Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris
c/o General Delivery
Phillipsville 95559-9999
CALIFORNIA, USA
In Propria Persona
All Rights Reserved
without Prejudice
District Court of the United States
Eastern Judicial District of California
Paul Andrew
Mitchell, ) No. CIV.
S-01-1480 WBS DAD PS
)
Plaintiff,
) NOTICE OF MOTION AND
) MOTION TO STRIKE ORDER AND
v. ) FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
) OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE ‑‑
PART I:
AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al., )
) 28 U.S.C. 1746(1)
Defendants.
)
______________________________)
COMES NOW Paul Andrew Mitchell, Plaintiff in the
above entitled case, Citizen of California, Private Attorney General and
Federal Witness, to move
this honorable Court for an ORDER striking the so-called ORDER AND FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS by U.S. Magistrate Judge Dale A. Drozd dated December 28, 2001 A.D.,
and to provide formal Notice to all interested Party(s) of same.
INCORPORATION
OF RELATED DOCUMENTS
Plaintiff hereby incorporates His COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT against Mr. Drozd, executed on January 11, 2002 A.D., as if set forth fully herein. See 28 U.S.C. 372(c).
Plaintiff also incorporates the AUTHOR’S AFFIDAVIT CONTESTING DECLARATION OF WESLEY C.J. EHLERS and Plaintiff’s NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR PROOF OF FRAUD, recently filed and served in the instant case, as if both were set forth fully herein.
MR.
DROZD HAS EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION
CORAM NON
JUDICE
The legislative Article IV United States District Court (“USDC”) lacks original jurisdiction to issue any of the relief requested in Plaintiff’s Initial COMPLAINT. See 60 Stat. 440, for example.
Plaintiff petitioned the Article III District Court of the United States (“DCUS”) for all the relief requested in that COMPLAINT. The DCUS does have original jurisdiction to issue all relief requested in Plaintiff’s Initial COMPLAINT.
As such, Mr. Drozd is usurping jurisdiction coram non judice.
Plaintiff never executed USDC-EDCA Form.9: CONSENT TO PROCEED BEFORE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE, and never intends to execute said form, in part because jurisdiction can never be waived by a litigant.
Moreover, the pertinent law makes it crystal clear that Plaintiff’s decision to consent, or not to consent, to the referral of the case to a United States Magistrate Judge is entirely voluntary.
28 U.S.C. 636(c)(2) states, in pertinent part:
The decision of
the parties shall be communicated to the clerk of court. Thereafter, either the district court judge
or the magistrate may again advise the parties of the availability of the
magistrate, but in so doing, shall also advise the parties that they are
free to withhold consent without adverse substantive consequences. Rules of court for the reference of civil
matters to magistrates shall include procedures to protect the voluntariness
of the parties’ consent.
[bold emphasis added]
Even if all named Defendants had consented to the exercise of civil jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge, under this statute a magistrate may conduct any or all proceedings in a civil case only upon the consent of all parties.
Plaintiff’s decision not to consent makes it impossible for any United States Magistrate Judge to exercise civil jurisdiction in the instant case.
Accordingly, the usurpation of jurisdiction by Mr. Drozd has resulted in causing serious adverse substantive consequences to Plaintiff, for which Mr. Drozd is personally liable. See all citations in Plaintiff’s COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT incorporated by reference supra; and The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. 1, 5 L.Ed. 191 (1821) (usurpation of power is not an exercise of judicial function).
Mr. Drozd has alleged that “Plaintiff [is] proceeding pro se” [sic]. Plaintiff is not proceeding Pro Se.
“Se” is a neuter Latin pronoun. In legal terminology, that term is appropriate for referring to a fictitious or juristic entity. Plaintiff is not a fictitious or juristic entity.
Plaintiff is a Citizen of California proceeding In Propria Persona (in His Proper Person).
Quem ad finem sese effrenata iactabit audacia. (“To what end will your unbridled audacity hurl itself, Cataline?” wrote Cicero.)
ATTORNEYS DID NOT
MAKE PROPER APPEARANCES
AT THE HEARING ON DECEMBER 14, 2001 A.D.
There is no evidence on record that any of the attorneys in question has a valid license to practice law, as required by Section 6067 of the California Business and Professions Code.
On December 14, 2001 A.D., the Clerk of Court issued valid SUBPOENAS commanding said attorneys to produce valid licenses to practice law, and to do so on or before February 15, 2002 A.D.
To assert that said attorneys “appeared” is to beg this important question. Such an assertion also assumes facts not in evidence.
NONE OF
DEFENDANTS’ PLEADINGS
It follows from the fact that the attorneys in question do not have valid licenses to practice law that they were not authorized to enter any pleadings on behalf of any named Defendants.
Plaintiff properly and timely moved this honorable Court for an ORDER striking all pleadings filed by attorneys lacking the requisite credentials (“STRIKE MOTION”).
Plaintiff’s STRIKE MOTION is still pending before this honorable Court, due primarily to the fact that the DCUS is presently vacant.
Plaintiff has properly and timely attempted to cure this vacancy by demanding a Certificate of Necessity from Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Plaintiff recently filed and served a supplement to said demand.
The prolonged delay in ruling on Plaintiff’s STRIKE MOTION now constitutes plain error by depriving Plaintiff of procedural due process, as guaranteed by the Fifth and Seventh Amendments.
Mr. Drozd lacks power, jurisdiction and authority to “grant” or to “deny” said STRIKE MOTION, or any other motion, for that matter.
Mr. Drozd does not enjoy life tenure, as required by Article III, Section 1.
Moreover, the Hon. William B. Shubb is a United States District Judge commissioned to preside on the USDC, not the DCUS. (See “WBS” in the Clerk’s docket number assigned to the instant case.)
Mr. Shubb and Mr. Drozd are also paying federal income taxes on their compensation, in violation of Article III, Section 1.
As such, Mr. Shubb cannot exercise the judicial Power of the United States, nor can he preside on the DCUS, because the President of the United States of America never commissioned Mr. Shubb to preside on the DCUS.
On January 15, 2002 A.D., Plaintiff requested certified confirmation of Mr. Shubb’s commission by submitting a proper and lawful request for same under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).
The court with original jurisdiction to adjudicate FOIA requests is the DCUS. See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B), in chief.
Therefore, Mr. Shubb lacks authority to delegate motion disposition to Mr. Drozd in the instant case.
Mr. Drozd has erred by stating that Plaintiff distributed the subject book “as shareware (i.e., free software)” [sic].
This is not correct.
Shareware and freeware are entirely distinct and different modes of distributing digital information.
The following letter to the Editor appeared in PC World magazine for July 2001, on page 24. Plaintiff argues that the author of this letter correctly understands the “shareware” model as applied to digital information available from the Internet:
Music File Sharing
Amidst the ongoing controversy about Napster, MP3, and the recording industry, I wonder if anyone has seriously considered trying the “shareware” model. Perhaps we could all download songs or albums, try them for 30 days, and then send in payment if we decide to keep them. This would solve the problem of paying 16 bucks for a CD only to find just one good song (or none) on it. Granted, there will be cheaters who do not pay, but dishonest people will always find their way around any system we put in place.
Ken Wenzler, Waukesha, Wisconsin
[bold emphasis added]
MR.
DROZD HAS MIS‑STATED
PLAINTIFF’S FIDELITY REQUIREMENT
Plaintiff’s README file contained a “Shareware Policy” which expressly prohibited changes in Capitalization, bold, italics and underlines [sic].
Mr. Drozd has committed telltale errors by defining those font characteristics as “i.e., bold, italics, and underlining” [sic], thereby neglecting to exhibit the correct characteristics, and also omitting “Capitalization” as such.
This is one of the key tests which Plaintiff originally designed and implemented to detect unauthorized derivatives of the subject book, and Mr. Drozd obviously failed this simple test.
These font characteristics were also an essential feature of the methodology which Plaintiff devised to crack the Internal Revenue Code.
Highlighting the key grammatical components of long paragraphs in federal laws, regulations and court cases eased the burden of deciphering the essential meaning of otherwise vague and unintelligible quotations.
Plaintiff’s Shareware Policy expressly allowed at most cosmetic changes that might result from translation into other word processor formats, such as different margins.
MR. DROZD
REPEATEDLY MIS‑APPLIES
Plaintiff filed and served a timely MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT to clarify the scope of authority granted by Congress to the U.S. Supreme Court for formulating rules of evidence and procedure.
The purpose of declaratory judgments is to clarify the legal relations of the parties to any action. 28 U.S.C. 2201.
Plaintiff was correct to request clarification on the question of whether or not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) bind litigants in the DCUS in any manner whatsoever.
Any motion which invokes a rule not applicable to the DCUS, or to litigants in the DCUS, exhibits the fatal defect of failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
28 U.S.C. 2072(a) grants authority to the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of evidence and procedure only for the USDC. The DCUS is not mentioned in that statute.
Confer at “inclusio unius est exclusio alterius” in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition.
Under this well established rule of construction, Plaintiff is allowed to infer that whatever was omitted or excluded was intended to be omitted or excluded by Congress.
The DCUS is obviously not mentioned in section 2072(a).
Moreover, it is quite well established that statutes granting original jurisdiction must be strictly construed. Plaintiff has strictly construed section 2072(a) to exclude the DCUS.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT also included a proper and timely challenge to the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. 2072(b), for violating the Separation of Powers Doctrine and the ex post facto Clause in the U.S. Constitution.
Congress never expressly abolished the DCUS, Congress never expressly repealed its grants of original jurisdiction, and Congress never expressly changed “DCUS” to “USDC” throughout the pertinent federal laws by means of lawful amendments.
Plaintiff argues and hereby complains that the switch from DCUS to USDC in pertinent federal statutes was allegedly accomplished retroactively, and in violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine, by means of rule changes. See Historical and Statutory Notes to FRCP Rule 1, for example, and compare 60 Stat. 440 as later amended.
As such, the scope of those changes was strictly limited to the rules in question, and could not be extended to any federal statutes, notwithstanding the language of section 2072(b).
Moreover, repeals by implication are never favored. 74 Am.Jur.2d 21-22: Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 27 S.Ct. 539, 51 L.Ed. 816 (1907); U.S. v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 22 S.Ct. 629, 46 L.Ed. 878 (1902); John T. Bill Co. v. U.S., 104 F.2d 67 (C.C.Pa. 1939).
Repeals of statutes granting original jurisdiction to the DCUS can never be implied from mere changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Evidence, or Local Rules.
The statutes in question are outside the scope of rule-making authority, primarily because all legislative powers, without exception, are vested in the Congress of the United States, and no legislative powers whatsoever are vested in the Supreme Court. See Article I, Section 1; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1856).
MR. DROZD COMMITS
PLAIN ERROR BY ALLEGING
THAT PLAINTIFF HAS FILED NO WRITTEN OPPOSITION
Plaintiff has carefully, lawfully, timely and properly challenged the attorneys in question to produce the licenses to practice law and certificates of oath required by Section 6067 of the California Business and Professions Code.
Plaintiff constructs Section 6067 to mandate that all licenses to practice law in California must be physical documents.
Absent these requisite credentials, said attorneys have committed misdemeanors in violation of the pertinent California State laws. See Sections 6126 and 6127 of the California Business and Professions Code (both misdemeanors).
When those attorneys failed to exhibit the requisite credentials, Plaintiff had probable cause and was entirely justified in filing and serving a VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT against each of them.
It necessarily follows, therefore, that their appearances in person and in writing were lacking in essential authority and ultra vires. Those alleged appearances assumed facts not in evidence.
Motions and other pleadings that are filed without authority are a trespass on the case, and should be stricken in order to restore integrity to the official Clerk’s record and to eliminate any hint of fraud existing, or lurking, in that record.
For example, when an unlicensed corporate president attempted to represent a corporation, the Ninth Circuit held that entry of default judgment was appropriate. See U.S. v. High Country Broadcasting Co., 3 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1993).
Thus, Plaintiff’s NOTICES OF JUDICIAL DEFAULT are entirely appropriate, specifically because valid licenses to practice law are not in evidence before this honorable Court.
Proceeding as He is In Propria Persona (not “Pro Se”), Plaintiff is not required to have a license to practice law in California.
Plaintiff is likewise not required to have a valid license to practice law in order to proceed as a qualified Private Attorney General. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) (RICO and Clayton Act statutes bring to bear the pressure of private attorneys general on a serious national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate.)
Furthermore, none of the attorneys in question has been admitted to practice in, or by, this honorable District Court of the United States (“DCUS”), even if valid licenses to practice law were in evidence. This DCUS is currently vacant.
None of the attorneys in question has even testified that they were ever admitted to practice in the Eastern Judicial District of California by lawful ORDER of the DCUS. California is not a “United States District” [sic] and California is not a federal Territory.
It is pointless and a waste of time for Plaintiff to discuss any merits that might exist in pleadings filed without authority. Confer at “Barratry” in Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition.
Plaintiff’s MOTION TO STRIKE those pleadings should be heard and decided, without further delays, by an Article III judge presiding on this DCUS. Plaintiff requires order in the Court.
If and only if that MOTION TO STRIKE should finally be denied by this honorable Court, only then would Plaintiff be required to address any merits that might exist in said pleadings.
This Court is reminded that Plaintiff has properly reserved all Rights without prejudice. See “All Rights Reserved without Prejudice” on the caption page supra, in the Initial COMPLAINT, and in all pleadings filed by Plaintiff to date.
This reservation of Rights is proper, timely, and sufficient.
It expressly reserves all Rights which Plaintiff possessed on August 1, 2001 A.D., and prevents the loss of any such Rights by application of the concepts of waiver or estoppel. See UCCA 1207, in chief, and compare U.C.C. 1-207.
Plaintiff declines to invoke the federal U.C.C. in this case, because that Code is federal municipal law confined to the District of Columbia. See 77 Stat. 630, P.L. 88-243, December 30, 1963.
By moving this honorable Court to strike all pleadings filed by attorneys lacking requisite credentials, Plaintiff has in no way waived His procedural right to address any merits in those pleadings, according as this Court might direct by timely and correct rulings.
The Supreme Court has ruled that waivers of fundamental Rights will never be presumed. Ohio Bell v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292 (1937). Waivers of fundamental Rights must be knowingly intelligent acts, done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742 (1970). Plaintiff has waived no fundamental Rights.
Plaintiff hereby asserts His fundamental Right to due process of law, as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.
A MOTION TO STRIKE pleadings by attorneys lacking credentials does not constitute a competent waiver of Plaintiff’s due process Right to address any merits in those pleadings, but only after a proper hearing and ruling on said MOTION TO STRIKE.
It necessarily follows that Mr. Drozd committed a serious and plain error by concluding that Plaintiff’s MOTION TO STRIKE in effect “justifies granting defendants’ motions.”
In light of all the above, said MOTION TO STRIKE does constitute written opposition to any and all motions filed by attorneys alleging to re-present certain named Defendants without exhibiting the requisite credentials.
To repeat, “defendants’ motions”, such as they are, have never been properly before this Court and should be stricken without a hearing on any merits they might contain.
PLAINTIFF
HAS NOT FAILED
TO REGISTER
HIS COPYRIGHT
Mr. Drozd appears to base this erroneous conclusion on Plaintiff’s NOTICE OF COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION merely because it says nothing regarding payment of the required fee, and “there has been no indication that the Copyright Office actually received the application.”
Plaintiff is quite surprised, and disappointed, that Mr. Drozd could not pick up the telephone and call the Copyright Office to confirm that Plaintiff’s Certified U.S. Mail had been delivered with the requisite application, fee, and deposit.
Plaintiff also argues that a simple misunderstanding has occurred here.
“Under registration and deposit of copies as conditions precedent to bringing an infringement action, and where all copyright certificates in question were received by the Copyright Office before suit was filed, registration was timely and plaintiff had the right to maintain the action.” G.R.I. Corp. v. Golden Fifty Pharmaceutical Co., 185 USPQ 674 (N.D. Ill. 1975) [emphasis added].
Because of case law like G.R.I. Corp. supra, Plaintiff executed His NOTICE OF COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION with the understanding that an “application” necessarily included the fee, and that an application would be incomplete without the required fee.
Mr. Drozd obviously has a different understanding.
Moreover, because Plaintiff’s U.S. Mail is being forwarded by a Forwarding Agent in Oakland, California (for security reasons), Plaintiff executed and filed His NOTICE OF COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION prior to receiving the return receipt requested.
Plaintiff’s PS Form 3811 (“green card”) has now been
returned to Plaintiff; it was stamped
“received” by the Library of Congress Copyright Office on July 23, 2001 A.D.
The required fee of $30.00 was tendered via bank check number #1059, signed by “Lonnie G. Schmidt” and drawn on account number 1059‑926‑4175218 at the California Federal Bank, 3501 Arden Way, Sacramento 95864, CALIFORNIA, USA.
The BASIC INFORMATION on Application Form TX clearly directs, for a Published Work, that an applicant must “Deposit two complete copies (or one phonorecord) of the best edition.” [emphasis added] See also 17 U.S.C. 408(b)(2) (“best edition”).
Said BASIC INFORMATION expressly did not direct Plaintiff to deposit all editions of the subject book.
Neither does the pertinent statute at section 408(b)(2) direct Plaintiff to deposit all editions of the subject book:
... [T]he material deposited for registration shall include ‑‑ ...
(2) in the case of a published work, two complete copies or phonorecords of the best edition.
17 U.S.C. 408(b)(2) [emphasis added]
Plaintiff complied correctly by depositing two (2) complete copies of the Eleventh Edition, which is currently the latest and best edition.
Because the collective misconduct of all Defendants has effectively diluted to zero the real economic demand for authentic editions of the subject book, and because Plaintiff desired to provide this Court with an authentic original of the best edition for purposes of detailed comparisons with all known counterfeits, in November of 2000 A.D. Plaintiff published the Eleventh Edition at Internet URL:
http://www.supremelaw.org/fedzone11/index.htm
PLAINTIFF’S
FORM TX APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION COVERS
THE ENTIRE
TEXT OF THE FIRST THRU ELEVENTH EDITIONS
Once again, Plaintiff is disappointed, and even a bit shocked, that Mr. Drozd did not telephone the Copyright Office, nor has Mr. Drozd comprehended the plain language of Plaintiff’s NOTICE OF COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION.
On Page 1, lines 34-35 in said NOTICE, Plaintiff clearly and expressly notified this Court that Plaintiff has applied for registration of His copyright “in all editions” of the subject book.
The completed Application itself lists three separate ranges of editions, to wit: (1) “entire text, first thru sixth editions”, (2) “entire text, seventh edition”, and (3) “entire text, eighth thru eleventh editions”.
Thus, it is grossly prejudicial to Plaintiff for Mr. Drozd to assert that “Plaintiff has not registered His copyright” [sic], and to conclude erroneously therefore that “the first cause of action must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction” [sic].
The law is quite contrary on this point:
At any time ... during the subsistence of any copyright secured after [1/1/1978], the owner of copyright or of any exclusive right in the work may obtain registration of the copyright claim by delivering to the Copyright Office the deposit specified by this section, together with the application and fee specified by sections 409 and 708. Such registration is not a condition of copyright protection.
17 U.S.C. 408(a) [emphasis added]
Mere delay [in depositing copies] will not destroy the right to sue. Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939).
The district court had jurisdiction of an action for infringement of a copyright where the action was filed on the same day that the copyright claimant had placed revised applications in the mail to the Copyright Office, where they were received two days later. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Company, 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970) [emphasis added].
Plaintiff’s proof of application to register His copyright, plus payment of the required fee and deposit of the work in question, are sufficient to give Plaintiff standing to sue for copyright infringement. Apple Barrel Productions, Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1984).
That either the copyright must be registered, or an application brought, is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing of an infringement action. Lennon v. Seaman, 84 F.Supp.2d 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) [emphasis added].
The Copyright Office has, to date, not refused Plaintiff’s Application for registration; Plaintiff has received no communications whatsoever from the Copyright Office to that effect.
Even if said Application had been refused, the statute at 17 U.S.C. 411(a) specifically allows an infringement suit even if registration is refused:
In any case, however, where the deposit, application, and fee required for registration have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form, and registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to institute an action for infringement if notice thereof, with a copy of the complaint, is served on the Register of Copyrights.
17 U.S.C. 411(a) [emphasis added]
“As is evident, a party may now sue for infringement notwithstanding the refusal of the Register to register the claim to copyright. The only precondition is that notice [of the action] be served on the Register.” Nova Stylings, Inc. v. Ladd, 695 F.2d 1179 (9th Cir. 1983) [emphasis added].
Since Plaintiff’s registration has not been refused, to date, Plaintiff has not served any notice(s) of the instant action on the Register of Copyrights, nor would Plaintiff be required to do so, until such time as His application for registration is refused.
Plaintiff is, therefore, left with no other conclusion except to wonder why Mr. Drozd has chosen to exhibit such prejudicial bias against Plaintiff on this point.
Selective reading of the law, and selective attention to the facts, are poor excuses for attempting to rationalize his erroneous and ultra vires actions and recommendations.
Whatever those actions may be, they are certainly not lawful ORDERS that bind Plaintiff in any way, shape or form. The same is true of any “orders” that Mr. Drozd may have relegated to the status of footnotes (a dubious practice at best).
PLAINTIFF’S
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION DOES STATE CLAIMS
FOR DIRECT, VICARIOUS AND CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
COUNT ONE expressly states, “Plaintiff re-alleges each and every allegation as set forth above, and hereby incorporates same by reference, as if all were set forth fully herein.” [Initial COMPLAINT, Page 27 of 43, lines 5-7]
The subject book was sold at EXECNET.COM! [Page 26, line 23]
An estimated 6,552,000 copies of one or more component files of the subject book, or modified derivatives, were obtained unlawfully, and without any payments whatsoever, from Defendants’ network of computers, in direct and/or indirect infringement of Plaintiff’s exclusive copyrights in the subject book. [Page 25, lines 18-23]
Defendants failed to respond expeditiously to Plaintiff’s numerous written messages complaining of a multiplicity of copyright infringements and Lanham Act violations. [Page 25, lines 2-7]
Defendants failed to respond expeditiously to Plaintiff’s BONA FIDE OFFERS IN COMPROMISE. [Page 25, lines 2-7]
Defendants failed to respond expeditiously to Plaintiff’s PUBLIC NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. [Page 25, lines 2-7]
Defendants failed to respond expeditiously to Plaintiff’s NOTICE OF DEFAULT AND PASSAGE OF DEADLINE. [Page 25, lines 2-7]
Defendants failed to respond expeditiously to Plaintiff’s Copyright Amnesty Program. [Page 25, lines 2-7]
Plaintiff confirmed a principal violation at Internet domain CIHOST.COM. This direct infringement violates both the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act, for being a modified derivative. [Page 23, lines 14-20]
Plaintiff confirmed a principal violation at Internet domain KINGDOMOFZION.ORG. This direct infringement violates both the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act, for being a modified derivative. [Page 23, lines 7-10]
Plaintiff complained in writing of a direct infringement at AOL by addressing a MEMO, with attached evidence, to Defendant James R. Bramson. Plaintiff’s first class envelope to Defendant Bramson was refused, in violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. [Page 21, lines 4-21]
Plaintiff confirmed a principal violation at Internet domain PHREAK.COM. This direct infringement violates both the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act, for being a modified derivative. [Page 20, lines 6-9]
Plaintiff made a point of sending His Copyright Amnesty Program via first class U.S. Mail to the last known mailing addresses of all recalcitrants and of all others suspected of copyright infringements, direct or indirect. [Page 19, lines 15‑17]
Plaintiff clarified His use of the term “principal copyright violations” by equating that term with “direct infringements”. [Page 17, lines 17-18]
Plaintiff also clarified His use of the term “principal violators” by equating that term with “those domains which had made unauthorized copies”. [Page 17, lines 21-22]
Plaintiff clarified His use of the term “recalcitrants” by equating that term with “those domains which had refused to remove the subject book and hyper-text links to it, after receiving lawful notices from Plaintiff.” [Page 17, lines 22-24]
Plaintiff confirmed that six (6) modified derivative files still remained at AOL approximately seven (7) weeks after receipt of Defendant Adit Seth’s hard copy letter. [Page 14, lines 21-30]
Plaintiff’s PUBLIC NOTICE TO COPYRIGHT VIOLATORS, as posted at the Supreme Law Forum on July 16, 1998 A.D., contained the following important statement (see Exhibit D-8):
Judicial enforcement of these rights will utilize industry standards established, and published, by the Software Publishers Association ("SPA") at their Internet website, particularly as regards the legal definitions of "direct infringement" [sic] and of "indirect infringement" [sic].
[bold emphasis added]
Exhibit D-8 contained a URL pointing to SPA’s legal definitions of “direct infringement” and “indirect infringement”.
Plaintiff’s Copyright Amnesty Program (Exhibit D-27) was also accompanied by printed hard copies of SPA’s industry standard definitions of “direct infringement” and “indirect infringement”, as published on the Internet.
SPA’s definition of “indirect infringement” included both “Contributory Infringement” with a list of specific examples, and “Vicarious Liability for Infringement by Another Person” also with a list of specific examples.
Specific examples of “Contributory Infringement” included linking to FTP (File Transfer Protocol) sites where software may be unlawfully obtained, informing others of FTP sites where software may be unlawfully obtained, aiding others in locating or using unauthorized software, supporting sites upon which the above information may be obtained, and allowing sites where the above information may be obtained to exist on a file server.
Specific examples of “Vicarious Liability for Infringement by Another Person” included ISP’s who have pirate sites on their system, ISP’s who have pirates for customers, and sys admins (system administrators) for newsgroups or IRC (Internet Relay Chat) where pirate activity takes place.
It is really difficult, if not impossible, for Plaintiff to believe that Mr. Drozd missed all of the above, merely because COUNT ONE did not itemize specific statutes in Title 17, instead of, or in addition to, Plaintiff’s re-allegation and incorporation as found at Page 27 of 43, lines 5-7.
Plaintiff wishes to stress that, prior to His application for copyright registration, Plaintiff claimed a Common Law Copyright.
Because the common law is mentioned twice in the Seventh Amendment, Plaintiff believes He is entirely justified in arguing that Congress cannot abolish the common law, notwithstanding legislative intent to do so in the Copyright Act of 1976. See Bromhall v. Rorvik, 478 F.Supp. 361, 5 Media L R, 1919, 203 USPQ 774 (E.D. Penna. 1979) (1976 Copyright Act abolished common law copyright).
Accordingly, Plaintiff has more than adequately alleged violations of at least two of His exclusive rights ‑‑ the rights of reproduction and of distribution ‑‑ without necessarily citing any particular subsections of 17 U.S.C. 106.
Infringement occurs when an alleged infringer engages in activity listed in 17 U.S.C. 106. See 17 U.S.C. 501(a) and Exhibit L-11, reproducing the published opinion of the Ninth Circuit in A&M Records, Inc. et al. v. Napster, docket number #00‑16401, February 12, 2001 A.D., Section III-A (Infringement) (hereinafter “Napster”).
Substance prevails over form. Plaintiff has identified the substance of Defendants’ alleged infringements.
Thus, contrary to the false and rebuttable statement by Mr. Drozd (his page 8, line 17 et seq.), Plaintiff has without any doubt stated claims for direct, vicarious and contributory copyright infringement.
Plaintiff can neither be faulted, nor forced to accept adverse substantive consequences, merely for subsuming the latter two terms (vicarious and contributory infringement) under the single umbrella term of “indirect infringements”. See 28 U.S.C. 636(c)(2) quoted supra (in re adverse substantive consequences).
This is particularly so when the Software Publishers Association has published industry standards that utilize the exact same umbrella term, and when Plaintiff published on the Internet PUBLIC NOTICES of His intent to utilize those very same standards when the instant case was eventually filed.
Sophistry is a poor substitute for methodological rigor, thorough attention to details, and intellectual honesty.
DEFENDANTS
ARE NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT
UNDER THE
DMCA’S SAFE HARBOR PROVISIONS
Plaintiff has adapted the holding in the Ninth Circuit’s Napster decision to derive the following test: Contributory liability may potentially be imposed only to the extent that Defendants (1) received reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files containing all or component parts of Plaintiff’s copyrighted book; (2) knew or should have known that such files were available on computers owned and/or operated by them; and (3) failed to act to prevent viral distribution of those component files. See Exhibit L‑11.
The mere existence of Defendants’ computer network and Internet services, absent actual notice and Defendants’ failure to remove the offending material, is insufficient to impose contributory liability. See Napster supra, section VIII.
Conversely, Defendants may be vicariously liable when they failed affirmatively to use their ability to patrol their systems, and preclude access to potentially infringing files listed in the index databases of commercially available search engines.
Defendants had both the ability to use these search engines
to identify infringing files, just as Plaintiff had used those same search
engines to locate the violations in question, and Defendants also had the right
to discipline and/or bar participation of users who engaged in the transmission
of infringing files.
The burden was decidedly upon Plaintiff to provide notice to Defendants of His copyrighted work, and of files containing that work which were available on the Defendants’ networks of computers, before Defendants had any duty to disable access to the offending content.
Plaintiff carried this burden, in part, by placing a valid copyright notice conspicuously in the Preface of the subject book, and reasonable terms and conditions in the Shareware Policy found in the README file. It is not Plaintiff’s fault that the README file was eliminated from most infringements of the subject book.
Plaintiff carried this burden, in remaining part, by demanding that Defendants disclose a certified copy of their authorization (if any) to promote the specific copies and/or counterfeits in question (“Plaintiff’s Demand”). See Exhibit “K” in toto.
Plaintiff opted for this approach during the period before the DMCA was enacted, and chose to maintain this approach for the sake of consistency and uniformity after the DMCA was enacted. See Exhibit “K” and the specific offending URL’s listed therein.
Those specific URL’s constitute verified empirical evidence
of direct and indirect infringements of Plaintiff’s exclusive copyright
in the subject book.
Defendants, however, bore the burden of policing the system within rapidly expanding technological limits. At the very least, this burden necessitated a bit more than merely purging the infringing material.
Certain Defendants are liable for contributory infringement because their failure to purge the infringing material, and thereby stop an infringing copy from being distributed worldwide, constitutes substantial participation in the distribution of copyrighted and possibly counterfeited material.
If a computer system operator learned of specific infringing material available on his system and failed to purge such material from the system, then the operator knew of, and contributed to, direct infringement.
This failure to purge applies equally to direct infringements (i.e. principal violations) and to indirect infringements by way of valid hyperlinks, i.e. accurate directions or “pointers” to stolen intellectual property, as compared to stolen intellectual property itself. See Exhibits D‑41 and L‑5.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants, once notified, were similarly obliged to purge residual evidence of copyright infringements that remained entrained in the index databases of popular Internet search engines. See Plaintiff’s NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, Exhibit D‑11‑B. These index databases contained chains of evidence leading ultimately back to the infringing users and to their stolen and modified derivatives, i.e. counterfeits.
Certain Defendants had actual knowledge that specific infringing material was available using their systems, that they could block access to their systems by suppliers of the infringing material, and that they failed to remove the infringing material.
However, Plaintiff argues that it was not enough for other Defendants merely to remove the offending material as their only response to Plaintiff’s Demand. If they cooperated at all with Plaintiff’s Demand, this was their most frequent response ‑‑ a minimal one, at best.
Their cooperation in purging the infringing material was an admission, by force of their conduct, that the material did reside at one time on computers they could police; and, it is correct to infer that, by such conduct, they acknowledged the material was a copyright infringement. Otherwise, why did they consent to purge that material in the first place?
However, their silence on other aspects of Plaintiff’s Demands, such as identification, notification and possible discipline of the responsible party(s), also spoke to Plaintiff of unsatisfactory policing practices. See Exhibit “J” and all SUBPOENAS for subscriber identities. Practices and policies often conflict dramatically.
To the extent that these other Defendants also failed satisfactorily to discipline the users responsible for the infringing files (the suppliers), either by minimally informing those suppliers of the violations in question, or by blocking all access to their systems by suppliers of the infringing material (e.g. canceling subscriptions), they failed satisfactorily to police their systems in this manner as well.
Last but not least, the responses of certain named Defendants (and other parties yet unnamed) to Plaintiff’s SUBPOENAS for subscriber identities and activity log records should provide further detailed evidence of direct, contributory and vicarious liabilities of all Defendants, particularly those whose obligation it was to answer those SUBPOENAS as lawfully issued by the Clerk of Court.
Plaintiff expects that the information provided in response to those SUBPOENAS will give Plaintiff, and this honorable Court, the information necessary to prepare a FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT with greater specificity than was hitherto humanly possible for Plaintiff to accomplish without access to the activity logs of Defendant ISP’s and the correct identities of subscribers revealed by those logs.
PLAINTIFF’S
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION IS NOT BARRED
BY THE 3-YEAR
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Plaintiff’s first cause of action against Defendant AOL Time Warner, Inc. (“AOL”) accrued on September 20, 1998 A.D., 7 weeks after Defendant Adit Seth’s letter falsely claimed that the counterfeit files in question had been removed. See Exhibit D-20.
Similarly, a second and completely separate copyright infringement by Defendant AOL accrued on August 20, 1999 A.D., when Plaintiff attempted to inform Defendant James R. Bramson of another separate and distinct violation.
Defendant Bramsom was, at that time, the agent designated by AOL to receive notification of copyright infringement claims. Plaintiff found Mr. Bramson’s name and contact information on the Internet registry of such agents hosted by the U.S. Copyright Office.
But, contrary to one of the stated purposes of the DMCA (an administrative procedure for notification of copyright infringement claims), Defendant Bramsom refused Plaintiff’s first class U.S. Mail, without even opening it, and with the written directive: RETURN TO SENDER! See Exhibit D‑32.
Because Plaintiff filed the instant action on August 1, 2001 A.D., both dates ‑‑ September 20, 1998 and August 20, 1999 ‑‑ did occur within the 3-year statute of limitations. See 17 U.S.C. 507(b). That statute was also tolled by many interrelated factors.
COUNT ONE
SUMMARY
Plaintiff’s first cause of action does not fail for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, nor does it fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted by this honorable Court.
On the contrary, in light of all the above, COUNT ONE in Plaintiff’s Initial COMPLAINT has moved far beyond the minimum threshold requirements for satisfying subject matter jurisdiction.
Moreover, it does properly and sufficiently state numerous claims for direct, contributory and vicarious copyright infringement, upon which the requested relief can be granted by this honorable Court, exercising the judicial Power of the United States in matters that arise under the Constitution, Laws and Treaties of the United States. See Arising Under Clause as mirrored by the Supremacy Clause and 28 U.S.C. 1331.
PLAINTIFF’S
COUNT TWO STATES
A
VALID CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR
SUBSTANTIAL ALTERATIONS
Mr. Drozd should be applauded (at least once) for citing Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, 538 F.2d 14, 24-25 (2nd Cir. 1976), a case that is particularly relevant to Lanham Act claims for creation and distribution of counterfeits, and for false designation of their origin(s).
However, Mr. Drozd once again commits a plain error by characterizing the alterations in those counterfeits as “limited”, “simple” and “nonsubstantive” (see his page 11, lines 2-6).
First of all, his powers of observation appear to be failing. Even after citing “Exs. A‑1 to A‑42, B‑1 to B‑42” [sic], Mr. Drozd has seriously failed to recognize the obvious omission of the README file from Exhibits B‑1 thru B‑42 (from DEOXY.ORG). This failure is fatal to his Findings and Recommendations, such as they are.
In simple point of fact, Exhibit “A” consists of Exhibits A‑1 thru A‑43 (not A‑42). Exhibit A‑1 occupies a conspicuously obvious position, whereas it is completely absent from Exhibits B‑1 thru B‑42 (not B‑43, which does not exist). The README file is not the Preface!
The modified derivative copies at Internet domain DEOXY.ORG and elsewhere did
intentionally omit the README
file!
This omission is not only substantive; it also provides a major point of evidence proving that the subject book was frequently modified without the Plaintiff’s permission, in violation of the “fidelity requirement” as stated in the Shareware Policy. The fact that this omission was later propagated by second- and third-generation derivatives has no bearing on the substantive effect of that omission ‑‑ false designation of origin!
Omitting the README file from the subject book was akin to omitting the Certificate of Authenticity, and all terms and conditions in the accompanying user license, from any of Microsoft’s commercial software packages.
As such, the modified derivatives in Exhibit “B” are exactly the kind of counterfeits which Congress intended to prohibit by the Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996 (“ACPA”). (See Plaintiff’s related discussion above entitled “MR. DROZD HAS MIS‑STATED PLAINTIFF’S FIDELITY REQUIREMENT.”)
Those counterfeits falsely designated Plaintiff as the
origin of all versions from which the Shareware Policy was removed
entirely, thus giving unsuspecting Internet users the false and
misleading idea that Plaintiff had authorized both publication of the
subject book on the Internet and its consequent availability at no
charge to Internet users worldwide.
Moreover, Exhibit “B” is not the only discrete counterfeit of which Plaintiff has properly complained. Exhibit “D” itemizes further discrete counterfeits at Internet domains PHREAK.COM (Exhibit D‑30), KINGDOMOFZION.ORG (Exhibit D‑38), CIHOST.COM (Exhibit D‑39), SPIRAL.ORG (Exhibit D‑44), TEXTFILES.COM (Exhibit D‑48), and COW.NET (Exhibit D‑52).
It is obvious that Mr. Drozd has overlooked these additional counterfeits.
Whether this fatal oversight on his part was intentional, we cannot say at this time. Mr. Drozd has already given Plaintiff sufficient probable cause to believe that he has not read all pleadings filed to date by Plaintiff; it would, therefore, come as no surprise to learn that Mr. Drozd was “just too busy” to review all the evidence placed so conspicuously before him, because he complains of being “inundated” [sic].
Welcome to the Internet, Mr. Drozd! It is certainly vast, and the material evidence of copyright and Lanham Act violations in the instant case is certainly voluminous as well. Plaintiff has certainly prevailed by the rule of preponderance.
To save paper and to minimize the overall bulk of printed Exhibits, most of the latter counterfeits were not printed but instead were posted on Plaintiff’s website ‑‑ the Supreme Law Library ‑‑ to facilitate access to all named Defendants and to this honorable Court.
It is clear that Mr. Drozd has chosen to overlook these Internet resources, despite the facts that Exhibit “D” was incorporated into the Initial COMPLAINT by reference, and the Clerk of Court was verbally informed that one filed copy of the Initial COMPLAINT was printed in color, so that hyperlinks in blue ink would be more obvious to any reader.
Plaintiff’s MASTER
LIST OF PRINCIPAL VIOLATIONS (i.e. direct infringements) was
incorporated as Exhibit D-43
specifically to summarize the full complement of separate and discrete
counterfeits.
Not all of these counterfeits were uploaded to the Supreme Law Library, however, because Plaintiff was not always able to obtain electronic copies of every confirmed counterfeit. See Plaintiff’s Introduction to the FIRST SUPPLEMENT TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT. Plaintiff’s allegation that they were, nevertheless, direct infringements can be inferred from the contextual evidence, e.g. textual annotations describing the underlying hyperlink(s).
Subsequent to filing all incorporated Exhibits, Plaintiff notified interested parties of another Internet URL entitled “Samples of Modifications in Derivative Files”. Once again, Plaintiff cannot be faulted if Mr. Drozd failed to access the numerous hyperlinks which Plaintiff added to this latter file.
Hard copies were always available using the File | Print menu in standard browsers like Microsoft Internet Explorer. Plaintiff witnessed late model laser printers in the office of the Clerk of Court. The federal courthouse in Sacramento is a modern, expensive building. Mr. Drozd has no excuse.
If Mr. Drozd had bothered to follow this chain of evidence, which is now available to anyone in the entire world with an Internet‑compatible computer, he would have experienced first-hand the kinds of textual corruptions which have rendered all modified derivatives “counterfeits” as that term was intended to be applied by the ACPA.
Plaintiff even went to the trouble of posting the ACPA’s legislative history as Exhibit L‑6 in the Supreme Law Library at Internet URL:
http://www.supremelaw.org/copyrite/statutes/anticounterfeiting.htm
Another important subtlety was lost by the cursory, even chronic lack of attention to detail exhibited by Mr. Drozd. By summarily attempting to “strike” the AUTHOR’S FOURTH SUPPLEMENT TO COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY (without jurisdiction, of course), Mr. Drozd most probably deprived himself of the important, pivotal distinction which Plaintiff made between computer screen images (on the one hand), and the underlying HTML code which controls the content of those screen images (on the other hand). For example, click on View | Source in the menu bar of Microsoft Internet Explorer.
The addition of HTML code to certain modified derivatives was a change that was never contemplated by Plaintiff, and thus never authorized by Plaintiff, because Plaintiff released the shareware version of the subject book several years before He even knew about the Internet or the World Wide Web (“WWW”).
The removal of all original character formatting, and the substitution of HTML markup codes, like hyperlinks, put underlines where they were not found in the original, and removed underlines where they were found in the original. This is the very kind of change which was intentionally and expressly prohibited by Plaintiff’s “fidelity requirement”.
Arguably the most offensive changes literally destroyed information. The tables in Appendix “J” of the subject book were, in many cases, converted without maintaining column alignments of the word “YES”, which Plaintiff used to indicate that a particular State had committed a given error in voting for, or against, the so‑called 16th amendment. The conversion to HTML resulted in left‑justifying all “YES” terms, shifting them out of proper column alignment and thereby destroying the entire content of these tables.
But, Mr. Drozd would have us believe that such destructive changes were merely “nonsubstantive” [sic]. Shall we relegate such a misrepresentation to the excesses of creative typing? Perhaps he should have his head examined, for subtle (hidden?) changes in the double helix strands of his cranial DNA.
If federal magistrate judges are not required to be learned in law, perhaps it would be too much to ask that Mr. Drozd read and study the excellent essay by author Flore Krigsman entitled “Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act as Defender of Artists’ ‘Moral Rights’,” in The Trademark Reporter, International Trademark Association, May 1983 ‑‑ June 1983 (73 TMR 251). This thorough and scholarly discussion of the Lanham Act was found at Internet URL:
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/metaschool/Fisher/integrity/Links/Articles/krigsman.html
Another excellent essay is entitled “Doing Justice on the Web | Moral Rights in Cyberspace,” by Catherine Sansum Kirkman, Web Techniques, November 1996. For the record, Plaintiff wishes to highlight the following (fair use) excerpts from Ms. Kirkman’s essay:
Moral rights vary from country to country, but generally cover four separate rights:
· The right of attribution or paternity .... This is the right to claim credit as author of a work, and to prevent others from falsely doing so.
· The right of integrity .... This is the right to preserve a work in its original form, and to control changes to the work.
· The right of publication .... This is the right to elect to publish (or not publish) a work.
· The right of withdrawal .... This is the right of an author to withdraw a published work from circulation. ...
[I]n 1988 the United States became a signatory to the Berne Convention, and this copyright treaty required the United States to explicitly recognize moral rights. ...
Article 6 (bis) of the Berne Convention reads as follows:
1. Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. ...
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a part of the federal trademark law, protects consumers from false designations on products. For example, the Patent and Trademark Office has said that Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act could be used in cases of misattribution of authorship, as well as to support actions by screenwriters or film directors to bar technological alterations of their works in certain circumstances.
False attribution can also constitute an invasion of privacy, as well as defamation if the work involved is of inferior quality and damages the author’s reputation. ...
Section 106 of the Copyright Act provides that the copyright owner has the exclusive right to adapt and prepare derivative works based on her copyrighted work. ...
By contract, an author can grant or reserve rights to make changes, including changes that amount to a distortion. ...
Of course, to the extent artists and authors control the content that goes into the digital pipeline, Web publishers will have to heed their concerns.
[bold emphasis added]
Plaintiff found Ms. Kirkman’s excellent article at Internet URL:
http://www.webtechniques.com/archives/1996/11/just/
She is a cyberspace attorney with the law firm of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati in Palo Alto, California, and she is solely responsible for the content of her essay, which was not offered as legal advice.
Clearly, Plaintiff properly and expressly reserved His exclusive right to make alterations and prohibit distortions of the subject book. The modified derivatives in question did exceed the specific purpose for which permission was granted, quite apart from additional violations of Plaintiff’s “payment requirement.”
The Lanham Act is designed not only to vindicate the Author’s personal right to prevent the presentation of His work to the public in a distorted, truncated or corrupted (read “counterfeit”) form.
The Lanham Act is also designed to protect the public and the Author from misrepresentations of His contribution to the finished work. See Follett v. Arbor House Publishing Co., 497 F.Supp 304, 313, 208 USPQ 604.
“Even if an attribution of authorship were consistent with industry practices, it would nevertheless be illegal under the Lanham Act if it misrepresented the contribution of the person designated as the author.” Follett supra, at 311, 208 USPQ 603 [emphasis added].
One is not to reap where one has not sown.
COUNT TWO
SUMMARY
Given the facts as alleged in Plaintiff’s Initial COMPLAINT and in all incorporated Exhibits, there was a strong likelihood of public deception and confusion sufficient to support a Section 43(a) Lanham Act action, and to warrant granting all relief requested under COUNT TWO in that Initial COMPLAINT. See RELIEF REQUESTED in Plaintiff’s Initial COMPLAINT, Pages 36 thru 42 of 43.
Plaintiff’s allegations ‑‑ that Defendants presented to the public, and to the world, a multitude of distorted, truncated and corrupted versions that impaired the integrity of Plaintiff’s book ‑‑ seek to redress the very rights sought to be protected by the Lanham Act, and should be recognized as stating a valid cause of action under that statute.
Plaintiff’s COUNT TWO does state a valid claim upon which relief can and should be granted by this honorable DCUS.
DEDICATION
As the one living and true God is my Witness, and according to His most holy Word as written in the Scriptures, I do confess that Jesus Christ came in the flesh. 1 John 4:2-3 I do hereby bind all spirits of injustice, theft, obstruction, retaliation, falsehood, fraud, misrepresentation, corruption, impersonation and unlawful dominion. And, I do hereby loose the spirits of liberty, truth and honesty, justice, righteousness, fidelity, scholarship, good faith and equal protection, in the most holy name of Christ Jesus, the only begotten Son of the Most High, the King of kings and the Lord of lords, who lives and reigns forever and ever. As agents of the Most High, we came here to establish justice. We shall not leave until our mission is accomplished, and justice reigns eternal in our minds and in our hearts. So be it. Amen.
VERIFICATION
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, Plaintiff in the
above entitled action, hereby verify under penalty of perjury, under the laws
of the United States of America, without the “United States”
(federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and
correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and
belief, so help me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1).
Dated: January 20,
2002 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul
Andrew Mitchell
___________________________________________
Printed: Paul
Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., Sui Juris
Plaintiff In
Propria Persona (not “Pro Se”)
I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under
penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America,
without the “United States” (federal government), that I am at least 18
years of age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I personally served the
following document(s):
NOTICE OF MOTION AND
by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in
first class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed to
the following:
Clerk of Court (2
copies)
District Court of the United States
501 “I” Street, Suite 4-200
Sacramento 95814-2322
CALIFORNIA, USA
Courtesy copies to:
Judge Alex Kozinski
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 91510
Pasadena 91109-1510
CALIFORNIA, USA
Ropers, Majeski, Kohn & Bentley DeForest & Koscelnik
(failed to exhibit oaths) (failed to exhibit oath)
1001 Marshall Street 3000 Koppers Building
Redwood City 94063 436 Seventh Avenue
CALIFORNIA, USA Pittsburgh 15219
PENNSYLVANIA, USA
Murphy Austin Adams Schoenfeld LLP Pillsbury Winthrop LLP
(failed to exhibit oaths) (failed to exhibit oaths)
P.O. Box 1319 400 Capitol Mall, Suite 1700
Sacramento 95812-1319 Sacramento 95814-4419
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Curiale Dellaverson Hirschfeld Quinn
Emanuel Urquhart Oliver
Kraemer & Sloan, LLP & Hedges, LLP
(oaths requested) (oaths requested)
727 Sansome Street
201 Sansome Street, 6th
Floor
San Francisco 94111 San Francisco 94104
CALIFORNIA, USA CALIFORNIA, USA
Office of the General Counsel Paul
Southworth
University of California 2018 N. New Hampshire Ave.
1111 Franklin Street, 8th Floor Los Angeles 90027
Oakland 94607-5200 CALIFORNIA, USA
CALIFORNIA, USA
Dated: January 23,
2002 A.D.
Signed: /s/ Paul
Andrew Mitchell
__________________________________________________
Printed: Paul
Andrew Mitchell, Plaintiff In Propria Persona
(not
“Pro Se” [sic])
Attachment “A”:
Plaintiff’s COVER LETTER
(first mailing of COMPLAINTS)
August 1, 2001 A.D.
COVER LETTER
TO: All Named Defendants
FROM: Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
DATE: August 1, 2001 A.D.
SUBJECT: Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al.
Enclosed please find the following documents:
(2) FIRST SUPPLEMENT
(4) THIRD SUPPLEMENT
Please pay particular attention to item (5): REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS, which should be self-explanatory.
The amount of documentary evidence in this case is so voluminous, the cost of photocopying and serving the entire set upon all defendants became quite prohibitive.
We initially considered serving documentary evidence on a CD-ROM, but technological barriers made this option either impossible or technically burdensome.
Instead, we have uploaded all electronic exhibits to the Internet, for your convenience. The Initial COMPLAINT and three SUPPLEMENTS are listed in the Table of Contents at Internet URL:
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/index.htm
Please note that we recently changed our Internet domain name from supremelaw.com to supremelaw.org.
We will do our best to maintain this website with identical copies of all pleadings and related exhibits filed in this case.
Thank you for your consideration. Please proceed now to our REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS (enclosed).
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Author, Damaged Party and Plaintiff
Attachment “B”:
Plaintiff’s TRANSMITTAL
LETTER
(second mailing of COMPLAINTS)
September 10, 2001 A.D.
TRANSMITTAL LETTER
TO: All Named Defendants
FROM: Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
DATE: September 10, 2001 A.D.
SUBJECT: Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al.
Enclosed please find the following documents:
(1) SUMMONS
IN A CIVIL CASE
(2) DOCUMENTS
FROM CLERK OF COURT
(3) NOTICE OF COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION, BY AFFIDAVIT
(5) FIRST SUPPLEMENT
(7) THIRD SUPPLEMENT
The amount of documentary evidence in this case is so voluminous, the cost of photocopying and serving the entire set upon all defendants became quite prohibitive.
We initially considered serving documentary evidence on a CD-ROM, but technological barriers made this option either impossible or technically burdensome.
Instead, we have uploaded all electronic exhibits to the Internet, for your convenience. The Initial COMPLAINT, three SUPPLEMENTS, and the NOTICE OF COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION are listed in the Table of Contents at Internet URL:
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/aol/index.htm
Please note that we have changed our Internet
domain name from supremelaw.com to supremelaw.org.
We will do our best to maintain this website with identical copies of all pleadings and related exhibits filed in this case.
Also, on August 1, 2001 A.D., the Clerk of Court re-assigned a new docket number for this case:
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Author, Damaged Party and Plaintiff
