Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness,
Counselor at Law, and Relator
c/o 2509 N. Campbell Avenue, #1776
Tucson, Arizona state
zip code exempt
Under Protest, Necessity, and
by Special Visitation
DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF MONTANA
BILLINGS DIVISION
People of the United States ) Case No. CV-96-163-BLG
of America, ex relatione )
Paul Andrew Mitchell, ) NOTICE OF REFUSAL FOR CAUSE:
) FRCP Rules 9(b); 12(b)(1),(2);
Petitioners, ) 28 U.S.C. 1746(1); Rule 201(d),
) Federal Rules of Evidence;
vs. ) Petition Clause; Supremacy
) Clause; Universal Declaration
United States et al., ) of Human Rights; International
) Covenant on Civil and Political
Respondent. ) Rights, enacted with explicit
______________________________) Reservations
COME NOW the People of the United States of America (hereinafter
"Petitioners"), ex relatione Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.,
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness, and Counselor at Law
(hereinafter "Relator"), to provide formal Notice to all
interested party(s) of Petitioners' formal Refusal of the alleged
ORDER of the honorable Jack D. Shanstrom, Chief Judge, United
States District Court (hereinafter "Chief Judge"), issued and
filed erroneously in the instant case on October 28, 1996.
Petitioners refuse said ORDER for fraud, and for all of the
following valid causes, to wit:
Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 1 of 14
1. Because Petitioners seek to enjoin the United States,
and its alleged agents in the instant case, from depriving
Citizens of Montana state of life, liberty, or property without
due process or law, Petitioners have invoked a three-judge panel
to preside over the District Court of the United States. The
Chief Judge, presiding over the United States District Court, is
not a three-judge panel. See 28 U.S.C. 2284, which was expressly
invoked by Petitioners in Their VERIFIED PETITION FOR WARRANT OF
REMOVAL BY THREE-JUDGE PANEL (hereinafter "VERIFIED PETITION").
2. The Chief Judge's ORDER is plainly issued from the
United States District Court for the District of Montana,
Billings Division. Petitioners' VERIFIED PETITION was presented
to the District Court of the United States. The former is an
Article IV territorial tribunal, with territorial and subject
matter jurisdiction tightly constrained by Acts of Congress; the
latter is an Article III judicial power Court, with general
jurisdiction to hear all matters arising under the Constitution,
laws, and treaties of the United States.
3. One of the other stated purposes for removing the
instant case into the District Court of the United States [sic]
is to enforce production of the documents requested in Relator's
original Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request, submitted
to the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., for the
official credentials (if any) of all six hundred thirty-three
(633) alleged federal agents who rotated in and out of the
standoff with the so-called Montana Freemen in Garfield county,
Montana state. This is a "federal question" which requires a
federal court of competent jurisdiction to adjudicate.
Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 2 of 14
4. The court of original jurisdiction to compel production
of documents requested under the FOIA is the District Court of
the United States ("DCUS"), not the United States District Court
("USDC"). See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B); Full Faith and Credit
Clause; and the ORDER of United States District Judge John M.
Roll, dated May 21, 1996, In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on New
Life Health Center Company, Case No. GJ-95-1-6 (JMR), USDC,
Tucson, Arizona state, to wit:
"... [T]his [USDC] is not the proper forum to bring a
request under the Freedom of Information Act.
5. The instant case was not properly dismissed through
lawful action by Garfield County District Judge Kenneth Wilson,
as alleged in the Chief Judge's ORDER, because Judge Wilson
failed to provide Petitioners with a proper hearing on Their
application for leave to appear in writing. While Petitioners
were awaiting a ruling on said application, Judge Wilson
attempted to dismiss the case because Petitioners had failed to
appear as scheduled. This worked a gross injustice against
Petitioners by violating Their fundamental Right to due process
of law. Petitioners never waived this fundamental Right.
6. Judge Wilson's alleged dismissal was also improper for
the several reasons as stated in Petitioners' PETITION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, dated July 29, 1996. Judge Wilson's failure to
rule upon motions which were properly placed before his court is
proof that two (2) international human rights treaties were
violated thereby in the instant case. Specifically, Petitioners
are guaranteed effective judicial remedies, notwithstanding that
the violations were committed by persons acting in their official
capacities, e.g. state and/or federal judges. Treaties are
rendered supreme Law of Our Land, pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause. See Petition Clause; Universal Declaration of Human
Rights; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 3 of 14
7. The Chief Judge erred by misinterpreting Petitioner's
NOTICE AND DEMAND to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for a
Certificate of Necessity to be served upon the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States. The Chief Judge alleged
that Petitioners sought to "empanel [sic] a Court of
International Trade to perform the judicial duties of this
Court." This statement is misleading and incorrect. Petitioners
are entitled to a 3-judge panel of competent and qualified
federal judges, whose compensation(s) are not currently being
diminished by federal income taxes. See Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S.
245 (1920) (never overturned).
8. Petitioners argued that the only competent and
qualified candidates for temporary assignment to preside on a
three-judge panel in this honorable District Court of the United
States ("DCUS") are those who preside upon the United States
Court of International Trade, which is expressly an Article III
forum, by Act of Congress. See 28 U.S.C. 251(a), to wit:
The court is a court established under article III of the
Constitution of the United States.
9. The authority in Evans is particularly poignant. It is
apparent to Petitioners, because of exhaustive research which
Relator has conducted for more than seven (7) years, that all
sitting United States District Judges in America are appointed to
serve in either an Article I or in an Article IV capacity at the
present time. In this capacity, said Judges do not enjoy the
explicit immunity which is found in Article III, Section 1
("3:1") of the Constitution for the United States of America, as
lawfully amended (hereinafter "U.S. Constitution"), to wit:
The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Offices during good Behaviour [sic], and shall,
at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office.
[U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 1]
[emphasis added]
Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 4 of 14
10. Petitioners submit that one of the major reasons why
said Judges do not enjoy the explicit immunity at 3:1 is the
doctrine of territorial heterogeneity. Confer in The Federal
Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue, Fourth Edition,
previously available on the Internet via the Alta Vista search
engine; see also U.S. v. Lopez, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995):
Each of these [schools] now has an invisible federal zone
[sic] extending 1,000 feet beyond the (often irregular)
boundaries of the school property.
[Kennedy concurring]
[emphasis added]
Here, the U.S. Supreme Court utilized this term as a common noun,
without any citations or footnotes. The doctrine of territorial
heterogeneity, as such, is summarized as follows in the
Conclusions of The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal
Revenue, to wit:
In exercising its exclusive authority over the federal zone,
Congress is not subject to the same constitutional
limitations that exist inside the 50 States. For this
reason, the areas that are inside and outside the federal
zone are heterogeneous with respect to each other. This
difference results in a principle of territorial
heterogeneity: the areas within the federal zone are
subject to one set of rules; the areas without (or outside)
the federal zone are subject to a different set of rules.
The Constitution rules outside the zone and inside the 50
States. The Congress rules inside the zone and outside the
50 States. The 50 States are, therefore, in one general
class, because all constitutional restraints upon Congress
are in force throughout the 50 States, without prejudice to
any one State. The areas within the federal zone are in a
different general class, because these same constitutional
restraints simply do not limit Congress inside that zone.
[The Federal Zone, electronic Fifth Edition, Conclusions]
Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 5 of 14
11. In the pivotal case of Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244
(1901), which is discussed at several places in the book The
Federal Zone supra, the U.S. Supreme Court established a doctrine
whereby the Constitution of the "United States", as such, does
not extend beyond the limits of the states which are united by
and under it. This doctrine of territorial heterogeneity is now
commonly identified as the "Downes Doctrine."
12. This doctrine has been reinforced by subsequent
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, notably, the case of Hooven
& Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), in which the high Court
ruled that the guarantees of the Constitution extend to the
federal zone only as Congress has made those guarantees
applicable. The United States District Courts ("USDC") are
currently established by Congress as territorial (federal zone)
courts, with constitutional authority emanating from Article IV,
Section 3, Clause 2, to wit:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needed Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States; ....
[U.S. Constitution, Art. 4, Sec. 3, Cl. 2]
[emphasis added]
13. Petitioners wish to litigate Their civil case against
the United States, and against other Respondents as yet unnamed,
in an Article III Court of competent jurisdiction. In
particular, Petitioners wish to invoke the judicial power of the
United States of America, among several reasons, in order to
enjoin the Respondent(s) from withholding the agency records
which Relator has requested in lawful and proper requests under
the FOIA, and to order the production of any agency records
improperly withheld from Relator. See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B), to
wit:
On complaint, the district court of the United States ...
has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding
agency records and to order the production of any agency
records improperly withheld from the complainant.
[5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B)]
[emphasis added]
Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 6 of 14
14. There is a distinct and definite difference between a
"United States District Court" and a "District Court of the
United States". The words "District Court of the United States"
commonly describe constitutional courts created under Article III
of the Constitution, not the legislative courts which have long
been the courts of the Territories. See International
Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342
U.S. 237 at 241 (1952), 72 S.Ct. 235, 96 L.Ed. 275, 13 Alaska
536.
15. The term "District Court of the United States" commonly
describes Article III courts or "courts of the United States",
and not legislative courts of the territories. See American
Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511 (1828), 7 L.Ed
242; International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union v.
Wirtz, 170 F.2d 183 (9th Cir., 1948), cert. den. 336 U.S. 919, 93
L.Ed. 1082, 69 S.Ct. 641, reh. den. 336 U.S. 971, 93 L.Ed 1121,
69 S.Ct. 936.
16. Though the judicial system set up in a territory of the
United States is a part of federal jurisdiction, the phrase
"court of the United States" when used in a federal statute is
generally construed as not referring to "territorial courts."
Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 7 of 14
See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 at 312 (1921), 42 S.Ct.
343, 66 L.Ed. 627. In Balzac, the High Court stated:
The United States District Court is not a true United States
court established under Article III of the Constitution to
administer the judicial power of the United States therein
conveyed. It is created by virtue of the sovereign
congressional faculty, granted under Article IV, Section 3,
of that instrument, of making all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United
States. The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true
United States courts in offering an opportunity to
nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local
influence, does not change its character as a mere
territorial court.
[emphasis added]
17. The distinction within the dual nature of the federal
court system is also noted in Title 18 U.S.C. 3241, which states
that the United States District Court for the Canal Zone shall
have jurisdiction "concurrently with the district courts of the
United States, of offenses against the laws of the United States
committed upon the high seas."
18. This honorable Court is directed to one of the great
masters of U.S. Constitution, Chief Justice John Marshall,
writing in the year 1828. Here, Justice Marshall makes a very
clear distinction between judicial courts, authorized by Article
III, and legislative (territorial) courts, authorized by Article
IV. Marshall even utilizes some of the exact wording of Article
IV to differentiate those courts from Article III "judicial
power" courts, as follows:
These [territorial] courts then, are not Constitutional
courts, in which the judicial power conferred by the
Constitution on the general government can be deposited.
They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative
courts, created in virtue of the general rights of
sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of
that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules
and regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the
United States. The jurisdiction with which they are
invested, is not a part of that judicial power which is
defined in the 3d article of the Constitution, but is
conferred by Congress, in the execution of those general
powers which that body possesses over the territories of the
United States. Although admiralty jurisdiction can be
exercised in the States in those courts only which are
established in pursuance of the 3d article of the
Constitution, the same limitation does not extend to the
territories. In legislating for them, Congress exercises
the combined powers of the general and of the State
government.
[American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton]
[1 Pet. 511 (1828), emphasis added]
Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 8 of 14
Other supporting authorities now follow, to wit:
Constitutional provision against diminution of compensation
of federal judges was designed to secure independence of
judiciary.
[O'Donoghue v. U.S., 289 U.S. 516 (1933)]
[headnote 2. Judges]
The term "District Courts of the United States," as used in
Criminal Appeals Rules, without an addition expressing a
wider connotation, had its historic significance and
described courts created under article 3 of Constitution,
and did not include territorial courts.
[Mookini et al. v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201]
[headnote 2. Courts, emphasis added]
Where statute authorized Supreme Court to prescribe Criminal
Appeals Rules in District Courts of the United States
including named territorial courts, omission in rules when
drafted of reference to District Court of Hawaii, and
certain other of the named courts, indicated that Criminal
Appeals Rules were not to apply to those [latter] courts.
[Mookini et al. v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201]
[headnote 4. Courts, emphasis added]
19. The following paragraph from Mookini is extraordinary
for several reasons: (1) it refers to the "historic and proper
sense" of the term "District Courts of the United States", (2)
it makes a key distinction between such courts and application of
their rules to territorial courts; (3) the application of the
maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius is obvious here,
namely, the omission of territorial courts clearly shows that
they were intended to be omitted:
Not only did the promulgating order use the term District
Courts of the United States in its historic and proper
sense, but the omission of provisions for the application of
the rules to the territorial courts and other courts
mentioned in the authorizing act clearly shows the
limitation that was intended.
[Mookini et al. v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201]
[emphasis added]
Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 9 of 14
The words "district court of the United States" commonly
describe constitutional courts created under Article III of
the Constitution, not the legislative courts which have long
been the courts of the Territories.
[Int'l Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union et al.]
v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237 (1952)]
[emphasis added]
The phrase "court of the United States", without more, means
solely courts created by Congress under Article III of the
Constitution and not territorial courts.
[Int'l Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union et al.]
[v. Wirtz, 170 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1948), headnote 1]
[emphasis added]
United States District Courts have only such jurisdiction as
is conferred by an Act of Congress under the Constitution.
U.S.C.A. Const. art. 3, sec. 2; 28 U.S.C.A. 1344]
[Hubbard v. Ammerman, 465 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir., 1972)]
[headnote 2. Courts]
The United States district courts are not courts of general
jurisdiction. They have no jurisdiction except as
prescribed by Congress pursuant to Article III of the
Constitution. [many cites omitted]
[Graves v. Snead, 541 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1976)]
Jurisdiction of court may be challenged at any stage of the
proceeding, and also may be challenged after conviction and
execution of judgment by way of writ of habeas corpus.
[U.S. v. Anderson, 60 F.Supp. 649 (D.C.Wash. 1945)]
The United States District Court has only such jurisdiction
as Congress confers.
[Eastern Metals Corp. v. Martin]
[191 F.Supp 245 (D.C.N.Y. 1960)]
Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 10 of 14
20. Petitioners are not proceeding "Pro Se" [sic]. They
are proceeding in Their own Right, Sui Juris. In Latin, the term
"Pro Se" means "For It", because "Se" is a singular neuter
pronoun which is utilized in law to refer to an artificial
entity, such as a statutory trust, partnership, association,
company, or corporation. Compare IRC 7701(a)(1) in pari materia.
The Relator herein speaks for Petitioners, because He is one of
Them, in good standing, by Right of birth. See jus soli.
21. The Chief Judge has confused "licensed attorney" and
"Counselor at Law". A Counselor at Law is not necessarily a
licensed attorney. See original Thirteenth Amendment. Confer at
"Counsellor at Law" in Bouvier's Law Dictionary (1856), to wit:
COUNSELLOR AT LAW, offices. An officer in the supreme
court of the United States, and in some other courts, who is
employed by a party in a cause, to conduct the same on its
trial on his behalf. He differs from an attorney at law.
(q. v.)
2. In the supreme court of the United States, the two
degrees of attorney and counsel are kept separate, and no
person is permitted to practise both. It is the duty of the
counsel to draft or review and correct the special
pleadings, to manage the cause on trial, and, during the
whole course of the suit, to apply established principles of
law to the exigencies of the case. 1 Kent, Com. 307.
3. Generally in the other courts of the United States, as
well as in the courts of Pennsylvania, the same person
performs the duty of counsellor and attorney at law.
4. In giving their advice to their clients, counsel and
others, professional men have duties to perform to their
clients, to the public, and to themselves. In such cases
they have thrown upon them something which they owe to the
fair administration of justice, as well as to the private
interests of their employers. The interests propounded for
them ought, in their own apprehension, to be just, or at
least fairly disputable; and when such interests are
propounded, they ought not to be pursued per fas et nefas.
Hag. R. 22.
Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 11 of 14
5. A counsellor is not a hired person, but a mandatory;
he does not render his services for a price, but an
honorarium, which may in some degree recompense his care, is
his reward. Doubtless, he is not indifferent to this
remuneration, but nobler motives influence his conduct.
Follow him in his study when he examines his cause, and in
court on the trial; see him identify himself with the idea
of his client, and observe the excitement he feels on his
account; proud when he is, conqueror, discouraged,
sorrowful, if vanquished; see his whole soul devoted to the
cause he has undertaken, and which he believes to be just,
then you perceive the elevated man, ennobled by the spirit
of his profession, full of sympathy for his cause and his
client. He may receive a reward for his services, but such
things cannot be paid for with money. No treasures can
purchase the sympathy and devotedness of a noble mind to
benefit humanity; these things are given, not sold. See
Honorarium.
6. Ridley says, that the law has appointed no stipend to
philosophers and lawyers not because they are not reverend
services and worthy of reward or stipend, but because either
of them are most honorable professions, whose worthiness is
not to be valued or dishonored by money. Yet, in these
cases many things are honestly taken, which are not honestly
asked, and the judge may, according to the quality of the
cause, and the still of the advocate, and the custom of the
court, and, the worth of the matter that is in hand, appoint
them a fee answerable to their place. View of the Civil and
Eccles. Law, 38, 39.
A Law Dictionary Adapted to the Constitution
and Laws of the United States of America
and of the Several States of the American Union,
Sixth Edition, John Bouvier (1856)
[emphasis added]
22. Petitioners hereby demand mandatory judicial notice,
pursuant to Rule 201(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, of
Relator's NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS AGAINST:
Rupert Randall Parsons, Keven Entzel, WITH VERIFICATION PER 28
U.S.C. 1746(1), dated December 12, 1996 and addressed to the
Postmaster, Billings, Montana state, Postal Zone 59108/tdc
["Threat, Duress, and Coercion"], which NOTICE OF INTENT is
attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth
fully herein. Petitioners were denied timely service of the
Chief Judge's ORDER, due to deliberate and premeditated mail
tampering and obstruction of mail. See attached.
Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 12 of 14
SUMMARY
Petitioners are entitled to a competent and qualified three-
judge panel to preside over this honorable District Court of the
United States [sic] and to consider Petitioners' proper petition
for warrant of removal. Chief Judge Shanstrom is neither a 3-
judge panel, nor is he competent or qualified to preside over
this honorable Court, because his judicial compensation is
currently being diminished by federal income taxes, in violation
of Article III, Section 1, of the U.S. Constitution, and in
violation of the pivotal holding in Evans v. Gore supra.
VERIFICATION
The Undesigned, Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S., hereby
verifies, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United
States of America, without the "United States", that the above
statements of fact are true and correct, to the best of My
current information, knowledge, and belief, so help Me God,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
Executed on December 13, 1996
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness,
Counselor at Law, and Relator
Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 13 of 14
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Paul Andrew, Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Citizen of Arizona state,
federal witness, and Counselor at Law, do hereby certify, under
penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of
America, without the "United States", that I am at least 18 years
of age, a Citizen of one of the United States of America, and
that I personally served the following document(s):
NOTICE OF REFUSAL FOR CAUSE:
FRCP Rules 9(b); 12(b)(1), (2); 28 U.S.C. 1746(1);
Rule 201(d), Federal Rules of Evidence; Petition Clause;
Supremacy Clause; Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
enacted with explicit Reservations
by placing one true and correct copy of same in first class U.S.
Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to:
Attorney General William H. Rehnquist, C.J.
Department of Justice Supreme Court of the U.S.
10th and Constitution, N.W. 1 First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C.
Solicitor General Warren Christopher
Department of Justice U.S. Secretary of State
10th and Constitution, N.W. Department of State
Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C.
James M. Burns LeRoy Michael; Schweitzer
United States District Court c/o Yellowstone County Jail
316 North 26th Street 3165 King Avenue, East
Billings, Montana state Billings, Montana state
Office of the U.S. Attorneys Judge J. Clifford Wallace
United States District Court Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Federal Building c/o P.O. Box 193939
Billings, Montana state San Francisco, California
Chief Judge Judge Alex Kozinski
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
c/o P.O. Box 193939 125 South Grand Avenue, #200
San Francisco, California state Pasadena, California state
Executed on December 13, 1996
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Citizen of Arizona state, federal witness,
Counselor at Law, and Relator
Notice of Refusal for Cause:
Page 14 of 14
# # #
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People v. United States et al.