Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris
c/o Forwarding Agent at:
11230 Gold Express Dr., #310-188
Gold River 95670-4484
In Propria Persona
All Rights Reserved
District Court of the United States
Eastern Judicial District of California
Plaintiff, ) AUTHOR’S FOURTH SUPPLEMENT
) TO COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT
v. ) CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY:
AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al., ) 17 U.S.C. 512(h);
) 28 U.S.C. 1746(1)
COMES NOW Paul Andrew Mitchell, Plaintiff in the above entitled case, Citizen of California, Private Attorney General and Federal Witness, to file and serve this, the AUTHOR’S FOURTH SUPPLEMENT TO COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY.
Plaintiff kindly requests all interested parties to go no further in this pleading, until they have thoroughly reviewed the legislative history of the Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996 (“ACPA”). For the convenience of all, Plaintiff has made an electronic copy of this legislative history available in the Supreme Law Library, and also incorporated it as Exhibit L-6 in the Initial COMPLAINT. See Internet URL:
Plaintiff understands and argues that the ACPA was originally motivated by Congressional recognition of the Internet’s rapidly expanding role as the engine or “enterprise” for facilitating interstate traffic in counterfeits of trademarked and copyrighted merchandise. Indeed, when Plaintiff first discovered a counterfeit copy of His book being hosted on the Internet, in December 1995 A.D., the Netscape Navigator software (“Navigator”) had already vaulted its owner ‑‑ Netscape Communications Corp. ‑‑ into a preeminent position among software vendors worldwide. They beat the Microsoft Corporation to this market, with unprecedented speed.
The people of the world had discovered the Internet; they were buying and using literally millions of commercial copies of Navigator; and the inevitable result of this new technology was something on the order of a quantum leap in the availability of electronic information worldwide. The Internet had become the talk of the town. To call it a technological revolution is an obvious understatement.
The key technological advance was a mechanism and corresponding communications protocol, commonly called Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (“http”), which effectively enabled a global “hyper-text” database to be distributed among all computers that supported this protocol. By observing the arcane coding format for “links”, any document hosted on any given computer disk in this network could be directly linked to any other document on this network, without regard to political or geographic boundaries, or distance from client to server.
Judge Lewis A. Kaplan has done the entire world an admirable service by authoring a brilliant opinion in the case of Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Shawn Reimerdes et al. (see Exhibit L-5). Although Judge Kaplan is not a computer expert, he succeeded in thoroughly documenting for lay people the key role that such “links” play in the day-to-day operations of the Internet’s World Wide Web (“www”), the name given to the worldwide database coded in Hyper Text Markup Language (“HTML”). Links coded in HTML are also called “hyperlinks.”
Arguably, the single most important feature of HTML is the Anchor for Hyper Text References, or “HREF Anchor”, which is now commonly called a “link”. The following illustrates the visible portion of a link to Exhibit L-5, as hosted at the Supreme Law Library:
In this format, the link effectively “points” to the Internet “address” of an electronic copy of Judge Kaplan’s published opinion in the DECSS case, stored in Adobe’s Portable Document Format (“pdf”). To insulate Internet users from the need to see the laborious details of links coded in this fashion, HTML HREF Anchors permit programmers to bind graphics and any arbitrary text string to this address, or Universal Resource Locator (“URL”) as it is now commonly called.
Thus, Internet publishers anywhere in the world can refer to “Exhibit L-5” (the visible text) and bind this visible text to the URL shown above, by means of an HREF Anchor in the underlying HTML source code. Internet browsers like Navigator and Microsoft Internet Explorer (“MSIE”) permit the user to see this normally invisible source code by activating the View | Source option in their screen menus. The following is a generic example of such a link, as stored in the HTML source code:
<A HREF=”URL”>Exhibit L-5</A>
URL = the text of the Uniform Resource Locator,
typically starting with http://www.DOMAIN
If Judge Kaplan made any significant errors in his DECSS opinion supra, he failed fully to realize that links do not move the user to a new location on the Internet. On the contrary, an HTML link merely allows a user to copy a document and transfer that copy from anywhere on the Internet to the user’s personal computer.
In a literal sense, the transfer protocol automatically begins to copy the document from the target URL, into the user’s local computer memory, the moment the user clicks on the corresponding link.
This essential and relevant fact can be demonstrated by activating the File | Save As option, which permits the user to save an identical digital copy of the target URL onto the user’s local hard disk. This is the sequence which Plaintiff utilized to save identical copies of all Internet URL’s suspected of violating His exclusive copyrights in “The Federal Zone.”
The evidence in question, therefore, began as electronic files, and should be viewed as electronic files. This is one of the fundamental reasons why Plaintiff went to so much trouble to upload a subset of relevant electronic evidence into the Supreme Law Library on the Internet. Making this evidence available on the Internet is the single best way to illustrate, and emulate, the technological ease with which Plaintiff’s exclusive copyrights were systematically infringed by all Defendants. Seeing is believing (and so is doing).
Plaintiff is endeavoring to avoid unnecessary costs, for Himself and for all Defendants, including but not limited to the cost of professional time required to search and locate text occurrences within these numerous electronic files. Plaintiff argues that this approach has resulted in providing a means of access to this information that is far superior to the access made possible by printed hard copies in lieu of electronic copies. Optical scans (eyes) will never be as fast, or as accurate!
In recognition of the need to make at least one copy of this electronic evidence available in printed, or “hard copy,” format, Plaintiff filed two (2) sets of hard copy Exhibits in the official Clerk’s record of the instant case. Plaintiff also shipped a full set of hard copy Exhibits to the registered agent for service of legal process on behalf of Defendant AOL Time Warner, Inc.
Clearly, with 129 separate Defendants named in the Initial COMPLAINT and the first three (3) SUPPLEMENT’s, it became economically prohibitive for Plaintiff to print and serve hard copies of all incorporated Exhibits on all named Defendants.
The law does not compel the doing of impossibilities. Lex non cogit impossibilia (in Latin).
With this essential background in mind, it is easy to understand how the advent of Netscape dramatically accelerated the availability of digital information throughout the entire world. As long as the information was properly coded in HTML, files hosted on the Internet could be copied automatically to any user whose local computer was properly configured with compatible browser software.
As a general rule, however, many users failed to acknowledge or to appreciate this simple fact: pirates had quickly learned to exploit these obviously powerful features of the Internet to steal and host identical copies and/or modified counterfeits of copyrighted works, and then to distribute them widely, in flagrant violation of the authors’ exclusive copyrights in those works.
An open season was launched against intellectual property, resulting in widespread alarm among writers and publishers who make their living creating and distributing intellectual property. They, in turn, stormed the Congress for immediate legislative relief.
In recognition of the need for prompt legislative action ‑‑ to stem the rising tide of Internet-based copyright violations ‑‑ Congress enacted the ACPA in 1996, and followed with a set of comprehensive amendments to the Copyright Act in 1998. The latter set is now called the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”); it was signed into law by President Clinton on October 28, 1998 A.D. The U.S. Copyright Office Summary of this Act is available at Internet URL:
With this historical setting in mind, Plaintiff now demonstrates how to search and locate evidence of Defendant Carnegie Mellon’s complicity in the widespread infringement of Plaintiff’s exclusive copyrights in the subject book.
SEARCHING FOR CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY
IN THE DATABASE OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
Plaintiff now endeavors to illustrate a search methodology that is generic enough to locate occurrences of Carnegie Mellon University, and Internet Domain CMU.EDU, in the database of evidence now available in the Supreme Law Library. Hopefully, readers here will generalize what follows by applying this methodology to search and locate every occurrence of any other text string(s) that may exist in this database, e.g. other named Defendants and their co-conspirators.
Bear in mind, from the outset, that the availability of this electronic evidence on the Internet means that this database can now be searched by any of the 500+ commercial search engines that are presently available to all Internet users, at no cost to them. For example, the popular Google search engine can be used to locate all occurrences of the text string “cmu.edu” within the Supreme Law Library, by specifying the following in Google’s input window:
Plaintiff here prefers a more systematic approach to searching the electronic evidence in this database. The Initial COMPLAINT and first 3 SUPPLEMENT’s are Exhibits as well. All Exhibits are expressly incorporated by reference. Quite obviously, any lawyer capable of viewing these Exhibits with MSIE, or Navigator, should encounter the following (or similar) references to Carnegie Mellon University and CMU.EDU (or any other named Defendant):
(1) Carnegie-Mellon University is a named Defendant;
(2) Plaintiff added Carnegie-Mellon to the list of universities that received His NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUE AND PROSECUTE VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS;
(3) Plaintiff wrote and mailed a NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUE to Defendant Karl Kleinpaste, c/o Carnegie Mellon’s President;
(4) Plaintiff wrote and mailed a MIRANDA WARNING to Karl Kleinpaste, c/o Carnegie Mellon’s President;
(5) Plaintiff wrote and mailed a DEMAND FOR SUBSCRIBER IDENTITY to the Designated Agent at Carnegie Mellon;
(6) Plaintiff wrote and mailed a NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR AUTHORIZATION to the Designated Agent at Carnegie Mellon.
Plaintiff argues that item (6) above is pivotal, for purposes of establishing whether or not probable cause exists to oppose any and all efforts by Defendant Carnegie Mellon University to dismiss the Initial COMPLAINT against it. On June 11, 2001 A.D., Plaintiff wrote and mailed to Carnegie Mellon’s Designated Agent a NOTICE AND DEMAND to deliver a certified copy of the Author’s written authorization (if any), permitting Carnegie Mellon University to promote a stolen electronic copy of the subject book at Internet URL:
Plaintiff first encountered evidence of this copyright violation after completing the initial Internet search now summarized in the TFZLINKS file. See Exhibit D-1-A, entry #53. Plaintiff had used the Alta Vista search engine to prepare this summary. However, Alta Vista had omitted the underlying hyperlink that normally would have underlined the phrase “my ftp area”. Subsequently, Plaintiff focused His copyright enforcement efforts on the principal violator made evident by this much evidence, namely Defendant Karl Kleinpaste.
Much later, during another pass through all electronic evidence, Plaintiff re-encountered His copy of the specific file to which entry #53 refers supra. In that file, using the View | Source menu option, Plaintiff confirmed that the link in question did, indeed, point to the ftp server at Internet Domain CMU.EDU, as shown above. Try it, by searching the HTML source code where “my ftp area” is found:
Remember, after his thorough dissertation on hyperlinks, Judge Kaplan ruled that a hyperlink to stolen intellectual property is evidence of a copyright infringement, pure and simple. Therefore, Karl Kleinpaste’s link to his “ftp area” at CMU.EDU is evidence that a copy of the subject book was hosted at Internet Domain CMU.EDU during some period of time, as yet undisclosed. Plaintiff now repeats verbatim what Defendant Karl Kleinpaste openly admitted in a document he published on the Internet, to wit:
Under my ftp area, you will find a number of excellent starter resources. Notably, The Federal Zone is there in its electronically distributable form, as well as some extensive materials on the nature of implied contracts and a few other random bits and pieces. (I haven’t read them all yet myself, by the way. I can’t vouch for their stature personally. However, I use TFZ extensively.)
(NOTE: I have made grievous errors in leaving CMU to join Lycos: My archive area was lost and has yet to be reconstituted anywhere. Fortunately, the single most important piece of those archives was TFZ, which you can find here. [sic]
Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to take formal judicial notice of the following admissions already made in these two paragraphs:
(1) the phrase “my ftp area” is a hyperlink to a URL at one time located on computers owned and operated by Defendant Carnegie Mellon University;
(2) The Federal Zone (“TFZ”) at one time could be found there, in its electronically distributable form;
(3) Kleinpaste admits that he used “TFZ” extensively;
(4) Kleinpaste admits that he made “grievous errors in leaving CMU”;
(5) One of those errors was that his archive area was lost, and has yet to be reconstituted anywhere;
(6) Then, Kleinpaste refers to TFZ as “the single most important piece of those archives”;
(7) Finally, Kleinpaste identifies that “single most important piece” by adding a hyperlink to the stolen and modified counterfeit version hosted by Internet Domain DEOXY.ORG;
(8) At that time, DEOXY.ORG was hosted by computers owned and operated by Defendant AOL Time Warner, Inc.
It is worthwhile to mention here that printing hard copies of files like philo.htm results in concealing the underlying HTML code. This is another reason why electronic files are superior for evidence.
Plaintiff then acquired verifiable evidence that Internet Domain CMU.EDU was hosted by computers owned and operated by Defendant Carnegie Mellon University. This evidence was obtained from the Network Solutions, Inc. WHOIS database of Internet domains and their responsible contacts (i.e. Administrative, Technical, and Billing Contacts). See Internet URL:
Further evidence of complicity by Defendant Carnegie Mellon University can be seen in Plaintiff’s NOTICE OF DEFAULT, mailed to CMU’s Designated Agent for Notification of Copyright Infringement Claims on July 16, 2001 A.D. See Internet URL:
Nobody at Carnegie Mellon University ever requested, or obtained, Plaintiff’s permission to host or to promote a stolen and modified version of the subject book on computers owned and operated by CMU. Plaintiff’s NOTICE OF DEFAULT was accepted by CMU without protest or rebuttal, when they fell silent after receiving it.
Plaintiff’s NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR SUBSCRIBER IDENTITY is noteworthy, in this context, for having demanded discovery of the current mailing address (or the last known mailing address) for service of legal process upon the principal(s) responsible for “Karl Kleinpaste”, for the ftp address at CMU.EDU shown above, and for the file formerly located at the URL for philo.htm above.
Plaintiff argues that simple textual substitution is all that is required to justify the following finding: the Initial COMPLAINT properly alleges that Defendant Carnegie Mellon University failed to respond expeditiously to Plaintiff’s numerous written messages. See 17 U.S.C. 512(c). Those messages alleged a multiplicity of copyright infringements and Lanham Act violations. Violations of both Acts are alleged using the exact language of the pertinent statutes.
Likewise, simple textual substitution is all that is required to justify the following finding: the Initial COMPLAINT properly alleges that Plaintiff is entitled to recover from Defendant Carnegie Mellon University the actual damages that Plaintiff has sustained and will sustain, and any gains, profits, and advantages obtained by agents of Carnegie Mellon University, as a result of their joint and/or several acts of copyright infringement, as properly alleged above.
Defendant Carnegie Mellon University never requested Plaintiff’s permission to modify the subject book, and then to make modified derivatives (read “counterfeits”) available for free on the World Wide Web of the Internet.
Defendant Carnegie Mellon University never obtained Plaintiff’s permission to modify the subject book, and then to make counterfeits available for free on the World Wide Web of the Internet.
Using said modified, degenerate derivatives, the coordinated actions of Carnegie Mellon’s agents jointly and severally saturated the market for the subject book, to Plaintiff’s obvious detriment, by effectively diluting to zero (or effectively near zero) the real economic demand for authentic editions of the subject book.
Plaintiff argues that simple textual substitution is all that is required also to justify the following finding: the Initial COMPLAINT properly alleges that, by modifying the electronic text of the subject book with: arbitrary changes, arbitrary deletions, the addition of HTML, and the addition of other extraneous text not found anywhere in the original text of the electronic editions, agents of Defendant Carnegie Mellon University created and maintained unauthorized counterfeits that violated the fidelity requirement and thereby falsely designated the origin(s), falsely represented the fact, and falsely described Plaintiff as the sole Author, of said counterfeits.
In so doing, the conduct of Defendant Carnegie Mellon’s agents was likely to mislead others, to cause confusion and mistake, and to deceive others, both on and off the Internet, as to Defendant Carnegie Mellon’s affiliation(s), connection(s), and association(s) with Plaintiff, if any.
Likewise, the conduct of Defendant Carnegie Mellon’s agents was likely to mislead others, to cause confusion and mistake, and to deceive others, both on and off the Internet, as to the origin, sponsorship, and approval of Plaintiff’s goods, services, and commercial activities, if any.
By placing and using said counterfeits on the Internet, by installing and maintaining active hyperlinks to same, and/or by failing to remove said counterfeits and links expeditiously, after receipt of repeated NOTICES AND DEMANDS from Plaintiff, agents of Defendant Carnegie Mellon University thereby falsely designated the origin(s) of said counterfeits, falsely represented the fact of said counterfeits, and falsely described Plaintiff as the sole Author responsible for authorizing the publication and maintaining the availability of said counterfeits, on the Internet’s World Wide Web.
Therefore, Plaintiff properly alleges that each discrete act by agents of Defendant Carnegie Mellon University thus: falsely designating the origin(s) of said counterfeits, misleading others by falsely representing the fact of said counterfeits, misleading others by falsely describing Plaintiff as the sole Author of said counterfeits, and copying or linking to same via the Internet or any other medium, constitutes a separate and distinct violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act (uncodified at 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)).
Plaintiff’s NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR SUBSCRIBER IDENTITY to CMU explained, in detail, why it is that Plaintiff is justified in claiming a right to discover predicate acts to a RICO enterprise and conspiracy, dating back 10 years prior to August 1, 2001 (the date on which the Initial COMPLAINT was filed). The statute at 18 U.S.C. 1961 itemizes the complete list of RICO predicate acts. Criminal copyright infringement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2319, is listed there as a RICO predicate act. It was added to that list by the ACPA, enacted in 1996.
Plaintiff has reserved all rights, including but not limited to the right to request leave to amend the Initial COMPLAINT by adding COUNT SIX: Civil RICO, or to file Civil RICO claim(s) in the Superior Court of California. The State of California has concurrent jurisdiction over Civil RICO actions. See 18 U.S.C. 1964(c) (authorizing triple damages for RICO violations).
Carnegie Mellon University can be held liable for Civil RICO damages, under the theory of vicarious liability, for the criminal copyright infringements of any of its trustees, officers, employees, faculty, students, staff and clients (collectively its “agents” supra).
For all practical purposes, it makes no difference that Plaintiff has named Carnegie Mellon University as a civil Defendant before applying for the SUBPOENAS authorized by 17 U.S.C. 512(h). That SUBPOENA authority was introduced for the first time by the DMCA. It is relevant and, without question, material to the subject matter at hand (copyright infringement).
Plaintiff is entirely justified in arguing that a SUBPOENA is the appropriate procedural mechanism to compel formal discovery of the subscriber identity(s) and Activity Log records necessary to establish the who, what, where, and when of each and every single Internet request for the copyright infringements itemized above ‑‑ dating back ten (10) years ‑‑ and to substitute additional named defendants for available John Doe’s, using discovered Activity Log records as empirical and admissible evidence of the identities of those subscribers.
In preparation for issuing a SUBPOENA upon Defendant Carnegie Mellon University, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 512(h), on October 22, 2001 A.D., Plaintiff mailed and faxed to CMU a second NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR SUBSCRIBER IDENTITY which also demands discovery of the following additional information now suspected of being in the custody of CMU:
full details of all Activity Log records
for all Internet users and clients
who requested File Transfer Protocol services
from the following Internet server(s)
at any time during the past ten (10) years:
laser-printed on 8.5” x 11” hard copy
with Code Book documentation
required to decipher
each and every data field
In this context, therefore, Plaintiff reiterates the formal DEMAND of Carnegie Mellon University that He made in His NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUE AND PROSECUTE VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS on August 16, 1999 A.D. Specifically, Plaintiff wrote the following in that NOTICE:
Formal demand is hereby made of you immediately and permanently to refrain from destroying any material evidence, and also to cease and desist any and all conduct which could be construed as an attempt by any member of your institution to conceal and/or destroy evidence of other copyright infringements, electronic or otherwise, past, present, or future.
To the extent that Defendant Carnegie Mellon University has failed to honor this demand, in whole or in part, Plaintiff argues that their failure to do so constitutes further evidence of copyright infringement, obstruction of justice, tampering with evidence, and other predicate acts in a Civil RICO conspiracy dating back at least to October 1997, when Plaintiff first discovered the philo.htm file, as written by Defendant Karl Kleinpaste.
Does Carnegie Mellon University harbor criminal copyright violators, as an unwritten custom, practice, or policy?
This Court will kindly also take formal judicial notice of the fact that Defendant Justsystem Pittsburgh Research Center, Inc. (“JPRC”), until recently had offices only a few blocks from Carnegie Mellon University. During the past 6 months, Plaintiff was informed that JPRC was dissolved, on or about the time that Defendant commenced to serve a MIRANDA WARNING and a NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUE upon Mr. Scott Fahlman, the WHOIS contact for Internet Domain JPRC.COM:
Scott Fahlman is listed as the Administrative, Technical and Billing Contact for Internet Domain JPRC.COM. Scott Fahlman’s email address is therein shown as sef@CS.CMU.EDU ‑‑ quite obviously the email server hosting Internet Domain CMU.EDU in the Department of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University.
Plaintiff’s recent search for all references to “Karl Kleinpaste” in files currently hosted by Internet Domain CMU.EDU revealed that Karl Kleinpaste has now moved his files back to Carnegie Mellon’s computers. It is difficult if not impossible for Plaintiff to believe that all officials at Carnegie Mellon University are completely unaware that Karl Kleinpaste has done so. This is particularly so in light of the fact that Plaintiff published His VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT against Karl Kleinpaste in the Supreme Law Library, after serving that COMPLAINT on the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on or about August 27, 1999 A.D.
Plaintiff’s NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUE and MIRANDA WARNING were addressed and mailed to Mr. Karl Kleinpaste, c/o Office of the President at Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh 15213, PENNSYLVANIA, USA. Plaintiff is justified in assuming that somebody in that office read those 2 documents. See Exhibits G-14 and H-14, already incorporated by reference.
After enumerating all Exhibits, on May 31, 2001 A.D. Plaintiff wrote and mailed two (2) more DEMANDS FOR SUBSCRIBER IDENTITY to Clairvoyance Corporation, the consolidated American subsidiary of Defendant Justsystem Corporation (Japan). Both DEMANDS require disclosure of the correct identity and current mailing address (or last known mailing address) for the principals responsible for Karl Kleinpaste, certain of his Internet files, and his known business associates. For details, see Internet URL’s:
For the record, Plaintiff reminds this Court that Exhibits D‑46 and D‑47 have likewise been incorporated by reference. These Exhibits are entitled “Documented Retaliations” and “RICO Predicate Acts,” respectively. They are found at Internet URL’s:
The Court is encouraged to study these files, and each and every link to supporting files of evidence itemized at those URL’s.
There is much more evidence than what has been summarized above, where the entire emphasis has been on evidence implicating Defendant Carnegie Mellon University.
The Internet has become so powerful, at the present time it is quite capable of generating over one million copies of the subject book per second of clock time.
Plaintiff has expended enormous efforts to locate and document the known violators, who have exploited and abused the power of the Internet for more than SEVEN YEARS!
It is time for this Court to exercise its lawful judicial authority in a manner that is equal to the task at hand.
Plaintiff can no longer afford to engage these thieves in a wild goose chase, only to find still more copies popping up out of nowhere, day after day, week after week, month after month, and year after year, ad nauseam.
The game stops here, and now.
Thank you for your professional consideration.
Plaintiff argues that the verified documentary evidence enumerated above is more than sufficient to establish probable cause to implicate Defendant Carnegie Mellon University in copyright infringements, Lanham Act violations, Civil RICO conspiracy, vicarious RICO liability, itemized predicate acts, and some if not all of the other federal offenses alleged in Plaintiff’s Initial COMPLAINT.
Although that Initial COMPLAINT does not allege any Civil RICO COUNTS, as such, Plaintiff has expressly and properly reserved all Rights, including but not limited to the Right to request formal leave of this Court to amend the Initial COMPLAINT, at least once, with COUNT SIX: Civil RICO, and specifically to name Defendant Carnegie Mellon University (among others both named, and as yet unnamed) with conspiracy to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, and liability for Civil RICO damages. See ACPA, for legislative intent.
For purposes of maintaining order in this Court, Plaintiff concludes by arguing that the most appropriate time to amend the Initial COMPLAINT would occur after formal discovery is completed, specifically after enforcement of the SUBPOENAS authorized by 17 U.S.C. 512(h). See 28 U.S.C. 2072(a) (FRCP only applies in USDC).
In light of the case law which has consistently held that statutes granting original jurisdiction to federal district courts must be strictly construed, this District Court of the United States will please take formal judicial notice of the grant of original jurisdiction in that statute to the United States district court [sic] (a legislative tribunal), specifically 17 U.S.C. 512(h)(1).
Plaintiff hereby formally incorporates by reference the AUTHOR’S FIRST CERTIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS IN RE DEFENDANT CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY, previously executed and served on October 25, 2001 A.D., as if the same were set forth fully herein.
A key document in said pleading is the Plaintiff’s NOTICE OF FAILURE TO DESIGNATE AGENT FOR NOTIFICATION OF CLAIMS OF CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT, which He transmitted via first class U.S. Mail to the Office of the President at Defendant Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh 15213, PENNSYLVANIA, USA, on August 16, 1999 A.D. See Internet URL:
Plaintiff wishes specifically to request careful judicial notice of the following key paragraph in said NOTICE:
The evidence available to us indicates that one Karl Kleinpaste has, at various times in the past, utilized the Internet file servers at Carnegie Mellon University to disseminate a stolen and modified, derivative copy of “The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue,” electronic edition, and to provide users of the World Wide Web (“WWW”) with explicit instructions for obtaining additional stolen and modified copies of same.
The evidence available to Plaintiff indicates that Defendant Carnegie Mellon University did, for the first time on September 12, 1999 A.D., register with the U.S. Copyright Office an Interim Designation of Agent to Receive Notification of Claimed Infringement, registration number #106231706. See Internet URL:
See the DMCA supra, for statutory details. Evidently, between October 28, 1998 A.D., and September 12, 1999 A.D., Defendant Carnegie Mellon University had failed to designate an agent for notification of copyright infringement claims, as required by the DMCA.
On October 16, 2001 A.D., Plaintiff accessed this latter URL to determine if there had been any changes in CMU’s Designated Agent, after September 12, 1999 A.D. The following information had remained unchanged, to wit:
Computing Services, Cyert 102
Carnegie Mellon University
5000 Forbes Avenue
tel: (412) 268-2638
fax: (412) 268-4987
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, Plaintiff in the above entitled action, hereby verify under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
Dated: October 29, 2001 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Sui Juris
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18 years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the following document(s):
AUTHOR’S FOURTH SUPPLEMENT
TO COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT
CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY:
17 U.S.C. 512(h);
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to the following:
Clerk of Court Mark Poepping
District Court of the United States Designated Agent
501 “I” Street, Suite 4-200 Carnegie Mellon University
Sacramento 95814-2322 Computing Services, Cyert 102
CALIFORNIA, USA 5000 Forbes Avenue
Courtesy copies to:
Ropers, Majeski, Kohn & Bentley DeForest & Koscelnik
(failed to exhibit oaths) (failed to exhibit oath)
1001 Marshall Street 3000 Koppers Building
Redwood City 94063 436 Seventh Avenue
CALIFORNIA, USA Pittsburgh 15219
Murphy Austin Adams Schoenfeld LLP Pillsbury Winthrop LLP
(failed to exhibit oaths) (failed to exhibit oaths)
P.O. Box 1319 400 Capitol Mall, Suite 1700
Sacramento 95814-1319 Sacramento 95814-4419
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Steinhart & Falconer, LLP James Barksdale
(oaths have been requested) c/o Spark Public Relations
333 Market Street, 32nd Floor 115 Constitution Ave., Ste. 3
San Francisco 94105-2150 Menlo Park 94025
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Marc Andreessen, CEO Perkins Coie LLP
Loudcloud, Inc. Attention: David Saenz
599 N. Mathilda Avenue 101 Jefferson Drive
Sunnyvale 94085 Menlo Park 94025-1114
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Dated: October 29, 2001 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Plaintiff In Propria Persona