also copyright infringements. See Exhibit L‑5.
My point here is two-fold: (1) the DMCA’s “take-down” procedure did not yet exist at that time (Summer of 1998), so I had to invent my own notification procedure, and (2) we did not regard any ISP’s as liable at that time, as long as they ended up removing the violations in question, and even if they failed to produce any purported “authorization” from me (because no such authorizations truly existed, in point of fact).
However, our ultimate purpose in confronting ISP’s, even after they removed the violations in question, was to obtain the identities of specific subscribers suspected of violating my exclusive copyrights. My reasons for doing so are fully explained in one of the numerous DEMANDS FOR SUBSCRIBER IDENTITY that we later mailed to these ISP’s. For example, the one we mailed to Carnegie Mellon University is at Internet URL:
http://www.supremelaw.org/copyrite/cmu.edu/subid2.htm
Here, I felt we were on very solid legal ground to enforce the principle of vicarious liability aka respondeat superior (in Latin). This legal theory is applicable to RICO violations as well as Lanham Act violations. Understanding this theory is akin to graduate level mathematics, however. Allow me to recommend that you do your own research on vicarious liability aka respondeat superior.
Even if we could not go back 10 years prior to July 1996, because of the ex post facto Clause, it was certainly the case that copyright infringements had become RICO predicate acts as of that date. Thus, the evidence acquired during the Summer of 1998 became rather pivotal in our decision formally to name and prosecute all of the specific Defendants that we eventually did name in my Initial COMPLAINT and 3 SUPPLEMENT’s. See the Table of Contents at Internet URL:
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/index.htm
Moreover, the specific misconduct of ISP’s after July 31, 1998 A.D., became even more important, and even more compelling, in part because the Copyright Act has a 3-year statute of limitations.
If ISP’s refused to disclose the identities of any of their subscribers whom we suspected ‑‑ from certified empirical evidence ‑‑ of criminal copyright infringement, we then felt quite confident that those ISP’s would ultimately be liable under a theory of vicarious liability, in addition to hindering apprehension and prosecution. Here is the crucial paragraph from a typical NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR SUBSCRIBER IDENTITY, which explains our reasoning in this regard:
For all the reasons stated herein, we conclude that Internet Service Providers should be held liable for any acts which conceal the identities, or hinder the apprehension and prosecution, of subscribers (or customers) engaged in any copyright infringements, Lanham Act violations, or patterns of racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1)(B) and 2319.
Clearly, the operative terms here are “concealing identities” and “hindering apprehension and prosecution”, both of which have been actionable for many years in American courts, under both State and federal laws. Remember, there are 3 other COUNT’s in addition to copyright and trademark infringements, e.g. unfair competition.
Thus, when many ISP’s defaulted at the end of July 1998, we were also quite confident that we would succeed in holding every single ISP liable that had failed to remove the violations in question. AOL is in this group, because the confirmed violations on their Internet servers continued there for another 8 months after July 31, 1998! This much should be plainly obvious to any competent federal judge.
When I use the term “violation” here, bear in mind that our NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE did separately itemize all wholesale copies, all counterfeits aka modified derivatives, all hyperlinks to wholesale copies and/or counterfeits, and all pointers to wholesale copies or counterfeits that might still persist in the index databases of common Internet search engines, like Alta Vista and Excite.
If ISP’s removed anything at all, they typically removed the wholesale copies and counterfeits. Fewer of them removed the hyperlinks of which we also complained. And, hardly any ISP’s bothered to clean out the index databases of common Internet search engines, probably because the ISP’s did not know how to do this particular task easily.
To summarize, a unique period existed between July 1996 and October 1998, one in which the ACPA could be enforced to elevate criminal copyright infringement to the level of a RICO predicate act, but only if I chose, at some point, to add COUNT SIX: Civil RICO to my case.
I have reserved my right to amend my Initial COMPLAINT, so COUNT SIX: Civil RICO remains a very viable and very probable option. If the federal courts continue to show signs of scuttling my federal case, as has already happened, I plan to file COUNT SIX: Civil RICO in the Superior Court of California, because State courts have concurrent jurisdiction of Civil RICO claims. See the case of Tafflin v. Levitt on this issue of concurrent State jurisdiction of Civil RICO claims; the Ninth Circuit has also agreed in Lou v. Belzberg.
This Act was signed into law by President Clinton on October 28, 1998. There was no grace period in this Act, so its provisions went into effect immediately.
The most important aspects of this law, as far as your questions are concerned, are the DMCA’s ISP immunity provisions, and the SUBPOENA authority for subscribers’ identities. See 17 U.S.C. 512 in toto:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/512.html
Clearly, I concur that Congress did a good thing by giving ISP’s a way to remain justly immune from unnecessary liabilities. But in order to remain immune, they are required by the DMCA to do at least 3 things:
(1) register an Agent for Notification of Copyright Infringement Claims at the website of the U.S. Copyright Office in Washington, D.C.;
(2) remove proven violations promptly, or “expeditiously” as the law is written, upon receipt of proper notification; and,
(3) respond to SUBPOENA’s served upon them for the identities of subscribers suspected of infringing an author’s exclusive copyrights (a MOTION TO QUASH would be one form of answer).
Thus, my reading of the DMCA infers that an ISP continues to be liable for the copyright infringements of its subscribers if (1) it fails to register an Agent for Notification of Copyright Infringement Claims at the Copyright Office website, also if (2) upon receiving proper notification, it fails to remove the violation(s) expeditiously, and also if (3) it fails to answer a lawful SUBPOENA served upon it pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 512(h).
All named Defendants have now been served, via U.S. Mail, with proper notification that conforms to the requirements of the DMCA. See:
http://www.supremelaw.org/copyrite/corres/notification.2001-03-01.htm
So, even if ISP’s have posted Registered Agents at the Copyright Office website, they are still liable if they do not expedite the removal of proven violations from the computers they own and operate, and they are still liable if they do not answer proper and lawful SUBPOENA’s served upon them for their computer activity logs and for the identities of subscribers suspected of infringing this author’s exclusive copyrights. The logs should reveal those subscribers.
Happily, the DMCA now supports entirely my assertion that ISP’s should be held liable, even prior to its enactment, for concealing the identities, and hindering the apprehension and prosecution, of subscribers suspected of infringing my exclusive copyrights. The same is true for their infringements of my trademarks, jointly and severally.
Consequently, the important questions I believe you should be asking, at this point in time, are these:
(1) How many colleges and universities were served with SUBPOENA’s pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 512(h)?
(2) How many of those colleges and universities have failed to answer those lawful SUBPOENA’s?
(3) How many colleges and universities were served with my NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR SUBSCRIBER IDENTITIES, prior to receiving SUBPOENA’s?
(4) How many of those colleges and universities have failed to answer my NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR SUBSCRIBER IDENTITIES, prior to receiving SUBPOENA’s?
(5) How many colleges and universities have failed timely to register an Agent for Notification of Copyright Infringement Claims at the website of the U.S. Copyright Office?
(6) How many colleges and universities have failed to obey my NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE by July 31, 1998?
(7) How many colleges and universities have failed to remove wholesale copies and/or modified counterfeits, after receiving proper notices from me?
(8) How many colleges and universities have failed to remove hyperlinks to wholesale copies and/or modified counterfeits, after receiving proper notices from me?
(9) How many colleges and universities have failed to remove pointers to proven violations on their servers, after those pointers were confirmed to exist in the index databases of popular Internet search engines like Alta Vista and Excite?
(10) And, how many colleges and universities failed to answer my REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS, the formal SUMMONS and the Initial COMPLAINT?
I can assure you that our legal research has confirmed a recent important shift in the decisions of many State and federal courts: efforts to stall or obstruct discovery of relevant admissible evidence are being met with increasingly harsh sanctions. Please remember that my case has not even gone to trial yet!
Now, add to all the above our findings that all colleges and all universities who attempted to appear ‑‑ to defend themselves against the charges found in my Initial COMPLAINT ‑‑ did so by means of attorneys who did not have the requisite credentials required by California State laws.
Specifically, section 6067 of the California Business and Professions Code mandates that all California State Bar members must have a license to practice law, and a certificate of oath must be indorsed upon that license. That oath binds them to uphold the U.S. Constitution and the California State Constitution.
If you will locate the High Country cite in my OPENING BRIEF to the Ninth Circuit, you will find that entry of default judgment was proper when an unlicensed corporate officer attempted to appear on behalf of his corporation. That corporate officer was not an attorney duly licensed to practice law; thus, his corporation failed to appear (hence the default judgment)!
Well, that case is directly relevant to our case against AOL et al. Many colleges and universities never even bothered to answer my Initial COMPLAINT after receiving two (2) copies, a formal request for waiver of service of the SUMMONS, and eventually the formal SUMMONS; clearly, all such defendants have defaulted ‑‑ for failing to answer.
Moreover, colleges and universities that did attempt to appear by means of one or another California attorney have also defaulted, because the attorneys they hired ‑‑ without exception ‑‑ failed to produce valid licenses to practice law that conform to section 6067 of the California Business and Professions Code.
I emphasize this point, because we went to the trouble of issuing additional SUBPOENA’s to those attorneys, commanding them to produce their licenses; those SUBPOENA’s were also ignored by every single attorney who attempted to represent certain colleges and universities! One attorney, in particular, was retained by a group of 10 university Defendants; he also failed to produce his license, so all 10 of those universities have also failed to answer (read “default judgment”)!
Do you think that, just maybe, every one of those universities now has a legitimate claim against their attorneys, for fraud, for malpractice and for willful misrepresentation? I think so! Either that, or the university Defendants already knew about these missing credentials, and chose to do nothing about it. The latter is more probable, based upon the facts now on record at the Ninth Circuit.
Clearly, there has also been extensive obstruction of discovery, not only of computer activity logs and of the identities of subscribers suspected of infringing my exclusive copyrights, but also of the attorneys’ licenses to practice law as required by California State laws. Who is responsible for that obstruction, I ask you? I certainly am not.
Now, your second question appears to be a slightly more specific variation of your first question. Your second question is predicated on your belief that ISP’s are categorically not responsible for monitoring the web pages of individuals. The Ninth Circuit’s Napster decision does not support your belief, however. Please read it to confirm what I am about to say here. See Exhibit L‑11.
That published decision, which also happens to be a numbered Exhibit in my Initial COMPLAINT, held that ISP’s are responsible for policing their systems, and that authors are not responsible for policing the Internet all by themselves. Confer at “obligation” in the California Civil Code. So, this one recent, and arguably very controlling decision contradicts your major premise.
Yes, based on what I have explained above, particularly as regards the SUBPOENA’s authorized by 17 U.S.C. 512(h), ISP’s can be held liable for copyright infringements, even if they respond to each complaint in time, if they then turn around and refuse to obey a proper and lawful SUBPOENA for their computer activity logs and for the identities of their subscribers who were originally responsible for the copyright infringement(s) in question (hopefully revealed by those logs).
Moreover, the violations of which I have complained, with incredible detail, were also Lanham Act violations because those violations were also what I termed modified derivatives and what Congress has elected to call “counterfeits”. Not only does the Lanham Act authorize triple damages; the theory of vicarious liability aka respondeat superior (in Latin) can be also applied to hold these ISP’s liable for the Lanham Act violations of their subscribers [cite omitted here].
And, as of July 1996, another vicarious liability theory, and triple damage multiplier, can be imposed by the ACPA, particularly when ISP’s choose to obstruct discovery. Obstructing discovery is a specific variant of obstruction of justice, the latter of which is also a RICO predicate act. Again, see 18 U.S.C. 1961(1)(B).
Combining the Lanham Act and the RICO Act at 18 U.S.C. 1964, total damages can be multiplied six-fold (6x).
I hope the details I have discussed above go a long way towards answering the 2 excellent questions you have asked.
If I can further elaborate on any of the points I have made above, please let me know which points need more explanation and I will do my very best to provide you with a prompt and professional reply.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.,
Private Attorney General, Author,
Damaged Party and Plaintiff/Appellant:
Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al.
PROOF
OF SERVICE
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby certify,
under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America,
without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18
years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the
following document(s):
MEMO to Jon
Mummolo,
November 9, 2002 A.D.
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in
first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to
the following:
Judge Alex Kozinski Clerk of Court (5x)
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Attention: Cathy Catterson
P.O. Box 91510 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Pasadena 91109-1510 P.O. Box 193939
CALIFORNIA, USA San Francisco 94119-3939
CALIFORNIA, USA
Ropers, Majeski, Kohn & Bentley DeForest & Koscelnik
(failed to exhibit oaths) (failed to exhibit oath)
1001 Marshall Street 3000 Koppers Building
Redwood City 94063 436 Seventh Avenue
CALIFORNIA, USA Pittsburgh 15219
PENNSYLVANIA, USA
Murphy Austin Adams Schoenfeld LLP Pillsbury Winthrop LLP
(failed to exhibit oaths) (failed to exhibit oaths)
P.O. Box 1319 400 Capitol Mall, Suite 1700
Sacramento 95812-1319 Sacramento 95814-4419
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Curiale Dellaverson Hirschfeld Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart Oliver
Kraemer & Sloan, LLP & Hedges, LLP
(failed to exhibit oaths) (failed to exhibit oaths)
727 Sansome Street 201 Sansome Street, 6th Floor
San Francisco 94111
San Francisco 94104
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Office of the General Counsel Paul
Southworth
(failed to exhibit oaths) 2018 N. New Hampshire Ave.
University of California Los Angeles 90027
1111 Franklin Street, 8th Floor CALIFORNIA, USA
Oakland 94607-5200
CALIFORNIA, USA
Karl Kleinpaste Ram Samudrala
P.O. Box 1551 UW Micro Box 357242
Beaver Falls 15010 Seattle 98195-7242
PENNSYLVANIA, USA WASHINGTON STATE, USA
Laskin & Guenard Rivkin Radler, LLP
(failed to exhibit oath) (failed to exhibit oaths)
1810 South Street 1330 N. Dutton Ave., #200
Sacramento 95814 Santa Rosa 95401-4646
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Harvey Siskind Jacobs LLP Office of Solicitor General
(failed to exhibit oaths) 950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
3 Embarcadero Center, Ste. 1060 Room 5614
San Francisco 94111 Washington 20530-0001
CALIFORNIA, USA DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Register of Copyrights Steinhart & Falconer LLP
Library of Congress (failed to exhibit oaths)
101 Independence Avenue, S.E. 333 Market Street, 32nd Floor
Washington 20559-6000 San Francisco 94105-2150
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Matheny Sears Linkert & Long LLP Latham & Watkins
(failed to exhibit oaths) (failed to exhibit oaths)
P.O. Box 13711 633 West Fifth St., Ste. 4000
Sacramento 95853-4711 Los Angeles 90071-2007
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
[Please see USPS Publication #221 for “addressing”
instructions.]
Dated: November
12, 2002 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul
Andrew Mitchell
__________________________________________________
Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Appellant In Propria Persona