Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

c/o Lake Union Mail

117 East Louisa Street

Seattle 98102-3203

Washington State, USA


All Rights Reserved









United States District Court


Northern District of Florida


Pensacola Division



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic]     )  Case No. 3:14cr91/MCR


     Vs                            )


KENT HOVIND [sic] and              )

PAUL JOHN HANSEN [sic]             )



United States                      )  NOTICE OF MOTION AND

ex relatione                       )  MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION:

Paul Andrew Mitchell,              )

                                   )  FREV Rule 103(e)

     Applicant.                    )  (plain errors).



Comes now the United States ex rel. Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Citizen of Washington State (expressly not a federal citizen), Private Attorney General under 18 U.S.C. 1964 (Civil RICO) and Agent of the United States as Qui Tam Relator (4X) under 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq. (False Claims Act), to petition this honorable Court to reconsider the ORDER issued in plain error on March 16, 2015, for all of the following meritorious reasons:

Said ORDER makes at least two (2) plain errors, as the latter term is expressly defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition:


(1)     “The individual or attorney who signed the document is not an attorney admitted to practice in the NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA (See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 11.1(C)).”


(2)     “The filing party is not a party to this case and is not an attorney of record in the above case.”


Statement (1) above is a plain error, for reasons briefly summarized in Applicant’s original MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE.  Attorneys for the government, as the latter term is expressly defined in Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, routinely fail to execute the second OATH OF OFFICE required by the Federal statute at 28 U.S.C. 544.  See also FRCrP Rules 6 and 7 in this context.

Moreover, the blank Standard Form 61 (“SF-61”) APPOINTMENT AFFIDAVITS published at the Internet website of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) is a proven COUNTERFEIT:  it lacks a valid OMB control number;  it omits any citation to 5 U.S.C. 2903;  and, OPM admittedly never applied for periodic OMB review and approval of the electronic version of that form.

As such, that blank SF-61 is a bootleg form as the latter term occurs in the legislative history of the Paperwork Reduction Act at 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.  In this context, see the clear bar authorized by the PRA’s Public Protection Clause at 44 U.S.C. 3512 (read “complete defense, bar or otherwise at any time[emphasis added]).

The existence of valid credentials, required of all government attorneys by applicable Federal laws and by Article VI, Clause 3 in the U.S. Constitution, now assumes facts not in evidence.

The implications of all such missing and/or defective credentials are not only very far-reaching, they are also very serious.  In U.S. v. Pignatiello, a Federal Judge in Denver, Colorado dismissed a Federal Grand Jury indictment as to all named defendants, and exonerated all bonds, solely because a lawyer for the Securities and Exchange Commission attempted to conduct grand jury hearings for three (3) weeks without the second OATH OF OFFICE required by 28 U.S.C. 543.

Insofar as the government attorneys in the instant also attempted to conduct grand jury hearings in the instant case, but without all required credentials, they committed fraud upon those panels and upon this honorable Court.  The moment they first stepped foot into a grand jury room without all required credentials, even if that room was empty, they also committed jury tampering -- a serious Federal felony.

This finding also justifies a prompt disclosure to all named Defendants of all grand jury transcripts, in order to permit those Defendants to discover the names and government offices allegedly occupied by all government witnesses who testified.  Insofar as those witnesses also lacked required credentials, they too committed fraud upon this Court, they most probably committed perjury (when they were sworn in) and they tampered with those panels as well.

Statement (2) above is quite easy to explain:  private attorneys general need no license to practice law,  they do not need to be admitted to practice before this honorable Court, and they are authorized by Act of Congress and standing decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court legally to represent the United States (Federal Government) “ex rel.  See, for example, Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000) for an excellent summary of the intent of the Civil RICO authority at 18 U.S.C. 1964, and the Petition Clause in this context.

There is another plain error in Statement (2) supra, albeit a very subtle error in the alleged Plaintiff named “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA”.  The Federal statute at 28 U.S.C. 1746 makes a very clear distinction between the “United States” (Federal Government) and the “United States of America” (50 States of the Union).  Similarly, the Executive Order previously cited in Applicant’s MOTION FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE correctly defines “United States of America” to mean the 50 State of the Union.

Even if all government attorneys in the instant case can produce valid copies of all required credentials, the Congress has never conferred any powers of attorney upon government attorneys legally to represent the 50 States of the Union, individually or collectively.  Each State is already legally represented by its own State Attorney General, and no State Attorney General has any powers of attorney legally to represent all 50 States as a group.

Moreover, Congress never conferred legal standing upon the 50 States of the Union to appear collectively before Federal Courts.  Each State of the Union must appear individually, and separately, whenever its own Attorney General appears before a Federal Court.

There is an even more subtle plain error that is concealed when “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” attempts to appears as a Plaintiff.  That entity incorporated twice in the State of Delaware, and subsequently the Delaware Secretary of State revoked both corporate charters.

Congress never incorporated the “United States” and has never conferred any powers of attorney upon government attorneys legally to represent foreign Delaware corporations, even if those Delaware corporations are in good standing.  See U.S. v. Cooper Corporation as discussed in the attached letter beginning “Dear Friends”, also incorporated here by reference.

All the more so are government attorneys barred from attempting to represent Delaware corporations which have already been revoked by the Delaware Secretary of State.

It is also apparent, from extensive historical research, that the Plaintiff “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” routinely occurs on all Federal Grand Jury indictments at present, in order to avoid invoking the judicial Power of the United States as conferred by Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 in the U.S. Constitution (cf. United States as a Party).

By allowing an entirely different entity to proceed as Plaintiff, this honorable Court ignores that Arising Under Clause and proceeds as a legislative tribunal, not as a constitutional court of competent jurisdiction.

This, of course, brings us per force to the matter of original jurisdiction, which can be raised at any time.

It is a very well established principle of Federal jurisprudence that statutes conferring original jurisdiction must be strictly construed.  The controlling statute in the instant case is 18 U.S.C. 3231, which conferred original criminal jurisdiction upon the Article III District Courts of the United States (“DCUS”).

That statute makes absolutely no mention of the Article IV United States District Courts (“USDC”).  Cf. inclusio unius est exclusio alterius in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition.

The only way Section 3231 could possibly confer any criminal jurisdiction upon the Article IV USDC is by application of the original Abrogation Clause at 18 U.S.C. 3771, as enacted on June 25, 1948.

That statute attempted to confer upon the U.S. Supreme Court the authority to abrogate all such Acts of Congress solely by means of amendments to Rules of Court e.g. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  However, the U.S. Supreme Court has now held that Rules of Court may not expand or restrict original jurisdiction previously conferred by Act of Congress:  Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131 (1992).

Accordingly, insofar as the United States was not the original Plaintiff in the instant case, and insofar as an improper name attempted to appear as a proper Plaintiff instead, the judicial Power of the United States is not operating in this honorable Court;  and, this Court also lacked original jurisdiction in the first instance.

Relator attaches a detailed essay entitled “Federal Practice and Procedure: The Court Conspiracy Finally Exposed”, in order to elaborate on the summary points made immediately above concerning Statement (2) supra.  See attached, incorporated here by reference.

In this same context it is very revealing that Congress subsequently repealed 18 U.S.C. 3771 as enacted on June 25, 1948, and replaced it with a different statute dealing with crime victims’ rights (“CVRA”).

That substitution not only exacerbated the jurisdiction problem it raises;  it shifted the burden of proof to the second Abrogation Clause at 28 U.S.C. 2072(b):  All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”

The latter Abrogation Clause is likewise unconstitutional, as already held by the Supreme Court in Willy v. Coastal Corp.  Rules of Court are not Acts of Congress:  1 U.S.C. 101.


In light of the several meritorious reasons summarized above, this honorable Court should issue an ORDER granting leave to the United States ex rel. Paul Andrew Mitchell, Private Attorney General and Agent of the United States as Qui Tam Relator, to intervene in the instant criminal case for purposes of demonstrating all of the several reasons why this United States District Court lacked original jurisdiction in the first instance, and should dismiss the instant “criminal” case without undue delays in the interests of justice.


Thank you for your continuing professional consideration.


Dated:   March 25, 2015 A.D.



Signed:  /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell


Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

         Private Attorney General, Civil RICO: 18 U.S.C. 1964;  and,

         Agent of the United States as Qui Tam Relator (4X),

         False Claims Act: 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq.



I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Private Attorney General and Agent of the United States as Qui Tam Relator (4X), caused the following pleading:



FREV Rule 103(e) (plain errors)


to be served via first class U.S. Mail, with sufficient postage affixed, upon the following recipients:


The Honorable U.S. District Judge Casey Rodgers (3x)

c/o Clerk of Court

United States District Court

One North Palafox Street

Pensacola 32502

Florida, USA



Office of the U.S. Attorney

21 East Garden Street, Suite 400

Pensacola 32502

Florida, USA



Office of the Federal Public Defender

Blount Building, 2nd Floor

3 W. Garden Street, Suite 200

Pensacola 32502

Florida, USA



Dated:  March 25, 2015 A.D.




Sincerely yours,


/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell


Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

Private Attorney General:  18 U.S.C. 1964;

Agent of the United States as Qui Tam Relator (4X):

31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq.