No. 07-2017
_______________________________________________________________________
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
______________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
John S. Williamson, Nancy L.
Williamson, John G. Williamson,
David A. Williamson, Garrett
J. Williamson, Deborah Kruhm,
Defendants-Appellants.
_____________________________________
ORAL ARGUMENT
DESIRED
_______________________________________
ON APPEAL FROM
THE ORDERS OF THE
UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF
NEW MEXICO
DISTRICT JUDGE
BRUCE D. BLACK
_____________________________________
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE
APPELLANTS
_____________________________________
1277 Historic Rte. 66E.
Tijeras 87059
NEW MEXICO,
USA
(505) 281-5788
_________________________________________________________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
STATEMENT OF SUBJECT MATTER AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION 4
INCORPORATION OF INTERVENOR'S REPLY BRIEF 9
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 10
STATEMENT OF
THE CASE 11
STATEMENT
OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 13
SUMMARY
OF THE ARGUMENT 21
CONCLUSIONS 22
STATEMENT
REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 27
CERTIFICATE
OF COMPLIANCE 28
CERTIFICATE
OF SERVICE 29
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
U.S.CODES PAGE
Title 26 U.S.C. 7402 4, 10, 12, 13
Title 26 U.S.C. 7403 4, 10, 12, 13
Title 28 U.S.C. 2410 4
Title 28 U.S.C. 2201 5
Title 28 U.S.C. 2463 6
Title 28 U.S.C. 1691 6, 10
Title 26 U.S.C. 7401 10
Title 31 U.S.C. 333 10, 16
Title 26 U.S.C. 7851(a)(6)(A) 10, 11, 13
Title 26 U.S.C. 6321 11
28 U.S.C. §§ 1345 and 1346, 12
Title 26 U.S.C. 6065 13, 17
Title 26 U.S.C. 3401(c) 15
Title 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(26) 15
Title 26 U.S.C. 3121(e)(1) 16
Title 26 U.S.C. 6303(a) 19
IRC 7809 21, 26
18 U.S.C. 912 22
IRC 6303(a) 22
18 U.S.C. 1341 22
18 U.S.C. 1961 22
18 U.S.C. 912, 1001 25
U.S. CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
26 C.F.R. 1.1-1 5, 23
26 CFR 301.6203-1 17
STATUTES
RRA98, section 3707 10, 17
Federal Register Act @ 44 U.S.C. sections 1501, 1507 11, 14, 16
Paperwork Reduction Act @ 44 USCS 3500 et seq, 3512 15
Administrative Procedures Act @ 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1) 16
U.C.C. 9-401 20
NMSA 58-13A-7 20
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
United States v Cooper Corporation, 312 U.S. 600 (1941) 4
Connally et al v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, (1926) 10
American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-357 (1909) 11
New York Central R.R. Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1925) 11
U.S. v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 222, 70 S.Ct. 10 (1949) 11
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) 13
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) 13
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan, 157 U.S. 429, 554 14
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 297 (1979) 16
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 92 (1959) 16
California Bankers Ass’n v Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) 17
Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 335 18
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 18
Strattons’ Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S., 406, 409-413 18
Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921) 18
Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, hn. 2 (1932) 18
G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977) 19
U.S. v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 399-400 (1973) 21
Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) 23
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991) 24
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177-78 (1803) 24
Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399 (1821) 24
LOWER COURT CASES
Hollingshead v. United States, 85-2 USTC 9772 (5th Cir. 1985) 4
Dwight v. Merritt, 4 F. 614, 615 (C.C. S.D.N.Y. 1880) 6
Middleton Paper Co. v. Rock River Paper Co. 19 F. 252, (C.C. W.D. Wisc. 1884) 6
Clough v. U.S., 47 F. 791, 795 (C.C. W.D. Tenn. 1891) 7
Leas & McVitty v. Merriman, 132 F, 510, 511-513 (C.C. W.D. Virginia 1904) 7
Perris Irrigation Dist. V. Turnbull, 215 F. 562, 564, (9th Cir. 1914) 7
United States v. Sharrock, 276 F. 30, 31 (DCUS Montana 1921) 7
Ex parte Craig, 282 F. 138, 145, (2nd Cir. 1922) 7
In re Simon, 297 F. 942, 944-946 (2nd Cir. 1924) 7
Sweeney v. Greenwood Index-Journal Co., 37 F. Supp. 484 (DCUS S.C. 1941) 7
Brown v. Beckham, 137 F.2d 644, 646, hn. 2 (6th Cir. 1943) 8
Royal Lace Paper Works, Inc.
v. Pest-Guard Products, Inc.,
240 F.2d 814, hn. 3 (5th Cir. 1957) 8
Scanbe Mfg. Co. v. Tryon, 400 F.2d 598 hn. 1 (9th Cir. 1968) 8
Attwell v. LaSalle Nat. Bank,607 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1979) 8
Gibbs v. Hawaiian Eugenia Corp., 581 F.Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) 8
Kroetz v. ATF-Davidson
Co., 102 F.R.D. 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) 8
Miles v. Gussin, 104 B.R.
553 (Bkrtcy. D.C. 1989) 8
U.S. v. National Muffler Mfg., Inc., 125 F.R.D. 453 (N.D. Ohio 1989) 9
Brafman v. U.S., 384 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1967) 17, 18
Linwood Blackstone et al. v. United States of America, 778 F.Supp. 244, 247
(USDC / D. Md. 1991) 19
Myrick v. United States, 296 F.2d. 312 (5th Cir. 1961) 19
March v. IRS, 335 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2003) 19
United States v. O’Dell, 160 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1947) 19
Geiselman et al. v. U.S., 92-1 USTC ¶50200 19
John M. Hirst & Co. v. Gentsch, 133 F.2d 247, hn. 4 (6th Cir. 1943) 20
Midwest Haulers v. Brady, 128 F.2d 496, hn. 3 (6th Cir., 1942) 20
Long v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 758 (1957) 20
United States v. Berman, 825 F.2d 1053, 1056-1057 (6th Cir. 1987) 22
U.S. v. High Country Broadcasting Co., 3 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1993) 22
U.S. v. Ballard, 535 F.2d 400, 404, hn. 2 (8th Cir. 1976) 23
Anastasoff v. United States of America, No. 99-3917EM (8th Cir. 2000) 24
STATEMENT OF SUBJECT
MATTER
Plaintiff
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic]
brought this suit alleging original jurisdiction in the United States District
Court (“USDC”) for the District of New Mexico under Title 26, U.S. Code, sections
7402 and 7403.
The “UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA” is not a proper party in this action. The Plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic] failed to appear and failed to
prosecute. It is not proper for
attorneys employed by the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
to appear and attempt legally to represent the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic] when said attorneys lack powers of
attorney to represent the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Doc. 1.)[1]
The
Williamson Appellants timely and properly challenged the jurisdiction of the USDC
over the subject matter and over the Defendants personally. U.S. District Judge Bruce D. Black completely
ignored the FACT that 26 U.S.C. §§ 7402 and 7403 explicitly
grant jurisdiction over the subject matter in question to the District Courts
of the United States (“DCUS”),
which are Article III constitutional courts. Such statutes must be strictly
construed [cites omitted here].
The UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA [sic] is not a
proper Party Plaintiff;
it is an improper name.
See FRCP Rule 10 and the
decisions under that Rule re: proper
and improper names. In United
States v. Cooper Corporation, 312 U.S. 600 (1941), the U.S. Supreme
Court wrote:
"We may say in passing
that the argument that the United States
may be treated as a corporation organized under its own laws, that is,
under the Constitution as the
fundamental law, seems so strained as
not to merit serious consideration."
[emphasis added]
Accordingly,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic] is not
a federal corporation representing the "United States" (federal
government); Congress
never incorporated it as such.
28 U.S.C.
2410 is a waiver of so-called “sovereign immunity” whenever the
United States (federal government) violates one of its own statutes. See Hollingshead v. United States,
85-2 USTC 9772 (5th Cir. 1985). The term “UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” does not
occur anywhere in Title 28
of the U.S. Code!
The UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA directs the Appellants’ and this Court's attention to 26 U.S.C.
1. That section has absolutely no
mention of “kind of tax 1040”. Pursuant
to its implementing regulation at 26
CFR 1.1-1, section 1 is expressly
imposed upon citizens of the
United States (aka federal citizens)
and residents of the United States (aka resident aliens), NOT Citizens of New Mexico or any of
the other United States of America (50
States of the Union).
The
Williamsons are not now, nor have they ever been “citizens of the United States” or “residents of the United
States” (resident aliens
bearing “green cards”).
The
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) at one time applied to the Office of
Management and Budget (“OMB”) for an OMB control number and expiration date for
the Form that corresponds to 26 CFR 1.1-1; that OMB number was 1545-0067; and, that number was found on IRS Form 2555 Foreign Earned Income, not
Form 1040.
There is
absolutely no evidence before the USDC
below, or before this Court, that the Williamson Appellants are anything other
than New Mexico State Citizens.
Moreover, 28 U.S.C.
2201 contains an exception which expressly bars any federal court
from declaring Appellants to be federal
citizens or resident aliens,
when they are not.
For
example, taxable income which federal
citizens earn within the 50 States of the Union is legally defined as
“foreign earned income”.
For
purposes of Private International Law, also known as federal municipal law, the 50 States are
legally foreign with respect to the areas over which Congress has exclusive
legislative authority. See “The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue,” by author Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A.,
M.S., Private
Attorney General. “Internal” means municipal here!
There is
ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE before the USDC
below or this Court that any valid ASSESSMENTS were ever done, or that any valid NOTICES OF ASSESSMENT AND DEMANDS FOR
PAYMENT were ever issued to the
Appellants for any of the so-called "tax liabilities" or
"assessments" alleged by Ms. Wolfinger. See Page 2 in her REPLY BRIEF.
Ms. Wolfinger entirely failed
to address this problem in her REPLY BRIEF,
choosing instead to assume facts not in evidence such as a “summons”
that violated FRCP Rule 4(b).
The
property "ordered to be sold" is deemed in the custody of the law
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2463, and should never have been illegally sold
without a proper ORDER issued by a court of competent jurisdiction after due
process of law had run its course.
The USDC
for the District of
New Mexico was clearly not a court of competent jurisdiction in the
instant case, for reasons that are quite thoroughly documented here.
For
example, the original “summons” and all of Judge Black's “orders” lacked either
the seal of the court and/or the signature of the Clerk of Court, as required
by 28 U.S.C. 1691, thereby rendering all of Mr. Black's
process totally invalid.
Moreover,
the case law under 28
U.S.C. 1691 and FRCP Rule 4(b) have consistently
held that a civil SUMMONS which fails to comply with those clear requirements
of 1691 results
in depriving a federal district court of In
Personam jurisdiction, in the first instance:
The statute intends that all process shall issue from the court, where such process is to
be held to be the action of the court, and that the evidence that it issues from the court and is the action of the
court shall be the seal of the court and the signature of the clerk. … In
courts of the United States a summons cannot be amended by subsequent addition
of the signature of the clerk, and the seal of the court. Citing Peaslee
v. Haberstro, 15 Blatchf.
472.
[Dwight v. Merritt, 4 F. 614, 615]
[hns. 1 and 2,
(C.C. S.D.N.Y. 1880)]
All writs and process
issuing from the courts of the United States shall be under the seal of the
court from which they issue, and shall be signed by the clerk
thereof.
[Middleton Paper Co. v.
Rock River Paper Co.]
[19 F. 252, hn. 1
(C.C. W.D. Wisconsin 1884)]
[emphasis added]
Seal is required to be affixed by
commissioner of circuit court to warrant issued by him to procure arrest for
preliminary examination of defendant charged with crime in violation of penal
statutes of United States.
[Clough v. U.S., 47 F. 791, 795]
[hn. 6 (C.C. W.D. Tennessee 1891)]
[emphasis added]
In Peaslee v. Haberstro,
15 Blatchf. 472, Fed.Cas.
No. 10,884, the summons was set aside because not under the seal of court
or signature of clerk. ... To my
mind, the word “process,” as used in Rev. St. § 911, means an order of court, although it may be
issued by the clerk.
[Leas & McVitty
v. Merriman, 132 F. 510, 511-513]
[(C.C. W.D.
Virginia 1904), emphases added]
In Leas
& McVitty (C.C.) 132 Fed. 510, 512 [supra], the court said: “I think section 911, Rev. St. (U.S. Comp.
St. 1901, p. 683), means no more than that, when a writ or process issues
from a federal court, it must be signed
by the clerk, and shall be authenticated
in the manner therein set out.”
[Perris Irrigation Dist. v. Turnbull]
[215 F. 562, 564, (9th Cir. 1914)]
[emphases added]
... [A]nd
the notice referred to is the usual process and subpoena in equity of statute
and rules ... necessarily under the seal
of the court, and signed by
its clerk. ... Such subpoena
was not published herein, and so
jurisdiction of defendant was not acquired.
[United States v. Sharrock,
276 F. 30, 31]
[(DCUS Montana 1921), emphases added]
It is our understanding that
a writ of habeas corpus, like a writ of error, or a writ of certiorari, or a
writ of mandamus, should be issued under the seal of the court. ...
And when so issued it has the test of the clerk as well as the seal
of the court.
[Ex
parte Craig, 282 F. 138, 145, hn. 4]
[(2nd Cir. 1922), emphasis added]
It will not be denied that a
writ is a mandatory precept issued by a court, commanding the person to
whom it is addressed to do or refrain from doing some act therein
specified. Because it is a mandatory, and
issued by a court, it is an order of
the court. ... A subpoena is a
writ or process, and is mandatory in nature, being a positive command. ... In some of the states statutes may permit
a summons or a subpoena to be issued by an attorney, but such statutes do not apply to proceedings in federal courts ….
[In
re Simon, 297 F. 942, 944-946]
[(2nd Cir. 1924), emphases added]
This [FRCP]
rule [4] and rule 12 of these
rules must be construed together.
[Sweeney v. Greenwood
Index-Journal Co.]
[37 F.Supp. 484 (DCUS S.C. 1941)]
The question whether an
order of attachment is “process in law” is not debatable. ... When issued out of the United States District
Court it must be signed by the Clerk as a ministerial duty.
[Brown v. Beckham, 137 F.2d 644, 646, hn. 2]
[(6th Cir. 1943), emphasis added]
Without personal service of process in accordance with rule [4], or the law of the State in
which the suit is filed, a federal
district court is without jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against a
defendant.
[Royal Lace Paper Works,
Inc. v. Pest-Guard Products, Inc.]
[240 F.2d 814, hn.
3 (5th Cir. 1957), emphases added]
Inasmuch as all writs and
processes issuing from a court of the United States are required, by statute, to be under seal of court and signed by clerk
thereof, an injunction signed only by deputy clerk of district court is
not void for want of a judicial signature.
[Scanbe
Mfg. Co. v. Tryon, 400 F.2d 598]
[hn. 1 (9th
Cir. 1968), emphases added]
In order for there to be in personam
jurisdiction, there must be valid service of process.
[Attwell
v. LaSalle Nat. Bank]
[607 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1979)]
There must be compliance with terms of rule governing service of process
and, absent waiver, incomplete or improper service will lead court to dismiss action.
[Gibbs v. Hawaiian
Eugenia Corp.]
[581 F.Supp. 1269
(S.D.N.Y. 1984)]
[emphases added]
Federal law governed the effect of the use of an improper name
in summons and complaint as that of
defendant because subd. (b) of
this [FRCP] Rule [4] and Rule 10(a) of these
rules had bearing on significance of use
of improper names.
[Kroetz
v. ATF-Davidson Co.]
[102 F.R.D. 934
(E.D.N.Y. 1984)]
Judgment creditor was not
entitled to judgment of condemnation based upon failure of judgment debtor’s
employer to answer interrogatories set forth in writ of attachment directed to
employer, where writ was not under seal and thus was defective.
[Miles v. Gussin,
104 B.R. 553]
[(Bkrtcy. D.C. 1989) emphases added]
Government's failure to serve defendant with signed and sealed
summons could
not be regarded as mere oversight warranting perfunctory amendment; in
light of Government's apparent disregard for requirements of rules,
summons would not be amended nunc pro tunc to conform to the rules.
[U.S. v. National Muffler Mfg., Inc.]
[125 F.R.D. 453
(N.D. Ohio 1989)]
[emphases added]
INCORPORATION OF INTERVENOR’S
REPLY BRIEF
Appellants
hereby incorporate by reference INTERVENOR'S REPLY TO BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEE
submitted concurrently
with this REPLY BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANTS, as if set forth fully herein. Appellants demand that this Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals take mandatory judicial notice of INTERVENOR'S
REPLY TO BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEE and docket same.
Intervenor has a statutory RIGHT to intervene in this appeal by federal statute
at 28 U.S.C. 2403(a) and pertinent Rules of Court. For all of the reasons elaborated in detail
above and below in all other pleadings filed to date by the United States ex rel. Paul Andrew Mitchell subsequent
to its timely and proper intervention, the
attorneys’ alleged OPPOSITION and BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEE
should be ignored, if not also stricken, by this honorable Court of Appeals.
On the merits, this Court should also ORDER the Office of Circuit Clerk
to certify to the Office of the United
States Attorney General all of Intervenor’s
challenges to the constitutionality of certain Acts of Congress previously
enumerated in pleadings filed or otherwise lodged to date by Intervenor, and by Appellants, at any stage and at any
level in these proceedings.
This Court should also now schedule a proper presentation of law and evidence, if such evidence is otherwise admissible in this case, supporting arguments for and against the constitutionality of said Acts of Congress thus properly challenged to date in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF
THE ISSUES
1. First Issue: Lack of jurisdiction. IRC §§ 7402 and 7403 expressly
confer original jurisdiction upon District Courts of the United States (“DCUS”), NOT
United States District Courts (“USDC”). The USDC
below refused to acknowledge that the law explicitly grants subject matter
jurisdiction to the District Courts of
the United States.
2. Second Issue: Appellants are
NOT “taxpayers” as
alleged by Plaintiff/Appellee. Appellants challenged Appellee
to place into evidence before the USDC
below all proof supporting that allegation.
Appellee refused and/or neglected to exhibit
evidence that Appellants are actually (and honestly) “taxpayers” as defined in
the IRC. The USDC
below refused and/or neglected to order Plaintiff/Appellee
to exhibit verified proof of the allegation that Appellants are
"taxpayers".
3. Third Issue: No STATUTE or REGULATION exists, or has been placed into evidence in the USDC below, authorizing any “kind of tax 1040” and making Citizens of New Mexico “liable” for a tax upon their earnings from occupations of common right.
4. Fourth Issue: Plaintiff/Appellee has not met all conditions precedent to be able to place “liens” upon the Appellants’ real or personal property. Without all required conditions precedent having been met, Plaintiff’s INITIAL COMPLAINT is a clear abuse of legal process for the purpose of economic terrorism.
5. Fifth Issue: IRS is NOT a bona fide agency of the United States Department of the
Treasury. Appellee
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic] failed
to place into evidence any documentation proving that IRS is a legitimate
service, bureau, office or other subdivision within the U.S. Department of the
Treasury, as each of those terms occur at 31 U.S.C.
333 (prohibiting any impersonation of the “Department of the
Treasury”).
6. Sixth issue: All federal statutes that fall within subtitle F of the IRC
have never really taken effect, notably sections 7401, 7402 and 7403 as cited in the
first paragraph on Page 1 of the INITIAL COMPLAINT. The term “this title” at section 7851(a)(6)(A) must refer to Title 26 of the U.S. Code, if
it is not vague. See standing tests for
“vagueness” already provided by the U.S. Supreme Court e.g. Connally et al. v. General Construction Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (“men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to the application
of a vague statute”). Federal judges
are men and women of uncommon intelligence (or should be, anyway).
7. Seventh issue: Appellants are neither tax protestors nor illegal tax protestors ("ITP"). The RRA98 expressly prohibits IRS officers and employees from designating "taxpayers" as "illegal tax protestors" or any similar designation. See RRA98, section 3707.
8. Eighth issue: The Appellants have appealed all lower court “orders” attempting to attach their property. Those lower court “orders” were timely shown to lack the seal of the court and the signature of the Clerk of the Court, as required by 28 U.S.C. 1691.
The Appellee persists in alleging that the Williamsons are
“taxpayers" and that the Williamsons have “federal income tax
liabilities”. However, IRC section 7851(a)(6)(A) specifically states that “the provisions of subtitle F shall take
effect on the day after the date of enactment of this title”. What exactly is the meaning of “this
title” here?
Within
Chapter 64 entitled Collections, section 6321, Lien
for Taxes, is found in subtitle F; and, since “this title” (Title 26) has never been enacted into positive law by
Act of Congress and never published anywhere in the Federal Register, such sections have no general applicability and
no legal effect upon the Williamsons.
They are, at best, provisions intended to enforce federal municipal statutes with no
territorial application anywhere within New Mexico. See Federal Register Act at 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501, 1507.
It is not
"tax protestor rhetoric" to state that Title 26 and IRC subtitle A do not
apply to New Mexico Citizens. It has been held by the U.S. Supreme Court
that such legislation is prima facie
territorial unless it explicitly states that such legislation is made
applicable to the fifty (50) States of the Union. Compare IRC 4612, where the
“50 States” are mentioned as such.
In her REPLY BRIEF Ms. Wolfinger and the USDC
below never placed into evidence any
proof that the tax "laws” in question are applicable anywhere other than the areas over which the Constitution grants exclusive legislative authority to the
Congress of the United States.
"All legislation is prima
facie territorial."
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-357 (1909)
"Legislation is
presumptively territorial and confined to limits over which the law-making
power has jurisdiction."
New York Central R.R. Co. v.
Chisholm,
268 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1925)
...[T]he "canon of
construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States ...."
U.S. v. Spelar, 338
U.S. 217, 222, 70 S.Ct. 10 (1949)
Arizona and
New Mexico became States in 1912 & 1914 on an equal footing with the
original thirteen States, so all these Acts like Title 26, Internal Revenue
Code (“IRC”), Taylor
Grazing Act (passed in 1934), and FLIPMA passed in
1976 and codified at Title 43
of the U.S. Code, are all territorial law.
(a) Case was brought by an Assistant
U.S. Attorney Waymon G. DuBose, Jr., under the name of U.S. Attorney David C. Iglesias for Plaintiff
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic]. David C. Iglesias lacked
proper credentials to hold that office and at this time is out of office.
Appellee's attorney FAILED to address this
problem in her REPLY BRIEF.
(b) DOJ’s
Attorneys lack powers of attorney to represent UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic]. Appellee's attorney
FAILED to address this problem in her REPLY BRIEF.
(c) Plaintiff
alleged authority under Title
26, U.S. Code, sections 7402 and 7403. Both sections expressly grant jurisdiction to District Courts of the United States (“DCUS”) NOT
to United States District Courts (“USDC”). Therefore,
the lower court lacked jurisdiction to even hear the action in the first
instance. Appellee's attorney
FAILED to address this problem in her REPLY BRIEF.
(d) Appellants
properly challenged jurisdiction from the beginning and continuously
thereafter. Appellee's
attorney FAILED to address this problem in her REPLY
BRIEF.
(e) DOJ
Attorney Waymon G. DuBose, Jr. changed the name of the alleged Plaintiff
three (3) times within the first three pages of the COMPLAINT. Doc. #1, pgs. 1, 2, 3. Appellee's attorney FAILED to address this problem in her REPLY BRIEF.
(f) USDC refused to recognize Appellants’ timely
and proper jury demands, thereby violating their Rights. Appellee's
attorney FAILED to address this problem in her REPLY
BRIEF.
(g) UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA [sic] lacks
capacity and standing to sue and be sued as such. Congress has never conferred legal standing
upon such an entity. Compare 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1345 and 1346, which
expressly confer legal standing upon the “United States” (federal government)
to sue and be sued, respectively. Appellee's attorney FAILED to address this problem in her REPLY BRIEF.
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT
TO THE
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
(a) Lack of jurisdiction under Title 26, U.S. Code, sections
7402 and 7403 for the USDC
below to hear the action in the first instance.
Compare IRC §§ 7402
and 7403.
(b) Defendants/Appellants
demanded a jury trial from
the beginning. See Doc #2, 11, 32.
(c) United States District Court is a
“territorial” tribunal that
lacks jurisdiction within the boundaries of New Mexico. Strictly speaking, it is not even a
“Court”. Article I.
(d) Defendants/Appellants are New Mexico Citizens NOT federal citizens; and, because subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code is
federal “municipal law”
applicable only to federal citizens
and resident aliens, IRC subtitle A is simply
NOT applicable Appellants.
(e) Plaintiff/Appellee alleges that
Defendants/Appellants owe some “kind of tax 1040” but fails or refuses to
exhibit any statute or regulation making New Mexico Citizens
specifically “liable” for a tax upon their earnings from occupations of common
right.
(f) Plaintiff/Appellee failed or refused to enter
into evidence a valid NOTICE OF ASSESSMENT AND DEMAND FOR PAYMENT as a
condition precedent to filing a NOTICE OF
FEDERAL TAX LIEN against Defendants/Appellants.
(g) Plaintiff/Appellee
failed or refused to place into evidence any valid ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATES
signed by a duly authorized Assessment Officer.
All Forms 4340 offered by Plaintiff/Appellee
for the record are computer printouts only “certified” by an “administrative
technician”, not an Assessment Office, and not under penalties of perjury as required by IRC 6065. These forms 4340 do not conform to the
statutes, regulations or IRM provisions governing proper ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATES. Therefore, all of Appellee’s
“liens” are fraudulent for lacking conditions precedent.
(h) IRC section
7851(a)(6)(A) is controlling because Title 26 of the U.S. Code has
never been enacted into positive law as such.
The Fifth Amendment prohibits all deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Due process of law is another honored and well developed feature of American Constitutional practice. Put simply, it requires Notice and Hearing before any property can be seized by any federal government officers, employees, agents, departments or agencies.
“A fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). “It is an opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (emphases added).
For more than thirty years (30) the Williamsons have been requesting the government to provide proof that they are “liable” for a tax called “kind of tax 1040”. Their requests and demands have been met with silence, malicious retaliation, and name-calling such as "frivolous" rather than a truthful exhibition of a statute and regulation making “kind of tax 1040” a lawful tax imposed upon the Citizens of New Mexico, or any other State of the Union for that matter.
The Williamsons have repeatedly requested and demanded that the Appellee exhibit the volume and page of the Federal Register wherein such a tax was made applicable to the general public inhabiting the 50 States of the Union. See 44 U.S.C. 1501, 1507.
Intervenor United States ex rel. served Treasury with a SUBPOENA for a liability statute for IRC subtitle A, but that SUBPOENA is long overdue and now in default. Appellee refuses to place into evidence any statute and regulation making the Citizens of the 50 States of the Union specifically “liable” for a direct tax upon their earnings from occupations of common right.
A unapportioned direct tax on earnings from occupations of common Right is unconstitutional, and so the U.S. Supreme Court correctly held in the Pollock [2] decision.
Absolutely
NO federal statute exists creating a “kind of tax 1040” and imposing a direct
tax upon the earnings of New Mexico State Citizens engaged in occupations of
common right.
Absolutely
NO federal regulation exists implementing “kind of tax 1040” and making the
Williamsons “liable” for a direct tax upon their earnings from occupations of
common right.
The government, in violation of the
Williamsons’ First
Amendment Rights to petition the Government for a Redress of Grievances, fails to
answer and exhibit the statutes and regulations supporting their allegations
that the Williamsons “owe” some “kind of tax 1040”. Cf. “Redress” in Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary (1856) (the act of receiving satisfaction for an injury
sustained).
The government falsely alleges the
Williamsons are “taxpayers” thus implying to this and other Courts that the
Williamsons are either government employees, “citizens of the United States” or “residents of the United States”
and not Citizens of New Mexico (their true status).
When
challenged, the government stands silent without evidence supporting its
allegation that the Williamsons are “taxpayers” in the sense that they owe some
“kind of tax 1040”. No number of Article
IV USDC decrees to the contrary are able to alter
the FACTS that the Williamsons are
private sector Citizens of
New Mexico who have been lawfully engaged in occupations of common Right for
the entire period in question.
They are
not federal citizens; they are not resident aliens; and they are not government “employees”. See IRC section 3401(c)
(term “employee of a corporation” is
conspicuously absent from that definition!)
Confer at Inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth
Edition (an irrefutable inference must be
drawn that whatever was omitted or excluded from a federal statute was intended to be omitted or excluded
by Act of Congress).
For example, IRC section 7701(a)(26) specifically defines “trade or business” as follows:
The term “trade or business”
includes the performance of the functions of a public office.
No other private sector occupation, trade, craft or business is “included”; therefore, all others are deliberately excluded by intentional Act of Congress. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius!
The Williamsons are NOT now, nor have they ever been, performing any “functions of a public office” as defined above.
The Williamsons have discovered that IRS Form 1040 does not comply with the Paperwork Reduction Act (“PRA”). Section 3512 of that PRA titled “Public Protection” reads as follows:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information that is subject to this subchapter {44 USCS Sec. 3500; et seq.} if --
(1) the collection of information does not display a valid control number assigned by the Director in accordance with this subchapter [44 USCS Sec. 3501 et seq.]; or
(2) the agency fails to inform the person who is to respond to the collection of information that such person is not required to respond to the collection of information unless it displays a valid control number.
The Williamsons have also discovered that the IRS does not comply with the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). The APA protects the public at 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1):
... a person may not in any
manner be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, a matter required
to be published in the Federal Register and not so published.
The Williamsons have also discovered that the IRS does not comply with the Federal Register Act either. The Federal Register Act protects the general public at 44 U.S.C. 1507:
A document required to
be published in the Federal Register is not valid as against a person who has
not had actual knowledge of it until the duplicate originals or certified
copies of the document have been filed with the Office of the Federal Register
and a copy made available for public inspection.
The
Williamsons have discovered that the Internal Revenue Service is not a bona fide service, bureau, office or
other subdivision within the U.S. Department of the
Treasury, as those terms occur at 31 U.S.C.
333. In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
441 U.S. 281, 297 (1979)
at footnote
23, the U.S. Supreme Court admitted that no organic Act of Congress
creating the IRS could be found, after the high Court searched all the way back
to the Civil War for such an organic Act.
The Williamsons have discovered that subtitle A of the IRC is federal “municipal law” applicable only to Washington, D.C., and to the enclaves, territories and possessions over which Congress has exclusive legislative authority.
For example, the federal UCC was enacted expressly for the District of Columbia. See also the special definition of “State” at IRC 3121(e)(1).
New Mexico is a sovereign State admitted to the Union on an equal footing with the original thirteen States of the Union. The Congress does not have exclusive legislative authority inside New Mexico State. Appellee's attorney, Gretchen M. Wolfinger, entirely failed to address this key problem anywhere in her REPLY BRIEF.
Concerning the
standing decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 92 (1959), the excellent abstract
published in the 1962 edition of American Jurisprudence states:
[A]n administrative agency may not create a criminal offense or any
liability not sanctioned by the lawmaking authority, especially a liability
for a tax or inspection fee.
In spite of
all these standing decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, Appellee,
Ms. Wolfinger, and others
are still unable to produce and place into evidence any proof of a Statute at Large creating a specific
liability for federal income taxes imposed by IRC subtitle A and
making New Mexico Citizens
specifically liable for an unapportioned
direct tax upon their earnings from occupations of common Right.
Appellee alleges that IRS Forms 4340 are
lawful ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATES, but they are not dated and signed under penalties of perjury by a duly
delegated Assessment Officer, as required by IRC section 6065.[3] See also Brafman v. U.S., 384 F.2d 863 (5th Cir.
1967), 26 CFR
301.6203-1, and all pertinent provisions of the Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM”)
which now have the force and effect of law by virtue of the IRS Restructuring
and Reform Act of 1998 (“RRA98”).
IRS employees can now be disciplined, or terminated,
for violating any provisions of that IRM.
The NOTICES OF FEDERAL TAX LIEN alleged as
admissible evidence are likewise not signed under penalties of perjury as required
by IRC 6065.
In California
Bankers Ass’n v Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), the Supreme Court
specifically held that “without a regulation there are NO civil or
criminal penalties for not complying” (emphasis added).
Therefore, unless and until the Appellee, Ms. Wolfinger, the USDC
below and this Circuit
Court can produce a "regulation" and Appellants can see clearly
that it is applicable to them, then Appellants are under absolutely NO
obligation to comply with a collection of information “Form 1040" that
also is in violation of requirements set out in the Paperwork Reduction Act, in
the Administrative Procedures Act and in the Federal Register Act.
Appellee, Ms. Wolfinger and others here are effectively urging this
Court merely to assume facts not in evidence and to hold in their favor
on that hollow and rebuttable assumption.
“It is
obvious that these decisions in principle rule the case at bar if the word
‘income’ has the same meaning in the Income Tax Act of 1913 that it had in the
Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, and that it has the same scope of meaning
was in effect decided in Southern
Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330, 335, where it was assumed for the
purposes of decision that there was no difference in its meaning as used in the
act of 1909 and in the Income Tax Act of 1913.
There can be no doubt that the word must be given the same meaning and
content in the Income Tax Acts of 1916 and 1917 that it had in the Act of
1913. When to this we add that in Eisner v. Macomber,
a case arising under the same Income Tax Act of 1916 which is here involved,
the definition of ‘income’ which was applied was adopted from Strattons’
Independence v. Howbert, arising under the
Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, with the addition that it should include
‘profit gained through sale or conversion of capital assets,’ there would seem to be no room to doubt
that the word must be given the same meaning in all Income Tax Acts of Congress
that was given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act, and that what that
meaning is has now become definitely settled by decisions of this Court.” Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka,
255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921)
(emphases added).
"... [A] statute which imposes a tax upon an assumption of fact which the [presumed] taxpayer is forbidden to controvert is so arbitrary and unreasonable that it
cannot stand under the Fourteenth
Amendment." Heiner v. Donnan,
285 U.S. 312, hn. 2 (1932) (emphasis added).
The IRS
lacks valid ASSESSMENTS to support NOTICES
OF FEDERAL TAX LIEN filed with the Bernalillo County Clerk. See Brafman v. United States, 384 F.2d 863 (1967); also Geiselman et
al. v. U.S., 92-1 USTC ¶50200.
After
willfully initiating an action by filing and recording NOTICES OF FEDERAL TAX LIEN in the public
records of the Bernalillo County Clerk, Appellee
failed to answer and then failed to prosecute the action which it had
initiated.
Said NOTICES OF FEDERAL TAX LIEN are not supported by valid ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATES, and
absolutely NO valid NOTICES OF ASSESSMENT AND DEMANDS FOR
PAYMENT have ever been served upon
Appellants.
See Linwood
Blackstone et al. v. United States of
America, 778 F.Supp.
244, 247 (USDC D. Md. 1991), quoting:
Without a valid notice
and demand there can be no
tax lien; without
a tax lien, the IRS cannot levy against the taxpayers property .… This Court concludes, consistent with the
views expressed in Berman, Marvel, and
Chila that
the appropriate ‘sanction’ against
the IRS for its failure to comply with the 6303(a) notice and demand
requirement is to take away its awesome nonjudicial
collection powers. citing
Myrick v. United States, 296
F.2d. 312 (5th Cir. 1961).
The USDC
below ignored the Appellants’ objection that no valid NOTICE OF ASSESSMENT AND
DEMAND FOR PAYMENT was ever admitted into evidence, and Appellee
has still failed to produce and place
into evidence before this Court a single valid NOTICE OF ASSESSMENT AND DEMAND
FOR PAYMENT.
In reality, the courts have created a legal fiction in which the
submission of Form 4340, which lists a “23C Date,” creates a presumption that a
Form 23C was signed. While the courts
have said that this presumption is rebuttable by the
“taxpayer”, the IRS concedes that “when the Debtors argue that the 23C Forms
were never produced, it is because they probably do not physically exist.” In other words, the IRS gets the benefit of a
presumption that they admit is likely false. March v. IRS, 335
F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2003)
The IRS never obtained a WARRANT OF DISTRAINT from any New Mexico Court having jurisdiction, or
any other court, before selling the property in question in this action[4]. See United
States v. O’Dell, 160 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1947), and G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S.
338 (1977).
Federal UCC
9-401 requires appearance in a State Court prior to the issuance of a WARRANT OF DISTRAINT. A denial of this constitutes a denial of due
process of law.
Because the
IRS agents failed to obtain a proper WARRANT OF DISTRAINT,
this sale becomes an illegal conversion
in violation of New Mexico State law at NMSA 58-13A-7. Appellee’s agents have conspired and unlawfully aided and
abetted this crime of conversion.
The United
States (federal government) can be enjoined to prevent the destruction of a
business which might otherwise occur as a direct consequence of enforcing the
assessment and/or collection of income taxes.
Specifically, the
Anti-injunction Act cannot be enforced to destroy a business. See John M. Hirst
& Co. v. Gentsch, 133 F.2d 247, hn. 4 (6th Cir. 1943); Midwest
Haulers v. Brady, 128 F.2d 496, hn. 3 (6th
Cir., 1942);
and, Long v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 758 (1957).
Appellee filed unverified and uncertified
NOTICES OF FEDERAL TAX LIEN in the
Public Records of the Bernalillo County Clerk, thereby injuring the
Williamsons’ Rights to property, good name, good credit and reputation.
Appellee FAILED to issue valid NOTICES OF
ASSESSMENT AND DEMANDS FOR PAYMENT before filing NOTICES OF FEDERAL TAX LIEN with the
Bernalillo County Clerk.
Appellee has FAILED to pay into the Treasury of the United
States any of the money taken from the Appellants and to credit those
amounts to the account(s) of Appellants.
Appellee has converted all of the money and
property taken from Appellants to the personal use and benefit of Appellee’s agents, in direct violation of the law. See IRC 7809.
Upon
demand, Appellee has refused, failed and/or neglected
to provide Appellants with a spreadsheet accounting of the money and property
taken from Appellants.
Appellee failed to respond to a single
issue contained in APPELLANTS’ INFORMAL
OPENING BRIEF.
Appellee lacks lawful authority for its
actions and, in that light, its several agents have now become personally
liable for the injuries they have caused.
Cf. “Respondeat superior” in Black’s Law Dictionary,
Sixth Edition (also known as vicarious liability).
The
Appellants have continually relied upon holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court as
the proper foundation for their beliefs and their position that the federal
government is wrongfully attempting to apply federal municipal "Codes" like
“Morse Codes” against Appellants.
If the
doctrine of stare decisis
has any meaning at all, it requires that People in their everyday affairs be
able to rely on decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and not be needlessly
penalized for such reliance. See U.S.
v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 399-400 (1973).
For the foregoing reasons, all "orders" of the United States District Court below should be vacated promptly, and this action should be remanded to a constitutional Article III District Court of the United States (“DCUS”) for a full and meaningful jury trial on the issues.
The
Williamsons are entitled to a full refund of all money and property taken from
them by the use of illegal liens and levies in absence of NOTICE OF ASSESSMENT
AND DEMAND FOR PAYMENT Form 17A[5]. See United States v. Berman, 825 F.2d
1053, 1056-1057 (6th Cir. 1987); and IRC section 6303(a). No Form 17A is evident anywhere in the
Record.
Eileen J. O’Connor dba Assistant
Attorney General, Andrea R. Tebbets
dba Attorney, Gretchen M. Wolfinger dba Attorney, and David C. Iglesias dba U.S. Attorney, are all in violation of the McDade
Act,[6]
and all lack proper powers of attorney and other credentials required to appear
legally on behalf of the Appellee UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA [sic] in this matter. See definition of “Union” in Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary (1856 Edition).
In this
context, please see U.S. v. High Country Broadcasting Co., 3 F.3d 1244
(9th Cir. 1993), because said attorneys’ attempt to appear on behalf
of the named Plaintiff assumed powers of attorney that did not exist, as a
matter of fact and as a matter of law.
See also 18 U.S.C.
912 (prohibiting impersonation of any officer of the United States), 18 U.S.C.
1341 (prohibiting mail fraud), and 18 U.S.C.
1961 et seq.
(prohibiting racketeering).
All claims
that Appellants’ pleadings are “frivolous” -- in all of Appellee’s
previous pleadings and in its REPLY BRIEF --
are hereby REFUSED FOR CAUSE nunc pro tunc.
The government and the courts know,
or should know, that no statute or regulation exists for any “kind of tax
1040”; they routinely brand pleadings as
“frivolous” when that term is really just another deliberately deceptive “CODE” WORD meaning:
“We won't deal with this because it will
expose our protection racket.”
The government
and the courts know, or should know, that United States District
Courts[7]
in the past lacked original jurisdiction in all actions brought against the
Williamsons.
The
government and the courts know, or should know, that United States District
Courts are not constitutional Article III federal
courts. Balzac v.
Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922).
The
government and the courts know, or should know, that the U.S. Tax Court is
the old Board of Tax Appeals and it is not a true constitutional Article
III federal court either.
Appellee alleges on Page 6 of its REPLY BRIEF that -- somehow -- IRC section 1 makes the
Williamsons specifically “liable” when no liability clause is evident anywhere in that section. On this point, please compare IRC section 3403, which
demonstrates the language and structure of a clear and unmistakable liability statute
for subtitle C “employment
taxes”.
IRC section 1 is
implemented by the regulation at 26 CFR 1.1-1, but that regulation is applicable only to federal citizens and resident aliens, which the
Williamsons are not.
Furthermore,
IRS petitioned the OMB for a control number to implement 26 CFR 1.1-1,
and the control number given to the IRS was 1545-0067. That control number was assigned to IRS Form 2555 entitled “Foreign Earned
Income”. The Williamsons do not have
“Foreign Earned Income”;
once again, that term applies only to federal citizens and resident aliens.
Appellee and this Court know, or should
know, that the general term “income” is not defined anywhere in the IRC. See U.S.
v. Ballard, 535 F.2d 400, 404, hn. 2 (8th Cir. 1976).
Appellee and this Court are also fully
aware that the U.S. Supreme Court has held the definition to mean “corporate profit”[8]. The Williamsons do not have any “corporate
profit” and the government is fully aware of this fact.
Appellee UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [sic] is not incorporated in New Mexico and never
has been incorporated in New Mexico.
The
government continues to perpetrate these acts of malicious economic terrorism
against the Williamsons in an effort to induce them and other Citizens into complying, under
duress, with their illegal taxing scheme.
That scheme has become a vicious extortion
racket just like a Plank in the Communist Manifesto -- punishing “rebels”
-- with deliberate intent to retaliate aggressively against anyone who learns
these facts and laws, and acts accordingly.
The COUNTERCLAIM by John S. Williamson and Nancy L. Williamson et.al. in
this action clearly sets forth valid claims for which the requested relief can
be granted by the DCUS.
Under the U.S. Constitution, the
fundamental Right to
petition the government for a redress of grievances is NOT a Right that is
expressly guaranteed there, only to be so circumscribed that it exists in
principle but not in fact and not in actual practice.
The Right to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances is nothing short of the Capstone Right through which all other Rights are peacefully enforced and the
sovereignty of the People is exercised directly by Citizens of the United States of America, like
Appellants.
In order for the Government to justify its failure to respond, it must be able to show that its non-responsiveness was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid discomfort, unpleasantness or practical difficulty. There must be a clear and present reason for the federal government to trespass upon any fundamental Rights of the Appellants. No such reason is evident anywhere in the official record before this Court of Appeals.
Wolfinger’s
limited response to the OPENING BRIEF
is nothing more than a wearisome diatribe of nefarious invective, and
inflammatory allegations, abusing the insult "frivolous". Wolfinger
et al. do not support their position
with the Constitution,
statutes, regulations, Rules of Court or Supreme Court decisions, because they cannot. They cannot exhibit any powers of attorney to
represent UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, because no such powers of attorney
exist. Their BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEE
really should be stricken from the record because it is so non-responsive and mostly
irrelevant to the facts and laws at bar.
Widespread abuse of the term “frivolous” implies special knowledge of
the future, which is a preposterous absurdity.
The Appellee relies in part on unpublished decisions of the Tenth Circuit. However, unpublished decisions have been held to be unconstitutional by the Eighth Circuit in Anastasoff v. United States of America, No. 99-3917EM, citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177-78 (1803); James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991); Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399 (1821); and, Article III, Section 1, Clause 1 in the U.S. Constitution (the judicial Power of the United States, NOT of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA).
All decisions of the Tenth Circuit are in jeopardy of being invalid for the very reason that the judges sitting on the Tenth Circuit cannot exhibit and refuse to exhibit the four (4) credentials required of the positions they claim to hold. See Article VI, Section 3, in chief.
Without all the proper credentials in place and in custody of the Clerk of Court at the time of these decisions, those individuals are not duly commissioned Circuit Judges, and their decisions and pronouncements are consequently criminal and not lawful. 18 U.S.C. 912, 1001.
Appellants have demanded exhibition and proof that all individuals claiming to be Tenth Circuit Judges timely provide certified copies of all four (4) of their required credentials.
WHEREFORE,
Appellants respectfully request justice(s) or judge(s) who are fully and
properly credentialed to preside upon this Tenth
Circuit Court, to enter a lawful ORDER:
a.
granting a PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION against the United States (federal government), the
Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Justice and any other agency of the United States (federal government) that arguably may act under color of law in this matter, from
taking any further retaliatory
actions against any named Appellants in this proceeding;
b.
vacating all “orders’ issued to date by the United States District
Court for the District
of New Mexico, and remanding this matter to the constitutional Article
III District Court of the United States
for the Judicial District of New
Mexico for a full and meaningful
review of the case, including a jury trial (of course);
c.
granting further relief to the Appellants by
commanding the United States
(federal government) to meet its obligations under the U.S. Constitution, Laws, Treaties and applicable rules and
regulations, by entering into good faith exchanges with the Appellants, to
provide Appellants with well documented and specific answers to the reasonable
questions they have asked, and to address each of the specific issues they
raised in their proper and timely COUNTERCLAIM;
d.
freezing all assets of the Internal Revenue Service
pending final disposition of this case as requested in the pending MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION;
e.
directing the United States Postal Service to re-route
all incoming U.S. Mail addressed to the Internal Revenue Service to the U.S. Department of the
Treasury, for the purpose of depositing all tax receipts daily into the Treasury of the United
States as expressly required by the federal statute at IRC section 7809;
f.
granting any and all other relief to the Appellants as
this honorable Court may deem just and proper;
and,
g.
retaining
jurisdiction of this action in order to ensure full compliance with all of the
Court’s decisions, orders, opinions and judgments.
Defendants/Appellants respectfully inform the Court that they believe oral argument in this case is necessary and that it would be helpful to the Court.
VERIFICATION
Under 28 U.S.C.
1746(1), we declare under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United
States of America (aka 50 States of the Union), without the “United States” (federal government),
that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to
the best of our current information, knowledge, and belief, so help us
God. See Supremacy Clause (Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the United States are the supreme Law of the Land).
Respectfully submitted:
Dated: June 6, 2007
/s/ John S. Williamson
__________________________
John S. Williamson, in Pro Per
/s/ Nancy L. Williamson
__________________________
Nancy L. Williamson, in Pro Per
/s/ John G. Williamson
__________________________
John G. Williamson, in Pro Per
/s/ David A. Williamson
__________________________
David A. Williamson, in Pro Per
/s/ Garrett J. Williamson
__________________________
Garrett J. Williamson, in Pro Per
/s/ Deborah Kruhm
__________________________
Deborah Kruhm,
in Pro Per
1277
Historic Rte. 66E.
Tijeras, [87059]
NEW MEXICO, USA
Tel: (505) 281-5788
Please complete one of the sections:
As required by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(C). I certify that this REPLY BRIEF is proportionally
spaced and contains 8991 words.
Complete one of the
following:
X I
relied on my word processor to obtain the count and it is [name word processor
software]: Microsoft Word
______ I counted five characters per word,
counting all characters including citations and numerals.
My REPLY BRIEF was prepared in a mono-spaced
typeface and contains 934 lines of text.
I certify that the information on this form is true
and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry.
/s/ John S. Williamson, Sui Juris,
in Pro Per
____________________________________________________
John S. Williamson, Appellant Sui Juris
and In Propria
Persona
It is hereby certified that an original and seven (7) copies of this REPLY BRIEF were mailed to the Clerk by first class mail on this 6th day of June, 2007, and that service of this brief was made upon Appellee’s Counsel, on this 6th day of June, 2007 two paper copies of the REPLY BRIEF in an envelope properly addressed as follows:
P.O.
Box 502
Washington
20044
DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA, USA
/s/ John S. Williamson, Sui Juris,
in Pro Per
____________________________________________________
John S. Williamson, Appellant Sui Juris
and In Propria
Persona
[1] Refers to the original COMPLAINT.
[2] Pollock v. Farmers' Loan, 157 U.S. 429, 554
[3] See 34 Am Jur 2d ¶70476, page 678.
[4] UNITED STATES of America v. John S.
Williamson, 1 F.3d 1134-1136, (10th Cir. 1993)
[5] See Mertins Law of Federal Income Taxation, Vol. 13, July 1987, monthly updates, secs. 49, 187.
[6] 28 U.S.C §§ 530B, 541.
[7] Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S.298, 312, (1922); see also Mookini v. U.S., 303 U.S. 201 (1938)
[8] Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921)
