Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
c/o Forwarding Agent
501 West Broadway #A-332
San Diego 92101
CALIFORNIA, USA
All Rights Reserved
without Prejudice
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic], ) Appeal Docket No. 07-2017
) Civil No. 04-CV-0885 BB/WDS
Plaintiff/Appellee, )
v. )
)
John S. Williamson et al., )
)
Defendants/Appellants. )
---------------------------------)
)
United States ) INTERVENOR’S REPLY TO
ex relatione ) BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Paul Andrew Mitchell, )
Intervenor. ) 18 U.S.C. 1964(a).
)
---------------------------------)
)
Internal Revenue Service, )
)
Respondent. )
_________________________________)
COMES NOW the United States (hereinafter “Intervenor”) ex relatione Paul Andrew Mitchell, Citizen
of ONE OF the United
States of America, Private Attorney
General, Criminal Investigator and Federal Witness (hereinafter “Relator”), to reply formally to the pleading signed by
Gretchen M. Wolfinger entitled BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEE.
ERRORS
IN WOLFINGER’S STATEMENT OF
SUBJECT MATTER AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Intervenor begins by demonstrating Ms. Gretchen M. Wolfinger’s many fundamental errors, sentence-by-sentence,
as follows:
The government brought this suit to reduce to
judgment federal income tax assessments against appellants John S. Williamson
and Nancy L. Williamson (collectively, the Williamsons) for various tax years
between 1985 and 1998 and to foreclose federal tax liens against real property
located at 31 Ben Road and 24 Dinah Road in Edgewood, Bernalillo County, New
Mexico (the Ben Road and Dinah Road properties, respectively).
The “government” did not
bring this suit. The U.S. Department of
Justice has no powers of attorney legally to represent any one of the 50 States
of the Union,
nor all of them collectively. 28 U.S.C. 547. The 50 States of the Union are already quite adequately
represented legally by their respective State Attorneys General. 28 U.S.C. 530B.
Moreover, in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), the Supreme Court
prohibited Congress from re-defining any
terms used in the Constitution for the United
States of America (“U.S.
Constitution”). At 28 U.S.C.
1746, both “United
States” and “United States of
America” occur in correct contradistinction to each other (inside one is
outside the others). 28 U.S.C.
1746 is the only statute in all of Title 28 where the term “United States of America” occurs
as such.
The UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA [sic] did incorporate twice as such in the State of
Delaware, but certified evidence now before this Court shows that both foreign
corporations have been revoked by the Delaware Secretary of State. Neither foreign corporation was ever
registered with the New Mexico Secretary of State
either! (See “Certificate”!)
Even if one or the other
were not revoked, DOJ
would still not have any powers of attorney legally to represent
a foreign Delaware corporation. Congress
never appropriated funds for DOJ
to do so.
Finally, Congress has
never incorporated either the “United States” or
the “United States of America” as
such. See U.S. v. Cooper
Corporation, 312
U.S. 600 (1941). It appears that Chief Justice
John Marshall was responsible for fabricating the myth that “The United States
of America” are a corporation. See Dixon v.
The United States, 1 Marsh. Dec. 177, 181 (1811). However,
without citing any actual legislative
authority for that proposition, Marshall’s statement is merely dictum that was later cited in Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary (1856), at the definitions of “Union” and “United States of America”. In any event, Dixon has been overruled
by Cooper supra because Dixon was decided by a Circuit Court in
a case on which C.J. Marshall presided.
There are no “income tax
assessments” in evidence in this case, and there are no “tax liens” in evidence
in this case either.
Both claims assume facts
not in evidence.
In order to be valid in
the first instance, all ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATES must be dated and signed under penalties of perjury by a duly
authorized Assessment Officer, pursuant to IRC 6065, 26 CFR
301.6203-1, Brafman
v. U.S., 384 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1967), and pertinent provisions
of the Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”) rendered enforceable by the IRS Restructuring and
Reform Act of 1998 (“RRA98”).
The term “certificate”
necessarily mandates verification or certification “under penalties of
perjury” as required by IRC 6065!
In particular, the IRM
mandates proper ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATES before any tax collections may commence.
Cf. “Certificate”
in any good law dictionary (implies a writing or written document).
And, as of the RRA98, all IRS personnel can now be
disciplined or terminated for violating any
provision of the IRM.
The District Court had jurisdiction under
Sections 7402 and
7403 of the
Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.) (I.R.C.)
and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1340 and 1345.
This statement is
erroneous and misleading on several counts.
First of all, there are two (2) different classes of Federal District Courts as the latter
term occurs in the Miscellaneous Provisions of the Act of June 25, 1948, to
wit: District Courts of the United
States (“DCUS”)
originate in Article III of
the U.S. Constitution, and the
United States District Courts (“USDC”)
originate in Article IV.
Statutes conferring
original jurisdiction on all Federal District Courts must be strictly
construed. On this one basis, then, the
term “District Court” is vague and misleading because it fails to identify the
one or the other class of “district” courts on which Congress has
variously conferred original jurisdiction since the year 1789 A.D.
Cf. 15 U.S.C. 1121, 60 Stat. 440 (conferring original
jurisdiction upon the district and territorial courts of the United
States).
IRC section 7403 mentions only
the DCUS, and does not mention the USDC anywhere in
that statute. Therefore, the USDC for the District of New Mexico
did not enjoy any original
jurisdiction under IRC
7403.
On the other hand, IRC 7402 mentions
both the DCUS and the USDC. For purposes of this case, the only provision
in section 7402
that even mentions the USDC is subsection 7402(e), to wit:
(e) To quiet
title
The
United States district courts shall have jurisdiction of any action brought
by the United States to quiet title to property if the title claimed by
the United States to such property was derived from enforcement of a
lien under this title.
This particular subsection is definitive and dispositive in the instant appeal, for all of the following
reasons:
(a)
the instant
action was not brought by the “United States”
(federal government); it was brought by
an entity with an obviously improper name in violation of FRCP
Rule 10 which requires Parties to be identified by their proper
names;
(b)
because the United States did
not bring the instant action, it did not and could not have claimed title to
any property without first serving a proper SUMMONS
and COMPLAINT making that claim; a
proper SUMMONS was never issued by the USDC;
(c)
title to property did
not derive from enforcement of any liens “under this title”, chiefly because no
valid lien(s) had ever been perfected, and “this title” (Title 26) was never enacted
into positive law by any Act of Congress.
To drive the latter points
home, see also IRC
7851(a)(6)(A), by which all provisions within IRC subtitle F shall take
effect on the day after the date of enactment of “this title”. IRC sections 7402 and 7403 both fall within subtitle F (remember
“F” for enForcement).
The statute at 28 U.S.C.
1340 is also relevant in this context:
The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of
Congress providing for internal
revenue, or revenue from imports or tonnage except matters within the
jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade.
[emphases added]
Here we see that Congress has used the umbrella term
“district courts” implying that both classes
of Federal District Courts are included.
Assuming for the moment that 26 U.S.C.
7402 is an “Act of
Congress”, as the latter term occurs at 1 U.S.C.
101, the points above already prove that the instant civil action did not
and could not arise under that Act, for the reasons already stated.
The Arising Under
Clause is discussed in further detail below.
Moreover, of even
greater importance is the massive amount of evidence proving that IRC subtitle A is federal
municipal law. The term “internal” means municipal! Therefore, “internal revenue” must
refer to revenue derived from some internal, municipal statute(s).
As Appellants have already
demonstrated, several times, there is
no Statute at Large which created a
specific liability for any federal income taxes imposed by subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code.
The “liability” provision was fabricated by the Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”) in the Code of Federal Regulations at 26 CFR
1.1-1(b).
Even if the IRS were a de jure service, bureau, office or other subdivision of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (the one in D.C.), which they are NOT, the IRS would still not have any authority to create a tax liability by means of regulations published in the Federal Register. On this fundamental point, see Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87 (1959) and the clear, explanatory abstract found in the 1962 Edition of American Jurisprudence, to wit:
In
application of the principles that the power of an administrative agency to
make rules does not extend to the power to make legislation and that a
regulation which is beyond the power of the agency to make is invalid, it has
been held that an administrative agency may not create a criminal offense or
any liability not sanctioned by the lawmaking authority, and specifically a
liability for a tax [citing Acker supra] or inspection fee.
[2 Am Jur 2d, p. 129, emphases added]
There are three (3) key points being made in that
excellent abstract:
(1) the power of an administrative agency to make rules does not extend to the power to make legislation;
(2)
a regulation which is beyond the power of the
agency to make is invalid; and,
(3)
an
administrative agency may not create a criminal offense or any liability not
sanctioned by the lawmaking authority, and specifically a liability for
a tax.
28 U.S.C.
1340 also makes a clear reference to “matters
within the jurisdiction of the Court of International
Trade”. This reference is extremely
useful, in this context, because the statute establishing that Court expressly
identifies Article III as its
true constitutional origin. Quoting 28 U.S.C.
251(a):
(a) The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, nine judges who shall constitute a court of record to be known as
the United States Court of International Trade. Not more than five of such
judges shall be from the same political party. The court is a court established
under article III of the
Constitution of the United States.
By comparison, however,
the statute establishing the USDC within the United States of America does not
identify its constitutional origin. See 28 U.S.C.
132. For this reason, we are justified,
and entitled, to rely upon standing decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court to
supply the missing information. Thus, in
American Insurance v. 356 Bales of Cotton (1828) and Balzac v. Porto
Rico (1921), the
origin of the USDC was clearly and expressly
identified as the Territory
Clause at Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 (“4:3:2”). As such, the USDCs
are Territorial Tribunals, not Constitutional Courts.
It is also not difficult
to prove that the term “Court” is really not even appropriate to identify any USDC. The authority at Article I, Section 8, Clause 9
confers upon Congress the power to “constitute Tribunals inferior to the
supreme Court”. The term “Court” is not
even used in that Clause. The only Clause
which authorizes Congress to establish “Courts” is Article III, Section 1, Clause 1,
to wit:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.
[emphases added]
Therefore, we have just proved that the USDCs are not even “Courts”!
Moving right along, the
statute at 28 U.S.C. 1345 is another very important way in which Ms. Wolfinger’s statement defeats itself. Unlike the named Plaintiff “UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA”, Congress has conferred
legal standing upon the “United States” –-
the proper name for the federal government -- to appear as a proper Party Plaintiff:
Section 1345. United
States as plaintiff
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits
or proceedings commenced by the United
States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized to sue
by Act of Congress.
[emphases added]
The constitutional origin of this latter
authority is the Arising Under Clause in the U.S. Constitution, which clearly
states:
Section 2. The
judicial Power shall extend to ... Controversies
to which the United States shall be a Party ....
[emphases added]
Note that Article III, Section 2, Clause
1 above properly identifies the “United States” (federal government) as the
proper Party with standing to
sue or, be sued. Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary is instructive here because it is the best single authority for
defining the meanings of all terms used in the U.S. Constitution. In Bouvier’s, the keyword “Party” is defined to embrace both
plaintiffs and defendants:
PARTY,
practice, contracts. When applied to
practice, by party is understood either the plaintiff or defendant.
[emphases added]
At this point, Intervenor incorporates the Press Release entitled “Private Attorney General
Cracks Title 28 of the United States Code,” and a related essay, by
reference to the following Internet URLs, hard copies of which are also
attached for convenience:
http://www.supremelaw.org/press/rels/cracking.title.28.htm
http://www.supremelaw.org/letters/us-v-usa.htm
In light of all the above,
it is now painfully obvious to this Intervenor,
“United States” ex rel.,
that a widespread conspiracy has evolved within DOJ
to deprive civil litigants of due process of law,
specifically by substituting an improper “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” for
“United States” as the proper Party Plaintiff in such cases, in
order to avoid the implications of the Arising Under Clause supra.
Instead of suing properly
on behalf of the “United
States”, DOJ
instead substitutes “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” evidently to maintain the
illusion -- and fraud -- that legislative
tribunals are “courts of competent jurisdiction” that may lawfully conduct summary
proceedings in all such cases but without Article III guarantees.
Although this may be
difficult for many to believe, Intervenor’s NOTICE OF INTERVENTION incorporates a very pivotal PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI in U.S. Supreme
Court docket number #03-5070 and, in the
latter PETITION Justice Brennan is correctly
quoted as follows:
In Marathon supra, Justice Brennan for the plurality reasoned that Congress could create legislative courts without Article III protections in only three limited settings: (1) territorial courts, (2) courts martial, and (3) courts deciding disputes involving public rights that Congress created in the first instance. Thus, by treating the 50 States as federal Territories and by creating federal citizenship as a municipal franchise, Congress could effectively “broadcast” into those States a legislative court that routinely proceeds without Article III protections! See the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 27-30, April 9, 1866 A.D. In the legislative USDC, those protections are options, not mandates, particularly when the extension statutes supra are also routinely ignored.
There you have it, in a
nutshell: Justice Brennan has let the
cat out of the bag by arguing, but without proving, that all federal
territories, and all public rights created by Congress, both justify
“creation of federal courts without Article III guarantees”.
That is a gross oxymoron, if ever there was one.
We just proved that
Federal District Courts can only be established under Article III; and, Federal Territorial Tribunals can
only be established under Articles I and IV. Moreover, the Supreme Court has already held
that the constitutional origin of the USDC is the Territory Clause, thus
rendering each USDC a Territorial Tribunal.
The other leg with no
“standing” is Brennan’s fallacious claim that a “public right” that is created
by Congress can also justify the systematic deprivation of any and all Article III guarantees. Here see 5 U.S.C.
552(a)(4)(B)!
This error is yet another manifestation of what Relator
has correctly called the Downes
Doctrine [sic]: briefly, that
Doctrine merely assumes the following
two propositions in error:
(1)
the
Constitution of the United States, as such, does not extend beyond the limits
of the States that are united by and under it;
and,
(2)
the guarantees of that
Constitution extend into the federal zone only as Congress makes those
guarantees applicable, by enacting federal statutes to that end.
However, putting the lie
to Brennan, and to every other decision based in whole or in part upon the Downes
Doctrine as summarized above, Congress
expressly extended the U.S.
Constitution into the District of Columbia in 1871, and then again into all
Federal Territories, even future Federal Territories, in 1873.
A third “Extension
Statute”, as Relator prefers to call these Acts, can
be found at 48 U.S.C. 1561, where Congress expressly extended certain
constitutional guarantees into the Virgin Islands. Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 559 (1989). It is apparent
that even Congress was ignorant of its prior Acts of 1871 and 1873, or section 1561 supra
would not have been necessary in the first place!
Duuuuh!
The far-reaching
implications of these three Extension Statutes need not be fully
documented here. Suffice it to say that
sacred guarantees such as those embodied in the Bill of Rights have
been enforceable mandates upon all federal courts, at least since 1871, even if a
controversy arose under federal municipal statutes.
Put simply, the Bill
of Rights and all other constitutional guarantees apply to the entire Internal Revenue Code, no
exceptions.
And
now, for a point that will surely shiver the timbers of many black-robed
impostors. Now that we have proven that federal
municipal laws are also subject to the U.S. Constitution as properly
amended, this Circuit Court will please take careful note of two
provisions expressly requiring that all federal direct taxes must be
apportioned within the 50 States of the Union.
See 1:2:3 and 1:9:4.
If one penny of a federal direct tax is imposed upon D.C. and then
collected from D.C., that tax is unconstitutional by definition, because
it is thereby NOT apportioned among the 50 States of the Union as required by
those two important provisions in the Constitution.
Accordingly,
insofar as 26 CFR
1.1-1 attempts to “hijack” the Downes
Doctrine by dispensing with such constitutional guarantees for federal
citizens and resident aliens, the direct taxes it attempts to impose
upon those two classes are necessarily unconstitutional.
Federal citizenship
is a municipal franchise domiciled in D.C.! Resident aliens are, by definition, subject
to federal municipal laws. Therefore,
a direct tax imposed by federal municipal laws is unconstitutional per
force the very moment it attempts to collect one penny ($0.01) of such a
tax from the private earnings of those two classes of people whenever
they labor in occupations of common right!
This brings us
to the situation facing State Citizens
like all named Appellants in this case.
The only way Congress can impose such a direct tax upon
any Citizens of ONE OF the United States of America (50
States) is to apportion that direct tax in accordance with the well
established rules for doing so. Just as
there can be no voting Representatives from anywhere inside the federal zone
who are seated in the House of Representatives, there can be no direct
taxes upon any State Citizens unless those direct taxes are also
proportional to their Representatives seated in that House. 1:2:3! 1:9:4!!
No taxation without representation, remember?
This brings us,
finally, to the notorious subterfuge entitled the “Sixteenth Amendment” [sic]. Suffice it here to say that Relator has already sued U.S. Senator Barbara Boxer in the
California Supreme Court, in the case of People
v. Boxer, docket number #S-030016. That case was a petition for writ of mandamus to compel
Boxer to witness the mass of material evidence which the People have assembled
to impugn the ratification of that so-called “amendment”.
When Boxer fell
totally silent (twice), she rendered the People’s verified evidence the “truth
of the case”. Therefore, pursuant to the
Full Faith and Credit Clause,
this Court must honestly face the fact that the so-called Sixteenth amendment
was never ratified according to the requirements of Article V, the only way
it could have become Law.
The consequences
are obvious, or should be obvious; and, those far-reaching consequences
were the whole reason why Relator authored the book entitled “The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal
Revenue” in the year 1992. That book
was subsequently entered into evidence in multiple
State and federal court cases, without rebuttals!
That book was
also the Primary Exhibit in the case of Mitchell
v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al. supra. When that case reached the U.S. Supreme
Court, all 129 named Defendants either fell totally silent, or their 48 UNlicensed attorneys formally
waived their clients’ right to answer.
Such silence activates estoppel. Carmine v. Bowen. And, such silence can only be equated with
fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak, or where an inquiry left
unanswered would be intentionally misleading.
U.S. v. Tweel.
At a most
opportune moment in that litigation, Relator wrote a one-word letter to Chief Justice William
Rehnquist. That letter said:
“Checkmate!”
William H. Rehnquist passed away, not long after
that momentous word!
INCORPORATION OF REPLY BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANTS
Intervenor United States ex rel.
Paul Andrew Mitchell B.A.,
M.S., Private
Attorney General, now expressly incorporates by reference the REPLY BRIEF FOR
THE APPELLANTS as filed and served concurrently with this INTERVENOR’S
REPLY TO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, as if the former were
set forth fully here.
Intervenor wishes to take this opportunity to compliment
Appellants for the courage and tenacity they have demonstrated in the face of
an ugly and premeditated extortion racket, and protection racket, which now
appear to pervade all 50 States of the Union.
Their REPLY
BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANTS is a masterful tour de force of cases and codes
that were deliberately rendered vague and difficult to understand, solely to
confuse the American People into coughing up their hard-earned pay, evidently
to enrich corrupt foreign banks and to finance their horrendously painful
serial wars ever since 1913.
REMEDIES REQUESTED
Chiefly, the United States has a
statutory right to intervene, and it has now effectively intervened pursuant to
the federal statute at 28
U.S.C. 2403(a) and pertinent Rules of Court.
For all of the reasons
elaborated in detail above and in all other pleadings filed to date by the United States ex rel. Paul Andrew Mitchell subsequent
to its timely and proper intervention, the attorneys’ alleged OPPOSITION and
BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEE should be ignored, if not also
stricken, by this honorable Court of Appeals.
On the merits, this Court
should also ORDER the Office of Circuit Clerk to certify to the Office of the
United States Attorney General all of Intervenor’s challenges to the constitutionality of
certain Acts of Congress previously enumerated in pleadings filed or otherwise
lodged to date by Intervenor, and by Appellants, at
any stage and at any level in these proceedings.
This Court should also now schedule a proper
presentation of law and evidence, if such evidence is otherwise admissible in
this case, supporting arguments for and against the constitutionality of said Acts of Congress thus
properly challenged to date in this appeal.
No such presentation will
be entirely complete or final, until such time as the Williamsons are
guaranteed an opportunity to have their day in Court and present their
arguments to a lawfully convened
civil jury of their peers, and not merely a panel of federal citizens assembled under
provisions of the Jury
Selection and Service Act.
The Seventh Amendment is
the supreme Law of the Land inside the federal
zone and inside the State zone!
Cf. also FRCP Rule 38.
Thank you again for your continuing professional consideration.
VERIFICATION
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1). See Supremacy Clause (Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the United States are all the supreme Law of the Land).
Dated: June 5, 2007 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
__________________________________________________________
Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Private Attorney General
All
Rights Reserved without Prejudice
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18 years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the following document(s):
28 U.S.C. 2403(a); 18 U.S.C. 1964(a)
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to the following:
Clerk of Court (5x)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
1823 Stout Street
Denver 80257
COLORADO, USA
Mr. and Mrs. John S. Williamson
1277 Historic Route 66 East
Tijeras 87059
NEW MEXICO, USA
Mr. John Gregory Williamson
c/o Mr. and Mrs. John S. Williamson supra
Mr. David Andrew Williamson
c/o Mr. and Mrs. John S. Williamson supra
Mr. Garrett James Williamson
824 Adams Street, N.E.
Albuquerque 87110
NEW MEXICO, USA
Ms. Deborah Kruhm
P.O. Box
23899
Santa Fe 87502
NEW MEXICO, USA
Ms. Gretchen M. Wolfinger
U.S. Department of Justice
Appellate Section
P.O. Box 502
Washington 20044
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Office of Chief Counsel
Internal Revenue Service
c/o U.S. Department of the Treasury
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington 20220
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Courtesy copies:
Office of the U.S. Attorney
P.O. Box 607
Albuquerque 87103
NEW MEXICO, USA
U.S. Department of Justice
Tax Division
717 North Harwood, Suite 400
Dallas 75201
TEXAS, USA
Dr. Harriet Smith Windsor
Secretary of State
State of Delaware
401 Federal Street
Dover 19901
DELAWARE, USA
[See USPS Publication #221 for addressing instructions.]
Dated: June 5, 2007 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
__________________________________________________________
Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Private Attorney General
All
Rights Reserved without Prejudice