Federal Practice and Procedure:

           The Court Conspiracy Finally Exposed




               Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

            Private Attorney General, 18 U.S.C. 1964



                  (March 21, 2010 A.D.)



If we step back from the dirty details, a broader perspective
on the current "Court Crisis" will help us better understand

what really happened during and after World War II.

If the experience of the Civil War is a valuable historical
example, it's very likely that world bankers were also backing
all sides in WWII.

They can't lose with such a strategy, right?

And, those bankers must have also surmised, correctly,
that "Article III guarantees" like due process and
the rule of law, presented formidable obstacles
to their grand plans to subdue and subordinate America
under world government and a global feudal system.

Entraining the USA in their "web" of financial slavery
was a challenge that required extraordinary steps.
And, after snagging the USA, doing the same to other,
less developed countries would be a piece o' cake by comparison.

While WWII was devastating most of Europe,
and leaving the continental USA completely intact,
enter a group of "judicial" personnel who conspired quietly
to re-write the entire U.S. Judicial and Criminal Codes
so as to morph constitutional courts into legislative tribunals.

As we have already established, this distinction has been upheld

many times by standing decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court,

so this writer is definitely not the source of this controversial


As we have also proven many times already, in the latter
tribunals fundamental Rights were destined to become "options"
and no longer "mandates" as they had been enforced in the former
Article III constitutional courts -- for only 159 YEARS!



Although their pursuit of this nefarious goal was implemented
almost flawlessly, it was their careless exposure of
one or two clues that has now revealed their true intent,
and ultimately unraveled their massive fraud.

For example, the name change from the term

District Courts of the United States (“DCUS”)

to the term United States District Courts (“USDC”)
was made to appear totally innocuous, except for the
fundamental problems that arise from the Abrogation Clause
still found in the Rules Enabling Act at 28 U.S.C. 2072(b):

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/2072.html  (b)

All laws in conflict with such rules

shall be of no further force or effect
after such rules have taken effect.

Rules of Court, written by judges,

can effect retroactive changes to Acts of Congress --
which previously conferred original jurisdiction

at times prior to issuance of those Rules --
and do so without authorization by the Congress

or by the President!

Very simply, there were all these many Acts of Congress
that had previously conferred original jurisdiction
upon the Article III DCUS, and none of those other statutes
was repealed or amended by the 2 Acts of June 25, 1948 --
one for Title 18 and one for Title 28.

This fact means, obviously, that the DCUS must still exist
and the USDC could not enjoy original jurisdiction because
it did not exist when those prior statutes were first enacted
-- particularly inside the several (now 50) States of the Union,
which are even now identified as "judicial" districts in Title 28

and not “legislative” districts and not “United States Districts”


Legislative, executive and judicial -- 3 branches of government
in a structure elevated to a fundamental Right, better known as
Separation of Powers, by Articles I, II and III in that order.

Thus exposed are now obvious violations of the ex post facto

restriction and Separation of Powers, both!

The Lanham Act comes to mind, because we explored
that Act in so much detail in Mitchell v. AOL et al.
But, there are many other examples, like statutes now called
the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Securities and Exchange Acts,

and the 1866 Civil Rights Act, to name a few more.

Where this ruse inflicts the most pain is in the
matter of criminal jurisdiction -- where the rubber
meets the road, so to speak.  Here, the grant of original

jurisdiction at 18 U.S.C. 3231 sticks out like a sore thumb!

In Title 18, in particular, we also found another
"abrogation clause" which attempted for Federal criminal cases
the exact same thing which the Abrogation Clause in Title 28
attempted for all Federal civil cases.  Also on June 25, 1948,

at 18 U.S.C. 3771, 62 Stat. 846, the Act revising Title 18

used language almost identical to the Abrogation Clause

in the Rules Enabling Act:


... and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith

shall be of no further force and effect.

To cover up this further damning evidence, 18 U.S.C. 3771

was subsequently repealed and then replaced by a completely

different federal statute dealing with crime victims’ rights.


One or more of those "judges" advising lawmakers
during WWII must have realized that they had a
serious problem, if constitutional courts were to
yield to legislative tribunals with no objections:  namely,

if all of those prior statutes were expressly itemized

in Miscellaneous Provisions of revisions to Titles 18 and 28,
and if all of those Miscellaneous Provisions were also
fully codified and then published in the United States Code --
along with all of the other sections of those same revisions --
such full disclosure might have exposed their true intent
for all to see.

This point is rendered all the more important because
the stated intent of the Title 28 revision is found
(read “hiding”) in those Miscellaneous Provisions and it is
not found in any of the sections that did make it into the U.S. Code.
The stated intent included a “continuation of existing law” --

which would necessarily embrace all laws that had already

conferred original jurisdiction upon the constitutional DCUS.

So, we can now hear a secret meeting where
Federal "judges" advised lawmakers to slip in
a single sentence which made it appear OK
to change names "retroactively", but to do so
in such a manner that few if any other legal
professionals would ever notice the obvious
violation, and conflicts, that sentence would cause
with the ex post facto Clause in the Constitution

and with Separation of Powers guaranteed by Article I:




Further to reinforce these very same conclusions,

in Willy v. Coastal Corp. the U.S. Supreme Court held

that Rules of Court may not expand or restrict original

jurisdiction already conferred by statute:


“Such a caveat applies a fortiori to any effort to extend by rule

the judicial power of the United States described in Article III

of the Constitution. The Rules, then, must be deemed to apply

only if their application will not impermissibly expand

the judicial authority conferred by Article III.”


Permitting any fundamental Right to “morph” from a mandate

into a discretionary option, without question expands

judicial authority in violation of that holding.

Being fundamental Rights expressly guaranteed by those
Clauses in the U.S. Constitution, neither the judges
nor the Congress could ever violate both of those
recognized restrictions with total impunity,
and certainly not in the manner in which they did so

-- in part by effectively withholding every word of

those Miscellaneous Provisions from the U.S. Code.

Thus, they substituted full disclosure of all
intended name changes in the Miscellaneous Provisions
with a one-liner that was much more easily hidden from view;

and, they bolstered that substitution by effectively
hiding those Miscellaneous Provisions completely --
by never codifying any of them in the published versions

of the U.S. Code.

This was certainly not the only time Congress has

withheld statutes from the U.S. Code: the liberal

construction rule for the racketeering laws is another

example of a Statute at Large that was never codified

and hence never published anywhere in Title 18 of the

U.S. Code.  Don’t bother looking for it, because

it’s just not there!



Pretty slick, if you ask me.  As my good friend
and honored colleague Thomas Brown once wrote:
"They must have expected that no one
would ever figure this out."

The Abrogation Clauses in Titles 18 and 28 are
much like the single thread that unravels the
entire garment:  all we need to do is locate that
thread and PULL!



Further Reading:


Private Attorney General Cracks Title 28 of the United States Code



Reading List:  Constitutional Courts and Legislative Tribunals

Prof. Emeritus Kenneth L. Karst, on the faculty of the UCLA Law School,
has summarized the overall problem quite nicely as follows:
"In essence a legislative court is merely an administrative agency with an elegant name. 
While Congress surely has the power to transfer portions of the business of the federal judiciary
to legislative courts, a wholesale transfer of that business would work a fundamental change
in the status of our independent judiciary and would seem vulnerable to constitutional attack."

[Discussion of “Legislative Court”]
[in Encyclopedia of the American Constitution]
[New York, MacMillan Publishing Company (1986)]

"The cases dealing with the authority of Congress to create courts
other than by use of its power under Art. III do not admit of easy synthesis."


"Furthermore, we cannot impute to Congress an intent now or in the future
to transfer jurisdiction from constitutional to legislative courts
for the purpose of emasculating the former































Chronological List of U.S. Supreme Court cases:



More to the merits, legislative courts are not required to exercise
the Article III guarantees required of constitutional courts.  See:

American Insurance v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511, 7 L.Ed. 242 (1828)
(C.J. Marshall’s seminal ruling); 
Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. 235, 242‑243 (1850); 
Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. 434, 447 (1871); 
Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. 648, 655 (1873); 
Good v. Martin, 95 U.S. 90, 98 (1877); 
Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1878); 
The City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453, 460 (1879); 
Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); 
Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 274 U.S. 145 (1927); 
Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928); 
Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U.S. 438 (1929); 
Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930); 
Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U.S. 382 (1932); 
O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933); 
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962);  and
Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 

The U.S. Courts of Appeal are Article III federal courts [cites omitted here].

In Marathon supra, Justice Brennan for the plurality reasoned that Congress could
create legislative courts without Article III protections in only three limited settings: 
(1) territorial courts,
(2) courts martial, and
(3) courts deciding disputes involving public rights that Congress created in the first instance. 

Thus, by treating the 50 States as federal Territories and
by creating federal citizenship as a municipal franchise,
Congress could effectively “broadcast” into those States
a legislative court that routinely proceeds without Article III protections! 

See the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 27-30, April 9, 1866 A.D. 

In the legislative USDC, those protections are options, not mandates,
particularly when the extension statutes supra are also routinely ignored.