COMPLAINT FORM

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT AND DISABILITY

 

 

MAIL THIS FORM TO THE CLERK, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, P.O. BOX 193939, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94119-3939/tdc.  MARK THE ENVELOPE "JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT COMPLAINT" OR "JUDICIAL DISABILITY COMPLAINT".  DO NOT PUT THE NAME OF THE JUDGE OR MAGISTRATE ON THE ENVELOPE.

 

 

SEE RULE 2(e) FOR THE NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED FOR FILING.

 

 

 

1.   Complainant's name:  Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

 

     Address:             c/o Forwarding Agent

                          350 – 30th Street, Suite 444

                          OAKLAND 94609-3426

                          CALIFORNIA

 

     Daytime telephone:   none at present

 

 

2.   Judge or magistrate complained about:

 

     Name:                Dale A. Drozd

                          United States Magistrate Judge

 

     Court:               United States District Court

                          Sacramento, California

 

 

3.   Does this complaint concern the behavior of the judge

     or magistrate in a particular lawsuit or lawsuits?

 

                      ( X ) Yes   (  ) No

 

     If "yes" give the following information about each lawsuit

     (use the reverse side if there is more than one):

 

     Court:                District Court of the United States

 

     Docket Number:        CIV. S-01-1480 WBS DAD PS

 

     Are (were) you a party or lawyer in the lawsuit?

 

           ( X ) Party     (   ) Counsel     (   ) Neither

 

     If party, give the name, address, and telephone number

     of your Counsel:

 

                      Self In Propria Persona

 

     Docket numbers of any appeals to the Ninth Circuit:

 

           Petition pending before Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski

           has not been docketed yet, to Plaintiff’s knowledge.

 

 

4.   Have you filed any lawsuits against the judge or magistrate?

 

                      ( X ) Yes      (   ) No

 

     If yes, give the following information about each lawsuit

     (use the reverse side if there is more than one):

 

     Court:     District Court of the United States

                Eastern Judicial District of California

 

                VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT for

                practicing law from the bench, 28 U.S.C. 454

 

     Present status of suit:

 

               John Doe #98 will be assigned to Mr. Drozd

               in a pleading being prepared at present.

 

     Name, address, and telephone number of your Counsel:

 

          n/a

 

     Court to which any appeal has been taken:

 

          (see above)

 

     Docket number of appeal:

 

          (see above)

 

     Present status of appeal:

 

          Demand for Certificate of Necessity is now pending

          before Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski.

 

 

(X)           On separate sheets of paper, no larger than the paper this form is printed on, describe the conduct or the evidence of disability that is the subject of this complaint.  See rule 2(b) and 2(d).  Do not use more than 5 pages (5 sides).  Most complaints do not require that much.

 

See attached

(incorporated by reference as if set forth fully)

 

(X)  You should either:

 

          ( )  check the first box below and sign this form in the presence of a notary public;  or

 

           (X)  check the second box and sign the form.  You do not need a notary public if you check the second box.

 

           ( )  I swear (affirm) that ‑‑

 

           (X)  I declare under penalty of perjury ‑‑

 

I have read rules 1 and 2 of the Rules of the Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit Governing Complaints of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, and the statement made in this complaint is true and correct to the best of My knowledge.

 

 

 

/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell

________________________________________

Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

Author, Damaged Party and Plaintiff,

Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al.

DCUS Sacramento #CIV. S-01-1480 WBS DAD PS

 

All Rights Reserved without Prejudice

 

 

Executed on:  January 11, 2002 A.D.

 

 

copies:   Judge Alex Kozinski, Ninth Circuit, Pasadena

 

          Judge William B. Shubb, USDC, Sacramento

 

          interested parties and agents

 

CAUSES FOR COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT

AGAINST U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE DALE A. DROZD

 

Plaintiff Paul Andrew Mitchell filed His Initial COMPLAINT In Propria Persona against 129 named defendants on August 1, 2001 A.D.

 

On that date, the Clerk of Court presented Plaintiff with a form entitled CONSENT TO PROCEED BEFORE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE (USDC-EDCA Form.9) (hereinafter “Consent Form”).

 

Plaintiff deliberately declined to execute this Consent Form, in part because U.S. Magistrate Judges are not authorized by law to preside on civil cases in the District Court of the United States (“DCUS”), and in part because jurisdiction can never be waived by any act of a litigant.

 

See U.S. v. Rogers, 23 F. 658 (DCUS Ark. 1885), for example.

 

28 U.S.C. 631 only authorizes U.S. Magistrate Judges to preside on the United States District Court (“USDC”).  See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922).

 

Statutes granting original jurisdiction to federal district courts must be strictly construed.  [numerous cites omitted here]

 

Even if Plaintiff had executed this Consent Form, Plaintiff’s “consent” is surely not the same as an Act of Congress, and would be meaningless in the absence of an Act of Congress authorizing U.S. Magistrate Judges to preside on civil cases in the DCUS.

 

Thus, it is also quite misleading for Clerk’s Form 8 to imply that Plaintiff had some “right” to waive jurisdiction, when Plaintiff did not, and never would, have any such “right” [sic].  See NOTICE OF RIGHT TO CONSENT TO THE EXERCISE OF CIVIL JURISDICTION BY A MAGISTRATE JUDGE (USDC‑EDCA Form.8).

 

Despite these pertinent facts and laws, and despite the fact that Plaintiff never executed this Consent Form, and never will execute this Consent Form for the reasons already stated, Magistrate Dale A. Drozd commenced to issue “orders” directly abridging Plaintiff’s procedural rights, including but not limited to “orders” [sic] issued under the caption of the USDC on Nov. 13, 14, 15, and 16, 2001 A.D.

 

Among other things, these specious and ultra vires “orders” attempted to do the following:

 

(a)  strike Plaintiff’s lawful MIRANDA WARNINGS;

 

(b)  strike Plaintiff’s proper NOTICES OF JUDICIAL DEFAULT by certain university defendants;

 

(c)  strike Plaintiff’s FOURTH SUPPLEMENT TO COMPLAINT;

 

(d)           deny Plaintiff’s MOTION FOR LEAVE TO SERVE VIA PRIORITY U.S. MAIL;

 

(e)  deny Plaintiff’s MOTION TO STRIKE ALL PLEADINGS BY ATTORNEYS LACKING CREDENTIALS;

 

(f)  deny Plaintiff’s MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT AND CHALLENGE TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN ACT OF CONGRESS;

 

(g)  strike Plaintiff’s FIFTH SUPPLEMENT TO COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND BREACH OF CONTRACT;  and,

 

(h)  grant Walter P. DeForest leave to appear pro hac vice.

 

Plaintiff then filed proper and timely NOTICES OF REFUSAL, specifically to inform Mr. Drozd that U.S. Magistrate Judges all lack jurisdiction to preside in the instant civil case.

 

Then, on December 14, 2001 A.D., Mr. Drozd conducted a hearing at which Plaintiff made a Special Appearance expressly Under Protest.

 

Relying on memory, Plaintiff also specifically complains that Mr. Drozd attempted to rule that Plaintiff’s challenge to the constitutionality of an Act of Congress was “frivolous” [sic].

 

Plaintiff has done extensive study and litigation in the field of American constitutional law, and constitutional questions are never frivolous.

 

Mr. Drozd either knew, or should have known, that constitutional questions are never frivolous.

 

If the Constitution is frivolous, why does federal law require Mr. Drozd to take a solemn oath to support that Constitution?

 

Mr. Drozd has also demonstrated ignorance and incompetence on the question of whether current rules of evidence and civil procedure are even applicable in the DCUS.  See U.S. v. Hough, 157 F.Supp. 771, 774 (USDC, S.D. Calif. 1957);  Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2nd Cir. 1983);  Hoffman v. U.S., 244 F.2d 378, 379;  Mookini v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201, 205 (1938);  Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950).

 

Plaintiff had previously requested an interlocutory judgment on the applicability of said rules (see (f) above), which judgment can only be issued by an Article III judge presiding on a court of competent jurisdiction.  That court is the DCUS.  See 28 U.S.C. 2072, in chief.

 

Despite Plaintiff’s MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT on this very question, Mr. Drozd clearly demonstrated his inability to understand why Plaintiff continues to argue that the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Evidence and Local Rules, do not and can not bind Plaintiff in the DCUS.

 

A clear construction of its plain language reveals that 28 U.S.C. 2072(a) grants to the U.S. Supreme Court specific authority to issue rules of evidence and procedure only for the USDC, and not for the DCUS.

 

Plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief on this obviously pivotal point.

 

Plaintiff also properly challenged the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. 2072(b), for violating the Separation of Powers Doctrine.

 

To refer to this challenge as “frivolous” is to make an ugly mockery of numerous American laws that have governed the federal court system for over 200 years.

 

Moreover, even if 2072(b) were constitutional, the U.S. Supreme Court cannot retroactively re-define the meaning of “district court of the United States” as that term was used in the original Lanham Act, enacted in 1946.  See 60 Stat. 440 (correctly cited in Plaintiff’s Initial COMPLAINT) and the ex post facto Clause.

 

Plaintiff’s COUNT TWO charges Lanham Act violations, and the Article III DCUS is the only federal court in California with original jurisdiction over Lanham Act violations.  60 Stat. 440.

 

By his own admission, Mr. Drozd is clearly not an Article III judge, in part because U.S. Magistrate Judges do not enjoy life tenure.  See Article III, Section 1, in the U.S. Constitution.

 

Mr. Drozd demonstrated further incompetence on the question of Plaintiff’s NOTICE AND DEMAND to Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski for a Certificate of Necessity to assign an Article III judge to the instant case.

 

Mr. Drozd made an obvious and embarrassing error by stating that Plaintiff was thereby attempting “to convene the Court of International Trade” (or words to that effect).

 

The attitude of Mr. Drozd while making this statement appeared to be one intended subtly to ridicule Plaintiff.

 

Plaintiff believes that Mr. Drozd would not have made such an error, if Mr. Drozd had truly read and minimally understood Plaintiff’s NOTICE AND DEMAND for a Certificate of Necessity.

 

Prior to the hearing on December 14, 2001 A.D., based in part upon the facts and laws discussed above, Plaintiff filed a VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT against Mr. Drozd for one (1) count of practicing law from the bench, in violation of 28 U.S.C. 454.

 

See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 549-550, fn. 7 (1984) (no protection for acts committed in excess of jurisdiction);  Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 351-353 (1872).

 

At that hearing, Mr. Drozd acted as if he was totally unaware of that VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT against him.

 

Attorneys for certain named defendants chose to inform Mr. Drozd of that VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT against him, and Mr. Drozd continued to act as if he knew nothing about it.

 

Such conduct strongly suggests that Mr. Drozd has not even read all the pleadings that Plaintiff has filed in the instant case.

 

Also prior to that hearing, Plaintiff filed His FIFTH SUPPLEMENT TO COMPLAINT, charging two (2) Sacramento individuals with felony violations of 18 U.S.C. 241 (conspiracy to deprive fundamental Rights), and one (1) of those same individuals with a felony violation of 18 U.S.C. 1512 (threatening a federal witness).

 

18 U.S.C. 4 requires Plaintiff to report felony federal offenses to a federal judge.

 

COUNTS THREE and FOUR of Plaintiff’s Initial COMPLAINT do comply with this legal obligation.  See also 18 U.S.C. 2319(c)(1).

 

If Plaintiff had not reported these felony federal offenses to a federal judge, then Plaintiff would have committed a felony too!

 

Moreover, the criminal conduct complained of in His FIFTH SUPPLEMENT was direct evidence of breach of contract and intentional obstruction of Plaintiff’s efforts timely to serve the civil SUMMONS and Initial COMPLAINT on all named defendants (129 in number).

 

Said FIFTH SUPPLEMENT is verified proof of serious obstacles specifically and intentionally created to delay indefinitely Plaintiff’s timely service of SUMMONSES and COMPLAINTS on all named defendants, and to deprive Plaintiff of funds necessary to pay for the normal expenses of SUMMONS service.

 

To attempt to “strike” that FIFTH SUPPLEMENT is a clear and blatant violation of the Petition Clause in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

 

This is extremely serious.

 

That attempt gives Plaintiff probable cause to believe that Mr. Drozd is also guilty of obstruction of justice.

 

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the Petition Clause guarantees a Right that is conservative of all other rights.  See Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907).

 

Plaintiff believes that His own actions to date have been courteous, lawful, timely, procedurally correct, and in obedience to all applicable federal laws.

 

Accordingly, Plaintiff believes He was entirely correct to demand, in a subsequent pleading, that Mr. Drozd recuse himself immediately.

 

But, Mr. Drozd has evidently refused to do so.

 

Without belaboring any other misconduct by Mr. Drozd, Plaintiff now believes that Mr. Drozd has either been directed by agent(s) presently unknown to Plaintiff, or Mr. Drozd has taken it upon himself sua sponte, to obstruct the instant case by practicing law from the bench and by obstructing justice.

 

Both are serious federal offenses warranting his immediate and permanent removal from the instant case, and the proper remedial disposition of all ultra vires actions taken by him to date.

 

The clear pattern of his actions to date admits of no other rational explanation.

 

For authoritative confirmation, confer at “Coram non judice” in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition (with Pronunciations);  Pulliam and Bradley supra.

 

 

VERIFICATION

 

I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).

 

 

Dated:  January 11, 2002 A.D.

 

 

Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell

        ________________________________

        Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

        Author, Damaged Party and Plaintiff,

        Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al.

        DCUS Sacramento #CIV. S-01-1480 WBS DAD PS