"Sea Change and Power Grab: Congress Was Conned by the Courts in 1948"

Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

Private Attorney General (18 U.S.C. 1964(a))

Americans who have been following the "drama unfolding" around

the two Acts of Congress signed by President Truman on June 25, 1948,

are already familiar with key features of that history.

What is not fully understood is the subtle yet fundamental differences

that distinguish constitutional courts from legislative tribunals.

Yes, one group originates in Article III of the U.S. Constitution,

the other group originates in Article I of the U.S. Constitution.

What are the differences, and why do they matter?

A good way to develop a deeper understanding of these differences

is to compare Rule 201 in the Federal Rules of Evidence:

one mode of judicial notice is entirely mandatory upon Federal Courts;

a second mode of judicial notice is entirely discretionary, allowing a

Federal Judge to take judicial notice or not take judicial notice,

as the Judge decides.

The general mode of operation or "modus operandi" of legislative tribunals

is very similar to discretionary judicial notice. If a Party to litigation in

such a tribunal insists on enjoying a Fundamental Right that is guaranteed

by the U.S. Constitution, the officers of that legislative tribunal believe

they can enforce that Right or not enforce that Right, as they decide.

This modus operandi is starkly different from the mode of operation

of constitutional courts established under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.

Not only do Fundamental Rights impose mandatory obligations upon

those courts. The damaged Party also has a Fundamental Right to

effective remedies for any and all violations of those Rights,

notwithstanding that the violations were committed by persons

acting in some official capacity.

That guarantee of effective remedies is expressly stated

in Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

a United States Treaty elevated to supreme Law of the Land

by the Supremacy Clause in the U.S. Constitution.

Article 2 of that ICCPR goes on to ensure that any persons

whose rights or freedoms guaranteed by that Treaty are violated

shall have those rights determined by competent judicial,

administrative or legislative authorities.

This point about courts of competent jurisdiction is extremely

important in this context. If Congress decides that

a legislative tribunal should have original jurisdiction

to adjudicate any given matter, the Act of Congress doing so

must make it entirely clear that a constitutional court

does not enjoy that same jurisdiction, or a constitutional court

shares concurrent jurisdiction with a legislative tribunal.

There are instances in Federal laws which do confer

original jurisdiction on both types of Federal courts.

The Civil RICO statute at 18 U.S.C. 1964 comes to mind:

Section 1964(a) expressly names the district courts of the United States,

Section 1964(c) expressly names the United States district court.

Although the latter conclusion is required of any objective reading

of that Civil RICO statute, it is also reasonable to ask whether or not

Congress has been fully aware of the differences distinguishing

these two types of Federal courts.

We believe the relevant historical evidence justifies the conclusion

that Congress has not been fully aware of those differences,

and a demonstrable vagueness has rendered its Acts

unconstitutional ab initio.

On the contrary, the historical context surrounding the

President's signature on the two Acts of June 25,1948,

generates more suspicion than anything else, particularly

when the real motives of the drafters are exposed.

For example, why did President Truman order a

Special Session of Congress during an election year, 1948?

The entire House and one third of the Senate were

already home campaigning.

In point of fact, switching constitutional courts to legislative tribunals

inside the 50 States of the Union was done by means of stealth,

deception and blatantly unconstitutional means. The most obvious

and most painful examples of those unconstitutional means

were the two Abrogation Clauses added to those two Acts of Congress,

one for Title 18 and one for Title 28.

Although official criticisms of those Abrogation Clauses are rare

and hard to find, our legal research did locate one objection by

Rep. Kastenmeier. He complained that the Abrogation Clause

in the Rules Enabling Act was "unwise and potentially unconstitutional".

That objection can be confirmed in the legislative history of the

1988 amendments.

A more dramatic illustration of deception can be confirmed

in the "Schedule of Laws Repealed" that was published

in Miscellaneous Provisions that were never codified

anywhere in the U.S. Code. The legislative history

very clearly says:

"This method of specific repeal will relieve the courts

of the burdensome task of ferreting out implied repeals."

In other words, if a statute conferring original jurisdiction

did not appear anywhere in that Schedule of Laws Repealed,

it remained unchanged and it remained unaffected in any way

when the two Acts of June 25, 1948 were revised, codified and

enacted into positive law, all on the same day.

It is also very revealing that those Miscellaneous Provisions

also state the intent of Congress i.e. continuations of existing law!

In other words, Congress told the Federal courts that

those courts were prohibited from implying any repeals

or implying subtle amendments to jurisdictional statutes

when a given statute was not mentioned in that Schedule.

The general rule here is that repeals by implication are never favored.

The clear intent of Congress was to continue existing laws

whenever such laws were not being repealed and

whenever such laws were not being amended either.

We applied that prohibition to the Lanham Act by proving

that its grant of jurisdiction was not mentioned in that Schedule;

and, consequently, that grant continues even today

to confer original jurisdiction on the Article III District Courts

of the United States.

This finding was not quite earth shaking, however,

chiefly because the Lanham Act is not very well known,

even among experienced legal professionals.

What did shake the earth like an 8.0 earthquake

on the Richter Scale, was our application of that

same methodology to the grant of criminal jurisdiction

at 18 U.S.C. 3231. Strictly construed, as it should be,

that statute continues even today to confer original

criminal jurisdiction on the Article III District Courts

of the United States.

The United States District Courts are not mentioned

anywhere in that statute!

Of equal importance is the fact that Section 3231

is also not mentioned anywhere in the Schedule

of Law Repealed, as published in the Miscellaneous

Provisions discussed above.

Without any reasonable doubts, this finding

does have extremely far-reaching legal consequences.

One of those consequences is the historical inference

it justifies, positively identifying the Federal Judiciary as the

principal entity that engineered the fraud now proven

to exist in those two Abrogation Clauses.

Although Rep. Kastenmeier was correct all along,

the legislative history seems to support a conclusion

that his objections were not only isolated, but

they were also ignored entirely.

The Federal Courts have now been caught red-handed

because they have been prosecuting criminal cases

in legislative tribunals that lack criminal jurisdiction

in the first instance.

This conclusion is fully supported by a standing decision

of the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that Rules of Court

may not expand or restrict original jurisdiction previously

conferred by prior Acts of Congress!

Our litigation formally challenged the Abrogation Clause

in the Rules Enabling Act because of its obvious

retroactive intent, violating the ex post facto prohibition

in the U.S. Constitution.

Clearly, this widespread violation runs directly contrary

to the ICCPR's guarantee that all American Court litigants

shall be guaranteed courts of competent jurisdiction.

The U.S. District Courts are NOT courts of competent

jurisdiction to adjudicate cases which are intended

to prosecute suspects on charges of violating

the Federal Criminal Code.

One is thereby motivated to wonder if this shocking finding

has also been a major albeit unspoken factor in the large percentage

of Federal criminal cases which are settled by means

of "Plea Agreements". The widespread practice of extorting

plea agreements is a topic for another day, but it is already

well documented.

Nevertheless, the question of original jurisdiction is

so fundamental, it can and should be raised as far back

as the initial Federal Grand Jury hearing convened

in any given felony case.

As the U.S. Supreme Court has already held, correctly,

jurisdiction is the power to declare the law;

without jurisdiction a Court cannot proceed at all

in any cause.

Further reading:

http://supremelaw.org/authors/mitchell/systemic.failure.htm

http://supremelaw.org/authors/mitchell/court.conspiracy.exposed.htm

http://supremelaw.org/cc/hovind/recon1.htm

http://supremelaw.org/cc/aol/cert.htm#drama

http://supremelaw.org/cc/aol/opening.htm#sec7c

http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/mandamus.2.htm

http://www.supremelaw.org/rsrc/dcus.htm

http://www.supremelaw.org/press/rels/cracking.title.28.htm

http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/microsoft/transmittal.htm

http://www.supremelaw.org/authors/mitchell/karmacts.htm

http://www.supremelaw.org/authors/schwan/sedition.htm

http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/gilberts/opening.htm#topic-e

http://www.supremelaw.org/letters/us-v-usa.htm

http://supremelaw.org/cc/makarian/notice.rule.44.htm

http://supremelaw.org/cc/edwards/notice.rule.44.htm

Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Private Attorney General, Civil RICO: 18 U.S.C. 1964;

Agent of the United States as Qui Tam Relator (4X),

Federal Civil False Claims Act: 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq.