No. 03-5070
______________________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 2002 A.D.
______________________________________
Paul Andrew Mitchell ‑‑ Petitioner
v.
AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al. ‑‑ Respondents
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Private Attorney General
c/o Forwarding Agent
501 West Broadway, Suite A-332
San Diego 92101
CALIFORNIA, USA
tel: (619) 234-5252
fax: (619) 234-5272
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
(1) Is the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869 et seq., unconstitutional for exhibiting vagueness, for violating the ex post facto prohibition at Article I, Section 9, Clause 3, for violating the Separation of Powers at Article I, Section 1, and for violating the well established principle that federal statutes conferring original jurisdiction on federal district courts must be strictly construed?
(2) Does the ex post facto Clause in the U.S. Constitution prohibit Congress from enacting or otherwise authorizing legislation which retroactively re‑defines the term “district courts” in federal statutes that pre‑date the Act of June 25, 1948, without expressly amending, or repealing and re‑enacting, those statutes?
(3) Are there two (2) separate and distinct classes of federal district courts currently established and currently available to federal litigants within the 50 States: one constitutional and the other legislative?
(4) Strictly construed, does the Rules Enabling Act at 28 U.S.C. 2072(a) limit this Court’s authority to promulgate rules of evidence and procedure only for United States District Courts, and not for the District Courts of the United States?
(5) Is the Abrogation Clause at 28 U.S.C. 2072(b) in the Rules Enabling Act unconstitutional for violating the Separation of Powers Doctrine as founded upon Article I, Section 1?
(6) Likewise, are the Local Rules for the federal district courts in Sacramento, California, expressly limited in scope to cases that proceed before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California (“USDC”)?
(7) Specifically, is a Local Rule “coercive” when it refers all Pro Per cases ‑‑ automatically and without the consent of all parties ‑‑ to U.S. magistrates appointed to that USDC and, as such, does that Local Rule also violate the Federal Magistrates Act, recent decisions of this Court, pertinent decisions of the Ninth Circuit, and Article III in the U.S. Constitution?
(8) Strictly construed, did the Lanham Act at 60 Stat. 440 confer original jurisdiction on the District Courts of the United States (“DCUS”) but not on the United States District Courts (“USDC”) inside California State, and has that grant of original jurisdiction ever been amended by Congress?
(9) Did Congress expressly extend the U.S. Constitution into D.C. in 1871 A.D. and into all federal Territories in 1873 A.D.?
(10) Are UNPUBLISHED Circuit Court opinions unconstitutional?
List
of Parties
Plaintiff:
Paul Andrew Mitchell
Defendants:
AOL Time Warner, Inc.,
Steve Case,
Lennert Leader,
Randall J. Boe,
Adit Seth,
George R. Boyce,
James R. Bramson,
Daniel Levy,
Jonathan Steuer,
Brian Oblivion,
Donald D. Hoffman,
Karl Kleinpaste,
California Institute of Technology,
Cornell University,
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University,
Florida Institute of Technology,
Indiana University,
Miami University of Ohio,
Northeastern University,
Pennsylvania State University,
Princeton University,
Stanford University,
Stetson University,
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology,
University of Arkansas,
University of California,
University of Georgia,
University of Kansas,
University of Michigan,
University of Oregon,
University of Texas,
Internet Domain INCORPTEK.COM,
Justsystem Pittsburgh Research Center,
Midwest Internet Exchange, Inc., [sic]
Simple Network Communications, Inc.,
Luke Stevens,
COWZ Technologies,
The Works BBS,
Sean Strasburg,
Michael McFarland,
David Thorburn-Gundlach,
Bob Isaacson,
Tore Nestenius,
C. J. Sollien,
Chris Hansen,
Floyd W. Shackelford,
Network Solutions, Inc.,
The Thomson Corporation,
Cosmic Awareness Communications,
Sprawlnet.com, Inc.,
Four Peaks Technology Groups,
Tzolkin Corporation,
ParabolaX Research Group,
William Harrity,
THF Pictures,
Synchron Data,
Lyle Myhr, and
Doe’s 98 thru 2,500
Dedications
Petitioner dedicates this document to Dr. John C. Alden, M.D., eye surgeon practicing in Oakland, California, and Trustee of the charitable trust we call The EyeCare Fund ‑‑ Vision for Everyone. Part of the proceeds of this lawsuit will be used to provide routine and emergency eye care to patients who cannot afford health insurance.
Petitioner also dedicates this document to Professor Emeritus Kenneth L. Karst, at the UCLA Law School in Los Angeles, California. As quoted below, Prof. Karst had the courage and foresight to question the wisdom of transferring wholesale American jurisprudence into the hands of federal legislative courts. Let Article III prevail. Amen.
Page
Table of Authorities ......................................... vi
Opinions Below ............................................. xiii
Jurisdiction ................................................ xiv
Constitutional / Statutory Provisions Involved ............... xv
Statement of the Case ......................................... 1
Reasons for Granting the Writ ................................. 4
A Drama Unfolding ............................................. 5
Navigating this Petition and its Appendices ................... 9
Final Summation .............................................. 27
Conclusions .................................................. 28
Index to Appendices .......................................... 29
Proof of Service ............................................. 30
For Appendix numbers, please refer in sequence to entries in the Table of Contents at Internet URL:
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/index.htm
This PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI is entry number 151 in that Table of Contents.
The Hyper‑Text Markup Language (“HTML”) version of this PETITION will contain additional underlines, due to the addition of numerous working hyperlinks.
The hard copy version was written and printed using registered copies of Microsoft WORD 2002 and Microsoft Windows 98 Second Edition.
And, many thanks to SuperMicro for manufacturing such a reliable PC motherboard. Mine has crossed the continent and the Pacific Ocean twice, surviving bumpy pickup trucks and airline baggage handlers.
Cases: Page
U.S.
Supreme Court
American Insurance v. 356 Bales of Cotton,
26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 7 L.Ed. 242 (1828) ...................... 23
American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister,
207 U.S. 284, hn. 2 & 6 (1907) ................................ 19
Ex parte Bakelite Corporation,
279 U.S. 438 (1929) ........................................... 23
Balzac v. Porto Rico,
258 U.S. 298 (1922) ....................................... 22, 24
Benner v. Porter,
50 U.S. 235, 242‑243 (1850) ................................... 23
Carmell v. Texas,
529 U.S. 513, 531 (2000) ....................................... 6
The City of Panama,
101 U.S. 453, 460 (1879) ...................................... 23
Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States,
285 U.S. 382 (1932) ........................................... 23
Clinton v. Englebrecht,
80 U.S. 434, 447 (1871) ....................................... 23
Darr v. Burford,
339 U.S. 200 (1950) ........................................... 25
Evans v. Gore,
253 U.S. 245 (1920) ....................................... 16, 21
Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co.,
281 U.S. 464 (1930) ........................................... 23
Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner,
274 U.S. 145 (1927) ........................................... 23
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U.S. 530 (1962) ........................................... 23
Good v. Martin,
95 U.S. 90, 98 (1877) ......................................... 23
Hornbuckle v. Toombs,
85 U.S. 648, 655 (1873) ....................................... 23
Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co.,
261 U.S. 428 (1923) ........................................... 23
Mookini v. U.S.,
303 U.S. 201 (1938) ........................................... 22
Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50 (1982) ............................................ 23
O’Donoghue v. United States,
289 U.S. 516 (1933) ........................................... 23
Reynolds v. U.S.,
98 U.S. 145, 154 (1878) ....................................... 23
Roell et al. v. Withrow,
2003 DJDAR 4593 (April 29, 2003) .......................... 11, 16
Swift & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 311 (1928) ........................................... 23
U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,
350 U.S. 11 (1955) ............................................ 12
Williams v. United States,
289 U.S. 553 (1933) ............................................ 8
U.S.
Courts of Appeal
A&M Records et al. v. Napster, Inc.,
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) .................................. 22
Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp.,
85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996) .................................... 22
Agnew v. Compton,
239 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1956) ................................... 22
Alpha Industries, Inc. v. Alpha Steel,
616 F.2d 440 (9th Cir. 1980) ................................... 22
Anastasoff v. USA,
223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000) ................................ 4, 20
Brennan v. Silvergate,
503 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1974) ................................... 22
Brookfield v. West Coast Entertainment,
174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999) .................................. 22
Crescent Wharf v. Pillsbury,
259 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1958) ................................... 22
Drop Dead Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,
326 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1963) .................................... 22
Gillespie v. Civiletti,
629 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1980) ................................... 22
Griffith Co. v. NLRB,
545 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1976) .................................. 22
Hajek v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co.,
186 F.3d 1105, hn. 9 (9th Cir. 1999) ........................... 11
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,
255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) .................................. 22
Hoffman v. U.S.,
244 F.2d 378, 379 (9th Cir. 1957) .............................. 25
In re Simon,
297 F. 942 (2nd Cir. 1924) ..................................... 15
Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc.,
152 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1998) .................................. 22
Leas & McVitty v. Merriman,
132 F. 510 (C.C. W.D. Virginia 1904) .......................... 15
Levi Strauss v. Blue Bell, Inc.,
778 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985) .................................. 22
Mai Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.,
991 F.2d 511, hn. 2 (9th Cir. 1993) ............................ 20
Martinez v. Stanford et al.,
2003 DJDAR 3371 (9th Cir. March 26, 2003) ...................... 11
Middleton Paper Co. v. Rock River Paper Co.,
19 F. 252 (C.C. W.D. Wisconsin 1884) .......................... 15
Midler v. Ford Motor Company,
849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) ................................... 22
Nova Stylings, Inc. v. Ladd,
695 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1983) .................................. 22
Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd.,
19 F.3d 479 (9th Cir. 1994) .................................... 22
Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co.,
429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970) .................................. 22
Scanbe Mfg. Co. v. Tryon,
400 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1968) ................................... 15
Seiler v. Lucasfilm, Ltd.,
808 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1986) .................................. 22
Taylor v. U.S.,
45 F. 531 (C.C. E.D. Tennessee 1891) .......................... 15
Traguth v. Zuck,
710 F.2d 90, 95 (2nd Cir. 1983) ................................ 25
Tsang v. Kan,
173 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1949) ................................... 22
U-Haul
Int’l v. Jartran, Inc.,
793 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1986) .................................. 22
U.S. v. High Country Broadcasting Co.,
3 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1993) ................................ 17, 22
U.S. v. Saunders,
641 F.2d 659, hn. 2 (9th Cir. 1980) ............................ 11
U.S. v. Woodley,
726 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1983) .................................. 22
Wells v. U.S.,
214 F.2d 380, 382, hn. 2-4 (5th Cir. 1954) ..................... 27
Wendt v. Host International, Inc.,
125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997) ................................... 22
U.S.
District Courts
Advance Coating Technology, Inc. v. LEP Chemical, Ltd.,
142 FRD 91 (USDC/New York 1992) ............................... 14
Austin v. Cuyler,
499 F.Supp. 1116 (USDC/Pennsylvania 1980) ..................... 13
Intellectual Reserve Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc.,
75 F.Supp.2d 1290 (USDC/Utah 1999) ............................ 20
Lord v. Kelley,
240 F.Supp. 167, 169 (USDC/Massachusetts 1965) ............ 16, 21
Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Ass’n of Fire Equip. Distrib.,
983 F.Supp. 1167, 1179 (USDC/Illinois 1997) ................... 20
Mullins v. Hinkle,
953 F.Supp. 744 (USDC/West Virginia 1997) ..................... 14
Nalty v. Nalty Tree Farm,
654 F.Supp. 1315 (USDC/Alabama 1987) .......................... 14
Thompson v. Rose,
505 F.Supp. 183 (USDC/Tennessee 1981) ......................... 14
U.S. v. Hough,
157 F.Supp. 771, 774 (USDC/California 1957) ................... 25
U.S. v. King,
119 F.Supp. 398 (DC/Alaska 1954) ............................... 6
U.S. v. Marrone,
172 F.Supp. 368, 370, hn. 1-2 (D.C. Alaska 1959) .............. 27
U.S. v. Murphy,
82 F. 893 (DCUS/Delaware 1897) ................................ 15
U.S. v. Sharrock,
276 F. 30 (DCUS/Montana 1921) ................................. 15
U.S.
Bankruptcy Courts
Miles v. Gussin,
104 B.R. 553 (District of Columbia 1989) ...................... 15
California
Court of Appeals
Legerton v. Chambers,
163 P. 678, 32 Cal.App. 601 (1917) ........................ 12, 15
Constitutional
Provisions:
Article I, Section 1 (“All legislative Powers ...”)........ i, 8
Article I, Section 9, Clause 3, ex post facto Clause ... i, 6, 7
Article II ..................................................... 8
Article III ................. i, xii, 5, 6, 11, 12, 16, 20, 23, 24
Article III, Section 1, Compensation Clause ................... 21
Article III, Section 2, Clause 1, Arising Under Clause ......... 8
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, Territory Clause ............. 6
Article IV, Section 4, Guarantee Clause .................. 10, 18
Article VI, Section 3, Oath of Office Clause .............. 3, 11
Ninth Amendment ................................................ 8
Tenth Amendment ................................................ 8
Statutes:
14 Stat. 27, 1866 Civil Rights Act ........................... 24
16 Stat. 419, 426, § 34 (1871) ................... i, 10, 18, 24
18 Stat. 325, 333, § 1891 (1873) ................... i, 10, 18, 24
62 Stat. 869 et seq. .................................... i, 5, 13
5 U.S.C. 552 ............................................ 11, 12
5 U.S.C. 2104 ............................................ 12, 15
5 U.S.C. 2902 ............................................ 12, 15
15 U.S.C. 1121, 60 Stat. 440 ................ i, xiv, 1, 5, 16, 18
15 U.S.C. 1125, 60 Stat. 441 .................. i, 1, 5, 6, 16, 25
15 U.S.C. 1127, 60 Stat. 443 .................................. 25
17 U.S.C. 101 ................................................ 20
17 U.S.C. 106 ................................................ 25
17 U.S.C. 506, COUNT ONE .................................. 1, 19
17 U.S.C. 512(h) ............................................. 18
18 U.S.C. 3-4 .............................................. 15
18 U.S.C. 241-242, COUNT FOUR ............................. 1, 25
18 U.S.C. 371, COUNT FOUR ................................. 1, 25
18 U.S.C. 1503 ................................................ 15
18 U.S.C. 1512-1513, COUNTS THREE, FOUR ............... xiv, 1, 25
18 U.S.C. 2319, COUNT ONE .................................. 1, 19
18 U.S.C.
3231 ............................................... xiv
26 U.S.C. 3402(n) (IRC 3402(n)) ............................... 21
28 U.S.C. ................................................... i, 5
28 U.S.C. 132 ................................................ 24
28 U.S.C. 251 ................................................ 24
28 U.S.C. 372(c) ...................................... 2, 12, 14
28 U.S.C. 453 ................................................. 3
28 U.S.C. 454 ............................................. 2, 14
28 U.S.C. 455 ............................................ 16, 21
28 U.S.C. 631 ................................................ 17
28 U.S.C. 636 ................................................ 14
28 U.S.C. 955 ............................................ 12, 15
28 U.S.C. 1254 ............................................... xiv
28 U.S.C. 1291 ........................................... xiv, 17
28 U.S.C. 1292 ................................................ 18
28 U.S.C.
1331 ............................................... xiv
28 U.S.C.
1338 ............................................... xiv
28 U.S.C. 1654 ................................................ 25
28 U.S.C. 1691 ............................................ 10, 15
28 U.S.C. 2072 ...................................... i, 7, 13, 16
28 U.S.C. 2403(a) ............................................. 12
California Business and Professions Code (“CBPC”):
§ 6067 ............................................. 11, 16, 17
§ 6126-6127 ................................................ 17
§ 17200 et seq., COUNT FIVE .................................. 1
Rules:
Rule 44, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”) ........ 13
Rule 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) .......... 14
Local Rule (“L.R.”) 73‑302(c)(21), USDC/EDCA ........... i, 11, 16
Other:
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1856) ................................ 8
“Party” defined (see Article III)
Quoting:
“When applied to practice, by party is understood either the plaintiff or defendant.”
[bold and underlined emphasis added]
Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition ......................... 24
“Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius” defined
Quoting:
“This doctrine decrees that where law expressly describes particular situation to which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or excluded was intended to be omitted or excluded.”
[bold and underlined emphasis added]
Academic
Treatises:
Prof.
Emeritus Kenneth L. Karst, on the faculty of the UCLA Law School, has
summarized the overall problem quite nicely as follows:
In essence a legislative court is merely
an administrative agency with an elegant name.
While Congress surely has the power to transfer portions of the business
of the federal judiciary to legislative courts, a wholesale transfer of
that business would work a fundamental change in the status of our
independent judiciary and would seem vulnerable to constitutional attack.
[Discussion
of “Legislative Court”]
[in
Encyclopedia of the American Constitution]
[New
York, MacMillan Publishing Company (1986)]
[underlines and
bold emphasis added]
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 2002 A.D.
Petitioner respectfully requests
that a Writ of Certiorari issue
to review the judgments below:
The “ORDER” denying rehearing by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, as filed on April 8, 2003 A.D., appears at Appendix 147.
The “MEMORANDUM NOT FOR PUBLICATION” by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, as filed on December 13, 2002 A.D., appears at Appendix 125.
The “MEMORANDUM AND ORDER” captioned “UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA” denying reconsideration on February 22, 2002 A.D., appears at Appendix 75. See also Appendix 70.
The “ORDER” captioned “UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA” adopting the findings and recommendations, as filed on January 25, 2002 A.D., appears at Appendix 57.
The “ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS” [sic] by Mr. Drozd, as filed on December 31, 2001 A.D., appear at Appendix 45.
Other alleged “ORDER’s” issued by Mr. Drozd are also listed in chronological order in the Table of Contents at Internet URL:
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/index.htm
Appendix numbers correspond to entries in that Table of Contents, in chronological order. (Appendix 1 = entry 1, etc.)
The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided this case was December 13, 2002 A.D. See Appendix 125.
A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of Appeals on April 8, 2003 A.D., and a copy of the “ORDER” denying rehearing appears at Appendix 147.
The jurisdiction of this Supreme Court of the United States is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
The United States Court of Appeals enjoyed appellate jurisdiction pursuant to a strict construction of the federal statutes at 60 Stat. 440, § 39, July 5, 1946 (aka 15 U.S.C. 1121) and 28 U.S.C. 1291.
The District Court of the United States enjoyed original jurisdiction pursuant to a strict construction of the federal statutes at 60 Stat. 440 supra, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338(a), 1338(b), and also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512, 1513 and 3231. See Initial COMPLAINT.
For the convenience of this Supreme Court and all its personnel, Petitioner now documents all known amendments to 60 Stat. 440 supra:
Statute at Large Date Public Law Miscellaneous
---------------- ------------- ------------ ------------------------
60 Stat. 440 Jul. 5, 1946 Ch. 540, Title VI, § 39
62 Stat. 870 Jun. 25, 1948 Ch. 646, §§ 1, 32(a)
62 Stat. 907 Jun. 25, 1948 Ch. 646, § 32
62 Stat. 991 Jun. 25, 1948 Ch. 646, §§ 1, 32(a)
63 Stat. 107 May 24, 1949 Ch. 139, § 127
96 Stat. 46 Apr. 2, 1982 P.L. 97-164 Title I, Part B, § 148
96 Stat 1316 Oct. 12, 1982 P.L. 97-296 § 39a, 15 U.S.C. 1121(b)
102 Stat 3946 Nov. 16, 1988 P.L. 100-667 Title I, § 131
112 Stat 3070 Oct. 30, 1998 P.L. 105-330 Title II, § 201(a)(10)
Sources:
15 USCA 1121, 15 USCS 1121, and the
U.S. Code at Cornell University’s website:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/15/1121.html
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved
Constitutional
Provisions:
Article I, Section 1 (“All legislative Powers ...”)
Article I, Section 9, Clause 3, ex post facto Clause
Article III, Section 1, Compensation Clause
Article III, Section 2, Clause 1, Arising Under Clause
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, Territory Clause
Article IV, Section 4, Guarantee Clause
Article VI, Section 3, Oath of Office Clause
Statutory
Provisions:
14 Stat. 27, 1866 Civil Rights Act
16 Stat. 419, 426, § 34 (1871) (first extension statute)
18 Stat. 325, 333, § 1891 (1873) (second extension statute)
62 Stat. 869 et seq.
5 U.S.C. 552, 2104, 2902
15 U.S.C. 1121, 60 Stat. 440 (Title 15 not enacted) (see COUNT TWO)
15 U.S.C. 1125, 60 Stat. 441 (Title 15 not enacted) (see COUNT TWO)
15 U.S.C. 1127, 60 Stat. 443 (Title 15 not enacted) (see COUNT THREE)
17 U.S.C. 101 (see COUNT ONE)
17 U.S.C. 106 (see COUNT ONE)
17 U.S.C. 506 (see COUNT ONE)
17 U.S.C. 512 (see COUNT ONE)
18 U.S.C. 3-4
18 U.S.C. 241-242 (see COUNTS THREE and FOUR)
18 U.S.C. 371 (see COUNT FOUR)
18 U.S.C. 1503
18 U.S.C. 1512-1513(see COUNTS THREE and FOUR)
18 U.S.C. 2319 (see COUNT ONE)
26 U.S.C. 3402(n), IRC 3402(n) (Title 26 not enacted)
28 U.S.C. 132
28 U.S.C. 372(c)
28 U.S.C. 453-455
28 U.S.C. 631
28 U.S.C. 636
28 U.S.C. 955
28 U.S.C. 1254
28 U.S.C. 1291-1292
28 U.S.C. 1654
28 U.S.C. 1691
28 U.S.C. 2072
28 U.S.C. 2403(a)
§§ 6067, 6126, 6127, and 17200 et seq., CBPC (see COUNT FIVE)
Reader’s Notes:
On August 1, 2001 A.D., Plaintiff Paul Andrew Mitchell filed a civil case in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Judicial District of California (“DCUS”), in Sacramento, California, alleging five (5) counts against a total of 129 named Defendants.
The five counts included copyright infringement, trademark infringement, deprivation of fundamental Rights, conspiracy to deprive fundamental Rights, and unfair competition under California laws.
Pursuant to a Local Rule and without the consent of all parties, the case was automatically referred to Mr. Dale A. Drozd, alleging to occupy the office of a United States magistrate in Sacramento, Calif. Mitchell timely objected to that referral, in numerous ways.
Over Mitchell’s written objections, Mr. Drozd scheduled a preliminary hearing for December 14, 2001 A.D., to consider motions to dismiss which had been filed in the wrong court by defense attorneys appearing without the credentials required by California State laws.
Mitchell appeared under protest to challenge jurisdiction.
At that hearing, Mr. Drozd agreed that 60 Stat. 440 was exactly the correct statute conferring original jurisdiction over Mitchell’s Lanham Act claim. Compare 15 U.S.C. 1121 (not enacted). Mr. Drozd also branded Mitchell’s constitutional issues as “frivolous” [sic].
Also on December 14, 2001 A.D., the District Clerk issued a large number of SUBPOENA’s IN A CIVIL CASE: to command certain named Defendants to disclose computer activity logs and the identities of subscribers suspected of infringing Mitchell’s exclusive copyrights, and to compel defense attorneys to disclose the certificates of oath that are required to be indorsed upon their licenses to practice law.
On December 31, 2001 A.D., Mr. Drozd filed his findings and recommendations, assuming motions to dismiss had been properly filed.
Mitchell followed timely with a complaint of judicial misconduct against Mr. Drozd, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 372(c). That complaint incorporated Mitchell’s VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT against Mr. Drozd, for practicing law from the bench in violation of 28 U.S.C. 454.
The delivery of Mr. Drozd’s mail, containing his findings and recommendations, was delayed for reasons that remain undiscovered.
Immediately upon receiving those findings and recommendations, Mitchell prepared, filed and served thoroughly detailed objections, in three (3) parts entitled MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER [sic] AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE ‑‑ PARTS I, II, and III.
Assuming he had jurisdiction, Mr. William B. Shubb then adopted Mr. Drozd’s findings and recommendations in full. Mitchell followed with a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, which Mr. Shubb summarily denied.
Mitchell then appealed timely to the Ninth Circuit.
In a MEMORANDUM NOT FOR PUBLICATION [sic] dated Dec. 13, 2002 A.D., Messrs. Goodwin, Hug and Trott issued an unsigned and unsealed ruling approving all actions taken by Mr. Shubb, and affirming for reasons set forth in Mr. Drozd’s findings and recommendations.
That MEMORANDUM also agreed that leave to amend Mitchell’s Initial COMPLAINT would be “futile” and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
Finally, that MEMORANDUM erred in finding that Mitchell had failed to file timely objections to the findings and recommendations, and that Mitchell had presented no valid grounds for reconsideration of the dismissal with prejudice.
Mitchell then objected to Shubb and Trott, because the U.S. DOJ later confirmed in writing that, as the legal custodian of record, DOJ could find no Presidential Commission for either gentleman.
Mitchell also objected to Mr. Hug, because an earlier VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT, which Mitchell had filed against Mr. Hug in 1997, created conflicts of interest in connection with the case of a federal grand jury SUBPOENA that Mitchell was authorized to litigate.
And, Mitchell also objected to Mr. Goodwin, because the latter’s decision in re the Pledge of Allegiance effectively disqualified him for lacking a proper oath of office (i.e. by omitting from that oath the conditional phrase “So help me God.”) See 28 U.S.C. 453.
Mitchell continued to investigate all pertinent laws and decisions with great diligence, e.g. see his detailed MEMO to Circuit Judge Kozinski detailing 25 years of Ninth Circuit precedents in re the Federal Magistrates Act, and a shorter MEMO to Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Mary M. Schroeder concerning her dissent in one of those cases.
Mitchell formally requested rehearing en banc, and also filed an APPLICATION FOR WRIT IN THE NATURE OF QUO WARRANTO on behalf of the United States ex rel., to challenge and finally to decide any rights in Messrs. Shubb and Drozd to occupy the offices they claimed.
In another unsigned and unsealed ORDER dated April 8, 2003 A.D., Messrs. Goodwin, Hug and Trott also denied Mitchell’s petition for rehearing and all other pending motions, inclusive of a demand by Mitchell for mandatory judicial notice of Trott’s missing commission.
Mitchell now respectfully requests that a Writ of Certiorari issue upon the U.S. Court of Appeals, permitting full appellate review by this honorable Supreme Court of all proceedings below.
The Ninth Circuit’s decisions conflict with the principles and the specific holding pronounced by the decision of the Eighth Circuit in Anastasoff v. USA, 223 F.3d 898 (2000) in re UNPUBLISHED decisions, and with standing decisions by other Circuit Courts in re trademark and copyright enforcement. The Anastasoff decision is particularly relevant to the historic and proper meaning of “judicial precedent.”
II
The Ninth Circuit has itself departed so far from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, and it has also sanctioned such a departure by a lower federal court, as to call for an exercise of this Supreme Court’s supervisory powers. Confer at “res judicata”.
III
The Ninth Circuit has effectively decided important questions of federal Law in a cursory, summary and “legislative” fashion that conflicts with standing and relevant decisions of this Supreme Court.
IV
The Ninth Circuit has effectively decided important questions of federal Law that have not been, and should be, finally settled by this Supreme Court, by exercising appropriate deliberation in this case.
Petitioner now elaborates in detail as follows:
To set the stage for the dramatic disclosures that are about to follow in this Petition, Paul Andrew Mitchell (hereinafter “Mitchell”) respectfully requests this honorable Supreme Court to pause, and reflect on two pivotal dates in the history of American jurisprudence.
First of all, a relatively unknown trademark law called the Lanham Act was first enacted on July 5, 1946. It conferred original jurisdiction on the district and territorial courts of the United States over federal claims of trademark infringement, including false designations of origin, false and misleading descriptions of fact, and false and misleading representations of fact. Compare 15 U.S.C. 1121.
Secondly, a well known Act of Congress was signed into law by President Truman on June 25, 1948. That Act completely re‑structured the entire federal court system, after several years of committee work were needed to re‑write numerous governing statutes. See Title 28.
It is not difficult to prove that, in 1946 A.D., the distinction between district and territorial courts was well understood and not terribly controversial. In that year, there was only one class of federal district courts established inside the several (48) States.
What has become rather controversial, however, is our recent discovery proving that “district courts” acquired quite a different meaning as a direct result of specific changes introduced in 1948 A.D.
Instead of referring to a single class of trial courts contemplated by Article III, the term “district courts” was elevated to embrace two (2) different and entirely distinct classes of trial courts, the second of which originated in the federal Territories, where Constitutional guarantees are presently options, not mandates.
Using a questionable premise that the several States could also be treated as federal Territories, for ever growing purposes, Congress effectively “broadcasted” an Article IV court from the federal Territories into each of the several States which existed in 1948, but without expressly abolishing the Article III court which had existed inside those States for almost 160 years. Whatever Congress creates, Congress must also destroy. See U.S. v. King, 119 F.Supp. 398 (1954).
Moreover, in the course of implementing this new court structure throughout America, Congress was too preoccupied in that post‑war era to notice an important omission. It failed to amend statutes like the Lanham Act in order to confer original jurisdiction on the Article IV district courts instead of, or in addition to, the Article III courts.
This omission would not be nearly so important as it is now, but for the clear constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, even if civil cases. See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 531 (2000).
Even if Congress had fully intended to re‑define the meaning of “district courts” retroactively, with the effect of granting original jurisdiction to the Article IV USDC to adjudicate Lanham Act claims, such an intent is obviously barred by that Clause which renders it unconstitutional. Thus, we must now confront fundamental justice.
Because the Lanham Act grant was not amended after it was first enacted in 1946 A.D., the federal court with original jurisdiction to adjudicate claims that arise under that Act remains the Article III District Court of the United States inside the several (50) States. We now abbreviate these as the “DCUS” (singular and plural).
This Court, and many inferior federal courts, have often held that repeals by implication are never favored. Cites in Appendix 86.
Using the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that Congress attempted to effect a sea change: from strictly constitutional courts inside the several States, to a hybrid in which legislative courts would eventually dominate federal jurisprudence in the first instance.
Although this important distinction between constitutional and legislative courts has been upheld in numerous decisions by this Supreme Court, Mitchell believes he is one of the first (if not the first) to reach this level with enough verified evidence to carry his burden of proving the following essential proposition:
The United States
District Courts now established within the 50 States are actually legislative
courts, convened to sustain the premise that those States can be treated as
federal Territories.
We now abbreviate these as the “USDC” (singular and plural).
Further dramatic evidence of this swing to legislative courts can be seen in a section of the Act of June 25, 1948, known as the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. 2072(a). Here, Congress attempted to delegate to this Court authority to promulgate rules of evidence and procedure, but only for the USDC. The DCUS are not even mentioned in that Act.
Along these very same lines of enabling legislative mode (we much prefer this term “mode” over references to physical buildings), Congress also attempted to confer on this high Court authority to abrogate federal statutes by means of rules of evidence and procedure promulgated by this Court. This was done in a subsection of the Rules Enabling Act called the Abrogation Clause, 28 U.S.C. 2072(b).
Not only would such “abrogations” necessitate effects that are retroactive, or ex post facto, in time. On a more fundamental level, such legislative powers are reserved to the Congress by Article I.
If the Separation of Powers Doctrine means anything in actual practice, it confines the legislative powers of the federal government to the Congress of the United States, while it simultaneously limits the ability of that Congress either to surrender or to delegate any legislative powers to any of the coordinate branches.
Without meaning to sound pedantic, federal Separation of Powers means that only Congress can legislate, only the Executive can execute, and only the Judiciary can adjudicate. Accordingly:
(1) the Congress can neither execute nor adjudicate;
(2) the Executive can neither legislate nor adjudicate; and,
(3) the Judiciary can neither legislate nor execute.
This structural property of our chosen form of government is mirrored directly in the structures of Articles I, II, and III, respectively. As such, that structure is elevated here to the level of a fundamental Right, institutionalized and perpetuated by the clear language of Article I, as qualified by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
Witness how this Court has addressed this matter in the past:
... the limitation fundamentally implicit in the constitutional separation of the powers, namely, that a power definitely assigned by the Constitution to one department can neither be surrendered nor delegated by that department, nor vested by statute in another department or agency.
[Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933)]
[italics in original, bold emphasis added]
However, the Williams decision was later repudiated for one very significant error: this Court had decided that “Party” in the Arising Under Clause referred only to the “United States” as plaintiff, and not to the “United States” as defendant. In the latter situation, statutes waiving sovereign immunity required legislative courts! Bouvier’s defines “Party” to embrace both plaintiffs and defendants.
The task before us now is to provide correct and authoritative answers to the Questions Presented above. There are no better means at our disposal to answer these questions, than the vast resources now provided to us by the Internet and the Supreme Law Library.
To this end, Mitchell hereby urges this Court, and all of its personnel, to begin by traveling the following path through the mass of pleadings and documentary exhibits already assembled in this case, and uploaded to the Internet where their accessibility has been vastly improved for all (numbers in parentheses identify the Appendix):
1. Internet copy of this PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI (151):
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/cert.htm
2. APPELLANT’S INFORMAL OPENING BRIEF (86):
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/opening.htm
3. APPELLANT’S BRIEF IN REPLY TO AOL TIME WARNER et al. (108):
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/reply.htm
4. APPELLANT’S BRIEF IN REPLY TO CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY (109):
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/reply.cmu.htm
5. APPELLANT’S BRIEF IN REPLY TO UNIVERSITY DEFENDANTS (112):
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/reply.univ.htm
6. Letter to Jon Mummolo, Washington Square News (124):
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/mummolo2.htm
7. PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC (126):
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/enbanc.htm
8. APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO (127):
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/quowarranto.htm
9. REFUSAL OF ORDER AND MEMORANDUM FOR FRAUD AND OTHER CAUSES (131):
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/refusal.schroeder.htm
10. MEMO to Chief Judge Mary M. Schroeder (133):
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/schroeder.2.htm
11. MEMO to Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski (136):
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/kozinski.htm
12. NOTICE OF FRAUD to Defendant Miami University of Ohio (141):
http://www.supremelaw.org/copyrite/muohio.edu/notice.of.fraud.htm
13. APPELLANT’S SECOND MOTION FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE (143):
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/mot.mandatory.notice.2.htm
14. NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (146):
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/nad.perform.htm
15. FORMAL NOTICE OF PERTINENT LAW AND DEMAND TO OBEY (149):
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/nad.1691.htm
In the course of reviewing each of these online documents, in the sequence shown above, it is hoped that the Answers we seek will emerge the same way an immense jigsaw puzzle is solved, one piece at a time.
In addition to the obvious solution, Mitchell also contends that a “picture within a picture” will emerge, just as a “state within a State” has already been recognized by this honorable Court.
On this particular point, legally speaking the population of federal citizens who now inhabit the 50 States of the Union comprise an absolute legislative democracy that is subject to the municipal jurisdiction of Congress, as well as its national laws.
In contrast, by intent of the Framers the population of State Citizens who now inhabit the 50 States are a constitutional Republic whose fundamental Rights also include qualified judicial officers presiding upon courts of competent jurisdiction, at the very least.
Due process of Law and the rule of Law in this scheme are the absolute Rights of any Citizen whose legacy is the Guarantee Clause.
Mitchell now submits that the extension statutes, discussed at length above and below, result in rendering that legislative democracy a phantom opera fiction, deserving of extinction with all deliberate speed, God willing. The Most High never speaks with a forked tongue.
We now proceed to elaborate with further essential details.
1. Automatic referral to a magistrate appointed to the United States District Court in Sacramento, California (“USDC”), was a “coercive referral” under Local Rule 73‑302(c)(21) and over Mitchell’s numerous and timely objections. See Roell et al. v. Withrow, 2003 DJDAR 4593 (decided April 29, 2003 A.D.). As such, it also violated the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Hajek v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 186 F.3d 1105, hn. 9 (9th Cir. 1999). In the latter case, local district court rules were invalid and thus ineffective to confer authority upon any federal magistrates without the express consent of all parties; moreover, as here those local rules were inconsistent with the Federal Magistrates Act (“FMA”) and with Article III. See also Martinez v. Stanford et al., 2003 DJDAR 3371 (9th Cir. filed March 26, 2003 A.D.)
Consent to civil jurisdiction by a magistrate cannot be inferred from any of Mitchell’s conduct in this case. See Appendix 136: Mitchell’s MEMO to Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski, dated Jan. 12, 2003 A.D., for a thorough review of 25 years of Ninth Circuit FMA decisions. The pattern of Ninth Circuit precedents is dramatic and undeniably consistent ‑‑ for mandating the consent of all parties.
(a) Mr. Drozd failed to exhibit the certificate of oath that is required to be indorsed upon licenses to practice law in the State of California by § 6067 of the California Business and Professions Code (“CBPC”). Mr. Drozd also failed to exhibit any oath of office, after Mitchell demanded same. His eligibility for the office of U.S. magistrate assumed facts that are not in evidence. There is no question in this case that Mr. Drozd is not an Article III federal judge. U.S. v. Saunders, 641 F.2d 659, hn. 2 (9th Cir. 1980). A FOIA request and appeal for his Presidential Commission also came up empty.
(b) The U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) were also unable to produce a proper Presidential Commission for Mr. Shubb, after Mitchell submitted a lawful FOIA request and appeal for same, and later a FINAL DEMAND that Mr. Shubb exhibit all credentials required by Law. See Appendix 52, 65 and 101. A candidate is not entitled to the office of district judge until the commission issues. Legerton v. Chambers, 163 P. 678, 32 Cal.App. 601 (1917). The DOJ are the sole legal custodians of all Presidential Commissions. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2104, 2902. Mr. Shubb’s qualifications for the office of U.S. District Judge also assumed facts that are still not in evidence, even today. After properly docketing Mitchell’s complaint of judicial misconduct against Mr. Drozd, the Circuit Clerk then failed to docket Mitchell’s proper complaint of judicial misconduct against Mr. Shubb, also served pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 372(c). See Appendix 46 and 132.
(c) Contrary to evidence on record, the Ninth Circuit erred by declining to hear an APPLICATION FOR WRIT IN THE NATURE OF QUO WARRANTO filed and served by the United States ex rel. Mitchell. That Writ of Quo Warranto would command Messrs. Shubb and Drozd to demonstrate by what lawful authorities (if any) each claimed to preside upon the DCUS in Sacramento, and to exercise the judicial Power of the United States in the instant case. Appendix 127 and 132. A State Citizen may appear on behalf of the United States ex rel. See U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (a criminal case enumerating certain fundamental guarantees embodied in Article III).
In that APPLICATION the United States exercised its statutory right to intervene in the instant case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2403(a), due to Mitchell’s formal challenges to the constitutionality of the Abrogation Clause in the Rules Enabling Act, and the Act of June 25, 1948 in toto, 62 Stat. 869 et seq. To date, the Circuit Clerk has failed to perform her duty formally to certify those challenges to the U.S. Attorney General. See Appendix 78, 94, and FRAP Rule 44.
(d) Likewise, the Ninth Circuit erred by declining to grant Mitchell’s PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC, for all of the meritorious reasons stated in that PETITION. Appendix 126. Mitchell now brings each and every one of those meritorious reasons before this Court. All Appendices are hereby incorporated fully by reference.
(e) The Ninth Circuit also erred by ruling that Mitchell failed to file timely objections to the findings and recommendations filed by Mr. Drozd on Dec. 31, 2001 A.D. In his detailed MEMO to Circuit Judge Kozinski, Mitchell itemized sixteen (16) separate written objections to Mr. Drozd, six (6) of which are dated prior to Dec. 31, 2001 A.D. See Appendix 136. Although delivery of U.S. Mail containing the findings and recommendations was delayed for reasons that remain undiscovered, well within 10 working days of receiving them Mitchell wrote and filed three (3) separate and thorough pleadings, documenting his objections to those findings and recommendations in great detail. See Mitchell’s MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER [sic] AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE ‑‑ PARTS I, II, and III: i.e. Appendix 55, 62 and 63, respectively.
Where delay in filing objections was beyond a party’s control, objections would be treated as timely. Austin v. Cuyler, 499 F.Supp. 1116 (USDC/Penna. 1980). The 10‑day time limitation for filing objections to a magistrate’s report ran from the date the report was actually received by the party; where a report was served by mail, the operative period for computing the 10‑day period was 13 days. Thompson v. Rose, 505 F.Supp. 183 (USDC/Tenn. 1981). In computing timeliness, exclude weekends and holidays, and add 3 days for mailing, pursuant to Rule 6(e). Mullins v. Hinkle, 953 F.Supp. 744 (USDC/S.D. W.Va. 1997); Nalty v. Nalty Tree Farm, 654 F.Supp. 1315 (USDC/Ala. 1987); Advance Coating Technology, Inc. v. LEP Chemical, Ltd., 142 FRD 91 (USDC/S.D.N.Y. 1992). Those were USDC rulings!
(f) The Ninth Circuit erred again by overlooking Mitchell’s complaint of judicial misconduct against Mr. Drozd, filed with the Circuit Clerk pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 372(c) within the 10‑day deadline imposed by 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(C). See Appendix 46. The findings and recommendations were filed by Drozd on Dec. 31, 2001 A.D.; Mitchell’s 372(c) complaint was mailed on Jan. 15, 2002 A.D. and delivered on Jan. 18, 2002 A.D. Two weekends intervened (excluding 4 days). Tuesday, Jan. 1, 2002 A.D. was a federal holiday (excluding 1 day). Thus, Dec. 31, 2001 + 10 days + 5 days + 3 days = Jan. 18, 2002 A.D.
The docket number assigned to that 372(c) complaint is displayed on the caption page of Mitchell’s INFORMAL OPENING BRIEF to the Ninth Circuit; that complaint is also cited at paragraph 4(d) in that BRIEF (“In Miscellaneous Pleadings”). See Appendix 86. And, that complaint incorporated Mitchell’s VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT against Mr. Drozd, dated Nov. 30, 2001 A.D., for one count of practicing law from the bench, in violation of 28 U.S.C. 454. See Appendix 34.
(g) The Ninth Circuit also erred by overlooking Mitchell’s SECOND MOTION FOR MANDATORY JUDICIAL NOTICE, BY AFFIDAVIT, containing testimony that the U.S. DOJ could not find any Presidential Commission for Stephen S. Trott, whose name has appeared on Ninth Circuit ORDER’s issued in this case. See Appendix 143 and Legerton v. Chambers supra. The DOJ are the sole legal custodians of all Presidential Commissions of federal circuit and district judges. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2104, 2902.
Mitchell also had a right to know if circuit clerks were impersonating circuit judges, and/or issuing “orders” in violation of the clear mandates imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 955 (clerks are prohibited from practicing law) and § 1691 (all court process must exhibit the seal of the Court and the signature of the Clerk). The word “process” at 28 U.S.C. 1691 means a court order. See Middleton Paper Co. v. Rock River Paper Co., 19 F. 252 (C.C. W.D. Wisconsin 1884); Taylor v. U.S., 45 F. 531 (C.C. E.D. Tennessee 1891); U.S. v. Murphy, 82 F. 893 (DCUS Delaware 1897); Leas & McVitty v. Merriman, 132 F. 510 (C.C. W.D. Virginia 1904); U.S. v. Sharrock, 276 F. 30 (DCUS Montana 1921); In re Simon, 297 F. 942, 34 ALR 1404 (2nd Cir. 1924); Scanbe Mfg. Co. v. Tryon, 400 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1968); Miles v. Gussin, 104 B.R. 553 (Bankruptcy D.C. 1989).
(h) Similarly, Mitchell objected strenuously when Procter Hug’s name appeared on Ninth Circuit ORDER’s, because a conflict of interest resulted directly from Mitchell’s VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT against Mr. Hug in 1997 A.D. for several violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3, 1503. In this context, see 18 U.S.C. 4 (creating a legal obligation to report felony federal offenses to a judge of the United States). The latter VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT was docketed by the Ninth Circuit Clerk as part of Mitchell’s complaint of judicial misconduct against U.S. District Judge John M. Roll, USDC/Tucson, to which that Clerk assigned docket number #96‑80380. See Internet URL:
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/roll/index.htm etc.
2. The worthy principles recited in Roell et al. v. Withrow supra were consistently and systematically violated when Mitchell was deprived of trial before an Article III district judge who was insulated from interference with his obligation to ignore everything but the merits of a case, and who was free from potential domination by other branches (or agents) of government. Compare Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920) with Lord v. Kelley, 240 F.Supp. 167, 169 (1965).
(a) Mitchell’s MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT AND CHALLENGE TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN ACT OF CONGRESS was not properly adjudicated before an Article III district judge. See Appendix 19 and 35. Instead, the merits of that pivotal MOTION were branded as “frivolous,” even in the face of serious Congressional doubt as to the constitutionality of the Abrogation Clause in the Rules Enabling Act. See 28 U.S.C. 2072(b). The Lanham Act conferred original jurisdiction on the DCUS at 60 Stat. 440 (15 U.S.C. 1121); but, the scope of the FRCP and of certain coercive Local Rules (like L.R. 73‑302(c)(21)), and the applicability of both to the DCUS in this case, still remain open questions without that interlocutory judgment.
(b) Mitchell’s MOTION TO STRIKE ALL PLEADINGS BY ATTORNEYS LACKING CREDENTIALS likewise was never duly adjudicated before an Article III district judge either. See Appendix 20 and 47. In particular, a conflict of interest arose for Mr. Drozd because that MOTION raised a California State law which Mr. Drozd himself was violating. See CBPC § 6067, and 28 U.S.C. 455. Mr. Drozd was unable to produce any certificate of oath properly indorsed upon a license to practice law in the State of California; hence, the record fails to exhibit a key prequisite qualification before Mr. Drozd was even eligible to occupy the office of United States magistrate in the first instance. See 28 U.S.C. 631(b)(1) (minimum of 5 years a member in good standing of the State Bar of California, or other Union State).
(c) Mr. Drozd was completely out of order to recommend that “motions” to dismiss be granted with prejudice, after Mitchell had timely objected not only to the missing credentials of attorneys who attempted to file those “motions,” but also to the legislative court from which those “motions” sought relief. As such, those “motions” failed to state any claim upon which the USDC could grant any relief. On Dec. 14, 2001 A.D., Mitchell obtained lawful SUBPOENA’s from the District Clerk in Sacramento, commanding those attorneys to produce the certificates of oath, and licenses to practice law, required by CBPC § 6067. See Appendix 34, 116, 117, 144 and CBPC §§ 6126, 6127. No such certificate, or license to practice law, was ever produced!
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit violated its own clear holding in U.S. v. High Country Broadcasting Co., 3 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1993), because the attorneys’ appearances on behalf of certain named Defendants assumed powers of attorney that did not exist, as a matter of fact. In High Country supra, entry of default judgment was proper when an unlicensed corporate president attempted to represent his corporation in court! Those “motions” should have been stricken, not granted, because they were never properly before the DCUS. Again, see CBPC sections 6126 and 6127 (misdemeanor and contempt of court, respectively). Sanctions for fraud and contempt are now in order.
(d) For the Ninth Circuit to have acquired jurisdiction under the Final Judgments Act at 28 U.S.C. 1291, the instant case had to have originated in the DCUS, and not the USDC. This conclusion is easily demonstrated by a simple process of elimination. Try it! See also 60 Stat. 440. Mitchell’s thoroughly detailed pleadings have more than fully satisfied his burden of proving that there are two (2) distinct classes of federal district courts: one constitutional and the other legislative. Mitchell has consistently argued, here as elsewhere, that statutes conferring appellate jurisdiction on federal circuit courts should be strictly construed as well. For example, see the Ninth Circuit’s rulings in USA v. Makarian at Internet URL:
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/makarian/index.htm etc.
In light of 2 Acts of Congress expressly extending the U.S. Constitution into D.C. and into all federal Territories ‑‑ 1871 A.D. and 1873 A.D., respectively ‑‑ the practice of treating California as a federal Territory, where the guarantees of the U.S. Constitution are matters of legislative discretion and not enforceable mandates, is a clear violation of the Guarantee Clause in this case. That Guarantee is Mitchell’s fundamental Right. These two “extension statutes” have never been litigated before now, to Mitchell’s knowledge.
(e) The only matter over which the legislative USDC had any jurisdiction whatsoever was the issuance and enforcement of SUBPOENA’s for computer activity logs and the identities of subscribers suspected of infringing Mitchell’s exclusive copyrights. See 17 U.S.C. 512(h). Statutes conferring original jurisdiction upon federal district courts must be strictly construed (cites in OPENING BRIEF: Appendix 86). Mitchell was thus deprived of his fundamental Right to compel discovery of evidence that remains essential to quantify the full extent of actual damages inflicted by the continuing wrongs properly alleged in his Initial COMPLAINT. See Appendix 1, 2, 3, 4, 16, & 21.
(f) The Ninth Circuit also erred by denying Mitchell’s MOTION FOR ORDER ENJOINING FURTHER INACTION BY THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, and by failing to take mandatory judicial notice of the Certificate of Copyright Registration issued by the Register of Copyrights on July 23, 2001 A.D., eight (8) days prior to commencement of this lawsuit. See Appendix 80, 107. Thus, the DCUS in Sacramento did enjoy original jurisdiction over the subject matter of COUNT ONE in Mitchell’s Initial COMPLAINT (i.e. formal registration is a prerequisite to judicial enforcement of copyrights). See COUNT ONE in Appendix 1.
Moreover, during this litigation, Mitchell submitted a second application for copyright registration, to register the specific shareware editions of the book at issue here. After being paid the required fee, the Register of Copyrights has, to date, failed entirely to act on this second application. The Register took Mitchell’s fee, then did nothing. This is theft, pure and simple (a common practice among modern American government personnel).
(g) The purpose of the copyright statutes is not so much to protect the physical thing created, as to protect the author’s rights of publication and reproduction. Those statutes should be construed in view of the character of the property intended to be protected. The property of an author in his intellectual creation is absolute until he voluntarily parts therewith. See American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, hn. 2, 6 (1907).
(h) The Ninth Circuit has already held that “copying,” for purposes of copyright law, occurs whenever a computer program is transferred from a permanent storage device to a computer’s random access memory (“RAM”). Loading copyrighted computer software from a storage medium, like a hard disk, floppy disk, or read only memory, into the memory of a central processing unit (“CPU”), causes a copy to be made. In the absence of ownership of the copyright, or express permission by license, such acts constitute copyright infringements. “... [W]e hold that the loading of software into the RAM creates a copy under the Copyright Act.” 17 U.S.C. 101. See Mai Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, hn. 2 (9th Cir. 1993).
(i) With complete approval, the USDC in Utah has cited the Ninth Circuit’s res judicata in this context:
When a person browses a website, and by so doing displays the Handbook, a copy of the Handbook is made in the computer’s random access memory (RAM), to permit viewing of the material. And in making a copy, even a temporary one, the person who browsed infringes the copyright. Citing MAI Systems Corp. supra.
[Intellectual Reserve Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc.]
[75 F.Supp.2d 1290 (USDC/Utah 1999)]
That district court also cited the decision in Marobie‑FL, Inc. v. National Ass’n of Fire Equip. Distrib., 983 F.Supp. 1167, 1179 (USDC/N.D. Ill. 1997) noting that liability for copyright infringement is with the persons who cause the display or distribution of the infringing material onto their computers. Additionally, a person making a printout, or re‑posting a copy of a book on another website, does infringe the author’s copyright. See Intellectual Reserve supra.
(j) The Ninth Circuit’s MEMORANDUM NOT FOR PUBLICATION conflicts with the holding of the Eighth Circuit in Anastasoff v. USA, 223 F.3d 898 (2000). See Appendix 125. In that appeal the Eighth Circuit held that their Local Circuit Rule #28A(i), permitting unpublished opinions, expanded the judicial Power beyond the limits set by Article III, by allowing complete discretion to determine which judicial decisions are binding, and which are not binding. Quoting, “Insofar as it limits the precedential effect of our prior decisions, the Rule is therefore unconstitutional.” The Ninth Circuit’s decisions in the instant case violated a multitude of standing judicial precedents, particularly its own! Confer at “res judicata”.
(k) Messrs. Drozd, Shubb, Goodwin, Trott, Hug and Kozinski are all paying federal income taxes on their judicial compensation, in violation of the Compensation Clause and the holding of this Court in Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920). Although “judge‑made doctrines” may have changed, the fundamental Law on this point has not changed.
Moreover, these very same gentlemen also appear to be material witnesses to the practice of concealing the withholding exemption certificate from them, when they were first hired into the federal judiciary. See § 3402(n) of the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) and 28 U.S.C. 455. The term “withholding exemption certificate” occurs some seventeen (17x) times in IRC § 3402. Even the appearance of a conflict of interest is sufficient to recuse any presiding federal judge. Compare Lord v. Kelley, 240 F.Supp. 167, 169 (1965).
(l) The Ninth Circuit’s actions in this case violated numerous other standing decisions of that Circuit Court. A complete list of such standing decisions is provided in Mitchell’s MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC. See heading entitled THE MEMORANDUM DECISION CONTRADICTS OR IGNORES NUMEROUS STANDING DECISIONS OF THIS COURT OF APPEALS in Appendix 126. The electronic version of that MOTION FOR REHEARING contains hyperlinks to the case contexts in which Mitchell cited those decisions. This Court is encouraged to take full advantage of the speed and accessibility of all documents itemized in the online docket created and maintained by Mitchell on the Internet for this case, using a high‑speed “broadband” connection like DSL or cable modem.
That list of cases is repeated here as follows: Tsang v. Kan, 173 F.2d 204 (1949); Agnew v. Compton, 239 F.2d 226 (1956); Crescent Wharf v. Pillsbury, 259 F.2d 850 (1958); Drop Dead Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 326 F.2d 87 (1963); Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (1970); Brennan v. Silvergate, 503 F.2d 800 (1974); Griffith Co. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 1194 (1976); Alpha Industries, Inc. v. Alpha Steel, 616 F.2d 440 (1980); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637 (1980); Nova Stylings, Inc. v. Ladd, 695 F.2d 1179 (1983); U.S. v. Woodley, 726 F.2d 1328 (1983); Levi Strauss v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352 (1985); U‑Haul Int’l v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034 (1986); Seiler v. Lucasfilm, Ltd., 808 F.2d 1316 (1986); Midler v. Ford Motor Company, 849 F.2d 460 (1988); U.S. v. High Country Broadcasting, 3 F.3d 1244 (1993); Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479 (1994); Abdul‑Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (1996); Wendt v. Host International, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (1997); Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc., 152 F.3d 1209 (1998); Brookfield v. West Coast Entertainment, 174 F.3d 1036 (1999); A&M Records et al. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); and Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (2001).
(m) And, the Ninth Circuit’s actions in this case also violated numerous standing decisions of this Supreme Court, e.g. Mookini v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201 (1938) (term “district courts of the United States” in its historic and proper sense) and Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (the USDC is not a true United States court established under Article III). See also Mitchell’s INFORMAL OPENING BRIEF, and all reply BRIEF’s, for a full set of citations in proper context.
More to the merits, legislative courts are not required to exercise the Article III guarantees required of constitutional courts. See American Insurance v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511, 7 L.Ed. 242 (1828) (C.J. Marshall’s seminal ruling); Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. 235, 242‑243 (1850); Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. 434, 447 (1871); Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. 648, 655 (1873); Good v. Martin, 95 U.S. 90, 98 (1877); Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1878); The City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453, 460 (1879); Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923); Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, 274 U.S. 145 (1927); Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928); Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 279 U.S. 438 (1929); Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930); Claiborne‑Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U.S. 382 (1932); O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); and Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). The U.S. Courts of Appeal are Article III federal courts [cites omitted here].
In Marathon supra, Justice Brennan for the plurality reasoned that Congress could create legislative courts without Article III protections in only three limited settings: (1) territorial courts, (2) courts martial, and (3) courts deciding disputes involving public rights that Congress created in the first instance. Thus, by treating the 50 States as federal Territories and by creating federal citizenship as a municipal franchise, Congress could effectively “broadcast” into those States a legislative court that routinely proceeds without Article III protections! See the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 27‑30, April 9, 1866 A.D. In the legislative USDC, those protections are options, not mandates, particularly when the extension statutes supra are also routinely ignored.
(n) Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski (or other qualified Circuit Judge) owed a duty to Mitchell timely to present to the Chief Justice of this Court a certificate of necessity, justifying designation and temporary assignment of a competent and qualified judge from the Article III Court of International Trade, to perform judicial duties in the constitutional DCUS below. See Mitchell’s NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT OF A JUDGE OF THE COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE TO PRESIDE OVER THIS DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. Drozd was obviously confused: it was not Mitchell’s intent to convene the Court of International trade; Mitchell merely sought to have one of its Article III judges assigned temporarily to the instant case.
The Court of International Trade is an Article III federal court by virtue of explicit language in the statute that created it. § 251. In contrast, the USDC is a legislative, territorial tribunal, by virtue of said standing decisions by this Supreme Court. See Balzac supra. 28 U.S.C. 132 does not identify the USDC as an Article III federal court, nor does it abolish the Article III DCUS which existed for almost 160 years before its enactment (1789 A.D. thru 1948 A.D.) Confer at “Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius” in Black’s Sixth Ed.
(o) Leave to amend would definitely not be futile. On the contrary, all confirmed deficiencies were minor and can be alleviated with simple additions to Mitchell’s Initial COMPLAINT, e.g. admitting evidence of the copyright registration certificate now issued by the Register of Copyrights; citing specific violations of 17 U.S.C. 106, such as Mitchell’s exclusive rights to reproduction and distribution; and similar minor edits. Contrary to a cruel fiction fabricated entirely by Mr. Drozd, Mitchell did pay the first application fee for registration of his exclusive copyrights in “The Federal Zone.” In the eyes of the Register of Copyrights, surely it would not have been a completed “application” without payment of that fee!
(p) When a petitioner appears In Propria Persona, the court itself should undertake to insure to the litigant that no meritorious case may be lost because of any lack of legal skill. 28 U.S.C. 1654. Moreover, technical compliance with the rules of court is not stringently enforced. See U.S. v. Hough, 157 F.Supp. 771, 774 (USDC/S.D. Calif. 1957). Implicit in the right of self‑representation is an obligation on the part of any court to make reasonable allowances to protect Pro Per litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of important Rights because of any lack of formal legal training. See Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2nd Cir. 1983); Hoffman v. U.S., 244 F.2d 378, 379 (9th Cir. 1957); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
(q) The Ninth Circuit has completely overlooked the stated legislative intent of the Lanham Act at 60 Stat. 443, 15 U.S.C. 1127:
The intent of this chapter is ... to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition entered into between the United States and foreign nations.
In this context, see COUNTS THREE and FOUR in Mitchell’s Initial COMPLAINT, Appendix 1. “The Federal Zone” traveled so far and wide, via the Internet, that certain named Defendants are domiciled in Canada, Sweden and Switzerland. After filing this lawsuit, a different electronic counterfeit of Mitchell’s book turned up on other computers located in Europe and in South America.
(r) Mitchell fully deserves preliminary injunctions to halt further viral distribution of his book and its many modified derivatives. The damages from copyright and trademark infringements did not stop when the case was filed on Aug. 1, 2001 A.D. Further witness retaliation has continued in the form of attempted assault, breaches of contract, peonage, obstruction of justice, obstruction of correspondence and denial‑of‑service attacks on Mitchell’s website, the Supreme Law Library. One named Defendant continues to sell a motion picture on a videotape entitled “The F Zone,” which plagiarizes verbatim segments from a chapter in Mitchell’s book. (The “F” stands for “Federal.”) Counterfeits have since appeared on web servers at the University of Wisconsin and at an engineering college at the University of Brazil. And Yahoo!, a major and popular Internet Service Provider (“ISP”), has adopted Mitchell’s recommendations for ISP’s, with their policy concerning links to copyright infringements that remain entrained in the index database of their search engines.
In retrospect, there is no question now that agents and employees of the federal government, collaborating with a host of unlicensed attorneys and numerous John Doe’s, have contributed materially to the continuing wrongs that all named Defendants have inflicted upon Mitchell over the span of many years. Let the truth prevail.
If fundamental justice means anything in America today, it should guarantee to Mitchell a trial in an Article III federal court before a lawful jury of his peers. This is a fundamental Right of his that must remain inviolate, if the rule of Law is to endure intact.
In light of all the well reasoned and thoroughly detailed argumentation provided above, and in all Appendices below, Mitchell urges the honorable Justices of this Supreme Court carefully to consider the specific remedies requested in his INFORMAL OPENING BRIEF and in his several REPLY briefs to the Ninth Circuit. Taken together, those remedies come very close to satisfying completely Mitchell’s educated understanding of “district courts,” judicial precedent and res judicata under pertinent American Laws that have never been repealed.
It is not too difficult to demonstrate the obvious disagreements among many federal judges on the correct meaning of “district courts”: e.g. see U.S. v King supra; Wells v. U.S., 214 F.2d 380, 382, hn. 2-4 (5th Cir. 1954); and U.S. v. Marrone, 172 F.Supp. 368, 370, hn. 1-2 (D.C. Alaska 1959).
It is Mitchell’s fondest hope, at this time, that the highest Court in America will view this case as a golden opportunity to issue a far‑reaching judicial precedent that will set a bright and shining example for many generations to come ‑‑ a monument to truth and to justice in our time, and a powerful beacon to weary travelers struggling to find their way to safe harbors, and home.
May the Most High and Living God guide your every step.
So be it. Amen.
# # #
This Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Paul Andrew
Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Sui
Juris
Private Attorney General and Petitioner
Date: May 26, 2003 A.D.
All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
Please refer to the Table of Contents at Internet URL:
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/index.htm etc.
Appendix numbers correspond in sequence to entry numbers in that Table of Contents.
A hard copy of that Table of Contents is reproduced on the following pages.
The suffix “.htm” refers to documents that were saved in an HTML format compatible with most Internet browsers, e.g. the HTML version of this document has a filename of “cert.htm”.
The suffix “.doc” refers to documents that were saved in a format that is “native” to Microsoft WORD 2002, e.g. the native version of this document has a filename of “cert.doc”.
By using compatible versions of Microsoft WORD, together with the View | Print Layout option in Microsoft Internet Explorer 6.0.2600+, users can view documents on‑screen exactly as they appear in laser‑printed originals, with line numbers generated automatically in the left‑hand margin.
This approach will guarantee that all Internet users will be viewing exactly the same copies of all documents now available in the Supreme Law Library at Internet URL:
http://www.supremelaw.org/index.htm etc.
Thank you.
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under
penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America,
without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18
years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the
following document(s):
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in
first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to
the following:
Ropers, Majeski, Kohn & Bentley DeForest & Koscelnik
(failed to exhibit oaths) (failed to exhibit oath)
1001 Marshall Street 3000 Koppers Building
Redwood City 94063 436 Seventh Avenue
CALIFORNIA, USA Pittsburgh 15219
PENNSYLVANIA, USA
Murphy Austin Adams Schoenfeld LLP Pillsbury Winthrop LLP
(failed to exhibit oaths) (failed to exhibit oaths)
P.O. Box 1319 400 Capitol Mall, Suite 1700
Sacramento 95812-1319 Sacramento 95814-4419
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Curiale Dellaverson Hirschfeld Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Oliver
Kraemer & Sloan, LLP & Hedges, LLP
(failed to exhibit oaths) (failed to exhibit oaths)
727 Sansome Street 201 Sansome Street, 6th Floor
San Francisco 94111 San Francisco 94104
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Office of the General Counsel Paul Southworth
(failed to exhibit oaths) 2018 N. New Hampshire Ave.
University of California Los Angeles 90027
1111 Franklin Street, 8th Floor CALIFORNIA, USA
Oakland 94607-5200
CALIFORNIA, USA
Karl Kleinpaste Ram Samudrala
P.O. Box 1551 UW Micro Box 357242
Beaver Falls 15010 Seattle 98195-7242
PENNSYLVANIA, USA WASHINGTON STATE, USA
Laskin & Guenard Rivkin Radler, LLP
(failed to exhibit oath) (failed to exhibit oaths)
1810 South Street 1330 N. Dutton Ave., #200
Sacramento 95814 Santa Rosa 95401-4646
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Harvey Siskind Jacobs LLP Office of Solicitor General
(failed to exhibit oaths) 950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
3 Embarcadero Center, Ste. 1060 Room 5614
San Francisco 94111 Washington 20530-0001
CALIFORNIA, USA DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA
Register of Copyrights
Steinhart & Falconer
LLP
Library of Congress (failed to exhibit oaths)
101 Independence Avenue, S.E. 333 Market Street, 32nd Floor
Washington 20559-6000 San Francisco 94105-2150
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Matheny Sears Linkert & Long LLP Latham & Watkins
(failed to exhibit oaths) (failed to exhibit oaths)
P.O. Box 13711 633 West Fifth St., Ste. 4000
Sacramento 95853-4711 Los Angeles 90071-2007
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Courtesy copies:
Clerk of Court Clerk of Court
Attention: Jack L. Wagner Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
501 “I” Street, Suite 4-200 P.O. Box 193939
Sacramento 95814-2322 San Francisco 94119‑3939
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Dr. John C. Alden, M.D. Hon. Norman L. Vroman
Eye Surgeon and Trustee District Attorney
350 – 30th Street County of Mendocino
Suite 444 100 North State Street
Oakland 94609-3426 Ukiah 95482
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
[Please see USPS Publication #221 for “addressing” instructions.]
Dated: May 27, 2003 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
___________________________________________________________
Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell,
Relator/Petitioner In Propria
Persona